Broadcasting regulation and the public-private dichotomy by Dawes, S
  
 
 
BROADCASTING REGULATION AND 
THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DICHOTOMY 
 
 
SIMON DAWES 
 
 
Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of PhD 
 
Nottingham Trent University 
December 2013 
 
 
  
  
 
 
DECLARATION 
This work is the intellectual property of the author. You may copy up to 5% of this 
work for private study, or personal, non-commercial research. Any re-use of the 
information contained within this document should be fully referenced, quoting the 
author, title, university, degree level and pagination. Queries or requests for any 
other use, or if a more substantial copy is required, should be directed to the owner of 
the Intellectual Property Rights.  
 
 
  
  
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... i 
Acknowledgments ...................................................................................................................ii 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1 
Part One: Methodology ........................................................................................................ 25 
1.1 CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS ......................................................................... 26 
1.2 GENEALOGY .......................................................................................................... 31 
1.3 A METHODOLOGICAL BRIDGE ............................................................................. 37 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 42 
Part Two: Broadcasting Regulation .................................................................................... 43 
2.1 EARLY APPROACHES TO BROADCASTING REGULATION ......................................... 45 
2.2 CITIZENSHIP, THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND NEOLIBERALISM ....................................... 52 
2.3 PUBLIC SERVICE, PUBLIC INTEREST AND CONSUMER CHOICE ............................... 63 
2.4 DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS OF CITIZENS AND CONSUMERS ............................... 72 
2.5 CRITIQUES OF THE DOMINANT APPROACH ............................................................... 78 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 84 
Part Three: The Public/Private Dichotomy ........................................................................ 87 
3.1 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ................................................................................................. 88 
3.2 PRESS FREEDOM, PUBLIC OPINION AND PUBLICITY – THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM 
(KANT, HEGEL, MARX AND MILL) .................................................................................. 92 
3.3 MASS SOCIETY, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PRIVATE CITIZEN (SCHMITT, 
LIPMANN, SCHUMPETER AND DEWEY) ........................................................................... 98 
3.4 PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND THE RISE OF THE SOCIAL – THE LOSS OF DISTINCTIONS 
AND BORDERS (ARENDT) ............................................................................................... 102 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 109 
Part Four: Habermas and the Bourgeois Public Sphere .................................................. 111 
4.1 THE CONCEPT ........................................................................................................... 112 
4.2 HISTORY .................................................................................................................... 115 
4.3 THE LIBERAL MODEL OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE ....................................................... 117 
4.4 THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN THE SOCIAL WELFARE STATE MASS DEMOCRACY ........ 124 
  
4.5 FROM RATIONAL-CRITICAL DEBATE TO NON-PUBLIC OPINION .......................... 131 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 136 
Part Five:  A ‘Dialectical Alliance’: Critiques, Developments and Divergences ............. 140 
5.1 HABERMAS’S DISCOURSE MODEL – BEYOND DICHOTOMOUS THINKING? .......... 141 
5.2 EXCLUSIONS AND OMISSIONS – A HISTORICAL REVISION .................................... 146 
5.3 LEGITIMACY AND EFFICACY – FROM BOURGEOIS PUBLIC SPHERE TO 
TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERES ............................................................................... 150 
5.4 ‘ON THE SOCIAL QUESTION’ – INCLUSION, PARTICIPATION AND RATIONALITY 157 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 162 
Part Six: Citizenship and Consumption ............................................................................ 165 
6.1 CITIZENSHIP .............................................................................................................. 166 
6.2.1 CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL RIGHTS – TH MARSHALL AND HIS CRITICS......... 166 
6.2.2 CITIZENSHIP, THE MARKET AND THE WELFARE STATE ................................. 170 
6.2.3 FROM CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS TO CITIZENSHIP AS PRACTICE AND PROCESS ... 172 
6.2.4 CITIZENSHIP AND CULTURE .............................................................................. 175 
6.2 CONSUMPTION .......................................................................................................... 178 
6.3.1 THE CRITIQUE OF CONSUMERISM .................................................................... 179 
6.3.2 CONSUMPTION AS PRACTICE AND PROCESS .................................................... 182 
6.3.3 PROBLEMATISING PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND POLITICS ................... 184 
6.3.4 CONSUMPTION, CRITIQUE AND MORALISM ..................................................... 188 
6.3 INDIVIDUALISATION – BEYOND THE CITIZEN-CONSUMER DICHOTOMY? ............ 190 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 196 
Part Seven: Neoliberalism – Ideological and Governmental Approaches ...................... 199 
7.1 IDEOLOGY, HEGEMONY AND THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC CRITIQUE OF 
NEOLIBERALISM ............................................................................................................. 200 
7.2 GOVERNMENTALITY AND THE GENEALOGY OF NEOLIBERALISM ......................... 206 
7.3 TOWARDS A PROCESSUAL APPROACH TO NEOLIBERALISM? ................................ 218 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 234 
Part Eight: Towards a Genealogy of PSB .......................................................................... 236 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 256 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 258 
Bibliography ....................................................................................................................... 270 
 
 
i 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This thesis is a theoretical and methodological engagement with the extent to which 
the public-private dichotomy is an appropriate and effective framework within which 
to critically approach the history of broadcasting regulation in the UK. The critical 
literature on the subject tends to present a narrative of decline, from an ethos of 
public service and citizenship, which is presumed to have enabled the public sphere, 
to a neoliberal faith in market logic and consumer choice, which is accused of 
undermining it. Much of this discussion is theoretically weakened, however, by a 
lack of engagement with the relevant literatures, and by the reduction to unitary 
oppositions between commonsensical terms of what are actually protean distinctions 
between contentious concepts. Taking this claim as its starting point, the thesis will 
attempt to clarify the ambiguity of the key concepts of debate on broadcasting 
regulation, recognising the need for the complexification of distinctions rather than 
their simplification or abandonment. Although not arguing that the assumptions or 
conclusions in the dominant literature are incorrect, the aim of the thesis is 
nevertheless to move away from an approach that identifies public service 
broadcasting (PSB) with political citizenship and the public sphere, and to explore 
instead the ways in which the distinction between public and private, and that 
between citizens and consumers, has always been a negotiated and unresolved 
process. Consequently, critical engagement with theoretical debates on citizenship, 
consumption, neoliberalism and the public sphere, as well as with methodological 
debates on the critical and genealogical approaches to discourse analysis, will be 
undertaken as a first step towards a more theoretically-informed (and more critical) 
genealogical account of the history of broadcasting regulation.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Background to the Thesis 
 
The original aim of this research project was to continue the work conducted for my 
earlier MA Dissertation (see Dawes, 2007 for a summary). This had involved a 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of contemporary regulatory documents in 
comparison with an earlier committee report, and had demonstrated the strategic 
manipulation of discourse to privilege consumer- over citizen- interests, and 
corporate logic over a concern for civic culture, as well as a diachronic shift from a 
public service ethos to a consumer choice perspective. The work of Norman 
Fairclough (on CDA) and Nicholas Garnham and Graham Murdock (on broadcasting 
regulation) underpinned this early work, which drew in particular on Garnham’s 
(1990) and Murdock’s (1999) distinctions between citizens and consumers, and 
followed their lead in identifying PSB with a political citizenry and civic culture, on 
the one hand, and unregulated commercial broadcasting with passive consumption 
and corporate power, on the other. Reference was also made to Habermas’s (1989) 
concept of the public sphere to rationalise the democratic importance of PSB, and 
shifts towards deregulation (or reregulation) and privatisation were expressed as 
symptomatic of neoliberalisation and the influence of corporate power on the 
regulatory process.  
 
Intending originally to broaden the scope of this research and to further the 
contribution to policy and regulatory debate, the PhD began as a more extensive 
literature review of the contemporary critique of broadcasting regulation made by 
media and communication studies scholars, as well as a more elaborate 
methodological review of CDA, to support what was principally to be a large-scale 
empirical (quantitative as well as qualitative) research project into the shifts in 
broadcasting regulatory discourse. However, initial work towards such a thesis 
revealed a tendency in much of the literature towards a superficial treatment of key 
concepts, prompting me to question more reflexively the concepts drawn upon to 
make sense of this discursive history. This recognition led me to contextualise and 
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historicise the critical approach to broadcasting regulation itself, to consider 
alternative approaches to broadcasting regulation, discourse analysis and the 
theoretical concepts used, and to engage with debates beyond the realm of media and 
communication studies and UK-centric debates on the role of the BBC.  
 
As the object of study shifted to a focus on the academic literature as much as the 
regulatory source material, the scope of the thesis became much more ambitious. 
Taking in the history of theoretical approaches to broadcasting, the literatures on the 
public sphere, public opinion, press freedom, citizenship, consumption and 
neoliberalism, as well as methodological literatures on CDA and Foucauldian 
genealogy, two problems arose: while the breadth of theoretical material became 
potentially unwieldy, there was increasingly less time and space for an empirical case 
study. However, by limiting the theoretical expansion to the rationalisation of the 
public-private dichotomy in liberal (and neoliberal) and republican traditions, and 
therefore in terms of governmental rationality (instead of ideology or class interests), 
and sidestepping the more explicitly political-economic or Marxist critiques of 
broadcasting regulation, the scope was made coherent and manageable, while the 
role of an empirical case study was recast in the more minor role of a suggestive 
summary of the research findings. 
 
The thesis was thus converted from what would have been an empirical research 
project on the discursive history of broadcasting regulation (and a contribution to its 
scholarly critique), into what became a theoretical-methodological critique of that 
very scholarly research into broadcasting regulation and its discursive history. 
Consequently, the structure of the thesis was also dramatically altered, from the 
conventional literature review-methodological review-case study-discussion format 
of the typical empirical research thesis (in which little space is given to enable a 
thorough and critical engagement with theoretical debates outside of the immediate 
interests of the researcher), to the more flexible sequence of the theoretical thesis, 
whereby thematic debates form the core. In this case, the narrative of the thesis 
builds from theoretical debates on the extent to which notions of public and private, 
and categories of citizen and consumer, can be contrasted, into a more explicitly 
methodological concern with the effectiveness of certain approaches at capturing 
their historical nuance. Consequently, the thesis closes with an attempt at theoretical 
3 
 
rapprochement between broadly ideological and governmental approaches, a more 
practical methodological rapprochement between critical and genealogical 
approaches to discourse analysis, and a suggestive concrete example of what such an 
empirical case study might look like as the final chapter.  
 
Because an engagement with such historical and theoretical nuance and complexity 
potentially undermines the often simplistic appropriation of such concepts for 
political critique, however, the extent to which such an engagement could be 
undertaken without abandoning critique or ignoring the role of (corporate) power 
became a central concern towards the final stages of the research project. Debates 
within each of the literatures critically acknowledged, in their own ways, the 
importance of (and difficulty in) undertaking such an enterprise, and Foucault’s 
presence is a recurring feature throughout the chapters of the thesis, to the extent that 
the Foucauldian approach becomes increasingly central, not as a simple alternative to 
a more obviously critical approach, but as a way of bridging theoretical engagement 
with political critique, and performing a historical analysis that ultimately 
strengthens critique by underpinning it with conceptual precision and historical 
location.  
 
This thesis, therefore, didn’t begin with a particularly Foucauldian perspective. 
Rather, it began as an inquiry into the extent to which the dominant approach/es in 
the critical literature on broadcasting regulation were appropriate and effective, 
before necessarily turning into a search for a way of making them more so. Taking as 
its conceptual starting point the contemporary critical literature on citizen and 
consumer interests in the discourse of Ofcom, beginning with my own early attempts 
(Dawes, 2007) and those of Lunt & Livingstone (2012), in particular, the thesis 
diagnosed the prevalence of citizenship, consumption, neoliberalism and the public 
sphere as recurring features of the effort to interpret research findings. These key 
concepts were then traced back to their emergence in the critical literature, and to the 
point at which, in the context of Thatcherite reforms, consensus appears to have been 
reached as to the most appropriate way to define and distinguish between them. 
Despite being used in multiple (and not necessarily compatible) ways, the existence 
of a particular approach that defends PSB against deregulation, that praises the 
advantages of the former in terms of citizenship and/or its importance for the public 
4 
 
sphere, that denigrates the latter for reducing the public to consumers and damaging 
the public sphere, and that draws upon the concept of neoliberalism to account for 
the shift from a public service ethos to a rationale of consumer choice, has been well 
documented (Collins, 1993; Dahlgren, 2000; Flew, 2006); it has also been the subject 
of critique by those arguing for the abandonment of the link between PSB, 
citizenship and the public sphere, and an embrace of commercialism and the 
imbrication of citizenship and consumption instead (Jacka, 2003; Nolan, 2006).  
 
By situating this ‘paradigm’ (which I see as including the alternative approach, 
which relies on similar terms of debate and exists largely in dialogue with the more 
‘critical’ variant) within a historical account of theoretical approaches to 
broadcasting, the extent to which this perspective has achieved a level of dominance 
can also be appreciated. As others have noted, in the context of Thatcherite reforms 
and the threat to the BBC, many left-leaning media scholars in the UK were ‘tiring of 
Frankfurt School-style critique and seeking, instead, to advocate a positive vision for 
public institutions’ (Lunt & Livingstone, 2013: 90), and the association of PSB with 
the public sphere armed proponents with the emancipatory arguments they needed to 
challenge those of the privatising marketeers (Collins, 1993: 246-247). The move 
away from both Marxist and free press approaches to broadcasting regulation 
(despite both continuing to be influential) was advocated even by those who were 
sceptical of the public sphere as an appropriate alternative (Curran, 1991; Thompson, 
1995), so the embrace of public sphere theory as a means to transcend the 
state/market dichotomy (Garnham, 1986) can be placed in the context of the longer-
term convergence of critical and liberal-pluralist approaches, and the ‘rise to 
dominance’ in the 1980s of a broadly intermediate perspective (Curran, 1990: 144). 
The journal Media, Culture & Society has been a forum for many of the scholars 
adopting this intermediary position, and, as Lunt and Livingstone have demonstrated, 
although there were only 23 references to the ‘public sphere’ in its pages throughout 
the 1980s, and only 58 in the 1990s, there were 247 in the 2000s (Lunt & 
Livingstone, 2013: 87), suggesting a paradigmatic spread of the framing of critique 
in terms of public sphere theory and its associated concepts (whether linking it with 
PSB or not), rather than in terms of the more traditional Marxist or free press 
categories.   
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Having traced the history of this approach, the thesis proceeds to explore the key 
concepts more closely, to offer a more informed, reflexive and critical engagement 
with the ways in which they can be applied to an understanding of broadcasting 
regulation. The Arendtian attempt to ‘stretch and compact distinctions’ between 
these concepts, and the Foucauldian ‘dismantling’ of the traditional approach to 
applying them, is a means of ‘flushing out assumptions’ and enriching and 
strengthening critique, rather than undermining or abandoning it. Concomitant to the 
work presented in this particular thesis, for instance, I have also undertaken a similar 
approach to the history of press regulation and the legal approach to balancing 
privacy with press freedom in the UK (Dawes, 2014). The critical thrust of that 
research is perhaps more clearly evident, as what was dismantled was the media law 
perspective that ignores issues of economic ownership, and what was flushed out 
were the assumptions behind the liberal theories of press freedom and privacy that 
saw them in terms of freedom from the state, rather than freedom from both the state 
and the market. Once market power and economic ownership are acknowledged, the 
News International phone-hacking scandal and the power and influence of Rupert 
Murdoch can more effectively be critiqued within the dominant framework of 
debate. However, in the case of broadcasting regulation, the contemporary dominant 
approach is one that is already a compromise of conventional left and liberal-pluralist 
approaches; a media organisation perspective (dominant in regulatory discourse) 
already addresses the issue of economic ownership, and both Marxist and public 
sphere perspectives have already roundly critiqued the assumptions behind the free 
press rhetoric of the traditional liberal-pluralist approach.  
 
The task, therefore, is a more delicate and less obviously critical one, but one that, I 
would argue, is all the more necessary for it. For despite its many strengths, through 
a focus on empirical research and relatively limited theoretical debate, the strand of 
the dominant approach that draws on the various concepts discussed in this thesis for 
the defence of PSB risks merely preaching to the converted, while regulators and 
policymakers, academics of the opposite opinion, and specialists of those concepts 
from other disciplines (not to mention the media itself), often simply dismiss the 
whole approach. A theoretical engagement, however, that privileges critical 
engagement with the concepts it deplores, as well as those it favours, with its critics 
as well as like-minded colleagues, and with its own weaknesses and shortcomings, 
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promises to do much more than preach to the converted. Moreover, rather than 
merely adding more of the same to the contemporary literature, the theoretical and 
methodological approach in this thesis offers not only a more solid (and original) 
contribution to academic debate, but it also encourages engagement with the 
dominant literature from those who would otherwise ignore it.  
 
 
 
Aims and Objectives 
 
In the light of the above, this thesis can be regarded as a theoretical and 
methodological engagement with the extent to which the public-private dichotomy is 
an appropriate and effective framework within which to critically approach the 
history of broadcasting regulation in the UK. This has entailed not only a close 
examination of the critical literature on broadcasting regulation and detailed analyses 
of regulatory documents themselves, but also an engagement with the wider 
literatures on citizenship, consumption, neoliberalism and the public sphere (as well 
as associated concepts, such as press freedom and public opinion). A Foucauldian 
approach has been applied throughout this thesis to historically situate the discourses 
drawn upon in the various approaches to each of the key concepts of debate, and to 
identify those discourses drawn upon and ignored by critics of broadcasting 
regulation in the UK. By supplementing the critical approach to discourse analysis 
with the Foucauldian archaeological approach in the analyses of regulatory texts, the 
thesis is able to link the analyses to the theoretical literature and provide a 
genealogical account of broadcasting’s regulatory history. As well as providing a 
critique of power in broadcasting regulation, therefore, the thesis is also able to 
provide a reflexive critique of knowledge in the traditional approach to the critique of 
power.  
 
The research began as a critique of the prevalence of the term ‘consumer’ in the 
contemporary discourse of broadcasting regulation in the UK, and thus an 
engagement with the literature that has diagnosed and critiqued a shift in the way in 
which the public are perceived in this context, from citizens to consumers, where the 
former are assumed to be the active members of a political community and the latter 
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the self-interested individuals of civil society. Concomitant with this shift in 
emphasis from citizenship to consumerism, this literature argues, is a shift from an 
ethos of public service to a logic of consumer choice, whereby the former is deemed 
by scholars to be in the public interest, establishing the conditions and supporting the 
aims of the public sphere, while the latter is revealed to be nothing more than a mask 
for private interests, whereby a neoliberal faith in market logic undermines those 
conditions and is detrimental to those aims.  
 
Closer analysis of contemporary documents suggested, however, that the reality was 
somewhat more complex, and that such texts featured discursive elements that 
couldn’t so easily be captured by a strictly dichotomous distinction between 
citizenship and consumerism. Expanding the scope of the research to survey the 
history of broadcasting regulation in the UK proved even more problematic, as 
analysis of early documents revealed a similarly complex discursive terrain, and even 
evidence of certain traits more typically associated with the contemporary influence 
of neoliberal ideology. As well as casting doubt on the assumption of a clear shift 
from public to private values, and the fruitfulness of a dualistic distinction between 
public and private interests, this also suggested that the critique of neoliberalism 
needed to be more analytically distinguished from the earlier critique of liberalism. 
Finally, critical engagement with the wider literatures (beyond broadcasting 
scholarship and even beyond the disciplines of communication, cultural and media 
studies) on the concepts of the public sphere, citizenship, consumption and 
neoliberalism further necessitated a qualification of the distinctions amongst them, of 
the assumption of linear shifts, and of the conflation of potentially contradictory 
concepts (such as social citizenship and the public sphere, for example).  
 
Much of the literature on UK broadcasting regulation, this thesis has found, is 
theoretically weakened by a lack of careful consideration of the meanings and 
implications of the concepts employed, reducing what are actually protean 
distinctions between contentious concepts to unitary oppositions of commonsensical 
terms. Where discussion is more conceptually self-reflective, one reading of a 
distinction is often privileged over others, with little evidence of awareness of the 
wider range of alternative frameworks in which it is employed. Although this can be 
simply a matter of a variation in terminology, a particular reading of the public-
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private or citizen-consumer dichotomies often reflects deeper theoretical or 
ideological commitments or assumptions that can have normative implications for 
the arguments they are drawn on to support (Weintraub, 1997).  
 
Taking this claim as its starting point, the thesis will attempt to clarify the ambiguity 
of the key concepts of debate on broadcasting regulation, acknowledging the 
difficulties involved in working within a dichotomous framework, and recognising 
the need for the complexification of distinctions rather than their simplification, 
without entailing the abandonment of the concepts themselves. Further, it will argue 
that a protean appreciation of the public-private dichotomy is not just superior to the 
unitary reading on which broadcasting scholars are dependent, but all the more 
necessary in the contemporary era of neoliberalism, as it can help explain the ways in 
which public and private interests, and citizen and consumer identities, are currently 
being reconfigured, and in which they have been perpetually reconfigured over time. 
Although not arguing that the assumptions or conclusions in the dominant literature 
are incorrect, the aim of the thesis is nevertheless to move away from an approach 
that appropriates citizenship and the public sphere for a conceptual defence of public 
service broadcasting (PSB), and to explore instead the ways in which the distinction 
between public and private has always been a negotiated and unresolved process.  
 
The shadow of Foucault has loomed over much of the wider literature surveyed, and 
his approach has played a significant role in both the theoretical and the 
methodological development of the research behind this thesis. While his recently 
translated lectures on liberalism (Foucault, 2009) and neoliberalism (Foucault, 2010) 
have been particularly useful for an enriched understanding of neoliberalism, as well 
as contributing to a more critical engagement with Habermas’s history of the liberal 
public sphere (Habermas, 1989), a general Foucauldian approach has also influenced, 
either implicitly or explicitly, much of the critical scholarship on citizenship, 
consumption and the public sphere. Further, his genealogical approach to teasing out 
governmental problematisations has proven essential for reframing the critical or 
ideological approach that has been dominant in broadcasting scholarship since the 
1980s.  
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A counter tendency has, of course, existed, whereby the propensity of critical 
scholars to defend PSB against privatisation or marketisation, and to frame their 
defence by reference to the concepts of citizenship and the public sphere in contrast 
to those of consumerism and neoliberalism, has been dismissed in favour of an 
engagement with the imbrication of cultural citizenship and consumption, and a 
consideration of the benefits brought to the public by commercialisation (Hartley, 
1999). While this thesis shares this interest in sceptically addressing the extent to 
which citizenship and consumption can be contrasted, and to which the public sphere 
can be appropriated for the defence of PSB, however, it argues that this approach (as 
discussed in Part Two) is equally partial in its engagement with only some 
perspectives on some concepts, and much more problematic, relativistic, and 
superficial in its treatment of those theories deployed (or dismissed). The critique of 
the association of PSB with citizenship and the public sphere, for instance, fails to 
offer a convincingly more substantiated interpretation of those concepts, so that they 
are equally guilty of partial and selective readings of theoretical debates, treating 
them as dismissively as they treat their supposed conflation. Likewise, the most 
explicitly Foucauldian scholarship (on consumption and neoliberalism, especially) 
runs the risk of relativism in privileging exceptions, differences and discontinuity 
over structural (and potentially hegemonic) similarity. Sensitivity to the theoretical 
arguments of both perspectives, and an attempt to bridge methodological approaches 
to actually existing practices can avoid both the elitist, moralist and partisan 
tendencies of the critical approach, as well as the relativist and agnostic tendencies of 
the more Foucault-inspired approach. (These debates are addressed in Parts Five and 
Six, while an attempt at methodological compromise is made in Part Eight.) 
 
A critique of these approaches is, however, largely beyond the remit of this thesis, 
which is only able to deal with them relatively fleetingly. Nor is the purpose of this 
thesis to provide a coherent alternative account of the history of broadcasting 
regulation, or to dramatically uncover something from the archive that has hitherto 
remained hidden or neglected. This thesis will make no attempt, furthermore, to cast 
judgment on whether or not a particular change in policy approach or regulatory 
mechanism is a good or a bad thing for democracy, or even to predict or recommend 
future changes in regulation or policy. Its focus is more limited and its scope more 
modest than this. Instead, its theoretical and methodological aim is to show what is 
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missing from the dominant approach, and to ‘flush out assumptions’ (Kendall and 
Wickham, 1999: 30) typically made by broadcasting scholars, so as to enrich and 
strengthen critique. Sharing Arendt's view of history as an ‘untidy heterogeneity’ 
(Baehr, 2003; xxxii), this thesis seeks to ‘stretch distinctions’ between generally 
familiar terms, such as ‘public service’ and ‘public interest’; compact generally 
dissimilar terms, such as ‘citizen’ and ‘consumer’; and ‘dismantle’ the traditional 
approach to broadcasting regulation by revealing the ‘dissension of things’, rather 
than a temporal contrast between original meanings and contemporary ideological 
masks (Foucault, 1977: 140-142). Rather than challenging the arguments made in 
favour of PSB, or dismissing the dependency on certain concepts and theories, 
therefore, this thesis argues for greater and even more ‘critical’ engagement with 
them if the defence of the public sphere is to be efficacious. Such critical theoretical 
engagement demonstrates how rich the citizen-consumer and public-private 
dichotomies are as a source of theoretical debate, and how indispensable an 
appreciation of that richness is for a critique of the history of broadcasting regulation.  
 
Although some critics of neoliberalisation have acknowledged that potentially 
arbitrary distinctions between citizens and consumers may actually obfuscate new 
spaces and practices of public connection (Couldry, 2004), and thus frustrate the 
attempt to defend the public sphere, the call for a more nuanced approach to 
citizenship and consumption has thus far been limited to accounts of media reception 
and practice, and a closer engagement with the public’s own understandings of 
citizenship, consumption and media use, rather than the deployment of the terms in 
regulatory documents. While these accounts share with this thesis a similar concern 
to avoid presumptuous distinctions, however, they neglect a more thorough 
engagement with theory and the wider literatures on these concepts, and do little to 
develop a more theoretically robust account of the history of broadcasting regulation; 
consequently, they not only remain on the same conceptual terrain they set out to 
transcend, but often commit yet more category errors (see Part Two). Consequently, 
this thesis approaches the public-private dichotomy historically and, more 
specifically, genealogically. As more than just a methodology, genealogy is ‘a means 
of distancing oneself from certain conceptual tools which have a powerful hold over 
critical thought’ (Rose, 1987: 61). Although the critique of the public-private 
dichotomy is ‘frequently revealing and insightful’, its insistence on conceptualising 
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the dichotomy as ideology and on demonstrating its falsity (Rose, 1987: 66) 
overstates the privatisation and consumerisation of the public sphere. Further, it 
suggests not only a previous golden age of broadcasting regulation, but that the 
normative criterion of ‘citizenship’ is somehow the true original state of broadcasting 
regulation, whereas ‘consumption’ is a relatively contemporary and false usurper, 
tied to ideological manipulation and particular class interests. The task of this thesis 
is therefore to ‘fragment, disturb and disrupt’ (Rose, 1987: 66) the conceptual tools 
of the critical approach to broadcasting regulation; not to prove them inadequate or 
wrong, but to identify what they miss and to qualify their deployment. 
 
It is not the intention of this thesis, therefore, to argue that it is incorrect to label 
contemporary regulatory trends as neoliberal; or that there has not been a shift in the 
construction of the public from citizens to consumers, or in ethos from public service 
to market competition and consumer choice; nor that it is inappropriate or futile to 
evaluate media regulation in terms of its effect upon the public sphere. Rather, it is 
the contention of this thesis that such terms require qualification; that the distinctions 
between them be treated as protean and mobile, rather than unitary and static; and 
that engagement with the theoretical debates around each concept be more critically 
engaged with than at present. It is not a case, therefore, of arguing that neoliberalism 
is an inadequate term and that a more appropriate alternative be used instead, but that 
what is meant by the term neoliberal needs to be explicitly stated, and that the extent 
to which the features described can be explained in terms of that particular use of 
neoliberalism, in contrast to other understandings of that term (or any other term), be 
substantiated. Neither is it a question of privileging consumption over citizenship, 
but of engaging critically with what is meant by each term, and the extent to which 
they overlap and complement, as much as they compete with or undermine, one 
another. Nor is it a matter of demonstrating the fallacy of associating PSB with the 
public sphere, but rather an insistence that the extent to which both PSB and the 
market simultaneously enable and undermine the public sphere be critically 
addressed. This would make more visible the specific points of conflicts or 
agreements, the agonistic arena in which negotiations take place, and the power 
relations that shape specific policies and practices. Ultimately, the extent to which 
neoliberalism and the public sphere can be unproblematically contrasted, and the 
potential of neoliberal techniques to contribute towards citizenship and the public 
12 
 
sphere, and even undermine a neoliberal hegemonic project, rather than merely serve 
powerful corporate interests, must also therefore be considered. 
 
Those wary of such an approach would maintain that an emphasis on PSB, 
citizenship and the public sphere remains politically necessary (Freedman, 2008; see 
also Hall, 2011), and that an acknowledgment of conceptual contradictions and 
ambiguity, or of theoretical debate or disagreement, risks agnosticism towards power 
relations as well as undermining the political defence of the public sphere. But while 
this thesis is primarily theoretical, it contends that a theoretically more nuanced 
critique of broadcasting regulation also contributes to a more convincing political 
critique of corporate power, private interests and market influence, as well as to an 
elaboration of a public sphere that is more efficacious for its critical acknowledgment 
of both the contradictions of PSB and the complexity of neoliberal thought (Dawes, 
forthcoming).  
 
Rather than being uncritical, therefore, this thesis aims to refuse moralism and 
actually deepen critique (cf. Slater in Schor et al, 2010: 281-282), by acting as a 
riposte to those who have dismissed the critical approach, as much as a ‘critique of 
critique’ itself. It aims not to supplant but to supplement an ideological approach 
with a governmental one, bridging the gap between contrasting approaches so as to 
avoid the former’s inclination towards elitism and the latter’s towards agnosticism 
(for an elaboration of this in the context of the critical sociologies of consumption 
and neoliberalism, see Parts Five and Six, respectively). In drawing on multiple 
perspectives and engaging critically with the theoretical debates around each of the 
key concepts of the traditional approach, it recognises that by constituting 
consumption, privatisation and neoliberalisation as social problems, the critique of 
broadcasting regulation is reduced to a narrow and singular analytical framework, in 
which the social and political location of the researchers becomes unreflexive, 
unchallenged and moralistic. As such, the political impulse to critique power actually 
becomes the opposite of politics, so that the only questions worth asking are those 
that would occur to a certain type of researcher, whether they are right to ask them or 
not.  
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Its aim, therefore, is to theoretically and methodologically engage with the extent to 
which the public-private dichotomy is an appropriate and effective framework within 
which to critically approach the history of broadcasting regulation in the UK. Its 
objectives are to problematise the ways in which the key concepts of debate (public 
sphere, citizenship, consumption and neoliberalism) are drawn upon within that 
critique. By adopting a Foucauldian genealogical approach, the critical-
archaeological analysis of regulatory texts is considered in light of the governmental 
problematisation of the public-private dichotomy in the critique of broadcasting 
regulation. Taken together, the governmental problematisations in the theoretical 
chapters of this thesis and the archaeological analyses in the case study material 
contribute towards a genealogy that aims to balance a nuanced historical account of 
discursive change with a critique of contemporary regulation; providing a history of 
the present for the purpose of providing a critique of the present.  
 
Although this thesis emphasises that public-private and citizen-consumer distinctions 
are protean and processual, it maintains that sensitivity to such complexity and 
nuance promotes rather than hinders the task of critique. It is ultimately hoped, 
therefore, that although its contribution to the literature on broadcasting regulation is 
not as was expected at the outset of this research project, its contribution is 
potentially greater for it.  
 
 
 
 
Methodological Challenges 
 
This theoretical-methodological research project began as a simple expansion of the 
scope of inquiry into those debates taking place within the wider literatures and other 
disciplines. In exploring the various literatures, however, it has been clear that a 
variably implicit or explicit Foucauldian approach has been drawn upon by many of 
those offering critical accounts of the historical imbrication of citizenship and 
consumption, or counter-histories of the public sphere or neoliberalism. The 
intellectual vigour and engagement with the issue of power of many of these 
contributions is a far cry, however, from the literature that (citing Foucault as an 
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influence) celebrates commercialism and consumption in the context of broadcasting 
regulation (Fiske, 1987; Hartley, 1999). The suspicion with which the ‘ambivalent 
legacy’ (Curran, 1990: 140) of Foucault in this domain is treated by ‘critical’ 
scholars is perhaps therefore understandable, but such scholars are representative 
neither of Foucault nor a Foucauldian approach, which should by no means be 
dismissed as somehow ignoring power. Indeed, as the opening methodological 
chapter to this thesis attempts to illustrate, critical and Foucauldian approaches have 
as much in common as they have that sets them apart.  
 
While the critical tradition is more reflexive than the early positivist tradition of 
social scientific research, seeing social reality as a set of relations hidden behind the 
biases of an ideological veil that needs to be removed by the theorist to enable 
critique (Delanty & Strydom, 2003: 1-6; Martin & McIntyre, 1994: xxvii), the 
Foucauldian approach is still more reflexive in that it understands social reality as a 
set of discourses that can be understood only from within, and which necessitates the 
situating of disciplinary knowledge within its larger social context (Delanty & 
Strydom, 2003: 3-6). This approach argues that the critical tradition’s assumption 
that it can stand outside of the power relations it identifies in social reality entails an 
unacknowledged complicity in such power relations (Conway, 1999: 82). As with 
every approach (including the Foucauldian one), the critical tradition ‘stubbornly 
defends’ its own hard core, auxiliary hypotheses and ‘problem-solving machinery’ 
(Lakatos, 1978: 4-5), and would not accept the Foucauldian critique. However, each 
tradition also has their margins, and it is at the margins of critical and Foucauldian 
traditions that this thesis seeks to engage at both theoretical and methodological 
levels. 
 
While materially realised observational processes are always conceptually 
interpreted, and the meaning of concepts depends on the way they structure 
observational processes and abstract from them (Radder, 2006: 1), ‘personal value 
judgments’ can lead to ‘conceptual confusion’ in social scientific research (Weber, 
2014: 7), and much of the literature surveyed in Part Two is either unreflexive about 
its use of concepts, or limited to a particular perspective that often ignores even the 
existence of alterantive frameworks (Weintraub, 1997).  
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This literature suggests that the ‘true’ essence of historical reality can be portrayed in 
particular readings of certain theoretical concepts (such as the citizen and the 
consumer), by the forcing of history into these constructs (such as the elaboration of 
PSB in terms of the public sphere), as well as the hypostasisation of ideas (such as 
neoliberal ideology) as real forces, which operate behind the passage of events and 
which work themselves out in history (Weber, 2014: 51). The Foucauldian reading of 
such arguments as discourses, and the discursive and historical account of the public-
private dichotomy (such as that performed by Nikolas Rose), however, offer an 
alternative framework to the critical and liberal traditions drawn upon by those who 
make most use of these concepts in the context of broadcasting regulation. 
 
Although the critical approach is successful at empirically discerning and analysing 
these concepts as ‘elements of meaningful human conduct’ (Weber, 2014: 65), the 
validity of the concepts themselves cannot be deduced from empirical data, which is 
always related to the concepts which alone make the data worth knowing (Weber, 
2014: 65). While critical discourse analyses, for example, are therefore effective at 
demonstrating the shift from the privileging of citizenship to the privileging of 
consumption, the proof of the validity of the concepts (of both citizenship and 
consumption) themselves is actually ‘empirically impossible’ (Weber, 2014: 65), and 
unreflexively presumed by the traditional approach. This thesis, therefore, aims to 
redress the balance between empirical and theoretical research by working towards a 
more reflexive account of the history of broadcasting regulation.  
 
If a distinction can be made between ‘subject matter specialists’ and ‘interpretative 
specialists’ (Vischer in Weber, 2014: 65), one could argue that broadcasting 
regulation tends to be critiqued by the former, privileging the analysis of legal 
documents and the production of statistics and questionnaires, while being 
insensitive to the ‘refinement of new ideas’. On the other hand, while the alternative 
approach is more sensitive to intellectual subtleties, its taste for theoretical nuance 
may dull that for facts. Both share the aim to understand the cultural significance of 
historical developments (Weber, 2014: 65), however, and the approach adopted in 
this thesis aims to reconcile such approaches by supplementing (rather than 
supplanting) the former with the latter, using a Foucauldian approach to strengthen 
the critique of the history of broadcasting regulation.  
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Any social scientific research, once it is oriented towards a given subject matter 
through particular settings of problems and the establishment of its own 
methodological principles (Weber, 2014: 66), will tend to regard the analysis of data 
as an end in itself, and to be relatively unreflexive about the validity of the concepts 
it uses. While the critique of broadcasting regulation has been effective at critiquing 
a particular aspect of broadcasting history from a particular perspective, this thesis 
argues that it too has tended to privilege the analysis of data (and the critique of the 
shift from citizen to consumer) over a reflexive engagement with citizenship and 
consumption themselves. Although for a time ‘it is well that should be so’ (Weber, 
2014: 66), ‘there comes a moment when the atmosphere changes’ and the 
‘significance of the unreflectively utilised viewpoints becomes uncertain’ (Weber, 
2014: 66). At this point, it becomes necessary to engage more with theory than with 
empirical research; to ‘view the streams of events from the heights of thought’ 
(Weber, 2014: 66). 
 
While this research project has become primarily theoretical, aiming to correct the 
tendency in the dominant literature to over-rely on empirical case studies at the 
expense of robust theoretical engagement, it has ultimately endeavoured to apply 
such theoretical engagement to the recasting of the dominant methodological 
approach to the critique of broadcasting regulatory discourse along more 
Foucauldian lines. It is hoped that an appreciation of theoretical nuance and 
complexity, therefore, neither ignores questions of power, nor undermines the 
critique of power, but that it actually enables a more thorough form of empirically-
supported critique.   
 
The methodological contention of this thesis is that a rapprochement between critical 
and Foucauldian forms of discourse analysis leads to an approach that is able to 
balance a long-term and nuanced historical excavation with a more urgent form of 
social critique, and the final chapter of this thesis is an attempt to put that 
rapprochement into practice.   
 
Nevertheless, the decision to write a thesis with such a heavy emphasis on theory 
brings with it its own set of methodological challenges. Firstly, if research projects 
17 
 
that privilege empirical studies over theoretical engagement risk producing research 
that contributes only towards a particular perspective and already established 
theoretical arguments, the contrary can be said of theoretical research projects: that 
their privileging of theory and interdisciplinary debates over empirical research risks 
providing only a superficial account of the object of study. The decision to not only 
include a case study, however, but to link theoretical and methodological concerns to 
a case study in which those theoretical and methodological engagements are applied 
in practice, is an attempt to address this challenge. Further, the analysis of these 
regulatory texts is something that this author has been working on for over a decade, 
originally from the critical perspective that this doctoral thesis now questions. It is 
not so much that actual analyses have been subordinated to theoretical engagement, 
therefore, but that theoretical limitations in the original analyses have necessitated 
greater emphasis on an engagement with theoretical complexity than on yet more 
empirical detail. Nevertheless, further postdoctoral research into international and 
multimedia regulation is planned to deepen and broaden the scope of this doctoral 
research project.  
 
Secondly, the selection criteria applied in the identification of topics to address, 
arguments to include, and documents to analyse (as well as those to exclude), is also 
a potentially thorny issue. The absence of an engagement with the concepts of 
privacy and the commons (both in the critical literature and in discursive analyses), is 
justified, however, by the relative lack of attention given to them in both regulatory 
documents and the critique of broadcasting regulation, despite their potential 
relevance to broadcasting and their explicit use in the critique of other aspects of 
media regulation (such as the press and the internet). This is explained by the way in 
which different sectors of media regulation have traditionally been approached. 
While privacy issues inevitably arise when press regulation is debated from a media 
law perspective, for instance, they are drowned out in broadcasting regulation by the 
debate between public service and free market arguments that arise in the media 
organisation perspective. Similarly, while the pre-history of alternative (press 
freedom, Marxist) approaches is surveyed in Part Two, it remains subsidiary to the 
primary focus of this thesis; the scope of which was defined by the initial 
identification of a particular approach to critiquing the use of ‘citizen’ and 
‘consumer’ signifiers in broadcasting regulatory discourse, and the tracing back, 
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through their rise to dominance to their initial emergence, of the key concepts and 
arguments drawn upon in this literature. 
  
Thirdly, the extent to which critique may be undermined by the questioning of the 
assumptions that inform it has also been a source of concern throughout this research 
project, and I’m grateful for the constructive criticisms I’ve received over the past 
couple of years from those voicing this concern. The emphasis placed, however, on 
the strengthening of critique, the critical treatment of more relativistic arguments and 
the rapprochement of contrasting approaches has been an attempt to resolve this, and 
it is hoped that the arguments and evidence contained in this thesis can contribute to 
the ongoing attempts of critical and Foucauldian-inspired scholars to do this, as well 
as to the contemporary scholarly critique of broadcasting regulation and its history.   
 
 
 
 
Thesis Structure 
 
The thesis is split into eight parts, beginning with an account of the methodological 
perspective employed, and ending with a summary of the research findings. Between 
these methodological chapters, a critical review of the literature on broadcasting 
regulation in the UK will set the scene for the debates that follow, and the theoretical 
and methodological conceptual tools deployed by critical analysts will be addressed 
in turn through in-depth engagements with the specialist literatures on each concept. 
 
Part One will provide a methodological review of CDA and genealogical approaches. 
By elaborating debates on the concept of power, history and critique, an attempt will 
be made to seek a rapprochement between the two approaches, and to develop a 
theoretical approach to the key concepts of debate that is as sensitive to the 
complexity of power as it is critical, as well as a method for performing discursive 
analyses that is as empirically detailed as it is critical of discursive change. In 
seeking a compromise between sweeping accounts of hegemony, on the one hand, 
and ambivalence towards hegemonic undercurrents, on the other, the normative 
thrust of the critical approach is made less explicit in favour of an account of the 
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perpetual ‘problematisations’ of the public-private and citizen-consumer dichotomies 
(in Part Eight). 
 
Part Two will provide a critical review of the literature on broadcasting regulation in 
the UK, focusing in particular upon the recent literature on the balancing of the 
interests of citizens and consumers in contemporary regulatory discourse. Much of 
this literature draws upon CDA in its examination of regulatory documents, and aims 
to reveal the rhetorical preference for ‘consumers’ over ‘citizens’, or the discursive 
reconstruction of ‘citizens’ as ‘consumers’. More broadly, scholars have also 
critiqued the redefinition of the ‘public interest’ in market terms, the rise of an audit 
culture and market mechanisms within the BBC, and the regulation of the 
broadcasting sector as a whole in terms of market competition. Such processes are 
associated with a ‘neoliberal’ logic, whereby neoliberalism is seen as a free market 
ideology that serves powerful private interests, and which undermines both PSB and 
the public sphere.  
 
Critical scholars’ association of PSB with citizenship and the public sphere is traced 
back to debates that took place in the 1980s, in the context of Thatcherite reforms of 
public services and the threat of the privatisation of the BBC and the deregulation of 
PSB. Underlying this literature is an assumption of a dichotomy between 
broadcasting as a public service, which caters to the benefits of citizens, and 
broadcasting as a commercial market, in which the consumer is sovereign and 
individual choice is valued above all else. Such an approach also views PSB as an 
ideal type of public sphere, and negatively interprets the history of its regulation as a 
shift from a public service to a free market, which has undermined its capacity to 
contribute to the informed and engaged citizenship upon which a public sphere is 
built.  
 
The unequivocal appropriation of the public sphere as a normative concept and its 
association with an abstract idealisation of PSB, however, has led some to suggest 
that the reading of Habermas has been somewhat selective (Collins, 1993: 257-258; 
Keane, 1995), considering that much of Habermas’s argument seems to actually 
contradict such a manoeuvre. Further, there has been an increasing weariness with 
the ubiquity of these terms, and dissatisfaction with the level of engagement or 
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appropriateness of their application to PSB (Flew, 2006; Jacka, 2003; Nolan, 2006). 
Rather than dismissing the deployment of such terms, however, the chapter 
concludes with the proposition that these terms be yet more critically engaged with. 
 
Parts Three, Four and Five then deal more closely with the public sphere and the 
wider public-private dichotomy. While Part Three provides an overview of literature 
on the associated concepts of press freedom, public opinion and the public-private 
dichotomy more generally, Part Four offers a particularly close (and relatively 
unselective) reading of Habermas’s seminal publication on the public sphere, and 
Part Five summarises the subsequent engagement with both this early work and the 
ongoing development of the concept.   
 
Habermas’s original aim in developing his concept of the public sphere was to 
balance liberal and republican approaches to the public-private dichotomy. These 
contrasting traditions are thus juxtaposed and traced back to their roots in antiquity 
(throughout Parts Three-Five), while 18
th
 and 19
th
 Century theorisations of the role of 
public opinion and a free press in liberal democracy, and the concomitant 
development of the notion of ‘publicity’ or ‘publicness’, are elaborated (in Part 
Three) to put Habermas’s own theoretical intervention in context.  
 
Equally, a comprehensive reading of Habermas’s book (in Part Four) also allows for 
his critique of the commercialisation of the press and the rise of consumer society to 
be assessed in the context of his more wide-ranging critique of the welfare state, and 
his identification of the passive citizenship it produced as the main cause of the 
decline of the public sphere. Habermas’s surprisingly nuanced treatment of the 
relation between citizenship and consumption, and his more explicit and 
controversial handling of the distinction between society and politics, are shown to 
pose particular problems for the appropriation of his concept by defenders of PSB 
against the threat of commercialisation; especially when tied to an account of social 
citizenship and an emphasis on democratic inclusion. 
 
Indeed, in highlighting the exclusivity of Habermas’s bourgeois model, revisionist 
and alternative accounts of Habermas’s history of the ‘rise and fall’ of the public 
sphere suggest that it may be better understood as a ‘fall and rise’, and that counter-
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examples of consumer movements, in being relatively more inclusive and 
participative, may even be more appropriate sources on which to build a public 
sphere model. Much of the post-Habermasian debate has revolved around this 
legitimacy deficit in his ongoing elaboration of the public sphere concept and wider 
theoretical approach, and around the most appropriate definitions of, and balance 
between, inclusion, participation and rationality for the development of a legitimate 
and efficacious public sphere. Engagement with the complexity of this debate (in 
Part Five) is essential for a truly critical account of broadcasting regulation, as it 
raises questions concerning not only the form and content of public communication, 
but also the distinction between formal and informal citizenship, and, therefore, 
between citizenship and consumption. 
 
Although distinguishing between the two has been an effective way of warning 
citizens of the threat of commodification and corporate power, the distinction has 
also been accused of legitimating the exclusion from the public sphere of those 
without formal citizenship rights. While an opposition between the public duties and 
ethics of citizenship and the private pleasures and aesthetics of consumption is 
assumed in the broadcasting literature reviewed in Part Two, debates within public 
sphere theory suggest that a more nuanced account of the relation between 
citizenship and consumption is required. Consequently, Part Six offers a review of 
theoretical developments in interdisciplinary studies of both citizenship and 
consumption, as well as the more recent literature on the imbrication of the two 
concepts.  
 
Turning towards a view of citizenship and consumption as ever-shifting, overlapping 
and sometimes complementary categories, rather than opposing ideal types, these 
literatures also share a move away from normative theory towards an account of 
citizenship and consumption as practice and process. Although broadcasting 
scholarship maintains an attachment to earlier approaches to citizenship and 
consumption, many contemporary theorists of citizenship have distanced themselves 
from TH Marshall's work on citizenship rights, and from a reduction of citizenship to 
a matter of status or rights more generally, while contemporary consumption scholars 
have, in turn, distanced themselves from the various traditions of consumer critique. 
The chapter begins, therefore, with a critique of Marshall's distinction between 
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political, civil and social rights, and of the passivity inherent to the liberal tradition 
within which the focus on rights is framed, before introducing the turn in citizenship 
studies towards an engagement with the practices and experiences of everyday life, 
and the significance of culture as well as politics to citizenship. The traditional 
critiques of consumerism are then summarised and contrasted with a critical 
sociology of consumption that is more informed by empirical and historical research 
than by normative theory. Such research has demonstrated the productive and active 
aspects of consumption, and revealed that consumption practices can be important 
sources of collective and political engagement, especially for those formally 
excluded from citizenship and the public sphere, as well as sources of individualistic 
and private pleasure. The parallel trajectories of both these bodies of literature, 
however, suggests that it is not so much the terms themselves that are unhelpful for 
understanding broadcasting regulation, but rather the binary opposition that has been 
constructed between them.  
 
In contrast to the willingness to engage with theories of citizenship and the public 
sphere, however, there has been a notable reluctance among broadcasting scholars to 
engage with theoretical debates around not only consumption, but also neoliberalism. 
While neoliberalism is persistently and loosely evoked as an antonym of PSB and as 
the cause of perceived shifts from citizen to consumer, its features are either taken 
for granted or predictably described (Collier, 2012). Part Seven therefore begins with 
an overview of neoliberalism’s assumed features and an account of the meteoric 
increase in the term’s occurrence in scholarly literature over the past decade, before 
engaging in theoretical debates within the recently emerging discipline of the critical 
sociology of neoliberalism.  
 
Neoliberalism is traditionally approached by broadcasting scholars as an ideological 
and hegemonic project (Harvey, 2007). There is a contrasting Foucauldian 
perspective, however, which views it instead as a form of governmental rationality, 
and both approaches are critically evaluated. However, in light of the ongoing 
financial crisis (2008-ongoing), whereby neoliberalisation has unexpectedly been 
exacerbated in response to a crisis seemingly of its own making, and following a 
recent wave of publications that have rewritten the history of the development of 
neoliberal thought (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009; Peck, 2010; Stedman Jones, 2012), 
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efforts to develop both ideological and governmental approaches, and to bridge the 
seemingly insurmountable gap between them, have been renewed. The chapter 
subsequently concludes with an elaboration of the theoretical and methodological 
debates that are currently taking place at an interdisciplinary and international level, 
as a means of negotiating a compromise between the critical approach to 
broadcasting regulation and a more nuanced governmental approach that avoids 
ideological or normative reductionism. 
 
Such a compromise, developed in detail in Part One, is then put to the test in Part 
Eight as the CDA approach commonly drawn on to critique regulatory documents is 
reframed within a Foucauldian genealogical perspective to provide a relatively more 
detailed, nuanced and yet more critical account. From this methodological 
perspective, a corpus of texts, extending from around 1920 (the inception of 
broadcasting) to 2013 (the year of writing), and including committee reports and 
white papers on broadcasting regulation in the UK, is analysed. Rather than simply 
presenting a chronological history of the increasing occurrence of the consumer 
signifier, such a long-term genealogical approach enables the identification of the 
underlying debates, concerns and conflicts that determine the reconfiguration of 
certain terms. Detailed analysis coupled with a nuanced appreciation of the 
distinctions between relevant concepts also enables a more critical understanding of 
the differences, still only just emerging, between the more recent approaches to 
broadcasting regulation of the previous and present governments. Specifically, three 
distinct (although overlapping) problematisations are identified: those regarding the 
relation between public control and private enterprise; public interest and public 
service; and citizenship and consumption. Although the identification of the public as 
consumers has been only a recent phenomenon, for instance, the analyses 
demonstrate that the underlying concern to resolve tensions between a view of the 
public as a mass or as a differentiated entity, and between a view of individuals as 
active or as passive, can be traced back to at least the mid-20th Century – long before 
the advent of the political appropriation of neoliberal theory.  
 
The thesis concludes with an appreciation of the continuing relevance of the public-
private dichotomy to any attempt to engage, either politically or theoretically, with 
both contemporary broadcasting regulation and its history. It maintains, however, 
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that there should be greater (and more critical) engagement with the dichotomy, and 
recommends an emphasis on the theoretical-methodological rapprochement of 
critical and more differentiated or empirically-based perspectives. Rather than 
dispensing with the dichotomy, rejecting critique or abandoning political 
intervention, therefore, the thesis argues that they be supplemented with, and thus 
strengthened by, an acknowledgment of their flaws and the incorporation of 
approaches more sensitive to the historicity of the developments and the stratagems 
of power that animate them.  
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Part One: Methodology 
 
 
While the following chapters will endeavour to provide a more critically nuanced 
and protean account of the theoretical concepts and discourses most often drawn 
upon in broadcasting regulation scholarship, and while a final chapter will provide an 
illustrative summary of the results of discourse analyses undertaken as part of the 
research for this thesis, this opening chapter will be limited to a discussion of the 
methodological approach of this thesis, and the method applied in the analyses 
themselves.  
 
Although Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is often utilised by scholars to critically 
contrast contemporary regulatory documents with earlier ones, there is unfortunately 
very little critical engagement with CDA itself. Further, while CDA lends itself well 
to policy analysis and is crucial for revealing the contradictions and sources of 
tension within and between texts, its theoretical underpinning in structural and 
ideological-hegemonic approaches means that it is also complicit in broadcasting 
scholars’ uncritical appropriation and unitary reading of the aforementioned 
concepts. Ultimately, in reducing complex relations and processes to a question of 
ideology, such an approach risks misunderstanding the most pertinent aspects of 
long-term social and discursive change. In contrast, a genealogical approach avoids 
dependency upon simple dualities of public-private or citizen-consumer, which treat 
one as original and proper, and the other as evidence of ideological manipulation and 
dominant class interests. Rather, in transgressing distinctions between public and 
private, and between power and freedom (Tully, 1999: 134), it recognises that the 
tactics of ‘government’ make possible the redefinition of what is within the 
competence of the state or market, and of what is public or private (Foucault, 1991: 
103). Following the lead of those critics of neoliberalism that seek to bridge 
ideological and governmental approaches (as discussed in Part Seven), this thesis 
will propose supplementing CDA with a genealogical approach. The task at hand, 
therefore, becomes one of looking at how the public-private dichotomy has been 
(re)configured over time, and how this has always been linked to power, whether the 
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emphasis is on public service and citizenship or on the free market and consumer 
choice.  
 
In analysing a corpus of texts that includes committee reports and white papers on 
broadcasting regulation, and which extends from around 1920 (the inception of 
broadcasting) to 2013 (the year of writing), such an approach, it is argued, is able to 
contribute towards a more nuanced account of broadcasting regulatory history. The 
final chapter will present a summary of the research findings, splitting the discourse 
analysis into three distinct (although overlapping) ‘problematisations’: those 
regarding the relation between public control and private enterprise; public interest 
and public service; and citizenship and consumption. 
 
This chapter, however, will begin by outlining the CDA approach as explained by its 
proponents and critics, before outlining the genealogical approach and developing a 
synthesis of the two for the purposes of this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
1.1 CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
 
 
CDA: Language, Discourse and Text 
 
Rather than referring to a homologous method, or even a particular school of inquiry, 
the label CDA encapsulates a cross-disciplinary approach to the study of text, united 
by a shared perspective on the role of language in society (van Dijk, 1993a), a view 
of text as simultaneously product and process (Fairclough, 1989; 1992), and an 
analytical focus on the dialectical relations between discursive and non-discursive 
social practices (Fairclough, 1989). Language, it is argued, is particularly important 
in politics and communication media (Thompson, 1990) – which is seen as playing a 
hegemonic role in the reproduction and restructuring of the relationship between the 
public and private realms of social life (Fairclough, 1992: 13) – and plays an 
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increasingly important role in the contemporary era due to a shift in its social 
function, from one committed towards communication to one more strategically 
oriented (Habermas, 1996). Discourse, which subsumes language and other forms of 
semiosis (such as body language and visual images), regulates the production of 
meaning within particular textual and institutional conditions, determining what can 
and cannot be said within historically and temporally specific situations. It is 
organised through the formation of imaginary symbolic figures, or subject positions, 
such as the ‘citizen’ and the ‘consumer,’ which provide a dichotomy of discursive 
oppositions, such as the ‘public/private’ dichotomy, between which meaning can be 
produced. Through the analysis of texts, approached as points of articulation and 
tension between practices and structures, the active construction of discourse can be 
made manifest.  
 
While some practitioners of CDA are rooted in the functional paradigms of linguistic 
traditions, others come from a broad range of disciplines across the humanities and 
social sciences. Most deal with power in some form, and with the reproduction and 
concealment of power in language, as well as the ways in which it is resisted (van 
Dijk, 1993a). While Foucault and Bourdieu are occasionally drawn upon, 
practitioners are most theoretically influenced by Gramsci and Hall, or by early 
Habermas and the Frankfurt School, and there is a consensual rejection of 
postmodern approaches and relativist assumptions, which are dismissed for ignoring 
discourse structures (van Dijk, 1993b) and for providing weak textual analyses 
(Fairclough, 1993). Some have prescribed that to qualify as CDA, analyses should 
have an explicit socio-political stance, be ‘unabashedly normative’ and motivated by 
social concern, and draw on theories and methods in terms of their relevance to 
achieving a particular socio-political goal (van Dijk, 1993b). The analysis of texts as 
instances of socio-cultural practice consequently foregrounds the connections 
between language, power and ideology, which may be hidden in articulations of 
commonsense assumptions (Fairclough, 1989: 4). CDA aims to deconstruct such 
assumptions as ideologies, seeing them as dependent upon the underlying social 
relations and differences of power that they serve to legitimise through the 
recurrence of the ordinary and the everyday (Fairclough, 1989: 2).  
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Methodologically, CDA proponents distinguish themselves from ‘linguistics proper’, 
which they see as not being critical or socio-political enough, insisting instead on the 
necessity of explaining findings in terms of power relations. Alternative linguistic 
approaches to textual analysis, it is argued, ignore social theory and give insufficient 
attention to the social and historical influences on discourse (Fairclough 1992: 4), 
limiting themselves to observing and describing, rather than explaining, linguistic 
variation, and ignoring the ways in which  everyday life and commonsense 
assumptions are determined by, and determinative of, wider social structures 
(Fairclough, 1989). 
 
Arguing against this ‘demarcated and hierarchically related branch system’ of 
language studies, a broader conception of language study has been called for 
(Fairclough, 1989). While language studies and social theory have traditionally 
treated texts as finished products that are reflective of external, social processes, 
branches of both disciplines have questioned this conception of texts. For example, 
some branches of language studies emphasise the processes of production and 
interpretation, and the situational contexts in which texts are produced and 
interpreted. In this case, texts become only one dimension of discourse - the 
written/spoken product of processes of text production – and the social effects of 
discourse become a further addition to the linguist’s object of study. Likewise, some 
social theorists see discourse as a way of structuring knowledge and social practice, 
as well as a type of language specific to a social situation (advertising discourse, for 
example). As such, discourses do not so much reflect or represent social entities or 
relations, as construct or constitute them. Further, different discourses constitute key 
entities – such as citizenship and consumption – in various ways, and position people 
in various ways as social subjects – such as citizens or consumers (Fairclough, 1992: 
4), construing the world in selective and partial, or even reductive, ways. By locating 
discourse in the context of social change, analysts aim to connect particular 
representations with particular interests and relations of power. 
 
However, the causal relations of social change are not simple or one-way, and social 
change, it is argued, is being increasingly discourse-led. This change is initiated 
through dialectical processes, such as the recontextualisation of discourses within 
new fields, which are ‘enacted in new ways of inter/acting,’ ‘inculcated as new ways 
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of being’ and ‘materialised as new ways of organising space’ (Fairclough, 2004: 3). 
These processes are, however, contingent on the ways in which they are resisted and 
accepted, so that there is often a tension within texts between the various ways of 
addressing subjects; and it has been argued that these tensions have been particularly 
evident in the language of New Labour, as the tendency to construct the public as 
consumers has been resisted by even the party’s own members (Fairclough, 2000).  
 
While ‘hegemony’ is used to explain the ongoing process of discourse production 
and the instability and transitivity of certain representations, ‘intertextuality’ is used 
to emphasise a historical view of texts. Fairclough’s focus on historical change, for 
example, sees discursive events (such as a government white paper) as attempts to 
negotiate unstable and changing social-cultural circumstances, which draw on and 
transform available discourse practices (those of regulatory documents) and orders of 
discourse (such as those of government or business). CDA can therefore be used to 
explain shifting discursive practices across domains and over time as a facet of social 
change (Fairclough, 1993).  
 
 
 
Critique of CDA 
 
However, the lack of a coherent and comprehensive theoretical model, as well as the 
unsystematic use of certain methods (Widdowson, 1995a; 1995b; 1996; Tian, 2004), 
have led to the accusation that CDA is more descriptive and interpretative than 
theoretical or analytical, remaining more sociological-political than linguistic, and 
little more than literary theory (Widdowson 1995b). It has been suggested that the 
ambiguous and contradictory use of terms deployed by Fairclough, for example, 
should be treated more as ‘labels for descriptive devices’ than as ‘concepts which 
cohere to a theory’ (Widdowson 1995b). The equation of theory with political 
commitment and the downplaying of empirical rigour have also brought forth from 
more traditional linguists the accusation of ‘partiality’; that CDA is partial, both in 
the sense that analyses are selective and not whole, and in the sense that they are 
prejudiced and partisan (Widdowson 1995b). Likewise, the explanation of pervasive 
practices in terms of ideology, and the interpretation of instances of heterogeneity as 
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evidence of ideological contradiction, have also been criticised for failing to even 
consider alternative or additional explanations (Toolan, 1997). 
 
In response, proponents of CDA have countered that because CDA is a 
multidisciplinary and non-neutral approach, distinctions between theory, description 
and analysis are irrelevant (van Dijk, 1993b: 252). Consequently, its success should 
be measured not in terms of the impressive detail of the analysis or in the 
contribution it makes to a particular discipline, but in how effective it is in 
intervening in or changing the current state of affairs (van Dijk, 1993b). The 
linguistic critique of CDA is dismissed for assuming the possibility of objective 
analysis, for failing to differentiate between ‘critical’ and ‘partisan’, or between 
‘scientific’ and ‘neutral’ (Rajagopalan, 2004), and for confusing ‘ideology’ with a 
political perspective rather than assumptions that maintain relations of dominance 
(Fairclough, 1996).  
 
Although the adoption of a particular perspective ‘from which some things become 
salient and others merge into the background’ (Hammersley, 1999: 14) suggests the 
possibility of bias, there remains a ‘fundamental distinction between those versions 
of partisan research which retain a commitment to objectivity, to the possibility of 
knowledge that is valid from all points of view, and those that do not’ (Hammersley, 
1999: 5), and, while some analysts are determined to foreground their socio-political 
goals (van Dijk, 1993b), others are more sensitive to balancing theory, politics and 
analysis. There remains, however, a more subtle but fundamental problem with the 
critical approach to discourse analysis. While Fairclough refers to Foucault’s work 
on biopower, for instance (Fairclough, 1993), his view of neoliberalism is dependent 
upon Bourdieu and Bauman (Fairclough, 2000), and his view of power is drawn 
principally from the work of Gramsci, Althusser and Hall on ideology and 
hegemony, a perspective which tends towards the interpretative reduction of power 
conflicts to binary oppositions in certain analyses (Wodak, 2000; Wodak & Meyer, 
2001), as well as to a reductive interpretation of neoliberalism (as discussed in Part 
Seven) and of discursive phenomena and social change more generally. In contrast, 
Foucault’s theoretical approach to the concept of power leads towards a 
methodologically different form of discursive analysis.  
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1.2 GENEALOGY 
 
 
Genealogy, Power and the Historical Critique of the Present 
 
The mechanisms by which power is exercised and analysed within the framework of 
‘a new economy of power relations’, along with the question of the subject, have 
been central to Foucault’s whole work (Foucault, 1982: 210). This economy of 
power, he says, is more empirical in approach than abstract theories of power, for it 
‘consists of taking the forms of resistance against different forms of power as a 
starting-point’ (Foucault, 1982: 211). He adds that what is in common amongst 
struggles against the power of some groups against others – men over women, etc – 
and the power ‘of administration over the ways people live’ is an ‘opposition to the 
effects of power which are linked with knowledge, competence, and qualification: 
struggles against the privileges of knowledge. But they are also an opposition against 
secrecy, deformation, and the mystifying representations imposed on people’ 
(Foucault, 1982: 211-212). The emphasis that Foucault puts on knowledge, 
‘representations’ and the open flow of information as targets of struggles clearly 
applies to the domain of media and culture. It foregrounds discourses and ‘technical 
capacities’ invested in practices whereby power seeks to operationalise the 
government of individuals and groups. It is for these reasons that Foucault’s 
‘analytics of power’, and its emphasis on the mechanisms of how power works and 
how it is effective in real life, has guided the turn towards practice and process, 
rather than normative criteria and fixed statuses, in the various literatures explored in 
this thesis.  
 
In Foucault’s work, what is normally called ‘power’ is better understood as 
‘domination’; that is, a particular type of power relationship that is hierarchical, 
asymmetrical and difficult to reverse (Foucault, 1988: 19). In contrast, Foucault’s 
understanding of ‘power’ is as a strategic game between liberties, which also 
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involves the attempt to determine the conduct of others. Between these games of 
power and these states of domination ‘you have governmental technologies’ 
(Foucault, 1988: 19), which are the primary source of power and domination, and 
which must therefore be analysed to understand how power and domination operate. 
In practice, this ‘analytics of power’ involves establishing genealogies of 
power/knowledge and the practices in which they are inscribed to produce 
‘technologies of the social’; technologies that are the dispositifs of governmentality. 
Genealogy thus has a central place in Foucault’s methodology.   
 
For Foucault, genealogical analysis proceeds through three specific displacements; 
three ways of ‘moving outside the institution...This kind of method entails first of all 
going behind the institution and trying to discover in a wider and more overall 
perspective what we can broadly call a technology of power’ (Foucault, 2009: 117). 
Such an approach, he says, ‘allows us to replace a genetic analysis...with a 
genealogical analysis...which reconstructs a whole network of alliances, 
communications, and points of support’ (Foucault, 2009: 117). 
 
A second displacement concerns the problematisation of the function of institutions, 
such as the prison or the BBC, to search for an ‘external point of view of strategies 
and tactics’ instead of focusing on ‘the internal point of view of the function’ 
(Foucault, 2009: 118).  This is because the degree to which an institution succeeds or 
fails is secondary to the wider strategies framing governmentality as ‘a general 
economy of power’; it is this wider transformation which is more important 
(Foucault, 2009: 117-118).  Besides, the shift from functions to wider relations 
enables one to ask questions about what is at stake in specific practices; as Foucault 
points out, ‘by de-institutionalising and de-functionalising relations of power we can 
grasp their genealogy; i.e., the way they are formed, connect up with each other, 
develop, multiply, and are transformed’ (Foucault, 2009: 119). 
 
The third shift ‘concerns the object...refusing to give oneself a ready-made object, be 
it mental illness, delinquency, or sexuality’ (Foucault, 2009: 118), or citizens or 
consumers. For, the question is: how did these objects come to be constituted; which 
discourses and apparatuses conditioned their constitution; under what circumstances; 
and what effects did they have on subsequent developments?  
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Foucault says that what is at stake in the genealogies he is theorising is the recovery 
of a ‘historical knowledge of struggles [and] a memory of combats...that had until 
then been confined to the margins’ (Foucault, 2003: 8). The connection with critique 
is clear when he concludes that ‘we can give the name “genealogy” to this coupling 
together of scholarly erudition and local memories, which allows us to constitute a 
historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of that knowledge in 
contemporary tactics’ (Foucault, 2003: 8).  It is in that sense that one can understand 
genealogy as a history of the present; that is, as a specific combination of critique 
and ‘desubjugated historical knowledges’ (Foucault, 2003: 10) that support ‘an 
insurrection against the centralising power-effects that are bound up with the 
institutionalisation and working of any scientific discourse organised in a society 
such as ours’ (Foucault, 2003: 9). 
 
So, in Foucault, the methodological approach described as genealogy is still about 
power, power relations and the interests inscribed in them, but genealogy, as a 
‘critique of the present’ (in the sense of producing a counter-discourse and counter-
history that feeds into resistance), adds analytical techniques that other positions (or 
‘critical’ approaches to discourse analysis), do not sufficiently do. Indeed, it is often 
in the context of the attempt to bridge a critical or ideological approach with a 
historical and empirical analysis that many of the scholars discussed throughout this 
thesis (and many that are explicitly Marxist, such as Lazzarato, 2000) turn to 
Foucault; not as a means of proving critique wrong and embracing the alternative, 
but of supplementing a Marxist approach and addressing change by reference to the 
heterogeneity and strategically mobile character of the conflicting forces shaping it. 
For while the more typically ‘critical’ critiques of neoliberalism, for example, are 
successful at capturing many of the rationales, motivations and effects of 
neoliberalism (whether in terms of ideology, hegemony or the withdrawal of the 
state), they are dependent upon the dualisms of state/market or citizen/consumer that 
play important roles in constituting liberal-capitalist societies (Lemke, 2001). This is 
why, for their critique of Thatcherite reforms, Nikolas Rose and colleagues 
(discussed in detail in Part Seven) turned to the history of public-private distinctions 
to understand liberal and neoliberal governmental rationality, rather than merely 
echoing the more dominant critiques of privatisation and neoliberal ideology.  
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Genealogy, Archaeology and Problematisations 
 
While Foucauldian research is sometimes referred to as ‘history of the present’, it is 
not interested in achieving a complete understanding of the present and how it 
emerged from the past, but to use history to diagnose the present (Kendall & 
Wickham, 1999: 4). Finding causes and effects should be avoided (Kendall & 
Wickham, 1999: 5-6). Rather, history for Foucault is a perpetual problematisation, 
and in his archaeological analyses he selects to tease out and examine these 
problematisations rather than to examine easier to define historical periods (Kendall 
& Wickham, 1999: 22). 
 
He distinguishes between the historical approach that seeks overarching principles 
(total history) and his own approach, that which describes differences (general 
history); although general history also seeks continuities, the focus is on defining 
new sets of possible relations and the analysis’s own spatio-temporal terrain – i.e. 
rather than adopting a presumed start and end date and presumed series of causal 
relations, the general historian seeks to avoid accepting the imposition of such 
reductive parameters (Kendall & Wickham, 1999: 24).  
 
Genealogy, however, adds to Foucault’s archaeological tools a new concern with the 
analysis of power and the ‘history of the present’. It is concerned more with flushing 
out assumptions than with claiming what is right or wrong (Kendall & Wickham, 
1999: 30). The emphasis is on the ‘processual aspects of the web of discourse – its 
ongoing character,’ rather than in judging it as the past to see what light it sheds on 
the present. Whereas archaeology emphasises the ‘historical slice’, genealogy 
emphasises the ‘historical process’. Foucault suggests that the difference between 
them is that archaeology is the ‘analysis of local discursivities’, while genealogy is 
the tactics which bring subjected knowledges into play, on the basis of the 
archaeological analysis’; archaeology can therefore be seen as a precondition of 
genealogy, or as the method, while genealogy is the strategic development of 
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archaeology, the linking of it to present concerns (Kendall & Wickham, 1999: 31); 
one could also say that Foucault’s critical reflection was genealogical in design and 
archaeological in method (Owen, 1999: 32).  
 
The role of the analyst isn’t, therefore, to promote or oppose resistance, but to 
describe how it operates as part of power (Kendall and Wickham, 1999: 50), and 
how we come to experience this form of subjectivity as universal, necessary or 
obligatory, by tracing its historical emergence and demonstrating how it is in fact 
singular, contingent and the product of historically constituted limits (Owen, 1999: 
33-34). This is not the same as ideology, however, and by tracing the emergence of a 
particular way of thinking or acting, genealogists do not claim to be able to identify a 
particular cause of an emergence; nor do they dare to denounce the introduction of 
one perspective into another context as false or wrong.   
 
Genealogy is not concerned with a pursuit of origins and the removal of masks to 
reveal original identities or meanings (Foucault, 1977: 140-142), for ‘what is found 
at the historical beginning of things is not the tangible identity of their origin; it is the 
dissension of things. It is disparity’ (Foucault, 1977: 142). History cannot be 
described in terms of linear development. Words do not keep their meaning, nor do 
ideas retain their logic (Foucault, 1977: 139). As such, Foucault proposes that, while 
remaining sensitive to recurrences, a genealogical analysis should avoid the urge the 
trace a gradual curve of evolution, and aim rather to isolate the different scenes in 
which words and ideas are engaged in different roles (Foucault, 1977: 140). 
 
Foucault also uses the terms ‘emergence’ – to describe the ‘non-place’, the scene 
where conflicting concepts are superimposed – and ‘descent’ – to qualify the relative 
strength or weakness of those concepts. The aim, therefore, is to ‘record the history’ 
of the different points of emergence, understood as the result of substitutions and 
displacements (Foucault, 1977: 151-152). For Foucault, an ‘event’ is not a text or a 
battle, but the ‘reversal of a relationship of forces’ (Foucault, 1977: 154), and 
genealogy must deal with these events in terms of their unique characteristics, rather 
than with the relations between events and continuity; not to discover the roots of 
identity (to try to understand the contemporary subject, individual, society etc.), but 
to ‘commit to its dissipation’, to ‘make visible the discontinuities’ and to ‘reveal the 
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heterogeneous systems which actually inhibit identity formation’ (Foucault, 1977: 
162). So, in terms of the consequences for identity, the analyses that follow are not 
so much interested in identifying the type of subject constituted throughout the 
discursive history of broadcasting regulation, but with identifying the discontinuous 
and heterogeneous constructions of the subject that co-exist and interact at any one 
time, and which change over time. Rather, it is more a question of approaching the 
‘arrangement’ or ‘disposition’ of things (Foucault, 1991: 95; 98).  
 
Accepting that it is no longer possible to define a totality, but only to delimit local 
constellations (Collier, 2009), Foucault also elaborates his concept of the ‘episteme’, 
understood as the ‘totality of relations for a given period’, rather than as a form of 
knowledge or perspective (Venn, forthcoming: 7). Distinct from a typically 
structuralist approach, the episteme is part of a project to uncover ‘submerged’ 
discourses and events, to search for ‘lines of descent’, and to recognise that 
discourses constitute intersecting series which, in turn, constitute a ‘history of the 
present’, from which one can understand the privileging of one discourse over 
another in the present (Venn, forthcoming: 7-8). In ‘cultivating the details and 
accidents’ (Foucault, 1977: 144) of the construction of the public and of public 
service, ‘maintaining passing events in their proper dispersion and identifying the 
deviations that gave rise to that which still exists’ (Foucault, 1977: 146), the 
following analyses challenge the assumption that broadcasting discourse was stable 
in the longer, earlier (‘pre-neoliberal’) period of 1920s-1970s. They also move away 
from the assumption that past changes have ‘culminated’ in the present, recognising 
instead that the present is a myriad of ‘current episodes in a series of subjugations’ 
(Foucault, 1977: 149), and that the linguistic conflict, or ‘hazardous play of 
dominations’, is still and always will be ongoing.  
 
I have therefore attempted to develop the theoretical underpinnings of CDA along 
more Foucauldian genealogical lines, while concomitantly supplementing 
Foucauldian archaeological methodology with the close textual methods of CDA. By 
avoiding limiting the research scope to local and partial inquiry (by performing 
instead a long-term analysis that avoids the assumptions often made about citizens 
and consumers), the analyses in Part Eight attempt to avoid being complicit in the 
very power relations they set out to identify, and to flush out some problematic 
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assumptions of the critical approach to broadcasting regulation – and so contribute 
towards a greater understanding of, and more critical engagement with, the issue at 
hand. 
 
 
 
 
1.3 A METHODOLOGICAL BRIDGE 
 
Critique, Power and History 
 
If language is indeed becoming more strategic than communicative, a CDA approach 
to revealing ideological manipulation is increasingly justified. The flip-side of this, 
however, is that if language was not as strategic in the past as it is now, the 
justification for a critical analysis of older texts is relatively weakened. Further, 
while the close linguistic analysis of contemporary texts may be capable of 
identifying the ways in which certain discourses are drawn upon, ignored or mixed 
with one another, similar analyses of older texts are (relatively) less able to draw 
upon that shared contextual knowledge, suggesting that CDA may not be as effective 
at long-term historical comparisons as it may be at diagnosing shorter-term 
discursive shifts. Rather, for long-term historical studies, such as that undertaken for 
the purposes of this thesis, the use of CDA on contemporary texts could best be 
supported by an alternative approach to analysing older texts; one which relies less 
on close linguistic analysis and the need to unmask strategic language use.   
 
While the importance of Foucault’s account of neoliberal governmentality (discussed 
in Part Seven) suggests the need for a more critical theoretical engagement with the 
concept of neoliberalism, developments in Foucault’s genealogical approach (also 
discussed in Part Seven) are also important for a methodological reframing of CDA. 
Concomitant with Foucault’s turn to an interest in the roots of neoliberalism was a 
shift in his framing of power/knowledge and historical analysis (Venn & Terranova, 
2009: 5), so that his analyses were redirected towards recognising ‘patterns of 
correlation’ (Collier, 2009) and the strategic disposition of heterogeneous elements in 
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the formation of the dispositifs (assemblages or ensembles of discursive and non-
discursive apparatuses) that constitute societies as particular realities (Lazzarato, 
2009). Echoing Arendt’s view of history as an ‘untidy heterogeneity’ (Baehr, 2003: 
xxxii) rather than a linear narrative characterised by epochal shifts from one 
paradigm to another, such an approach is more appropriate to the history of 
broadcasting’s public and private emphases, and particularly to the complex ways in 
which citizen and consumer interests are rhetorically combined in more recent 
regulatory documents.  
 
Such an approach does not, however, equate to a relativisation of discursive change. 
Neoliberalism’s recasting of the public domain according to the market logic of civil 
society blurs the boundaries between the public and private realms (McNay, 2009: 
64-65). One of the significant features of civil society is that it is a space which 
envelops both the subject of rights and the subject of choices, the differences 
between which are modified in contemporary civil society by neoliberal 
governmentality (Lazzarato, 2009). This governmentality operates by enveloping 
civil society with an economic ontology (McNay, 2009), relegating the juridical 
discourse of rights to a secondary role of containing the fragmenting effects of 
normalising governmental techniques. 
 
But it is precisely the relations between the subjects of rights and choices and 
between public and private realms that require analytic attention if scholars are to 
understand what neoliberalism actually does. What changes is more the dominant 
characteristic or system of correlation than the form of power itself (Collier, 2009: 
88). This dominant characteristic guides and even determines how the other elements 
are combined, but it does not saturate them (Collier, 2009: 89). It is a mistake, 
therefore, to refer to neoliberalism in broadcasting simply as a shift from the public 
service ethos of before to the commercial interest of today, suggesting that the latter 
has ‘saturated’ the former. It is also a mistake to exaggerate the erosion of the public 
domain, overestimate neoliberal hegemony or misrecognise the relation between 
public and private domains as one of a struggle between two forces. 
 
These Gramscian assumptions lie behind much of the CDA literature that 
broadcasting scholars draw upon for their own analyses. Although useful in 
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explaining discursive change, hegemony is incapable of accommodating the protean 
character of the public-private dichotomy, which cannot be reduced to a binary, let 
alone a case of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ (Wodak, 2000). For Foucault, partisanship always 
entails an aggressive complicity in power relations, as limiting analysis to a partial 
and local inquiry risks having the interpretation determined by general structures 
(Conway, 1999: 82). This criticism could be made of most CDA studies, and 
certainly the CDA research undertaken into broadcasting regulation. Such research 
avoids a long-term analysis, even when analysing shifts over time, and concentrates 
more on the present than on a ‘history of the present’. These studies are also partial 
in the sense that they intervene in judging their immediate object of study negatively.  
 
While CDA’s approach to discourse as that which structures knowledge and social 
practice, not so much reflecting or representing social entities or relations, as 
constructing or constituting them (Fairclough, 1989; 1992), and its approach to texts 
as only one dimension of discourse, shares much in common with a Foucauldian 
critique, its use of close linguistic analysis to ‘unmask’ strategic language use and its 
foregrounding of the connections between language, power (as dominance) and 
ideology (Fairclough, 1989: 4) lead to an ‘unabashedly normative’ (van Dijk, 1993b) 
form of critique. Genealogy, in contrast, is not concerned with the pursuit of origins 
and the removal of masks to reveal original identities or meanings (Foucault, 1977: 
140-142). Instead of approaching texts to reveal what is hidden, therefore, this thesis 
is more interested in highlighting the ways in which certain concepts and themes 
have been constructed as problems to be addressed, and in revealing the ‘historically 
sedimented underpinnings of particular problematisations’, rather than assuming a 
linear historical process or single underlying cause (Barry et al, 1996: 5). To achieve 
this, it aims to supplement CDA methods with a Foucauldian archaeological 
approach to the analysis of perpetual (governmental) problematisations, and to frame 
this within a genealogical theoretical-methodological approach to a history of the 
present, which places less focus on detailed linguistic analysis and avoids the 
ideological-reductiveness of much CDA research. 
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Method 
 
For the purposes of these analyses, I have endeavoured to supplement CDA methods 
with a Foucauldian archaeological approach to the analysis of perpetual 
(governmental) problematisations, and to frame this within a genealogical 
theoretical-methodological approach to a history of the present, which places less 
focus on detailed linguistic analysis and avoids the ideological-reductiveness of 
much CDA research.  
 
The aspects which are relevant for genealogical explorations are the following. 
Firstly, at the general level, an analytical framework that works as the broader 
theoretical context, and which provides the coherence for the genealogical account. 
Secondly, a set of methodological concepts, such as ‘emergence’ and ‘line of descent 
from the present’. Their application requires an archaeological excavation of the 
archive to search for specific discourses or cases that work as points at which crucial 
shifts happened, or decisions were taken, that functioned as key conditions for later 
developments. Thirdly, genealogy also requires the researcher to establish both intra- 
and inter-discursive relations through detailed analyses of specific documents, texts 
and archival material, so that the less visible traces of discursive shifts can be 
reconstructed by reference to a discursive formation and the power relations 
inscribed in discourses.  
 
While closer linguistic analysis and more recognisable CDA techniques have proven 
relatively effective in the analyses of the more recent texts, those of the earlier 
documents are more obviously Foucauldian. I have not simply used one method for 
older texts and another for recent ones, however, and there is no clear point in the 
middle at which one method is suddenly replaced by the other. Rather, the two 
approaches have complemented and supplemented one another throughout the study.   
 
In undertaking the analyses, I have (drawing upon particular aspects of Wodak, 
2000; Wodak and Meyer, 2001) triangulated the historical dimension of discursive 
events (i.e. intratextual and intertextual relationships) with the historical background 
of the extra-linguistic variables and institutional frames in which discursive events 
are embedded (i.e. the history of broadcasting regulation), as well as close 
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engagement with relevant theoretical and methodological debates (i.e. around the 
concepts of citizenship, consumption, neoliberalism and the public sphere). Rather 
than applying a preconceived set of certain theories to interpret the findings – such as 
the presumption of a neat fit between PSB, citizenship and the public sphere – I have 
also followed Wodak’s lead in ‘abductively’ or dialectically ‘to-ing and fro-ing’ 
between theory and practice. By focusing on the structuring processes of texts over 
time, and the longer-term construction of ‘orders of discourse,’ the relations between 
discursive and social change can thus be located historically. 
 
Although critical discourse analysts accept that changes are not uni-linear or part of a 
top-down process, and that there is always a struggle from below over the structuring 
of texts and the orders of discourse, which resists such changes (Fairclough, 1992: 
9), they argue that discursive relations are hidden from, or, at least, not transparent 
for, all people, especially for those most disadvantaged by changes (Fairclough, 
1992: 9), because there is an unequal access to (institutionally controlled) social and 
linguistic resources. Instead of approaching the texts in order to reveal what is 
hidden, however, I will (in the next section) be more interested in highlighting the 
ways in which certain concepts and themes have been constructed as problems to be 
addressed, and in revealing the ‘historically sedimented underpinnings of particular 
problematisations’, rather than assuming a linear historical process or single 
underlying cause (Barry et al, 1996: 5). 
 
However, in seeking a methodological compromise between sweeping accounts of 
hegemony that gloss over contradictory hybridity, and fine-grained accounts of 
hybridity that betray an ambivalence about hegemonic undercurrents across contexts 
(Peck, 2013a: 20), I have extended the selection of cases in relational or conjunctural 
terms, rather than in terms of terrain or typicality (Peck, 2013a: 21), and ‘in an 
orthogonal or awkward relation to emergent explanatory conceptions’ (Peck, 2013a: 
20). That is, rather than dealing with the corpus of texts in chronological order and 
suggesting a linear narrative or chain of cause and effect, I have allowed my 
engagement with problematisations and the less dominant aspects of certain texts to 
lead me in non-linear directions, and I present these findings by themed 
problematisation rather than by chronology.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This opening chapter has elaborated the methodological perspective of the thesis. It 
has set out the attempt to supplement the critical approach to power and history with 
a more Foucauldian-inspired one that focuses on discourses and governmental 
problematisations, and to, more specifically, supplement the critical approach to 
discourse analysis with an archaeological-genealogical one. This recast theoretical 
approach will now be applied to a critical review of the literature on broadcasting 
regulation, as well as concomitant engagements with theoretical debates on each of 
the key concepts identified. A recast analytical method, framing critical discourse 
analysis within a genealogical perspective, will then be applied in the closing chapter 
to the corpus of regulatory texts, so as to continue the problematisation of the public-
private dichotomy, and ultimately provide a genealogy of broadcasting regulation.   
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Part Two: Broadcasting Regulation 
 
 
This chapter provides a critical overview of broadcasting regulation in the UK from a 
historical perspective. More specifically, it places the contemporary theoretical and 
methodological approach to critiquing broadcasting regulation in the UK in historical 
perspective.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the term ‘regulation’ has been adopted in preference 
to ‘policy’. While Hesmondhalgh (2013: 123) distinguishes between legislation 
(general issues, such as privacy and competition) and regulation (agencies and rules 
regarding particular institutions and sectors) as distinct elements of government 
policy, and Freedman (2008: 13-14) distinguishes between policy (broad ideas and 
general assumptions) and regulation (specific institutional mechanisms for realising 
policy aims), both nevertheless agree that there is considerable overlap between 
them. As the remit of this thesis seems to fall somewhere between policy and 
regulation, considering that it is concerned with both general issues and specific 
mechanisms as far as they relate to the approach(es) of successive governments to 
the broadcasting sector, the term ‘regulation’ has been chosen to distinguish between 
relatively abstract theoretical debates (as covered in Parts Two to Six) and their more 
concrete application to broadcasting (covered in Parts One and Seven).  
 
The historical approach has been adopted to provide critical distance from the 
contemporary context (Curran, 2002: 3), in an effort to clarify issues that may be 
blurred by a more direct and politically-motivated approach. Because the 
contextualization of media history dissolves (both positive and negative) linear 
narratives (Curran, 2002: 51), this chapter will deconstruct contemporary theoretical 
approaches to broadcasting regulation, rather than attempt to offer a neutral and 
descriptive chronology of regulatory change, and critically evaluate them in 
reference to earlier theoretical approaches as well as contemporary critiques of 
dominant debates.  
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Underlying the contemporary critical literature is the assumption of a dichotomy 
between broadcasting as a public service catering to the benefits of citizens, and 
broadcasting as a commercial market, in which the consumer is sovereign and 
individual choice is valued above all else (Garnham, 1983; Murdock, 1993, 1999; 
Scannell, 1990). Citizenship is here rooted in TH Marshall’s (1969) account of 
political, civil and social rights, to which are added an elaboration of information-
cultural rights to provide a rationale for the particular importance of broadcasting to 
democracy (Murdock, 1999). Such an approach also interprets the history of 
broadcasting regulation, from public service to market (Tracey, 1998), in the same 
mood of decline as Habermas (1989) interpreted that of the bourgeois public sphere 
in its free press guise. Whether scholars are critical or not of the extent to which 
broadcasting has in practice conformed to the normative ideal, the trend in regulation 
since the late 1980s, understood in terms of marketisation and neoliberalism, is 
deemed almost unanimously to have had a detrimental impact on the public sphere. 
 
Taking into account critiques within media studies of the assumptions behind this 
approach, tracing its emergence back to the politically-charged debates of the 1980s, 
and placing it in the context of previously dominant approaches to broadcasting 
regulation, this chapter will provide a review of the most relevant scholarship. 
Beginning with the earlier approaches, it provides a brief overview of the mass 
society thesis, liberal-pluralism and the 'critical' paradigm, and distinguishes between 
populist, radical-libertarian and liberal approaches, focusing in particular on the 
liberal approach to press freedom. It then summarises the distinction made in the 
1980s between PSB and the commercial market, the equation of citizenship with the 
former and consumerism with the latter, and the application of the public sphere 
concept to the defence of PSB against impending privatisation (Garnham, 1986; 
Scannell, 1989). The history of broadcasting regulation in the UK is then 
summarised from this perspective, first in terms of the theoretical critique of 
marketisation and neoliberalism (Hesmondhalgh, 2013; Freedman, 2008), then in 
terms of the guiding principles of regulation, focusing on the diagnosed shifts in 
ethos from public service to consumer choice, and debates on the meaning and 
significance of the public interest. The contemporary concern with discursively 
analysing, especially with recourse to CDA methods, the strategic representation of 
citizens and consumers in regulatory documents is then examined and critically 
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evaluated. Finally, the increasing weariness of certain broadcasting scholars with the 
ubiquity and predictability of such an approach is placed in the context of more 
established critiques, which have found fault with the selectivity of theoretical 
appropriations, and the arbitrariness of public-private and citizen-consumer 
distinctions.  
 
 
 
 
2.1 EARLY APPROACHES TO BROADCASTING REGULATION 
 
The emergence of public sphere theory as an appropriate perspective from which to 
engage with the role of broadcasting in the UK can be situated in the context of the 
absence of a theoretical and methodological orthodoxy (Thompson, 1993). Following 
the respective dominance of the mass society tradition, the liberal-pluralist positivism 
of US social science and the later ‘critical paradigm’, a conceptual vacuum existed in 
which the emergence of a diverse range of perspectives, drawing on liberal, populist 
or radical libertarian traditions, had been predicted. Before going on to describe the 
subsequent public sphere paradigm, therefore, this section will review these 
theoretical antecedents to public sphere theory, focusing in particular on the liberal 
theory of press freedom to which the public sphere can be seen as a corrective 
response. 
 
 
 
From Mass Society Thesis to Liberalism 
 
The mass society tradition can be traced back to reactions to the 18th century rise of 
urban commercial culture, though it was revived in the latter half of the 19th century 
to frame the terms of debate on the transition to monopoly forms of advanced 
capitalism (Hall, 1982: 57), and became the dominant paradigm in the earliest 
scholarship on broadcasting and the media in the 1930s to 1950s (Bennett, 1982: 31; 
Gurevitch et al, 1982: 8). Less an integrated body of theory than a loosely defined 
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outlook, the mass society tradition had evolved from the works of a range of social, 
cultural and political theorists, and consisted of such intersecting themes as the 
decline of the organic community, the rise of mass consumer culture, and the social 
atomisation of man, viewing pessimistically the processes of industrialisation, 
urbanisation, political democracy, popular education and mass communication 
(Bennett, 1982: 32).  
 
Although the mass society thesis that the media were influential enough to change 
the attitudes and beliefs of a susceptible public was empirically repudiated in the 
1940s-1960s by the liberal-pluralist approach, which demonstrated both the limited 
influence of the media and the manipulation of media messages by active audiences 
(Curran et al, 1982: 12), the equation of the absence of media conversion with the 
absence of influence was, in hindsight, rather simplistic. The ‘new look’ generation 
of researchers within the empirical effects tradition returned to the small print of 
these early studies, and even re-examined their original data, to reinterpret the 
findings as actually revealing the central role of the media in ‘consolidating and 
fortifying’ (albeit not converting) the values and attitudes of audiences (Curran et al, 
1982: 13-14). Further, the empirical research of the liberal-pluralist approach came to 
be more resolutely dismissed by the ‘critical paradigm’ (Hall, 1982) of the 1970s, 
which saw capitalist society in terms of class domination (Curran and Gurevitch, 
1977: 4-5), and the media as ideological agencies (Curran et al, 1982: 13), whether 
analysed from structuralist, culturalist or political-economy perspectives, within a 
general Marxist framework that tended to merge explicitly Marxist concepts with 
elements of the mass society thesis (Curran et al, 1982).  
 
Although sharing in common a critique of the liberal perspective and assuming a 
connection between economic interests and ideological representations (Curran, 
1990: 139), however, there were important differences between the political-
economic and radical-cultural wings of this critical paradigm. Whereas the former 
emphasised the significance of economic ownership and critiqued the indirect 
influence of both state and market (Murdock and Golding, 1977; Murdock, 1982; 
Hood, 1980), the latter focused more on the meda’s subordination to ideological 
control (Hall, 1977). As far as journalism and the media are concerned, the Glasgow 
University Media Group’s ‘concerted assault’ on the liberal-pluralist conception of 
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PSB and the fourth estate rhetoric of press freedom is perhaps the ‘most salient 
development’ of this ideological approach (Curran, 1990: 137). Their critique of the 
extent to which much of supposedly objective TV reporting was actually grounded in 
the assumptions of dominant groups in society (Glasgow University Media Group, 
1976; 1980; 1982; 1985) was accompanied by others, particularly from the 
Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, who also argued that 
broadcasting coverage was structured in dominance and that the media had an 
‘ideological effect’ (Hall, 1977), served dominant class interests and even 
misrepresented reality in a way that promoted false consciousness (Curran, 1990: 
138). The distinction between these critical approaches, as well as that between the 
critical and liberal-pluralist traditions, has, however, since broken down somewhat, 
as the political-economists moved towards more of an ideological approach, the 
ideologists incorporated some of the arguments of the liberal-pluralists, and those 
‘flirting’ with cultural relativism became increasingly critical (for an overview, see 
Curran, 1990: 140-158).   
 
Following the dominance of the mass society tradition, the liberal-pluralist empirical 
repudiation of its thesis, the amendments, revisions and qualifications to that 
repudiation by the ‘new look’ approach, and the absolute dismissal of its claims by 
the Frankfurt School-influenced and ideology-focused ‘critical paradigm’, there 
existed no clear ‘orthodoxy’ in media research by the beginning of the 1980s. In 
addition to the plethora of new linguistic and psychological methodologies for 
analysing the media, a range of theoretical perspectives also vied for dominance. 
Among the traditions drawn upon, those most relevant to the public-private 
dichotomy (and the subsequent emergence of the public sphere concept) were the 
populist (or culturally democratic), radical-libertarian and liberal approaches 
(Curran, 2002). While the populists praised commercial culture and critiqued the 
paternalism of PSB and state intervention, the liberals focused on the independence 
of the media, particularly from state power, and the potential of such independence to 
empower the public; in contrast, the radical-libertarians critiqued both the state and 
the market as the indirect means by which powerful elites maintain their influence 
over society.  
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According to the populist narrative, the market’s transfer of arts from the court to a 
fee-paying public, and the concomitant rise of a potentially assertive consumer 
society (the history of both of which are covered more critically by Habermas, 1989) 
were inherently democratising processes (Curran, 2002: 15). Similarly, the press's 
privileging of human interest stories over political coverage from the end of the 19th 
Century onwards is interpreted by populists as the emergence of a popular and 
increasingly accessible form of journalism (Curran, 2002: 18). Conversely, the 
Arnoldian and Reithian notion of ‘public service’ (Scannell, 1990), the explicit focus 
on maintaining editorial standards and the curbing of corporate power, which PSB 
supposedly represented, are criticised by the populists, therefore, for frustrating via 
state intervention an essentially egalitarian market (which had contributed towards 
the creation of an otherwise democratic common culture), with the aim of reasserting 
an elitist and exclusionary cultural hierarchy (Curran, 2002: 19).  
 
The radical-libertarian narrative, on the other hand, views both the state and the 
market as a dual system of control from which PSB is not immune. While PSB may 
be between public and private forms of control, its emphasis on impartiality has been 
shown by radical media sociologists to mask the indirect and insidious influence of 
political elites, while its ostensible independence from government has been 
similarly countered by claims of its lack of ideological independence from 
underlying power structures (Curran, 2002: 37-38). The liberal narrative, in contrast, 
views media history in terms of the increasing freedom of the media from state 
control and public authority, as well as in terms of the associated empowerment of 
the public (Curran, 2002: 4-6), with the market in the role of guarantor of the media’s 
democratic potential.  
 
However, the ‘sufficient diversity of contending perspectives’ (Gurevitch et al, 1982: 
8), which existed at the beginning of the 1980s, would not last until the end of the 
decade. On the one hand, the populists’ emphasis on consumption practices and 
distrust of state power, mixed with the liberal rhetoric of free markets, achieved 
hegemonic status as guiding values of media regulation (Curran, 2002: 22), 
articulated through a ‘neo-liberal rhetoric’ used to justify the destruction of PSB 
(Curran, 1990: 156). On the other hand, and largely in response to the new right’s 
assault on PSB and the welfare state in the UK, political concerns returned to the fore 
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and led to a revalorisation of the role of the state, citizenship and PSB, as a more 
intermediate theoretical perspective rose to dominance (Curran, 1990: 144; 156-157) 
and as media critics came out explicitly in defence of the BBC. In this local socio-
political context, in which critics ‘sought to articulate how PSB could and should 
underpin the public interest and civic culture in a realm otherwise dominated by 
commercial or state power’ (Lunt & Livingstone, 2013: 90), the emergence of the 
public sphere concept, which appeared to bridge the Marxist and free press 
approaches, introduced a new theoretical framework for such ideas, which enabled 
both a scholarly critique of this neoliberal hegemony and a simultaneous defence of 
PSB, consequently quashing the ‘lively and productive climate of [theoretical] 
debate’ (Gurevitch et al, 1982: 8) that had been predicted.  
  
 
 
Press Freedom and the Public Sphere 
 
Critical engagement with the realities of media history allowed an acknowledgment 
of both the positive and negative aspects of media independence from the state, and 
set the scene for an engagement with the theory of press freedom itself. Habermas’s 
history of the press in terms of the public sphere seemed to offer a way of 
simultaneously critiquing corporate as well as state power, and enabled the 
elaboration of the idea of independent regulation; that is, a sphere between public 
and private realms that could be protected from both the state and the market. Before 
going on to discuss broadcasting scholars’ appropriation of this concept in their 
defence of PSB, a brief overview of the critique of press freedom is required (see 
Dawes, 2013b; 2014 for a fuller account of the following). 
 
In 1855, the last of the state-imposed taxes on newspapers in England was abolished 
in the context of increasing literacy and a more universal franchise, whereby public 
reasoning had become more inclusive of non-business and non-professional classes 
(Thompson, 1995). The theory of press freedom, whether as an educational or 
representative ideal, as an influence on public opinion or as a reflection of public 
opinion and provider of news and facts (Hampton, 2001), derives from this mid-
Victorian era of newspapers making politics a public affair and the promise of a free 
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market in ideas. Originating as a practical means to combat the secret politics of the 
absolute state, the liberal faith in public opinion, the openness of political life and the 
freedom of the press evolved into an absolute value for liberalism, and became the 
guarantee of the elimination of secret politics, making the misuse of power 
unthinkable in a society in which public opinion had such a controlling force 
(Schmitt, 2010: 76-77).  
 
However, although the press achieved its freedom from the state in the nineteenth 
century, and achieved many positive things in making politics a public affair, by the 
end of that century, the rise of the press barons and the decline in content standards 
(or the democratisation of content, as the populists would argue) had already 
weakened press freedom from the market and cast doubt upon its democratic 
potential and its legitimacy as a form of public opinion. Although institutions such as 
the press had been originally ‘protected from interference by public authority by 
virtue of being in the hands of private people’, their critical functions have since, 
Habermas has argued, been threatened by ‘precisely their remaining in private hands’ 
(Habermas, 1989: 188), so that, owing to commercialisation and concentration, they 
have become ‘…the gate through which privileged private interests [invade] the 
public sphere’ (Habermas, 1989: 185). As conflicts hitherto considered private 
emerged in public, the public sphere became an arena of competing private interests 
and reasonable consensus degraded into compromise (Habermas, 1989: 132), so that 
scepticism about the importance of a free press and the political role of public 
opinion grew. 
 
The theory of press freedom also assumes that the press is a property right exercised 
by publishers on behalf of society, their free-market regulated actions being 
consistent with public opinion and the public interest, which in turn becomes 
synonymous with self-regulation and the market (Curran & Seaton, 2003: 346-347). 
As Curran (1979, 1991; Curran & Seaton, 2003) and others (Keane, 1991; 
Thompson, 1995) have pointed out, the liberal theory of press freedom makes a 
series of unconvincing assumptions. The idea of the press as a form of public opinion 
assumes that a market democracy is representative of the will of the people. But this 
ignores the distorting effects of capital in the marketplace, and the politically charged 
publishing environment in the UK that, despite the rhetorical independence from 
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politics, has tended to produce newspapers that are biased and partisan and more 
susceptible to influence from both politicians and political pressure groups than they 
are objective or neutral. The idea of the press as an agency of information highlights 
the numerous successes in holding political authority to account, but ignores the 
reality of the full range of newspaper content and the role of the press as an 
entertainment industry, not to mention the increasing blurring of the boundaries 
between information, entertainment and advertising. And the view of the press as an 
independent watchdog assumes, on one hand, that it is independent of economic 
interests, ignoring the size of the multinational corporations that own them and the 
fact that newspapers are often a subsidiary of a much larger network of multimedia 
and other industries, so can rarely be said to be free of vested interests. And it 
assumes, on the other hand, a political independence, ignoring the mutual advantage 
and lack of transparency in the relation between the press and political parties, the 
role of opaque lobbying and the influence of the media on government policy and on 
electoral results, which threatens not only the media's independence from 
government, but government's independence from the media. 
 
Because liberal theory conflates the freedom of the press with that of media owners, 
it overlooks the employee rights of journalists and disregards their freedom from the 
restraint and whims of their employers, and fails to recognise the reality of the 
incentives and constraints, inherent to an environment of market competition, that 
guide journalist behaviour. Consequently, press freedom from regulation fails to 
protect the press from the negative effects of competition and the needs to cut costs 
and boost profits. It also allows media owners to pursue their own private interests, 
using their power to influence public policies which, in turn, further deregulate 
media or other sectors in which they have vested interests, thus granting them even 
greater power in the name of press freedom. Such manifestations of market 
censorship (Jansen, 1991; Keane, 1991) undermine the liberal theory of press 
freedom, and suggest that a certain amount of state intervention (as in the 
broadcasting sector in the UK) would, in ensuring that the press met the obligations 
that attend its right to freedom of expression (Petley, 2012: 19), actually empower 
the press to express itself more freely. 
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2.2 CITIZENSHIP, THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND NEOLIBERALISM 
 
PSB and Citizenship 
 
In the 1980s, the distinction between a public service regulated environment and an 
unregulated commercial market became more entrenched in critical broadcasting 
scholarship in the UK. While the former was attached to citizenship and praised for 
its potentially positive contribution to the public sphere, the latter was associated 
with consumerism and denigrated for its negative impact on democracy.  
 
Debate in the first quarter of the 20
th
 Century on how to establish the most legitimate 
and effective regulatory framework for the emerging broadcasting industry had 
depended on the interpretation of broadcasting's power, and the extent to which it 
needed to be controlled, and on the classification of spectrum, whether understood as 
public resource or private property (Hesmondhalgh, 2013: 129; Streeter, 1995). 
While a commercial model had been developed in the US, whereby private 
companies ‘made profits by packaging audiences for sale to advertisers and 
beckoned their viewers and listeners to join the democratic community of 
consumers’, a public service model had been adopted in the UK, whereby a licence 
fee funded a public corporation which ‘didn’t take advertising and which addressed 
audiences as members of a national and imperial community’ (Murdock, 1999: 31).  
 
This distinction foregrounded two overarching identities, those of ‘citizen’ and 
‘consumer’ (Murdock, 1999: 31), which traditionally denoted either the public or the 
private sphere: 
 
Within the political realm the individual is defined as a 
citizen exercising public rights of debate, voting etc, within a 
communally agreed structure of rules and towards 
communally defined ends. The value system is essentially 
social and the legitimate end of social action is the public 
good. Within the economic realm on the other hand the 
individual is defined as producer and consumer exercising 
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private rights through purchasing power on the market in the 
pursuit of private interests, his or her actions being 
coordinated by the invisible hand of the market.  
(Garnham, 1990: 110) 
 
This left-wing critique of media policy in the name of citizenship, which has 
continued to dominate and develop since the 1980s, called for market power to be 
tempered through regulation (Flew, 2006: 295) and counterposed the ‘citizen’ and 
the ‘consumer’ as exemplars of ‘social democratic’ and ‘neoliberal’ approaches, 
respectively (Flew, 2006: 296). PSB is thus praised as the rejection of market 
definitions and the refusal to deliver commodities to consumers (Garnham, 1983), or 
consumers to advertisers (Murdock, 1999); rather, it is shown to foster a shared 
public life (Scannell & Cardiff, 1991) among rational citizens in the public sphere 
(Scannell, 1989).  
 
Drawing on the work of TH Marshall, Graham Murdock identifies four ‘clusters’ of 
rights that are constitutive of the ideal type of citizenship that emerged alongside the 
development of mass media communication. To the civil (freedom of belief and 
action, from torture and arbitrary detention) and political (the universal franchise and 
jury system that allows individuals to participate in the laws under which they are 
governed) rights of the 19
th
 Century, the socio-economic and information-cultural 
rights of the 20
th
 were added. Murdock argues that socio-economic (employee, 
consumer and welfare) rights are the minimum material basis for the exercise of civil 
and political rights, and that information-cultural rights are important for securing the 
symbolic and discursive resources necessary for the exercise of citizenship. More 
specifically, while information rights require that the fullest range of information is 
provided within a framework of arguments and concepts (that is, not simply that all 
information is made available, but that all relevant information is made available, 
alongside informed opinions from a range of perspectives), cultural rights signify that 
complex spaces should be made available within which individuals can recognise 
themselves and affirm themselves for what they wish to be (Murdock, 1999: 29-30). 
These rights of representation, or ‘rights of everyday life’, relate to social identities 
that cannot be neatly subsumed within the master-categories of ‘citizen’ or 
‘consumer’ (Murdock, 1999: 30), thus blurring the traditional boundaries between 
public and private. The complexity of these social identities and the significance of 
54 
 
these ‘rights of everyday life’ contribute, Murdock argues, towards a tension in the 
way that communicative and representative rights are addressed in government 
literature on broadcasting regulation. The significance of the mass media 
communications sector lies in both the role it plays in organising the symbolic world 
(where these rights can be guaranteed), and in its position as a link between the 
economic structures and cultural formations of modern capitalist societies. It 
connects a ‘productive system rooted in private ownership to a political system [of] a 
citizenry whose full social participation depends in part on access to the maximum 
possible range of information and analysis and to open debate’ (Murdock, 1993: 4). 
 
References to citizenship in regulatory discourse, however, have been accused of 
equating it merely with formal participation in the political process, ignoring its 
participatory aspects and limiting links between broadcasting and citizenship to news 
and current affairs, while leaving drama and entertainment to be subsumed under the 
signs of ‘culture’ or ‘quality’ (Murdock, 1999: 29). Although users of public services 
continued to be depicted as citizens in Conservative government documents 
throughout the 1990s (Keat, Whitely & Abercrombie, 1994: 15), and their rights to 
decent standards of public services set out in charters, such as John Major’s Citizen’s 
Charter (1991), some have argued that this merely conflated citizenship rights with 
consumer rights (Murdock, 1999: 29; Needham, 2003). Nonetheless, the 
representation of consumer rights in terms of citizenship does not necessarily exclude 
other aspects of citizenship rights; rather, a conceptual space for these rights is left 
remaining. There exists, however, the very real possibility that this space could be 
filled by ‘consumerist redefinitions of non-market forms of citizenship’, which 
would lead to confusion over the distinction between consumer sovereignty and the 
position of the citizen in the political sphere (Keat, Whitely & Abercrombie, 1994: 
15).  
 
 
 
PSB and the Public Sphere 
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The idea of a public, as opposed to a private or commercial, system of 
communication usually makes reference to Habermas’s work on the public sphere 
(Stevenson, 2003); ‘a realm of our social life in which something approaching public 
opinion can be formed’ (Habermas, 1996). In the three decades between the 
publication in German of Strukturwandel der Öffenlicheit in 1962 and its English 
translation as The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Habermas, 1989), 
the issues raised by Habermas had been largely neglected in the English-speaking 
world (Thompson, 1993: 173), which had until then favoured approaching the role of 
broadcasting (as we saw in the previous section) within either the framework of the 
state/civil society dichotomy and the liberal theory of the free press (Garnham, 1986: 
39-40), or an alternative ‘critical paradigm’ (Hall, 1982; Scannell, 1989) that was 
dismissive of press freedom and the democratic potential of the mass media.  
 
As well as filling a theoretical void in British media studies, however, the 
appropriation of the public sphere concept and its application to PSB can also be 
seen as part of the British left’s defence of PSB against Thatcherite reforms 
(Thompson, 1993) – and successive waves of marketization (Hesmondhalgh, 2013) – 
as well as their protest against the shift towards market interests, rather than the idea 
of public service, in the cultural sector, and the shift in the definition of public 
information from a public good to a private commodity (Garnham, 1986: 40). 
Although there were also criticisms of PSB from the left (in terms of the BBC’s 
paternalism), and supplementary praise for the democratic importance of commercial 
PSB (Garnham, 2003; Scannell, 1990), the association of PSB with the public sphere 
armed proponents with the emancipatory arguments they needed to challenge those 
of the privatising marketeers (Collins, 1993: 246-247). It also established 
commercial TV, or, at least, the possibility of an unregulated broadcasting market, as 
a threat to democracy (Dahlgren, 2000: 13), to such an extent that even writers more 
critical of PSB and some of the assumptions made by Habermas (Curran, 1991; 
Thompson, 1995) advocated a move away from both Marxist and free press 
approaches.  
 
There were, however, differences in the ways in which Habermas’s work was 
appropriated. Paddy Scannell’s employment of the public sphere concept was in 
reaction to the dominant view of broadcasting among British academics ‘from F.R. 
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Leavis through Richard Hoggart to Stuart Hall’ (Scannell, 1989: 136), which 
devalued broadcasting’s role as a ‘form of social control, or of cultural 
standardisation or of ideological (mis)representation’ (Scannell, 1989: 136). 
Emphasising instead broadcasting’s role as a public good contributing to the 
democratisation of everyday life, Scannell’s appropriation shared assumptions with 
the liberal-pluralist approach that saw the media as providing a forum for debate that 
reflected the attitudes of society (Curran et al, 1982: 21), and as performing the 
liberal democratic function of a fourth estate, independent of government and 
essential for democracy (Bennett, 1982: 31). Whereas the mass society tradition had 
seen the media as a threat, whether to cultural values or to democracy, for Scannell it 
was the unfettered market that was the threat to that which the publicly regulated 
media could help sustain. Taking from Habermas a historical approach to the 
formation of the public sphere, Scannell provided a historical account of 
broadcasting as a public service, both in terms of its content, which produced a new 
form of public life, and in terms of its audiences, which constituted a new kind of 
general public (Scannell, 1989: 136-137).  
 
For Nicholas Garnham, on the other hand, the relationship between public and 
private was inherently problematic in broadcasting, and meant that PSB occupied a 
unique position that defied analysis within the framework of contemporary debate, 
which had ‘traditionally been carried on within the terms of the Hegelian state/civil 
society dichotomy’ (Garnham, 1986: 39), within which the dominant theory had been 
the liberal theory of the free press, derived from the history of print communication. 
Garnham argued that even the wealth of substantiated evidence used to critique this 
theory had failed to suggest better alternatives, with the public service model of 
broadcasting being seen as an unfortunate necessity of technical limitations rather 
than as a positive good in itself. Garnham proposed approaching broadcasting from 
the perspective of public sphere theory as an escape from the bind of the state/market 
dichotomy (Garnham, 1986: 40), as the public sphere was distinct from both the 
economy and the state, opening up instead a space between the two (Garnham, 1986: 
41). The concept offered for the first time a viable democratic alternative to the free 
press, as well as a seemingly accurate description of PSB: hypothetically insulated 
from control by both the state and the market, and presupposing, it was alleged, a 
political rather than an economic audience (Garnham, 1986: 45-47).  
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Although the legitimacy of the class-based definition of the public good, and the 
efficacy of imposing this public good upon the public through a monopoly, are 
among the weaknesses of the practical application of this ideal, because the mass 
media operate simultaneously across the political and economic realms, as both 
commercial operations and as political institutions, PSB presupposes political rather 
than economic social relations, addressing the public as political beings rather than as 
consumers, and insulating itself from control by both the state and the market 
(Garnham, 1986: 45-47). Comparing the PSB model of the UK (which included the 
regulated commercial sector) favourably against both print communication and the 
commercially driven broadcasting model of the US in terms of their contribution to 
democracy, and acknowledging the role of commercial TV (within the former 
model) in making advances as part of the public sphere in the UK, he argued that a 
public service regulated environment was the most effective, if imperfect, 
embodiment of the public sphere ideal (Garnham, 1983; 1986; 2003; Murdock, 1993, 
1999; Scannell, 1990). 
 
The public-private dichotomy, however has never been rigid or clear cut in the 
historical development of modern societies. States continuously modified the legal 
and political frameworks within which the capitalist economic organisations 
emerged, and were, in turn, constrained by the development of the economy (and its 
effect on their ability to raise taxes). While the state has been increasingly 
interventionist, private individuals have united to form pressure groups to influence 
government policy. The boundary between the two realms has become a focus of 
political debate as governments either try to expand public services, by bringing parts 
of the private sector under state control, or dismantle them through privatisation, by 
selling off state responsibilities to individual companies (Thompson, 1990), while the 
increasingly relational nature of public communication has contributed to ever more 
interactive relationships between public and private life (Scannell, 1989: 161).  
 
Nevertheless, academic thinking on broadcasting is now grounded (albeit not 
uncritically) in the links between PSB, citizenship and the public sphere. Admittedly, 
increasing attention has been paid to questions about the culture-politics divide and 
the normative or empirical, universal or plural application of the public sphere 
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concept (Born, 2006: 106; Fenton & Downey, 2003), as well as to political 
philosophical debates on democracy and difference (Born, 2006), and the contested 
nature of citizenship and the public interest, particularly in postcolonial societies 
(Wasserman, 2013; Wasserman & Jacobs, 2013). But despite such qualification and 
recognition of complexity, the category of the public sphere continues to be 
employed in a ‘generic’ sense to see how it can be most productively understood 
today (Dahlgren, 2000: 90), and these questions tend to be incorporated into a 
recasting of citizenship and the public sphere along less universal, exclusive or 
rational lines, or into an updated account of either citizenship (Coleman, 2001; 
2005a; 2005b) or the public sphere (Dahlberg, 2001; Dahlgren, 2005) in the context 
of technological changes.  
 
 
 
Marketisation and Neoliberalism 
 
Although PSB has been criticised from the left for not being as impartial as it has 
claimed to be (Glasgow University Media Group, 1976), for reproducing class power 
through its labour relations (Garnham, 1990) and for failing to provide programming 
for non-elite audiences (Ang, 1991), in the absence of better alternatives the 
tendency has been to address particular weaknesses in actually existing PSB and to 
propose reforms. The critique of PSB from the right, however –in terms of market 
impact and the illegitimacy of public intervention in the private realm – has tended to 
advocate the privatisation and deregulation of the broadcasting sector, and the 
wholesale replacement of PSB by a free market.  
 
Since the 1980s, two distinct approaches have dominated debate over the regulation 
of broadcasting in the UK, whether they are conceived as left-wing and right-wing, 
political-social and economic (Born, 2006), the cultural and economic ‘ends of the 
telescope’ (Barnett, 2002), social values-led and economy-driven (Ofcom, 2004), or 
social democratic and neoliberal (Flew, 2006; Lunt & Livingstone, 2012). The 
former has been preoccupied by the protection of broadcasting from corporate power 
and market logic, emphasises the importance of broadcasting for democracy, and 
considers the contemporary issue of digitisation in terms of e-government, the 
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‘digital divide’, achieving ‘universal digital access’, and mitigating social exclusion. 
The latter perspective, on the other hand, is treated as continuous with the Peacock 
Report (1986), and is concerned with competition, market failure, the limits/scope of 
public intervention/funding and, currently, the role of digital media in boosting the 
UK’s prosperity and competitiveness. Issues include replacing the licence fee with 
subscription, and limiting PSB to market failure provision, with benefits seen in 
terms of consumer choice and interactivity (Born, 2006: 104).  
 
Contrary to fears about the privatisation of the BBC under Thatcher’s government, 
however, the Peacock Report (1986) argued against the government’s suggestion of 
replacing the licence fee. Nevertheless, Thatcher’s influence has been evident in 
regulatory change since Peacock, as the BBC have introduced internal markets 
(Born, 2003), and controls on market concentration and cross-media ownership have 
been weakened through legislation, such as the Broadcasting Act (1996) and the 
Communications Act (2003) (Hesmondhalgh, 2013: 142). Although the positive 
contribution to society since the 1980s of principles that recognise individual rights, 
such as value for money, transparency and accountability, have been acknowledged 
by some, they are nevertheless regarded as consumerist values. These have been 
accompanied by a change in language, with ‘customers’ replacing more specific 
appellations (such as ‘viewer’), as well as the quantification of quality, and the 
increasing dependence upon quantitative measures of performance, league tables and 
auditing, which privilege quantifiable performance and ignore that which is difficult 
to quantify (Barnett, 2002: 37). 
 
More recently, New Labour’s desire to correct the market distortion of PSB 
institutions (Freedman, 2008: 158) has led to a recasting of ‘public service’ in terms 
of programming rather than institutions, and the reconceptualisation of the BBC’s 
relation to the rest of the broadcasting environment, to the extent that the BBC is no 
longer regulated as an institution in its own right, but only insofar as it is tied to its 
commercial rivals (Freedman, 2008: 149), who may also be providers of public 
service content. Although praise continues to be offered for PSB, and even the BBC, 
in regulatory documents such as the White Paper (2006), such praise is now almost 
entirely from the perspective of market competition (Freedman, 2008: 169).  
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Such changes are part of a wider trend, understood as either ‘marketisation’ and/or 
‘neoliberalisation’ (Freedman, 2008; Hesmondhalgh, 2013). Dating back to the 
1970s/1980s, this trend is seen as involving processes of privatisation (the expansion 
of private ownership and the outsourcing of service provision to the private sector), 
deregulation (the lifting of state restraints) and liberalisation (the opening up of 
barriers to national markets), whereby audiences are reconceptualised as 
‘consumers’. While ‘marketisation’ is understood as the privileging of market 
exchange as the guiding principle of the cultural industries (Hesmondhalgh, 2013: 
126-128), ‘neoliberalism’ is more ambiguous. Hesmondhalgh sees it as the political 
context of marketisation (Hesmondhalgh, 2013: 102) and equates it with the shift in 
government policy towards an unregulated free market (Hesmondhalgh, 2013: 99-
100), often expressed by the ‘information society’ rhetoric of policymakers over 
recent decades. Contradictions between the typically neoliberal critique of the BBC 
in terms of market distortion, on the one hand, and the concomitant re-envisaging of 
the BBC’s information society role in ‘building digital Britain’ are, consequently, 
interpreted as evidence of the incoherence of neoliberal policy (Born, 2005).  
 
The neoliberal perspective is contrasted with the Marxian critique of culture 
commodification (Hesmondhalgh, 2013: 128; 156), whereby marketisation is resisted 
by advocates of the public interest and PSB (such as Murdock). While Sylvia Harvey 
has identified the ethos of communications regulation under the New Labour 
government and the regulator it established as neoliberal, dismissing it as appropriate 
for an analysis of markets and competition, but not of ‘social significance and 
cultural value’ (S Harvey, 2006), Hesmondhalgh has argued, drawing on David 
Harvey (2007), that their media policy approach represents more of a hybrid of 
neoliberal and social democratic perspectives, combining marketisation with public 
service and public interest concerns (Hesmondhalgh, 2005). Meanwhile, others have 
seen the New Labour perspective as primarily a variant of economic neoliberalism 
with only overtones of social democracy, where neoliberalism is more explicitly seen 
as a free market ideology that serves powerful private interests, and which 
undermines both PSB and the public sphere (Leys, 2001).  
 
Des Freedman, for example, has emphasised that media policy and regulation need to 
be understood in terms of political acts and ideological influences (Freedman, 2008: 
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13), rather than as a disinterested process that is impartially applied in the public 
interest (Freedman, 2008: 2), focusing our attention on the informal and relatively 
invisible influence of corporate lobbying as much as official policymaking processes 
(Freedman, 2008: 12). Although such an approach sees neoliberalism as aversion to 
state intervention in markets (Freedman, 2008: 11), it sees debate less in terms of a 
regulated market versus a free market, and more in terms of a distinction between 
regulation that is either in the public interest or for private interests (Freedman, 2008: 
17). Although technological convergence and the hybrid status of the internet have 
disrupted easy distinctions between public (press and broadcasting) and private 
(telecommunications) forms of communication, scholars such as Freedman and 
Garnham maintain that there remain distinctions between private transactions on the 
model of the market and public communication in the public sphere (Freedman, 
2008: 16; 21; Garnham, 1990).  
 
Heavily influenced by the ideological critique of media regulation (in the work of 
Garnham and Murdock) and neoliberalism (D Harvey, 2007), Freedman's 
engagement with those alternative approaches (including the work of Jamie Peck and 
colleagues, discussed in detail in Part Eight) that have emphasised the contradictory, 
historically-specific and ongoing nature of neoliberalisation ultimately concludes 
that, despite such contradictions and theoretical nuance, neoliberalism remains 
fundamentally connected to a limited set of core ideas; namely, free markets, 
individual rights, personal choice, small government and minimal regulation 
(Freedman, 2008: 25; 36). And despite acknowledging that neoliberalism shares 
certain features with classical liberalism, such as competition, marketplace 
democracy and freedom from the state, Freedman nevertheless argues that 
neoliberalism’s privileging of private property as one of its fundamental principles 
distinguishes it from earlier guises of liberalism (Freedman, 2008: 37). He warns, 
however, that in providing long lists of its negative tendencies (as described in Part 
Seven), or in treating it as shorthand for marketisation, neoliberalism is ‘flattened 
and homogenised’, to the extent that it comes to be little more than an ‘umbrella term 
for all that is wrong with a more commercialised society’, simultaneously 
dehistoricising the process (and suggesting that market obsession is only a recent 
phenomenon) and marginalising the tensions and competing interests at the heart of 
neoliberal projects (Freedman, 2008: 37-38). He also acknowledges, by reference to 
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David Harvey, the multiple forms of neoliberalism, distinguishing between the 
circumscribed Swedish variant and the more sustained UK variety, for example, as 
well as Jamie Peck’s elaboration of the differences between neoliberalism’s roll-back 
and roll-out policies within such variants (see Part Seven for an elaboration of this). 
Further, he accepts that the reification of neoliberalism as something that is 
manifested everywhere risks conflating distinct aspects of neoliberal thought and 
missing the links between ideas and practices (Freedman, 2008: 42-45).  
 
Nevertheless, Freedman maintains that a singular conception of neoliberalism that 
foregrounds its links with increasing social inequality remains both useful and 
necessary (Freedman, 2008: 46), and recommends understanding neoliberalism 
instead (Freedman, 2008: 41) as a range of discourses that legitimate the market and 
delegitimate the social (Couldry, 2006), with the aim of transforming the balance of 
forces so as to facilitate capital accumulation (D Harvey, 2007). He maintains that 
while appreciating varieties of neoliberalisation and acknowledging the nuances of 
neoliberal thought is a useful area of research, it remains limited compared to 
research that develops a sense of what links such variation and nuance together, 
approaching neoliberalism instead as a purposeful political project with an 
overarching commitment to private over public institutions and interests (Freedman, 
2008: 223-224). 
 
This ‘social democratic’ approach, which associates PSB with citizenship and the 
public sphere, contrasts it with consumerism, commercial media and the free market, 
and sees broadcasting history in terms of increasing marketisation or 
neoliberalisation, has dominated academic debate on broadcasting regulation in the 
UK since the 1980s. In the following section, the history of broadcasting regulation, 
as it has been depicted throughout this literature, will be summarised in terms of its 
relevance to the key concepts of debate and the public-private dichotomy, focusing 
on the principles of public service, public interest and consumer choice.  
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2.3 PUBLIC SERVICE, PUBLIC INTEREST AND CONSUMER CHOICE 
 
Public Service and Press Freedom Approaches 
 
Broadcasting in the UK has traditionally been regulated from the perspective of 
media organisation and framed in terms of the debate between ‘public service’ remits 
and the invisible hand of the free market. Conversely, the UK's legal approach to 
press regulation presupposes a market and frames debate in terms of the paternalist-
libertarian dichotomy of privacy versus free speech, whereby the ‘public interest’ 
functions as little more than a defence for particular activities carried out within a 
market framework (Curran & Seaton, 2003). Consequently, while the public interest-
supplemented self-regulation of the press views newspaper readers primarily as 
consumers, the public service remit of broadcasters and the independent regulatory 
broadcasting environment has, in contrast, traditionally viewed audiences as citizens 
first, consumers second.   
 
Over the course of the 20th century, however, this dichotomous relationship between 
the public service and press freedom approaches to media regulation became less 
distinct as attempts to address more popular tastes, as well as the representation of 
minority or marginalised groups and interests, coincided with broadcasting’s 
acceleration into the corporate system (Curran & Seaton, 2003; Murdock, 1993; 
1999). The dichotomous relationship between the models began breaking down in 
the mid-1950s, following the introduction of commercial television in the (quasi-
corporate) form of ITV. While this second channel (now Channel 3) was privately 
owned by independent companies that sought profits, it represented a ‘half-way 
house’ between a public and a commercial service, with corporate logic being 
restrained by extensive public service requirements, and controls on advertising and 
ownership (Murdock, 1999: 32). Whereas the BBC continued to represent a 
nationally unified community (and in so doing, deny the differences between 
citizens), ITV emphasised the differences of class, region and generation among the 
public.  
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In comparison with the more inclusive commercial model of US broadcasting, the 
BBC was criticised in the 1970s for its condescending attitude towards the lower 
classes and for failing to represent a range of groups, from women, the disabled, the 
elderly and the young to national minorities, the latter of which brought the very 
definition of national culture under scrutiny. These ‘crises of representation’ 
coincided with broadcasting’s acceleration into the corporate system (Murdock, 
1999: 33), and it was in this context that the Annan Committee met in 1977. 
Breaking with ‘imagined unities of national culture’ and abandoning the commitment 
to an undivided public good, they embraced Britain as a ‘fractured cultural 
formation’ and replaced the ideal of public service with the principle of liberal 
pluralism (Curran & Seaton, 2003: 304; and Murdock, 1999: 33). Breaking with the 
Pilkington Report’s (1962) hostility towards advertising, the Committee proposed 
that, while the new channel (Channel 4) should ‘address constituencies of interest 
that were under-represented in mainstream terrestrial programming’ (Murdock, 1999: 
34), it should also be funded by a mixture of advertising revenue and public funds
1
. 
Murdock regards this contradiction as a source of tension in the way the channel 
constructs and represents difference. ‘The remit clearly works with a conception of 
social interests whilst advertisers work with a map of market niches’ (Murdock, 
1999: 34). The distinction between the two overarching identities of ‘citizen’ and 
‘consumer’ becomes, therefore, significantly blurred, and the ‘tone, language and 
style of everyday life’ increasingly ambiguous, as the contested representations of 
the public become depoliticised and re-presented in the private realm.  
 
Whereas ‘the concept of public service is elaborated in all broadcasting reports 
before that of the Annan Committee’, the ideal of broad consensus on the public 
interest is abandoned and replaced by the principle of a free marketplace in the 
private realm ‘in which balance could be achieved through the competition of a 
multiplicity of independent voices’ (Curran & Seaton, 2003: 303). This pluralist view 
of the Report left broadcasters defenceless against the threats posed by technological 
developments. By redefining public service there were left no grounds upon which to 
                                                          
1
 C4 was originally funded by the already existing, and advertising funded, commercial companies, 
specifically so that it would be removed from the direct pressure of advertisers. The 1990 
Broadcasting Act, however, removed this barrier. 
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regulate the impact of the inevitable introduction of cable, video, satellite and digital 
broadcasting.  
 
Further, with the end of spectrum scarcity, the case for deregulation was reinforced. 
The technical justification for state regulation had been the scarcity of spectrum 
frequency, which, considered as a public resource, needed to be managed in the 
public interest. In contrast to the press, broadcasting had been organised as a public 
service for precisely this technical reason. Curran and Seaton (2003) claim, however, 
that the argument had always been more of an ideological than a technical one, as it 
presupposed that public interest management was better entrusted to the state than 
the marketplace. Whereas the rhetoric of the (very real) technical limitations had 
been used to mask the ideological incentives for regulation by the state in the 1920s, 
the increasing inapplicability of the rhetoric in the late 1970s coincided, it is argued, 
with a shift in ideology towards the effectiveness of the market (Curran & Seaton, 
2003; Murdock, 1993; 1999). 
 
 
 
From Public Service to Consumer Choice 
 
From the 1920s to the 1970s, broadcasting regulation in the UK assumed an ethos of 
public service. Although the earliest reports – Sykes (1923) and Crawford (1926) – 
had focused on ensuring that PSB was set up in a way that guaranteed its 
independence (the independence of what was at the time just one institution) and the 
service of the national interest, little attention was paid to debating these issues 
between then and the 1960s/1970s, both because governments had been more 
concerned with technical matters, and because there had been little disagreement 
over what constituted the national interest (Curran & Seaton, 2003). The Annan 
Report (1977) is regarded as the last example of a formal, systematic attempt to 
examine the role, future and contribution of broadcasting in cultural rather than 
economic terms, coinciding as it did with the political turning point of the 
corporatism of the 1960s and 1970s giving way to the individualism, market 
liberalism and private enterprise of the 1980s.  
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During the 1980s, however, the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher 
followed a radical programme of economic and institutional reform, grounded in 
economic liberalism, which appealed to market efficiency, individual liberty and a 
non-interventionist state (Keat & Abercrombie, 1991: 1), and consisted of the 
transfer of state-owned industries to the private sector, and the reorganisation of 
publicly funded bodies. Under the Thatcher government, such bodies were 
reconstructed in the model of a commercial enterprise, with the term ‘consumer’ 
becoming increasingly commonplace in its displacement of other terms that were 
‘more closely tied to the ways in which the specific nature and purposes of these 
institutions’ activities had previously been understood’ (Keat & Abercrombie, 1991: 
3).  
 
With these developments in mind, the Peacock Report (1986) went on to reinterpret 
the role of the market in broadcasting, by defending PSB insofar as it was a 
‘successful attempt to replicate artificially a true broadcasting market,’ and thus more 
in its function as protector of consumer sovereignty than as a service for the public 
good. It is the report that set the tone of economic priorities and an economic 
approach to PSB, establishing the ideological position for the subsequent White 
Paper (1988) and Broadcasting Act (1990), as well as the new vocabulary of 
regulatory discourse throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Curran & Seaton, 2003). In the 
context of Thatcherite Britain, however, the Peacock Report (1986) could be praised 
for at least putting public service temporarily back on the agenda, by stressing the 
social importance of broadcasting, espousing the libertarian value judgments 
distrusted by Thatcherites, and advising against the replacement of the licence fee by 
advertising, albeit in the name of consumer sovereignty.  
 
David Ward has suggested that public service nevertheless continued to evolve, 
regardless of the various funding regimes for the different channels, until the 1990s 
(Ward, 2005: 1608), at which point the Broadcasting Act (1990), representing the 
‘first major reform’ of PSB regulation, increased competition and shifted public 
policy objectives to account for it (Ward, 2005: 1607). All the same, even this 
document was less terminal for PSB than would have been expected in the 1980s, 
due to the insistence on the cultural value of PSB from across the political divide 
(Barnett, 2002: 34).  
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Although the Royal Charter (1996) and the Broadcasting Act (1996) encouraged the 
BBC to increase its commercial activities rather than relying on an increase in the 
licence fee, ‘economic priorities qualified by cultural considerations’ led to a ‘more 
muted market-led approach’ throughout the 1990s under both Conservative and New 
Labour governments (Barnett, 2002: 34). Barnett claims that the advent of New 
Labour was an ideological continuation of the cautious mixture of market and culture 
approaches of the Major government, with the rhetoric of culture remaining 
subservient to the substance of market objectives. While the Davies Report (1999) 
recommended an increase in the licence fee to support digital switchover, 
consultation papers on the future of the BBC, reforming ownership and digital 
proposals, represented a mixture of market-led reforms and an acknowledgment of 
the cultural-political role of PSB (Barnett, 2002: 35). Despite the Davies Report’s 
(1999) request that there be clear and separate accounts to distinguish between the 
BBC’s public service and commercial activities (Ward, 2005: 1628), however, there 
has been little acknowledgment of the problems of consolidation between different 
commercial media corporations, whereby a newspaper may report news from a 
perspective that serves the interests of a TV channel (or vice versa) within the same 
empire. Barnett has accused the newspaper industry, for example, of reporting the 
arguments around charter renewal almost exclusively from an economistic 
perspective (Barnett, 2002: 36). 
 
Finance became more of an issue from the Broadcasting Act (1990) onwards, which 
gave only two paragraphs worth of attention to ‘quality programmes’ but fifteen 
pages worth to financial arrangements. Throughout the 1990s, the content of 
programmes became a side issue as the main concern in broadcasting regulation 
became the means of delivery of new services (Curran & Seaton, 2003: 305). In 
short, attention turned away from an ideal of serving a unified public, regardless of 
cost, and, taking into consideration technological developments and costs to the 
service providers, moved towards an understanding of the public as a community of 
private individuals, and of quality programming as ‘what the public would be willing 
to pay for.’  
 
68 
 
While these transformations were subtler in the cases of broadcasting, health and 
education than those taking place in the railway, mining and telecommunication 
sectors, the Conservative agenda of privatisation was always overt. It has been 
argued that  under the New Labour government, however, the rhetoric of 
transcending the citizen-consumer divide has concealed the continuation of this 
trend, and the priority of the economy over culture in significant aspects of public 
policy (Steemers, 1999: 235), by foregrounding technological developments and 
constructing the free market as ‘already there.’ In the case of broadcasting, this has 
involved managing the remodelling of the public service broadcasters to the agenda 
of the development of digital technology and the converging media sectors. In 
response to the complexity of technological and economic convergence, as well as 
the public’s confusion with so many regulators, the Communications White Paper 
(2000) established Ofcom (the Office of Communications) as a single meta-
regulator. Following the Communications Act (2003), the National Audit Office now 
audits all BBC activities (Ward, 2005: 1623), even though the BBC had previously 
been exempted from a full external audit so as to protect its independence, and the 
BBC has itself since internalised accountability structures through mechanisms such 
as ‘public value’ tests and key performance indicators (Ward, 2005: 1625-1626).  
 
However, while privatisation and technological developments make the convergence 
of media sectors possible and the economic merger of corporations across sectors 
likely, it has been argued that this, in turn, increases the amount of power 
corporations have over media production and service provision. Consequently, prior 
to corporations taking advantage of these new opportunities, a change in the political 
context is also required (Murdock, 1993: 2-3). This context has been one of 
deregulation and liberalisation. Successive governments have transferred ownership 
from the public to the private sector, whereby the power of the leading 
conglomerates has been reinforced and extended. However, while the private sector 
was heavily regulated (to spread ownership and limit foreign programming) when 
competition was first introduced into the market in 1954, with the contemporary 
agenda of liberalisation, such regulation is being weakened so that national markets 
are opened up to the major international corporations (Murdock, 1993: 10) – indeed, 
Murdock argues that with each new incarnation of the regulator, the rationale has 
been to extend corporate influence further (Murdock, 1999: 39). He sees 
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‘deregulation’ as a misnomer, however, as it becomes not so much a reduction in the 
number of rules that is signified, as a ‘shift in their overall rationale, away from a 
defence of the public interest and towards the promotion of corporate interests’ 
(Murdock, 1993: 12). This ‘reregulation’ reinterprets the defence of the civil right to 
freedom of speech, for example, so that corporate promotion can be seen as a 
continuation of individual speech, and advertising as ‘commercial speech’ (Murdock, 
1993: 14).  
 
Consequently, critical scholarship on broadcasting regulation tends to represent these 
developments as a shift: in ethos, from one of public service to one of consumer 
interest; in emphasis, from the public to private interests; and, in address, from 
constructing the audience as citizens to constructing them as consumers. As part of 
this shift, both paradigms, and the relations between them, have gone through a 
process of renegotiation. 
 
In the first instance (in the 1920s), the UK model of PSB was set up as the opposite 
of the commercial model in the US. With the following introduction of competition 
to the market (in the 1950s), the BBC’s direct responsibility to the public was 
compromised by the need to compete with ITV.  Likewise, the restrictions that were 
put on ITV meant that definitions of consumer interest were made to include aspects 
of the public service ethos. Both models were, therefore, redefined through 
competition, and the differences between the two models reduced. With the arrival of 
Channel Four (in the early 1980s) as a response to the ‘crises of representation,’ 
however, public service was redefined to emphasise the individual in the 
(increasingly commercial) private realm. By the mid-1980s, PSB was regarded as a 
protector of consumer sovereignty in the pre-digital environment, and, therefore, in 
strictly private (and corporate) terms. Meanwhile, state restrictions to the corporate 
logic of the commercial model have been continually weakened, while the 
corporations involved in the sector have become increasingly powerful. 
 
 
 
Public Interest and Private Interests 
 
70 
 
Since the 1990s, economic and technological convergence has weakened 
justifications for regulating broadcasting as a public service, and therefore differently 
to other media (Barnett 2002, 36), while consumer choice and market objectives, 
equated with the ‘public interest’ (Goodwin & Spittle, 2002; Naranen, 2002), 
presuppose broadcasting as a market much like any other. Despite Ofcom’s aim to 
balance the interests of both citizens and consumers (Lunt & Livingstone, 2012), it 
sees public service as only one subset among others, such as competition and a 
thriving market, of this new public interest (Dawes, 2007: 12).  
 
Although deriving from liberal debates in economic regulation and the history of 
consumer rights (McQuail, 1992), however, the common good conception of ‘public 
interest’ has traditionally been a countervailing force to markets and private interests, 
rather than an accessory to it (Freedman, 2008: 67). It remains, however, a ‘narrowly 
consumer-oriented’ standard compared to the concept of ‘public service’, which 
rejects the (neo)liberal view of society as an aggregation of contracting and 
exchanging individuals (Curran & Seaton, 2003). The ‘neoliberal privatisation’ of 
the public interest has, furthermore, jettisoned the common good interpretation, and 
linked it firmly with individual consumer choice instead (Freedman, 2008: 68-69), 
while New Labour has redefined its use in media regulation more in terms of 
consumer sovereignty and market competition than the common good (Freedman, 
2008: 70). 
 
Concomitant to this displacement of the ‘public service’ ethos by market logic and 
the ‘public interest’ has been the increasing influence of private interests upon the 
policymaking and regulatory process. The Communications Act (2003), which 
introduced three tiers of (external, co- and self-) regulation into broadcasting and 
weakened the rules on cross-media ownership (Ward, 2005: 1616), is seen, for 
instance, as a prime example of the result of an unequal struggle between the 
corporate lobbyists, on the one hand, and groups such as Public Voice and Voice of 
the Listener and Viewer, on the other (Barnett, 2002: 36). This gulf in lobbying 
power between corporate interests and public interest or consumer groups is even 
more pronounced at the EU level, where global corporations can more easily operate 
across national boundaries and target individual commissioners (Barnett, 2002: 36), 
and where the economic perspective of the European Commission, focusing almost 
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uniquely on competition policy, is particularly explicit. The TVWF (Television 
Without Frontiers) Directive (1989) is regarded as the liberalising centrepiece of 
audio-visual policy, discussing cultural provisions only ‘by the economic back door’, 
while the subsequent Annex (1997) to the Treaty of Amsterdam is seen as the key 
text specifically concerned with the public funding of PSBs in the marketplace. 
While the Green Paper on Convergence (1997) has been held responsible for the 
emergence of the technocentric ‘information society’ rhetoric (distinct from an 
education- or community-based rhetoric), which is often drawn upon to substantiate 
the lack of a contemporary justification for PSB, the Competition Directorate (2001) 
has dealt with the extent to which PSB can be considered as an exception to the rules 
against state aid. Regulating media concentration uniquely in terms of competition 
policy, however, may not be the best or only way, as it fails to grasp the symbolic 
and cultural power of broadcasting (Wheeler, 2004).  
 
This shift in rhetoric from ‘public service’ to ‘public interest’ constitutes a shift in 
rationale for the regulation of broadcasting, from public service regulation to free 
market competition, where ‘public interest’ is the defence referred to when market 
logic leads media players too far, and ‘public service’ is reduced to a limit placed on 
the freedom of the media; a shift which has led some to investigate the discursive use 
of such terms in more detail (as discussed in the section), and others to interpret in 
terms of the refeudalisation of the public sphere (Freedman, 2008: 71). Certainly, this 
history of broadcasting suggests that we have come full circle, and that broadcasting 
is now being regulated from a free press perspective. However, while the UK press 
has maintained its independence from the state and its freedom from constraints, 
such as public service obligations and independent regulation, it has been defenceless 
against the market and the associated conflicts of public and private interest. And 
while PSB in the UK was originally protected from both the state and the market by 
independent regulation, as well as public funding, ownership and service obligations, 
contemporary regulatory trends that confuse public service with a narrowly redefined 
view of public interest, and the narrative (familiar from the history of the press) of 
commercialised content and the corporatisation of public life, suggest that its 
protection from the market is now also being undermined.  
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2.4 DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS OF CITIZENS AND CONSUMERS 
 
The recognition of such a terminologically charged debate invites discursive analysis 
of broadcasting regulation texts (Livingstone et al, 2007a), and there has been a trend 
over the past decade to map the discursive terrain at national and international levels. 
While some have critiqued the contradictory distinctions made between citizenship 
and consumption throughout New Labour’s literature on public service reform, as 
well as the then government's fetishisation of ‘choice’ and ‘plurality’ (Clarke et al, 
2007; Needham, 2003), others have monitored the development of ‘public value’, 
succeeding concepts such as the ‘public good’ and even ‘public service’, as the 
guiding principle of broadcasting policy under New Labour (Lee et al, 2011).  
 
These studies critique the policymaking preoccupation with ensuring an effective 
market and limiting government action to market and technical matters (Goodwin & 
Spittle, 2002), and reveal regulatory attempts to equate citizenship with consumption 
(Harrison & Woods, 2000, 2001; Harrison & Wessels, 2005), and the public interest 
with market objectives (Dawes, 2007; Freedman, 2008; Harrison & Woods, 2001; 
Naranen, 2002). Harrison and Woods (2001), for instance, demonstrate tensions 
between the European Commission’s contrasting and contradictory approaches to the 
‘public interest’ and the ‘common interest’, and critique the Commission’s review of 
the scope of PSB in terms of the latter (Harrison and Woods, 2001: 479), where that 
limits the review to an account of PSB’s impact on competition. Meanwhile, others 
have noted the rise of external and internal auditing and accountability cultures 
within broadcasting, the internalisation of market discourse by PSBs themselves, and 
the role played by such discourse in reforming public service, redefining public 
interest, and recasting citizens as consumers (Born, 2003; Coppens & Saeys, 2006; 
McQuail, 2003). Although they tie PSB to citizenship and the public sphere, and 
contrast it to the market that merely ‘entertains consumers’ (Harrison & Woods, 
2001: 485), others have warned against judging the public and private systems with 
too contrasting criteria, as both public and private broadcasters share a common 
inheritance of the notion of the ‘good society’ (McQuail, 2003: 17).  
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In demonstrating the shift from national, sector-specific content regulation in the 
interests of citizens to international, cross-sectoral competition policy and the 
increasing focus on consumers (Naranen, 2002: 31), such studies often draw on 
Murdock and Habermas to substantiate their critique of the reduction of citizenship 
to consumer rights, and on Norman Fairclough to inform their application of Critical 
Discourse Analyses (CDA) to regulatory documents (Dawes, 2007; Goodwin & 
Spittle, 2002; Harrison & Woods, 2000; Livingstone et al, 2007b), or at least 
performing similar analyses (Born, 2003). Such an approach examines the ways in 
which the public are not only represented, but actually constituted, as citizens and 
consumers. Through comparative analyses, it also ties particular discourses to 
particular interests and relations of power, and sets out to reveal evidence of 
ideological manipulation or tension within or between texts (Fairclough, 1992). This 
methodological approach to the analysis of discursive change has proven to make a 
valuable contribution to the critique of broadcasting regulation (and will be looked at 
more closely in Part Eight). 
 
Peter Lunt and Sonia Livingstone have perhaps made the most important 
contribution to this particular area of inquiry. Through a series of publications 
(ultimately 2012), they have demonstrated the ways in which the UK’s New Labour 
government (1997-2010) and media and communications regulator Ofcom 
(established in 2003) have framed the public interest in terms of citizen and 
consumer interests, and shifted, as a consequence, the concept of the ‘public’ 
(however conceived) and the role of the regulator itself (rather than that of the BBC) 
to the centre of the new regulatory framework (Livingstone et al, 2007a). The 
distinctive focus of their approach is to assess the extent to which Ofcom performs 
the function of an institution in the public sphere, principally in terms of its role in 
relation to the public interest, and the rather peculiar way in which the public interest 
has been framed (and reframed) over time by government and regulator in terms of 
the interests of citizens and consumers. Because already ambiguous terms such as 
‘audience’ or ‘user’, as had traditionally been used in the respective regulatory 
discourses of broadcasting and telecommunications, fit poorly in a converged media 
environment, a converged regulator needed a new language. Covering a ‘key decade 
in the history of the digital age’ (Lunt & Livingstone, 2012: x), Lunt and Livingstone 
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present Ofcom as a new breed of regulator for new times – the embodiment of a 
social democratic response to changes in the ‘relations of power and legitimacy in 
representative liberal democracies’ (Lunt & Livingstone, 2012: 20) brought about by 
economic convergence and globalisation, on the one hand, and technological 
convergence and digitalisation, on the other. Established as a hybrid between an 
economic regulator, on the one hand, and a proactive consultative body with its own 
‘philosophy’, as well as a wide remit to conduct research and consultations with 
‘stakeholders’ through a mixture of regulatory regimes (self- and co-regulation), on 
the other, Ofcom represents an ‘uneasy compromise’, the authors argue, between free 
market and state intervention approaches. 
 
Lunt and Livingstone chart two distinct stages in the discursive process. Firstly, they 
analyse the period from 1997, and the beginning of the New Labour government, to 
the publication of the Communications Act 2003 that established Ofcom, in which 
the ‘plethora of everyday notions of the individual or audience or viewer or public’ 
were resolved into ‘citizen’ or ‘consumer’ (Lunt & Livingstone, 2012: 43-44). The 
White Paper, A New Future for Communications (DTI/DCMS, 2000), had proposed 
a new framework for communications regulation that would protect the interests of 
both citizens and consumers. It intended to do this via, on the one hand, a Consumer 
Panel that would be semi-independent of the new regulator, and which would further 
the interests of consumers where they were not met by the market; and, secondly, via 
a Content Board within Ofcom to ensure citizen interests in relation to content 
standards. By the time of the Draft Communications Bill (2002), however, both 
terms had been replaced by ‘customer’. Thanks to the efforts of Lord Puttnam, both 
through a Joint Select Committee report in 2002 and a House of Lords debate in 
2003, first the consumer interest – in the Communications Bill (2002) – and then the 
citizen interest – in the Communications Act( 2003) – were re-instated and enshrined 
as Ofcom’s statutory duties. In the second stage, the authors analyse the almost 
immediate unravelling of the ‘citizen-consumer’ solution, from when Ofcom began 
its work, in late-2003, to the transition, in 2010, to the Conservative-led coalition 
government, which has threatened to reform or replace the regulator (Lunt & 
Livingstone, 2012: 43-44). They also reveal some surprising contradictions, such as 
arguments that the market delivers citizen interests, and that what is in the interest of 
consumers is not necessarily in the long-term interests of shareholders; also 
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surprising are the claims of the government – in a reply to suggestions by the Joint 
Committee, chaired by Lord Puttnam, on the draft Communications Bill (2002) – 
that ‘customer’ was a convenient term to cover both ‘citizen’ and ‘consumer’, and 
that they had received legal advice not to use ‘citizen’ in legislation to refer to ‘all 
members of the public in the UK’, as it would conflict with its narrower use in the 
sense of ‘nationality’ (Livingston et al, 2007a: 623).  
 
For Ofcom, the ‘social values-led’ approach to citizen interests and the ‘economy-
driven’ approach to consumer interests are ‘not so different’ after all, and ‘can, in 
fact, be captured in a wider economic framework’. Seeing itself as primarily an 
economic regulator, and interpreting as such a fundamental ambiguity in the 
Communications White Paper (2000) and Act (2003), Ofcom has seen fit to redefine 
‘public service’ and the market as non-conflicting subsets of the ‘public interest’ 
(Dawes, 2007), and by conjoining the citizen and consumer as the ‘citizen-consumer’ 
– and latterly simply as ‘consumer’ – they have foregrounded competition as the 
primary instrument to further the interests of both (Lunt & Livingstone, 2012: 49).  
 
Because of this focus on competition, and despite the ostensible freedom from both 
state and market, and the splitting of citizen and consumer interests, Ofcom’s 
‘uneasy compromise between free market and state intervention approaches’ (Lunt & 
Livingstone, 2012: 20, 35), or ‘social democratic and neoliberal perspectives’ (Lunt 
& Livingstone, 2012: 19, 192), has meant an inconsistent approach to distinguishing 
between them. Some of the authors’ findings demonstrate the ways in which 
Ofcom’s aims and outcomes, already inconsistent from one policy area to another, 
evolve over time in not always coherent and often contradictory ways. While their 
study of Ofcom’s efforts to promote media literacy, for example, shows how what 
began as a technocratic rationale to deregulate grew over time into a policy to 
strengthen the democratic infrastructure of society (Lunt & Livingstone, 2012: 140), 
their analysis of Ofcom’s approach to community radio reveals how, even in such a 
citizen-focused area of regulation, the outcomes can still be shaped and constrained 
by consumer interest and market logic (Lunt & Livingstone, 2012: 192). Other 
studies are more significant for what they reveal about the role of the regulator. 
Contrary to Conservative criticisms of Ofcom’s unaccountable independence, the 
study of the regulation of advertising to children, for instance, demonstrates both 
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how an evidence-based regulator can be forced to rethink its objectives when the 
evidence challenges its expectations, and how the state continues to intervene when 
the regulator is heading in a direction that contravenes its interests (Lunt & 
Livingstone, 2012: 191). The most significant of the case studies, however, evaluates 
Ofcom’s reviews of PSB, in which are demonstrated both the changing balance of 
citizen and consumer interests, and the changing role of the regulator. The 
comparative analyses of the two reviews reveals a shift in the importance given to 
PSB’s ‘public value’, and a more even balance between the interests of citizens and 
consumers (where the interests of the latter had been more prominent in the first 
review), as well as a shift in Ofcom’s role, from that of a confident and independent 
regulator pushing forward its own radical agenda, to that of a mere evidence-
gatherer, acting ‘neutrally’ on behalf of government (Lunt & Livingstone, 2012: 
113). 
 
Although the Act mapped purposes onto structures by aligning citizen interests with 
a Content Board and consumer interests with a Consumer Panel, realignments saw 
the Consumer Panel take on some citizen interests (Lunt & Livingstone, 2012: 55), 
and Ofcom’s  rhetoric about the extent to which the two interests could be conflated 
became increasingly ambiguous and contradictory. The source of this tension is not 
purely down to the technological difficulties of a converged media environment, 
however, but to the incorporation of the idea of ‘society as a whole’ or the 
‘generality of consumers’. Although Ofcom can see how individuals are sometimes 
citizens and sometimes consumers, and distinguish between these two roles, when it 
comes to imagining the public more generally they are incapable of addressing the 
public as citizens, or acknowledging the ways in which citizens may be ‘plural, 
diverse, alternative, radical or justifiably disaffected’ (Lunt & Livingstone, 2012: 60, 
66).  
 
Ultimately, in applying Habermasian criteria to their evaluation of Ofcom as an 
institution in the public sphere – assessing it in terms of its success at articulating the 
public interest, balancing conflicting requirements, combining effectiveness with 
legitimation, and acting reflexively (Lunt & Livingstone, 2012: 10) – the authors 
conclude that the regulator has not been entirely successful. Their criticism focuses, 
in particular, on the unconvincing influence of consultation exercises upon the 
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decision-making process, as well as the tendency to weigh consumer interests over 
those of citizens, and to weigh business interests over both (Lunt & Livingstone, 
2012: 189). That being said, they nevertheless praise Ofcom as a ‘neutral, 
independent, principled regulator’, and stress that the balance struck between citizen 
and consumer interests is never disastrous, even if sometimes unsatisfactory (Lunt & 
Livingstone, 2012: 192).  
 
But although the authors demonstrate the interplay between discursive debates and 
practical activities, and the complex ways in which these develop over time, they 
seem to stop short of explicating the significance of the tensions they identify, or of 
extrapolating the wider consequences for governance and regulation. Despite 
identifying the cause of tensions in the very setup of Ofcom as a hybrid between an 
economic regulator and a proactive consultative body with its own ‘philosophy’, the 
authors’ conclusion that it represents an ‘uneasy compromise’ between free market 
and state intervention approaches (Lunt & Livingstone, 2012: 35) says nothing about 
the tensions within New Labour’s third way politics itself. Further, there is an 
inconsistency throughout the book in the way that Lunt and Livingstone distinguish 
between the social value and economic perspectives of Ofcom, leading to a 
conceptual confusion that undermines attempts to make broader claims. Although 
they make a fairly standard distinction (Lunt & Livingstone, 2012: 37) between civic 
republicanism (which they suggest underpins expectations regarding the citizen 
interest) and liberalism (which they link to the consumer interest), civic 
republicanism is sometimes presented as a synonym for social democracy (Lunt & 
Livingstone, 2012: 19; 192), and sometimes as a particular form of social democracy 
(Lunt & Livingstone, 2012: 37), despite the fact that social democracy incorporates 
the neo/liberal view that markets must be deregulated (Lunt & Livingstone, 2012: 
20). Likewise, Ofcom is held to be the embodiment of social democracy because it 
balances the free market with state intervention (Lunt & Livingstone, 2012: 20), 
whilst also displaying a liberal-pluralist tendency because it generally favours the 
former over the latter (Lunt & Livingstone, 2012: 39-40). Such confusion of public 
and private interests, however, potentially threatens the public sphere, even as Ofcom 
tries to engage public deliberation. A clearer delineation of civic republican, social 
democratic and third way perspectives could, on the other hand, have facilitated a 
more nuanced grasp of the significance of the tensions these authors identify, and 
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prevented them from naively repeating Ofcom’s own strategic conflation of 
incommensurable approaches. There is, furthermore, little elaboration on the types of 
citizen and consumer envisaged by the regulator or government, beyond comparisons 
of liberal and republican archetypes; nor is there any engagement with the literature 
on citizenship, consumption or the public sphere, or much of a sense of the 
complexity of each of these concepts. Indeed, the authors even assume that 
citizenship was once defined in terms of active participation in public life, and that 
the merging of this term with ‘consumer’ constructs a different meaning of civic life 
(Livingstone et al, 2007a: 615). Despite their call for a public discussion on the 
meaning of citizenship (Livingstone et al, 2007a: 633), this belies their own limited 
appreciation of the complexity of different forms and practices of citizenship, and the 
ways in which it may not be a republican version of citizenship that is merged with 
(one of many interpretations of) consumption at all.  
 
 
  
2.5 CRITIQUES OF THE DOMINANT APPROACH 
 
While early critics of PSB (such as the Glasgow University Media Group, for 
example) had focused on its paternalism or its promulgation of consumerist 
ideological frameworks, contemporary critiques tend to come from a pro-market 
perspective. Both proponents and critics of PSB often agree that the lack of 
consensus on a clear definition of PSB has been problematic for policy-makers, 
broadcasters and scholars alike (Harrison & Woods, 2001: 479; Jakubowicz, 2009: 
155; Ward, 2005), while the original (technological, economic, political, social and 
cultural) conditions for PSB have undergone such radical transformation that the 
concept requires reconceptualisation anyway (Born, 2006: 102; Cowling & Tambini, 
2002: 4). Consequently, numerous efforts have been made over the years (Born & 
Prosser, 2001; Brants & Siune, 1992; Blumler, 1992: 102; Tracey, 1998: 26-9; 
Hesmondhalgh, 2013: 137) to identify the key features of PSB – or PSC (public 
service communications), to update the concept for the post-broadcast digital world – 
privileging concepts such as public accountability, public finance, content regulation, 
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universal service, citizens and the public sphere, and contrasting it with those of the 
market, consumers and neoliberalism.  
 
There has recently, however, been an increasing weariness with such efforts, as well 
as the simplicity and rigidity of this distinction, the ubiquity of these terms of debate, 
and dissatisfaction with the level of engagement or appropriateness of their 
application to PSB-market distinction (Flew, 2006; Jacka, 2003; Nolan, 2006). While 
some have warned that arbitrary distinctions between citizens and consumers may 
actually obfuscate new spaces and practices of public connection (Couldry, 2004), 
others have been more explicitly critical of the arbitrariness of the distinction that 
informs much of the above literature, arguing that the binaries of universal versus 
multiple public spheres, PSB versus commercial, and ‘market approach’ versus 
‘public service approach’ need to be transcended (Born, 2006: 117; Ward, 2005: 
1655). Many authors have argued that the debate has already moved on from a 
dichotomy of ‘public intervention only in the case of market failure’ versus the 
public sphere related arguments, and that there is now more consensus on the need to 
return to first principles and the civic role of communication (Cowling & Tambini, 
2002: 173). Elaborating a ‘new public interest’ for a PSC environment, which 
privileges empowerment and interactivity to reinvigorate the public sphere (Cowling 
& Tambini, 2002: 175), they stress the importance of an environment that includes 
small independent developers and grassroots not-for-profit content creators, as well 
as publicly-owned communications (Cowling & Tambini, 2002: 176).  
 
John Hartley, in particular, has criticised both the distinction between PSB and 
commercial TV (Hartley, 1999: 144), and that between citizenship and consumption. 
Arguing that the defence of PSB against commercialisation teaches us little about the 
relation between TV and the public, or about what TV has been or could be for 
(Hartley, 1999: 23), he demonstrates through an examination of Housing Problems, a 
commercially-funded social campaigning film from 1935, the ways in which public 
and private interests had converged to form a ‘mixed economy’ even before the 
advent of television (Hartley, 1999: 97-98). Further, arguing that the theoretical 
divide between citizenship and consumption is more complex and problematic than 
the ‘public service critique’ suggests, he elaborates the ways in which consumption 
practices actually inform citizenship (Hartley, 2002: 37-38). Rather than 
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consumption eroding citizenship and civic rights, therefore, Hartley argues that the 
acknowledgment of a differentiated audience and the privileging of choice, typical of 
cultural citizenship, actually promote a new (fifth) form of DIY citizenship that 
overlays and supplements the older forms outlined by Murdock and Marshall 
(Hartley, 1999: 158-159). No longer about a social contract between state and 
subject, the common heritage of a given community, or even the relatively more 
recent recognition of cultural or subcultural difference, his DIY incarnation of 
citizenship is self-determined and the result of choices people make for themselves. 
Reversing the PSB/citizenship versus market/consumption dichotomy of Garnham 
and Murdock, Hartley even suggests that the early PSB model treated the public as 
an undifferentiated mass of infantilised consumers, whereas commodity culture not 
only recognises difference, but enables autonomy and agency, empowering 
individuals to use TV in ‘public’ ways (Hartley, 1999: 179-178).  
 
Drawing on Hartley's supposedly more nuanced reading of citizenship, Elizabeth 
Jacka (2003) attempts to recast the relation between media and democracy by 
embracing plurality, breaking the public-private binaries that limit debate on the 
future of broadcasting, and questioning the ongoing privileging of PSB. Taking 
particular issue with Garnham’s exemplification of the ‘public service critique’, she 
dismisses the dependence on the public sphere concept to link PSB to democracy, 
and argues against the efficacy of the public-private dichotomy at capturing the ways 
in which citizenship has historically expanded as society has become more 
pluralised. Further, in drawing on Chantal Mouffe and the radical democratic 
recognition of differential power relations, she argues for moving beyond a 
conception of citizenship rooted in either the liberal or civic republican traditions, 
arguing that there is no general good nor universal public in a society of difference, 
but only an ethical bond between citizens, and shared values rather than shared 
identities. Garnham (2003), however, acknowledges the difficulty of making a 
dichotomy between public and commercial broadcasting, praising the role of 
commercial TV in making advances as part of the public sphere, though always (in 
the UK) within a public service regulated context, and recognising commercial print 
media as the founding model of Habermas’s public sphere concept. Rather than 
favouring public over private institutions, as such, his approach is better understood 
as the comparison of the democratic contribution of the PSB model of the UK (which 
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includes the regulated commercial sector) against that of the commercially driven 
model of the US.  
 
Taking up Jacka’s critique, on the other hand, and taking issue more generally with 
the critical-normative approach that assesses PSB in terms of abstract theorisations, 
David Nolan (2006) has proposed an alternative Foucauldian approach, which 
analyses instead the material forces and practices that socially shape the ‘actually 
existing’ public sphere, and which assesses the way that PSB performatively defines 
citizenship (Nolan, 2006: 227-228). In contrast to Scannell’s idealisation of PSB, and 
both Murdock’s and Dahlgren’s diagnoses of a civic deficit between reality and their 
Marshallian or Habermasian ideals of citizenship (Nolan, 2006: 229), Nolan argues 
that PSB produces both membership of, and exclusion from, the political community. 
The methodological task becomes, therefore, to analyse conflicting definitions in 
terms of their consequences, rather than in comparison with a normative standard. 
 
Unfortunately, these critiques tend to dismiss outright both the public sphere and 
PSB, without sufficient engagement with the relevant theoretical debates or adequate 
regard for an account of power. While they valuably turn attention to the positive 
aspects of contemporary neoliberalisation that ‘may promote core social democratic 
values such as programme diversity and media pluralism’ (Flew, 2006: 298), they 
tend to dismiss rather than critique the social democratic defence of PSB, and 
describe rather than critically engage with the alternative literature on which they 
draw, as well as risk glossing over the ways in which distinctive features of 
neoliberalism have had an undeniably negative impact upon the public sphere. Less 
dismissive critiques have, on the other hand, questioned the extent to which there has 
really been a shift from a golden to a neoliberal age of media regulation (Hallin, 
2008). Providing exhaustive accounts of the many uses of the ‘public service’ 
concept in broadcasting, many of which have more to do with public utilities or 
passive audiences than with the public sphere, Syvertsen (1999) has demonstrated, 
for instance, the ways in which the term is used strategically to serve the self-
interests of various groups; even John Reith’s definition of ‘public service’ is shown 
to resemble ‘public utility’ more than ‘public sphere’, addressing it almost 
exclusively in terms of universal access and engineering quality.  
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Others have engaged more substantively with the ‘perilous strategy’ of tying the 
public sphere to PSB (Keane, 1995: 4), and the forcing of a normative concept, such 
as the public sphere, upon an abstract idealisation of PSB without an account of how 
such institutions actually operate (Sondergaard, 1999). Although the splitting of the 
public sphere from its association with both PSB and Habermasian normative criteria 
(Keane, 1991: 90, 155), and the recasting of press freedom in terms of freedom from 
both the state and the market (Dawes, 2013b; 2014), have been proposed as 
alternatives, however, such ideas have met with a cool reception (Scannell, 1992) 
when applied to broadcasting because of their consequences for the public ownership 
of PSB. The Habermasian inheritance (Habermas, 1989; 1992a; 1992b; 1996) that 
has informed this perspective has been misleadingly selective and particular, it is 
argued, as it remains unclear that there is ‘a necessary irreconcilability’ between the 
market and either PSB or the public sphere (Collins, 1993: 257-258). Certainly, 
Habermas demonstrates that the initial potential of the market to produce a public 
sphere is thwarted in the long-term by the rise of press barons, the manipulation of 
public opinion by private interests, and the reduction of the public to a mass of 
consumers, all consequences of a public sphere separated from the state but not 
sufficiently separate from the market. But he also demonstrates the negative impact 
of the welfare state on the public sphere. For despite making the private lives of the 
public more equal as a supplementary corrective to the destabilising effects of 
capitalism, the construction of the public as a passive citizenry of recipients of state 
aid, requiring state interference and thus compromising their freedom from the state 
(and the legitimacy of the liberal state as one which does not interfere in the private 
realm), broke down the public-private distinction between politics and economy, and 
undermined just as much as market processes the ability of citizens to form an active 
public and hold political power to account. The rise of spin and marketing discourse 
within politics and the subsequent manipulation of public opinion by the state have 
only exacerbated both these trends.  
 
In other words, the liberal equation of the free press with the free market 
simultaneously enabled and undermined the public sphere by making the public free 
from the state but defenceless against the market, frustrating the extent to which they 
could act as citizens rather than as consumers. Similarly, in correcting the failure of 
press freedom, the liberal compromise of PSB enabled the public sphere by making 
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the public free from the market and private interests (their own as well as those of 
powerful corporations), but simultaneously undermined it by reducing citizenship to 
a passive, top-down relationship between community and nation-state. As important 
as this type of citizenship may be as a corrective to press freedom’s merging of 
citizenship and consumption, the extent to which it can be equated with a political 
community and seen as more significant for the public sphere is dubious.  
 
In contrast to the willingness to engage with theories of citizenship and the public 
sphere, however, there is a notable reluctance to engage with theoretical debates 
around consumption and neoliberalism. Consumption is held to be the opposite of 
citizenship, and suggestions to the contrary are treated with understandable suspicion 
by those wary of the application of free market rhetoric to broadcasting regulation. 
Similarly, despite rare acknowledgments that references to neoliberalism require 
greater nuance (Hesmondhalgh, 2005), or warnings that the ‘intuitive’ focus on a big 
picture narrative of global neoliberal trends risks privileging similarities in 
privatisation and liberalisation over ‘diverging accents’ in their implementation 
(Parthasarathi, 2010), such accounts limit themselves to the ways in which 
neoliberalism is combined with other ideologies in policy and regulation, avoiding 
engagement with neoliberal literature itself or with critical theoretical debates on 
neoliberalism that aren’t limited to viewing it simply in ideological terms. When 
these literatures and debates are engaged with (Freedman, 2008), they are 
nevertheless dismissed for downplaying the political importance of neoliberal 
hegemony. Further, neoliberalism is widely seen in broadcasting scholarship as the 
process by which consumption and the market undermine citizenship and public 
service to the detriment of the public sphere. But as convincing (and convenient) as 
this is, it ignores the ways in which the relation between citizenship and consumption 
is reconfigured over time, and in which both liberalism and neoliberalism, 
understood as political-economic governmentalities, simultaneously enable and 
undermine the public sphere.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has reviewed the contemporary theoretical and methodological 
approach to broadcasting regulation by placing it within its historical development. 
By doing so, we are reminded that scholarly assumptions about regulatory change are 
typical of a particular theoretical perspective, which is contingent, temporally- and 
spatially-specific, and not necessarily universally endorsed. The fact that British 
scholars today tend to approach PSB in terms of citizenship and the public sphere, 
for instance, means neither that they have always done so, nor that they always will. 
Nor should it be assumed – as useful, and as practically and politically convenient, as 
it may be to do so – that words like ‘citizenship’ or ‘consumption’ adequately resume 
the plethora of overlapping and conflictual forms of each, or that their opposition is 
as clear-cut or as permanent as the opposition suggests.  
 
The contemporary preoccupations with critically analysing the strategic use of terms 
such as ‘citizens’ and ‘consumers’ in regulatory discourse, critiquing the shift in 
regulatory emphasis from ‘citizens’ to ‘consumers’ as symptomatic of 
neoliberalisation, and assessing the impact of regulatory change in terms of its 
impact upon the public sphere, have been situated within a particular scholarly 
paradigm. This paradigm comprises overlapping narratives and approaches, and the 
citizen-consumer, public sphere and neoliberalism concerns are not necessarily 
shared by each approach, nor are the respective specialisms always mutually 
compatible. However, the assumptions made by (for example) those broadcasting 
scholars writing about citizenship and consumption are often shared by those writing 
about neoliberalism or the public sphere. Likewise, the critique of neoliberal 
hegemony, and the implicit or explicit elaboration of this hegemony in terms of 
inequality, private interests and dominant class power, may not be manifestly related 
to public sphere theory, but such scholars are hardly likely to argue that 
neoliberalism is good for the public sphere. More often than not, though, even when 
only one aspect of this paradigm is under analysis, the other terms tend to be drawn 
upon to some extent. Despite the prevalence of such terms and their significance to 
the critique of broadcasting regulation, however, it is surprising that there is only 
sparse acknowledgment of conceptual nuance, and often little engagement with the 
theoretical debates around each concept. This is equally the case for the uncritical 
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appropriations of Marshall’s citizenship, the Habermasian public sphere, Harvey’s 
approach to neoliberalism and the various traditions of consumer critique, as it is for 
the denial of alternative approaches.  
 
But although regulatory trends necessitate a critical counterbalance (Freedman, 2008: 
23), and as politically useful and important as these critiques are, they are weakened 
theoretically by their rudimentary readings of neoliberalism as an ideology, 
citizenship as a set of rights, and consumption as synonymous with consumerism. 
While arbitrary distinctions between citizens and consumers may actually obfuscate 
new spaces and practices of public connection (Couldry, 2004), they may also 
obstruct the diagnosis of emerging threats to the public sphere. Likewise, while the 
misrecognition of neoliberalism, as simply the undermining of citizenship by 
consumption, risks ignoring the ways in which neoliberal techniques can sometimes 
contribute towards citizenship and actually enable the public sphere, it also risks 
undermining the efficacy of the critical counterbalance itself. The linking of civic 
republicanism and liberalism, for example, to Ofcom’s expectations regarding the 
citizen and consumer interests, respectively (Lunt & Livingstone, 2012: 37), leads to 
a conceptual confusion that undermines attempts to make broader claims about the 
significance of media regulation to the public sphere. It confuses liberal and 
republican traditions, and assumes untenable distinctions between social democracy 
and neoliberalism, attributing a relative importance to citizenship that somehow rings 
hollow, and presenting Ofcom as a blend of neoliberal and republican approaches, 
rather than as the very embodiment of neoliberalism (Dawes, 2013a).  
 
Ultimately, what each of these distinct and occasionally conflictual approaches share 
is a similarly un-Foucauldian approach to the public-private dichotomy. While all 
tend to fall back on an overly rigid distinction between what is public and private, 
even those that call into question the dichotomous construction of the distinction (by 
envisaging a sphere between state and economy, as with public sphere theory, or by 
blurring the state-civil society dichotomy, as with Gramscian approaches to ideology 
and hegemony) presume that civil society, for example, is either a reality (normally 
in opposition to the state) or an ideological construct (of the state). A Foucauldian 
approach, however, would regard it instead as a ‘correlate of a particular technology 
of government’ (Burchell et al, 1991: 141), arguing for the ‘historical and artefactual 
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nature of the distinction’ (Bennett, 1998: 74), and explicating the ways in which 
liberal ‘government’ has continually established and amended the relations and 
distinctions between realms that may be considered public and private. As Dahlgren 
has suggested, it is necessary to explore more fully the concepts of ‘public’ and 
‘private’, and to consider the trajectories that have determined the relation between 
them in the present (Dahlgren, 2000: 90). 
 
This thesis will therefore investigate the extent to which the dominant critique of 
broadcasting regulation has been made within an appropriate or effective theoretical 
and methodological framework. Taking the criticisms in the preceding section into 
account, and echoing the Foucauldian turn suggested by Nolan, this thesis will 
address the public-private dichotomy on multiple levels. As well as engaging 
critically with the literatures on citizenship and the public sphere, it will engage just 
as critically with those on consumption and neoliberalism. Although the dominant 
approach has been reluctant to engage with either the theoretical debates within 
critical sociologies of consumption and neoliberalism, or with the contradictions 
inherent to their application of citizenship and public sphere theories to PSB, the 
subsequent chapters of this thesis will ardently approach those contradictions and 
inconveniences. Finally, the thesis will then apply a more nuanced and theoretically-
informed account of these key concepts to a rereading of the history of broadcasting 
regulation. As Part One has demonstrated, this will also necessitate some fine-tuning 
of the typical methodological approach to the analysis of relevant documents. 
Ultimately the aim of the thesis will be to establish the extent to which the critical 
approach to broadcasting regulation can actually be strengthened by a closer and 
more critical engagement with each aspect of the public-private dichotomy.  
 
However, before investigating the discursive reconfigurations of public and private 
concepts throughout the history of broadcasting regulatory documents (in Part Eight), 
and in advance of the engagements with the theoretical and methodological debates 
in studies of neoliberalism (Part Seven), and citizenship and consumption (Part Six), 
this thesis will turn to public sphere theory (Parts Four and Five) and earlier debates 
on the role of public opinion and press freedom (Part Three), beginning with an 
elaboration of the public-private dichotomy more generally.   
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Part Three: The Public/Private Dichotomy 
 
 
Underlying Habermas’s concept of the public sphere, and the application of that 
concept to PSB, are assumptions regarding the distinction between what is public and 
what is private. This chapter begins, therefore, with an introduction (in section 3.1) to 
contrasting perspectives on the public-private dichotomy and their respective roots in 
antiquity. For reasons of space, and to maintain the focus on the public sphere rather 
than privacy and other aspects of the public-private debate, however, feminist and 
other criticisms of the dichotomy will be dealt with in more detail later in Part Five 
only in as far as they critique directly Habermas’s model of the public sphere.  
 
Drawing explicitly on 18
th
 and 19
th
 Century theorisations of the role of public 
opinion and a free press in liberal democracy, Habermas built on the defences and 
critiques of the state-society distinction and the extent to which public opinion was 
undermined by private interests and both political and economic forces. He ignored 
almost completely, however, the early 20
th
 Century equivalents that took particular 
aim at the supposed rationality of the citizen. The middle sections of this chapter (3.2 
and 3.3) will offer a selective summary of this background literature on publicity, 
public opinion and press freedom, highlighting those particular debates that are of 
relevance to the problematic of the public sphere as later developed by Habermas and 
his critics.  
 
The normative weight behind the Habermasian emphasis on the idea of ‘publicity’ or 
‘publicness’ will then be traced back through the republican tradition via the work of 
Hannah Arendt. Whereas Arendt’s abstract account of the ‘rise of the social’ 
emphasises the loss of the original meaning of publicity and of the public-private 
distinction in modernity, however, Habermas provides a historical account of the rise 
and fall of publicity throughout the development of liberal democracy, providing an 
explicit account of both the positive and negative significance of media and 
communication to the representation, rationalisation and manipulation of publicity.  
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3.1 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
 
The practical and theoretical distinction between public and private has been a 
central preoccupation of Western thought since classical antiquity, with the concepts 
‘public’ and ‘private’ serving as organising categories in social and political analysis, 
jurisprudence and legal practice, as well as in moral and political debates (Weintraub 
& Kumar, 1997: xi) to distinguish different kinds of human action, realms of social 
life, and physical and social spaces (Weintraub, 1997: 6). The most significant of the 
‘grand dichotomies’, according to Norberto Bobbio, its usefulness is in its capacity to 
comprehensively subsume a wide range of other important distinctions within a 
binary opposition (Weintraub, 1997: 1). Yet the countless realities it does not explain 
and conflicts it cannot resolve have led to attempts, such as Habermas’s, to 
trichotomise the problem of recognising the importance of both individual autonomy 
and collective purpose without absolutising either (Wolfe, 1997: 200-201).  
 
A distinctive emphasis of Western modernity, and of liberal thought particularly, has 
been upon demarcating the ‘public’ domain of state power from the ‘private’ domain 
of the market and civil society (Weintraub & Kumar, 1997: xiii). In recent decades, 
claims regarding the erosion or ‘colonisation’ (Bauman, 2000) of the public by 
private processes – where the changing relationship in the role of the ‘public sector’ 
and the process of ‘privatisation’ is just one aspect of this – and concern regarding 
the impact of rapid advances in technology on ‘publicity’ and ‘privacy’, have 
increased interest in the distinction between public and private, and in the validity of 
the public/private distinction itself. Feminist approaches, in particular, have critiqued 
the exclusionary potential of the boundary between them (Weintraub & Kumar, 
1997: xi-xii), while others have proposed dispensing entirely with the dichotomy, 
arguing that nothing much of contemporary social life can be said to remain on one 
side or the other (Sheller & Urry, 2003: 122).  
 
But much of this ‘infantile’ discussion (Sheller & Urry, 2003: 113) is weakened by a 
lack of careful consideration of the meanings and implications of the concepts 
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themselves, reducing what is actually a protean distinction to a unitary reading of 
‘public this’ and ‘private that’. It is often taken for granted, for instance, that the 
distinction is equivalent to a boundary of the political, but this depends on whether 
the political is conceived as state administration or a realm in which society acts as a 
public, rather than just an aggregation of individuals (Weintraub, 1997: 2). Where 
discussion is more conceptually self-reflective, one reading of the distinction is often 
privileged over others, with little evidence of awareness of the wider range of 
alternative frameworks in which it is employed. Here there has traditionally been a 
concern with the blurring of the distinction between two realms that had previously 
been clearly distinguished, or more recently with the shifting of the always mobile 
boundary between them. But the reduction to a single binary of what is better 
understood as a complex family of interdependent and mutually constitutive 
oppositions, tends to fragment different fields of discussion and result in conceptual 
confusion rather than fruitful cross-fertilisation (Weintraub & Kumar, 1997: xii), and 
attention is shifting to the deterritorialisation of ‘publics’ and ‘privates’, and the fluid 
hybridising between them (Sheller & Urry, 2003: 108). 
 
Broadly speaking, and at the root of the various theoretical traditions to be discussed 
shortly, there are two kinds of imagery behind the contrast between public and 
private: the distinction between what is hidden and what is accessible, and that 
between what is individual and what is collective, or between what is part and what 
is whole (Weintraub, 1997: 4-5); imagery that can be summarised as the invariably 
overlapping criteria of ‘visibility’ and ‘divisibility’ (Dawes, 2011a: 116). Whether an 
attempt to ascertain if issues are of common concern or a matter of individual 
discretion, or to distinguish between public and private space in terms of whether it is 
accessible to all or just for the individual, questions of both visibility and divisibility 
will have a propensity to arise. The criteria are also interdependent and mutually 
constitutive, guaranteeing or helping to define one another. When the views of 
individuals are aggregated to form ‘public opinion’, for example, it is the privacy and 
invisibility of the secret ballot that safeguards the individual voter from ‘private 
pressure’, enabling them to act as citizens and perform their ‘public function’.  
 
Drawing upon the multiplicity of ways in which these criteria of distinguishing 
between ‘public’ and ‘private’ are employed in social and political analysis, Jeff 
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Weintraub has identified four overlapping theoretical discourses: the liberal-
economistic model dominant in public policy and law, in which the distinction is 
drawn between the state and the market; the classical civic republican perspective 
which distinguishes between the public sphere of political community and 
citizenship, on the one hand, and both the state and the market on the other; the 
approach of social historians and anthropologists which tends to oppose sociability 
and the intimacy of backstage life; and the feminist perspective which views the 
distinction as between the political and economic order (or state and market) on the 
one hand, and family on the other (Weintraub, 1997: 7). Although sometimes simply 
a matter of variations in terminology, these differences often reflect deeper 
theoretical or ideological commitments or assumptions that can have normative 
implications for the arguments they are drawn on to support. Any discussion of 
public and private should begin therefore with an attempt to clarify the ambiguity of 
the concepts (Weintraub, 1997: 3), acknowledge the difficulties involved in fitting 
modern civil society into a dichotomous framework (Weintraub, 1997: 35), and 
recognise the need for the complexification of the distinction rather than its 
simplification (Weintraub, 1997: 34).  
 
Within liberalism (itself a contested term), for instance, there is an implicit 
assumption of the naturally self-interested character of individuals behind the debate 
over market self-regulation and government intervention (Weintraub, 1997: 8). At 
the same time, the dual register of the ‘public’ as ‘political’ (referring either to the 
state or the public sphere) in the republican tradition needs to be clarified by placing 
the terms 'public' and 'private' in historical context. Beneath the distinction between 
institutional domains of household and body politic set forth in Book 1 of Aristotle’s 
Politics, there lies a further distinction between modalities of agency within the 
individual (Gobetti, 1997: 104). Although the model of the public realm as a self-
governing polis of active citizens derives from the Roman Republic, the model of 
sovereign power over a society of private and passive individuals, who bear rights 
granted to them by the sovereign, comes from the Roman Empire (Weintraub, 1997: 
11). Although a tendency in other civilisations and in some periods of Western 
history (Baehr, 2000: xxx) has been to approach politics from the same perspective 
as the Empire, thus focusing on rulership or domination, and assuming a separation 
of the rulers and the ruled, classical moral and political philosophy has tended to 
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approach politics from the perspective of the Republic, focusing on participation and 
defining the citizen as one who is (in Aristotle’s words) capable both of ruling and of 
being ruled (Weintraub, 1997: 12). In contrast to the liberal conflation of citizenship 
with community membership, republican citizenship entails the active participation 
and collective decision making of equal members of a ‘willed community’ 
(Weintraub, 1997: 13).  
 
Whether understood as Tocqueville’s ‘political society’, Arendt’s ‘public realm’ or 
Habermas’s ‘public sphere’, this political sphere of social life problematises the 
public-private dichotomy, or at least the extent to which the public can be reduced to 
the state, and civil society identified as private, suggesting instead a tripartite 
distinction between state, civil society and the public sphere. The tendency in social 
and political theory to fall back on the public-private distinction and to focus 
attention upon defining the public, however, has led to a relegation of the private to a 
residual category of interest. As well as trivialising the domestic sphere, some 
feminists have argued that this lack of interest has also been responsible for shielding 
abuse and domination in the home from political scrutiny or legal redress. Further, 
the gendering of the distinction between public and private has excluded women 
from the public sphere and confined them to a sphere of inferior interest and value 
(Weintraub, 1997: 28). The increasingly explicit distinction between the public 
realms of the polis and the sovereign, and greater interest in fine-tuning the 
distinctions between the private realms of civil society, family and intimacy, 
however, have moved debate beyond dichotomous models (Weintraub, 1997: 15).    
 
Perhaps of even greater significance to the irreducible complexity of the public-
private distinction, however, is the increasing centrality of the market economy in 
modernity, which has made it no longer possible for the household (oikos) to 
comprise both the family and economic life, as it had done for Aristotle (Weintraub, 
1997: 35). In response to the difficulty in recognising the civil society of modernity 
as either public or private, Hannah Arendt developed her own tripartite model of 
public, private and what she called 'the social' (Weintraub, 1997: 35), and although 
Habermas makes only one fleeting reference to Arendt in his 1962 book, her account 
of the significance of the breakdown in the distinction between public and private 
corresponds to his narrative of the shift from critical to manipulative publicity. 
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Before discussing the civic republican view of an agonistic or discursive public space 
in the work of Arendt and Habermas, however, the next section will deal with the 
more dominant legal and liberal tradition of civil society’s freedom from state, 
through a review of its earliest and most prominent critiques.  
 
 
 
  
3.2 PRESS FREEDOM, PUBLIC OPINION AND PUBLICITY – THE LIMITS OF 
LIBERALISM (KANT, HEGEL, MARX AND MILL) 
 
Anglophone discussion of the ‘public sphere’ has been hampered by problems of 
translation. The late 18th Century German word Offentlichkeit can be translated as 
‘publicness’ or ‘publicity’, but this fails to grasp Habermas’s use of the term. Its 
designation as a sphere of open (public) spaces and communication where public 
discourse on matters of common concern can take place, which leads to the 
formation of public opinion that in turn may influence political decision-making 
(Gripsrud et al, 2010: xv), captures only part of Habermas’s model. The public 
sphere is more than just a description of a network of institutions; it is the expression 
of the ‘publicness’ that Arendt argues is lost in modernity. Its normative content 
advances a principle of democratic legitimacy that goes beyond liberalism. The 
exercise of governmental and state power should be ‘public’ (in contrast to ‘secret’) 
and reflect the power of a rationally and critically deliberating public of nominally 
free and equal citizens (Gripsrud et al, 2010: xv). This emphasis on the rational-
critical debate of the public sphere, in contrast to the irrational and self-interested 
discourse of the private realm, is the republican dimension that Habermas adds to the 
liberal principles of political participation and press freedom. 
 
Political participation in liberal democracies is based on citizens’ right to vote, to 
express opinions freely and to have free access to information and ideas. The extent 
to which reasoned public opinion based on principled deliberation can be formed, 
however, has been a source of debate since the very beginning of the era of press 
freedom (Gripsrud et al, 2010: xv). For the philosophers of the Enlightenment, 
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reason was tied to publicity and public agreement (Gripsrud et al, 2010: 1). 
Immanuel Kant argued that, although difficult for a ‘separate individual’ (Kant, 
2010: 4), the public could enlighten itself provided it had the freedom to make 
‘public use of one’s reason in all matters’ (Gripsrud et al, 2010: xvi); that is, where 
men of learning address ‘the entire reading public’ (or literary public sphere), and 
where the ‘private’ use of reason refers only to the actions of a civil servant, which 
can be restricted without ‘undue hindrance’ to enlightenment (Kant, 2010: 3). Kant 
also distinguished between someone in their function as a priest or a teacher, using 
their reason before their congregation, and that same person in their function as a 
citizen scholar (or, more specifically, a philosopher as representative of the public), 
using their reason through publishing (Kant, 2010: 5). For Kant, only the latter could 
be considered public and free, while the former remained private and subject to 
institutional constraints. Kant qualified this faith in publicity, however, by 
emphasising the slowness of enlightenment reform against the revolutionary 
replacement of old prejudices with new ones to ‘control the great unthinking mass’ 
(Kant, 2010: 4).  
 
This public use of reason was connected not only to personal autonomy but also to 
political legitimacy, made just by the principle of publicity, whereby laws had to pass 
the test of public scrutiny to guarantee that restrictions on freedom were justifiable to 
all (Gripsrud et al, 2010: xvi) as members of the public, so constituted by the public 
sphere (Habermas, 1989: 106). This broke with Rousseau's view of public opinion as 
derived simply from a permanent and consensual assembly of passive citizens (his 
view of the ‘public place’ being inspired more by the spatial imagery of the Greek 
polis than its normative connotation), rather than from any critical debate that 
occurred there. For Kant, it was precisely the rational-critical public debate of an 
enlightened public that could form the basis for public opinion (Habermas, 1989: 
99). ‘Human beings’ were only constituted as ‘citizens’ whenever they engaged in 
rational-critical debate concerning the affairs of the ‘commonwealth’, forming a 
public sphere in the political realm which became the organisational principle of the 
liberal constitutional state, within whose framework civil society was established as 
the sphere of private autonomy (that is, the personal freedom to pursue happiness in 
one’s own way) (Habermas, 1989: 106-107). In the sociological conditions that Kant 
deemed necessary for a public sphere, paramount was its dependence upon social 
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relationships within this sphere of private autonomy among the freely competing 
commodity owners emancipated from domination and insulated from intrusions of 
power (Habermas, 1989: 111). Consequently, only property-owning private people 
were to be admitted to the public sphere (Habermas, 1989: 109), whereupon they 
would be ‘pathologically forced’ to behave outwardly as if they were inwardly free 
persons, a condition which conflated the selfish bourgeois with the unselfish homme, 
and which considered the citoyen under a twofold aspect of legality and morality 
(Habermas, 1989: 111).  
 
It was Jeremy Bentham who first explicated the connection between public opinion 
and publicity, stressing not just the importance of the openness to the public of 
parliamentary discussion, but firmly positing the public deliberation of parliament as 
only one part of the public deliberation of the public in general. Critical political 
debate could be secured only by publicity both inside and outside parliament, he 
argued (Habermas, 1989: 99-100), referring to Guizot’s classic 19th Century 
formulation of the ‘rule of public opinion’, where the legitimacy of the representative 
system is guaranteed by the incessant search for reason, justice and truth that 
regulates actual power in three ways: through parliamentary discussion, the openness 
or publicity of these discussions so that they are always under citizen control, and the 
freedom of the press as a stimulant for citizens to search for these things (Habermas, 
1989: 101).  
 
The Kantian grounding of the public sphere in an inherently conflicted civil society, 
the dubious relationship of bourgeois-homme-citoyen and the bourgeois 
interpretation of ‘public opinion’, however, was soon to be questioned (Habermas, 
1989: 116-117). For GWF Hegel, this normative vision of an enlightened public 
ignored how ill-informed and irrational the public could be. He also feared that 
public opinion could represent the interference of private interests in government 
decisions (Gripsrud et al, 2010: xvii). Although the ‘principle of subjectivity’ entails 
the freedom of individuals to express their opinions on affairs of the state, 
collectively manifested as public opinion, the mixture of the substantive with the 
particular and the private, and the dubious link between the passion with which 
opinion is urged and its substantive content (Hegel, 2010: 10), meant that this 
unorganised opinion offered an inferior alternative to legislative assemblies as a 
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mediating force between state and citizens. His demotion of ‘public opinion’ to 
merely ‘opinion’ (Habermas, 1989: 121) was a consequence of his critique of civil 
society as an antagonistic system of needs, in which the liberal interpretation of 
public opinion as plain reason was but pretence (Habermas, 1989: 118). Further, the 
liberal view that political authority was legitimated by what Hegel saw as 
particularistic public opinion and conflicted private interest, meant a confusion of 
civil society and the state, whereby the former tended to absorb the latter (Habermas, 
1989: 119). 
 
Rejecting liberal freedom as an abstraction for splitting individuals from their 
communities, he argued that concrete freedom required individuals to also pursue 
their lives as members of the state (Gripsrud et al, 2010: 2), the sphere of true 
universality, and made clear distinctions between the state, civil society (market 
economy, law, corporations) and the family sphere of emotional ties. In Hegel's 
triadic system, the public sphere is located between civil society and the state, but it 
little resembles the model that Habermas was later to develop. Hegel praised the 
legislative assembly of estates that represented members of civil society, and its 
public transactions that educated citizens about their ‘true’ interests, as the crucial 
mediating organ between the state and the isolated individuals of civil society 
(Gripsrud et al, 2010: 9). The public sphere was thus demoted to education rather 
than the realisation of reason, and the publicity of the estates demoted to the function 
of integrating the subjectivities of citizens into the objectivity of the state from above 
(Habermas, 1989: 120). Developing a nuanced theory of civil society in terms of 
privacy and legality, plurality and association, and publicity and mediation, his 
inclusion of the economy within civil society, and the paternalistic and statist 
character of the public sphere he envisaged, limited political-philosophical debate  to 
a statist-economist dichotomy (Cohen & Arato, 1992: xiv). Rather than constituting 
the sphere of autonomy and emancipation from domination in which private people 
could relate to one another and form a public, Hegel saw civil society as antagonistic, 
naturally tending towards disorganisation and requiring integration by political 
(statist) force, and thus as an inappropriate basis on which to translate political into 
rational authority (Habermas, 1989: 122). 
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For Karl Marx, however, the estates on which Hegel based his constitutional model 
were incapable of linking state and society. Locating these estates in the political 
sphere was illusionary because, in a prerevolutionary society, they had dissolved into 
little more than social classes of civil society (Habermas, 1989: 122). In the way that 
elements of civil life determined an individual's relation to the state, however, society 
had nevertheless some sort of political character. But political revolution, and the 
making of the state a general concern, would abolish this limited political character 
and dissolve civil society into individuals and material and cultural elements, while 
the ‘political spirit’, fragmented by feudalism, would be reassembled and liberated 
from its confusion with civil life into a sphere ‘common to all’, the ‘general affair of 
the people’, independent of the particularism of civil life. Professions and ranks, no 
longer the link between individuals and state, would sink to individual importance, 
while public affairs would become the general affair of each individual and politics a 
general occupation (Marx, 2000: 63).  
 
Marx exposed the contradictions in the rooting of the public sphere in the private 
realm of civil society, arguing that the emancipation of civil society from state 
regulation did not insulate it from power, but introduced instead new relations of 
power between owners and wage earners. Because access to property and education 
was unequal, the public sphere contradicted its own principle of universal 
accessibility. And because the ‘public’ and ‘civil society’ represented property 
owners rather than the whole of society, ‘public opinion’ was nothing more than 
false consciousness, hiding the particular interests of this bourgeois class (Habermas, 
1989: 124-5). 
 
Although the separation of state and society corresponded to the division of man as 
public and private person, as a property owner ‘unfree’ of private interests the 
bourgeois (property owning private person) could never actually assume the 
functions of a citoyen or engage as an homme (human being) representing society as 
a whole. In Marx’s interpretation, it was the very separation of the public and private 
realms of the bourgeois constitutional state that prevented the dissolution of political 
domination that it promised (Habermas, 1989: 124-5).  
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The bourgeois public sphere arose historically in conjunction with a society 
separated from the state, whereby the ‘social’ was constituted as a separate sphere by 
the reproduction of life taking on private form, and the private realm assuming public 
relevance. But with the expansion of the franchise the public sphere would come 
under the control of groups that, because they lacked control over property, had no 
basis of private autonomy and consequently no interest in preserving society as a 
private sphere. The enlarged public and democratically revolutionised public sphere 
would, in theory, represent the real civil society of ‘society as a whole’, and only 
then become a sphere of deliberation capable of subjecting political domination to 
reason (Habermas, 1989: 126-8). With the dissolution of class distinctions and of 
‘political’ power (as the organised power of one class for oppressing another) into 
‘public’ power, Marx supplied a socialist alternative to the liberal model of the 
political public sphere. In this counter-model, with public control extended to the 
non-property owning portions of civil society, autonomy is no longer based on 
private property or grounded in the private sphere but founded in the public sphere 
itself: ‘Private persons (come) to be the private persons of a public rather than a 
public of private persons’ (Habermas, 1989: 128-9). Rather than the citizen of a state 
being a function of the freedom of a property owner, the freedom of private people 
becomes a function of their role as citizens of society. As such, the public sphere no 
longer links a society of property-owning private persons with a state; rather, the 
autonomous public of citizens of a society secures for itself a private sphere of 
personal freedom, such as in an intimate sphere set free from economic functions, in 
which marriage, for example, becomes private in the sense of no longer the concern 
of society (Habermas, 1989: 129). 
 
As literacy increased and the taxes on newspapers came to end, and as the franchise 
became more universal and participation in public reasoning became more inclusive 
of non-business and non-professional classes, scepticism about the political role of 
public opinion also grew throughout the 19
th
 Century (Gripsrud et al, 2010: 1). As 
conflicts hitherto considered private emerged in public, the public sphere became an 
arena of competing private interests and reasonable consensus degraded into 
compromise (Habermas, 1989: 132). Considering the pressure on legislators to 
respond to public opinion as presented by the popular press, John Stuart Mill 
moderated his faith in individual autonomy and the liberal freedom of expression 
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with his reservations about the moral coercion of public opinion, and the old tyranny 
of inherited power being replaced by a new ‘tyranny of the majority’, endorsing 
without scrutiny or debate only the most popular views and received opinion, and 
constraining the expression of minority opinions (Gripsrud et al, 2010: xvii; 2). As 
well as the partial character and infallibility of prevailing opinions (Mill, 2010: 20), 
Mill acknowledged the impossibility of fixing the bounds of fair discussion (Mill, 
2010: 21). However, because the denunciation of intemperate discussion is mostly 
applied as a restraint of its employment against the prevailing opinion (discouraging, 
for example, offensive attacks on religion), opinions contrary to those commonly 
received can only obtain a hearing by studied moderation of language (while 
religious attacks on infidelity are exempted from consideration of the offence they 
may cause) (Mill, 2010: 21-22). As such, Mill argued against the qualification of free 
expression by legal or political authority, leaving it to public opinion itself to 
adjudicate on an individual basis the morality of public discussion (Mill, 2010: 22) 
through the process of open and principled deliberation in which participants are 
required to think from the perspective of ‘those who think differently from them’, ‘to 
accord them equal respect’ and to state their opinions without distortion or 
exaggeration; conditions to which Habermas would later refer for the development of 
his own position (Gripsrud et al, 2010: 15). But by warning that the power of public 
opinion should not be allowed to swallow up all other forms of power, Mill had 
shifted the function of public opinion from one of dissolving power to one of less 
ambitiously limiting and dividing power (Habermas, 1989: 136). 
 
 
 
 
3.3 MASS SOCIETY, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PRIVATE CITIZEN 
(SCHMITT, LIPMANN, SCHUMPETER AND DEWEY) 
 
Though the principle of publicity and public opinion had been the topic of the 18th 
Century, electoral reform and the extension of equal political rights became the focus 
of the 19th Century. The enlargement of the public sphere did not in principle lead to 
its undermining, but it did lead to an ambivalent conception of the public sphere in 
the theory of liberalism, as its social-philosophical representatives took on board and 
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developed the socialist critique while economic liberalism reached its peak 
(Habermas, 1989: 130). Whereas the socialists had demonstrated that the basis of the 
public sphere did not actually meet its preconditions and so needed to be set up 
differently, the liberals went further and challenged the presuppositions of a natural 
basis upon which the idea of the public sphere rested – proposing instead the 
conservation of a relativised or realistic form of bourgeois public sphere (Habermas, 
1989: 131).  
 
By the 1920s, universal suffrage in most European countries and the abolishment of 
illiteracy laid the foundation for a well-informed public. But according to the 
developing ‘mass society’ critique, it also offered new possibilities for the 
manipulation of the masses through advertising and propaganda. Both the political 
left and the conservative elite viewed democracy with scepticism, interpreting it 
respectively as a bourgeois regime or mob rule, while the rise of Fascism liquidated 
democracy in Italy, Germany and Spain.  
 
Carl Schmitt saw the theory of liberal democracy as a mask for what was, in reality, 
a system whereby parliament was influenced by organised interest groups, and 
decisions were made behind closed doors by committees (Gripsrud et al, 2010: xvii), 
rather than a system whereby the public's representatives participated in open and 
public discussion (Schmitt, 2010: 83). Because of both this influence of such groups 
on the state, and the state's expansion and intervention into society, Schmitt 
dismissed as invalid and outdated the dualism of state and society (Gripsrud et al, 
2010: 73). For Schmitt, the liberal faith in public opinion was really a concern with 
the openness of opinion. At first a practical means to combat the secret politics of the 
absolute state, he argued that openness became an absolute value for liberalism, so 
that the openness of political life became the benchmark of the extent to which 
politics was right and good. A free press became the guarantee of the elimination of 
secret politics, making the misuse of power unthinkable in a society in which public 
opinion has such a controlling force. Referring to Mill’s caution that public opinion 
could result in the crushing of minority opinion, however, Schmitt emphasised the 
contradiction between democracy and freedom, and critiqued the misplaced 
Enlightenment faith in the progress of publicity (Schmitt, 2010: 76-77). 
Demonstrating that openness and discussion had become empty and trivial, he 
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argued that the freedom of the press had lost its rationale and parliament its 
foundation and meaning (Schmitt, 2010: 83-84). (This line of argument also, 
however, formed part of Schmitt's defence of dictatorships and led to his 
membership of the Nazi Party.)  
 
In the USA, however, growing tensions between the ideal of the public sphere and 
the reality of democracy also led to distinctively different approaches to democracy 
and the role of the public. On the one hand, Walter Lipmann and Joseph Schumpeter 
dismissed as pretence the normative emphasis on citizenship and public opinion; 
arguing that voters were merely consumers, and parties like entrepreneurs that 
aggregated consumer interests as public opinion, they modelled democracy on 
principles derived from the market. On the other hand, John Dewey emphasised a 
view of democracy as a forum for public debate among active citizens, legitimated 
by its capacity to distinguish between truly public opinion and that which has been 
manufactured (Cohen & Arato, 1992: 4-8).  
 
Lipmann’s ‘realistic’ approach dismissed the unattainable ideal of the ‘sovereign and 
omnicompetent citizen’, replacing it with the portrait of the private citizen, detached 
from public affairs (Lipmann, 2010: 25-27) and disenchanted by his failure to 
embody that false ideal (Lipmann, 2010: 32). Distinguishing between the specific 
opinions of the private citizen and the general opinions of the public citizen, 
Lipmann argued that the two opinions ‘merged insensibly’ into one another, with 
general notions influencing individual decisions, and direct experiences 
unconsciously governing general notions, so that public opinion became nothing 
more than the ‘attempt to control the actions of others from the outside’ (Lipmann, 
2010: 34-5). Citing statistics on the decline of the percentage of votes cast as those 
eligible to vote had risen, he denounced as fallacy the assumption that the people 
desired to participate, and suggested that public opinion would not be improved by 
more people being asked to express their opinion more frequently (Lipmann, 2010: 
31). Disregarding also the idea that the press could be effective at informing the 
public (Gripsrud et al, 2010: 23), particularly in the context of a society increasingly 
too complex for unqualified citizens to understand, he proposed that only experts 
should be given the task of understanding public affairs, and relegated the public to 
the role of choosing among given alternatives (Gripsrud et al, 2010: xvii), aligning 
101 
 
itself for or against a proposal, personalising whatever it considers (Lipmann, 2010: 
38), rather than forming public opinion (Gripsrud et al, 2010: 25; Lipmann, 2010: 
37).  
 
Likewise, Schumpeter was sceptical of the ability of the public to form a rational 
opinion and to choose representatives capable of giving effect to that opinion, 
arguing instead that the public's role should simply be to choose a government, with 
democracy being nothing more than a competitive market for votes among elites, and 
the public sphere an arena for persuasion (Gripsrud et al, 2010: xvii). He argued that 
it was unrealistic to attribute either rationality or independence from influence to the 
individual citizen, and presumptuous to interpret the will of the people in the 
aggregation of the wills of individuals (Schumpeter, 2010: 56-58). Schumpeter saw 
the ordinary citizen as ignorant, irresponsible and infantile in political matters, 
regardless of the amount and quality of information to which they have access 
(Schumpeter, 2010: 62). As such, he also proposed that the deciding of issues by the 
electorate should be secondary to the election of representatives (Schumpeter, 2010: 
67).  
 
On the other hand, Dewey, another prominent critic of actually existing politics, saw 
democracy as a way of life rather than simply a political decision making system. 
Rather than reducing democracy to the electoral system and the actions of experts 
and elites, Dewey saw democracy as more than simply majority rule, a technical 
means to an idealistic end (Gripsrud et al, 2010: 24); it was ‘the means by which a 
majority becomes a majority through debate’ (Gripsrud et al, 2010: 43). Although the 
recognition of common interests can be confused by popular government, it 
recognises at least the existence of common interests, which are clarified to some 
extent by the democratic need for discussion and publicity (Dewey, 2010: 49). 
Dewey emphasised the significance of the public sphere as an arena of deliberation 
in which majorities and minorities share common knowledge and become competent 
at discussing and judging. Responding to Lipmann's elitist view of democracy and 
pessimistic appreciation of the public, he argued that experts were far removed from 
the common interest and ignorant of the needs of the society they were supposed to 
serve (Dewey, 2010: 49), becoming effectively a class with private interests and 
private knowledge, and consequently an illegitimate check on power. In contrast, 
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public deliberation is legitimated by the implication of citizens in the political affairs 
by which they are affected (Gripsrud et al, 2010: xviii). Furthermore, the very 
individualistic characteristics supposed to incapacitate the public from participation 
in public affairs, he argued, actually made them unfit for passive submission to 
intellectual elites (Dewey, 2010: 48). The role of the technical expert was, rather, to 
manifest their expertise and to make known the facts upon which decision making 
depends, the bearing of which upon the common concerns of society the public can 
then debate and judge (Dewey, 2010: 50).  
 
In the ideological ecology of the Cold War era, the survival and extension of 
communism replaced fascism as an alternative to democracy, and helped shape a 
new type of social critique, in which the idea of the public sphere was rediscovered 
and elaborated (Gripsrud et al, 2010: 91). Diagnosing a breakdown in the distinction 
between public and private, both Hannah Arendt and Jurgen Habermas outlined 
accounts of how this came to happen. While Arendt drew upon Ancient Greek 
distinctions to diagnose a political deficit in modernity, Habermas drew upon the 18
th
 
and 19
th
 Century critics of public opinion and press freedom to elaborate the 
changing function of rationality in the liberal public sphere.  
 
 
 
 
3.4 PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND THE RISE OF THE SOCIAL – THE LOSS OF 
DISTINCTIONS AND BORDERS (ARENDT) 
 
Arendt's position is difficult to situate between mass society, republican and liberal 
traditions, however. Although she defended fundamental liberal rights and stressed 
the importance of civic engagement and collective deliberation, Arendt criticised the 
theory of representative democracy and opposed the construction of political 
community on the basis of apolitical categories, such as religion or race (Gripsrud et 
al, 2010: 91). Contributing to the ‘classical’ political republican tradition, Arendt 
adopted the language of ‘mass society’ theory to argue that politics was irreducible to 
other spheres of human life, having its own space and principles. In her theoretical 
model, politics occupies a public space (visible to oneself and others) constituting a 
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common ‘world’ that both relates and separates. The ‘world’ is an artificial space 
that connects us to and separates us from our fellows. Its ‘spatial, in-between quality’ 
is the condition for human freedom, for having a self capable of political relations. 
The Arendtian view of politics requires spaces that separate people, as only with 
distance and divisibility are people enabled to act as plural persons. It is important to 
note, however, that not all that is public (such as a school) is political for Arendt; for 
a public space to become political, people must meet in it as equals, neither being 
ruled nor ruling, a principle derived from citizenship rather than from being human. 
Politics as the public space of equality is distinct from both the private and the social. 
In the private realm, people meet as intimates, conducting private life in isolation 
from the polis, and tending towards exclusivity, the result of personal choice. 
Whereas the political realm belongs to all, private life requires a place of one's own. 
Although privacy is less than human in the Greek view of the private realm, a life 
without privacy, for Arendt, would be meagre; likewise, a life continually in the 
public realm would be equally detrimental (Baehr, 2000: xxxiii-xxxiv).  
 
In terms of historical approach, Arendt saw history as an ‘untidy heterogeneity’ 
rather than as a sequence of episodes devoid of inherent value and significant only in 
their contribution to the direction in which history is moving (Baehr, 2000: xxxii). 
Her technique was to ‘dismantle’ traditions (Baehr, 2000: xlv), methodologically 
‘making, adapting and stretching distinctions between terms that were generally 
familiar’ (such as ‘labour’ and ‘work’) (Baehr, 2000: xix). Although her work is 
often interpreted as a nostalgic history of decline, her methodology was rather ‘the 
attempt to think through human history, sedimented in layers of language’ 
(Benhabib, 1992: 76). Opposed to ‘rupture, displacement and dislocation’, she 
emphasised the continuity between the past origin and the present condition, and 
sought to uncover at the origin the ‘lost and concealed essence’. In the case of her 
historical reading in The Human Condition of the dignity of political life from 
ancient to modern times, this amounted to a search for the ‘original meaning of 
politics’ and the ‘lost’ distinction between the public and the private (Benhabib, 
1992: 77). 
 
Focusing on an elaboration of theoretical distinctions and taking the ancient Greek 
distinction between oikos (household) and polis (city) as her starting point, Arendt's 
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opposition of the public and private realms unquestionably privileged the former. But 
of utmost importance to Arendt was the maintenance of the distinction between the 
two realms, emphasising the significance of the Ancient Greek border between them, 
and presenting the ‘rise of the social’ as the unfortunate blurring of that distinction.  
 
In Ancient Greek, there was no clear distinction between the ‘social’ and the 
‘political’, as there was in Latin or in the medieval recognition of the ‘common’ 
interests of private individuals (Arendt, 2000a: 189), only between private and 
political life; where what is one’s own (idion) is always private and where what is 
communal (koinon) is always political, and where the former was located in the 
home and the family (oikos) and the latter in the polis (Arendt, 2000a: 183). The later 
concept of ‘society as mankind’ was less a human condition for the Greeks than an 
individual dependency upon others imposed by the needs of biological life, and 
therefore also confined to the oikos, in opposition to the specifically ‘human’ 
capacity for political organisation transcending such ‘natural’ association (Arendt, 
2000a: 183). In ancient thought, ‘society’ referred merely to a collection of families 
organised economically; the political form of this organisation was referred to as the 
‘nation’. Anything that was economic related to the individual and the survival of the 
species, and was essentially non-political. For the Greeks, it was unthinkable that 
politics could ever exist as a function of society, or that social freedom could ever 
justify the restraint of political authority (Arendt, 2000a: 187). The means of politics 
was ‘power’, an energy derived from collective action, and its vital condition was the 
equality of citizenship and the plurality of human beings (Baehr, 2000: xxx). Society 
was the realm of unfreedom (Arendt, 2000a: 187), and to be equal in the polis meant 
nothing more than the freedom to neither rule nor be ruled among one’s peers 
(Arendt, 2000a: 188).  
 
Although the rise of the city-state institutionalised the rise of the public over the 
private realm, boundaries (horoi) between public and private parts of the world 
prevented the polis from violating the private lives of its citizens out of respect for 
private property as the guarantee of a man's location in the world and his 
participation in world affairs (Arendt, 2000a: 186). Despite the facts that necessity 
dictated the activities performed within the oikos, and that the polis was the sphere of 
freedom, the two spheres were linked by the mastering of the former being the 
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condition for participation in the latter (Arendt, 2000a: 186-187). The horoi therefore 
served as a link as well as a division between the two realms, ‘relating and 
separating’ them (Arendt, 2000a: 201), guaranteeing the integrity of the public realm 
by protecting privacy for its political function. This border between the privacy of 
the home and the publicity of political life was mutually constitutive. Privacy was the 
hidden side of publicity; while to be political was to attain the height of existence, to 
be deprived of privacy was to be no longer human (Arendt, 2000a: 208).  
 
But when economic activity rose to the public realm and when private interests 
assumed public significance, the horoi were breached and the two realms flowed into 
each other, constituting a new hybrid realm of the social (Arendt, 2000a: 188-189), 
in which neither private nor political life were protected. Consequently, Arendt saw 
the social realm as undermining privacy as much as it undermined the political realm 
(Arendt, 2000a: 191). The ‘rise of the social’ refers to the emergence of society as a 
realm of social interaction between the state and the household, and the 
differentiation of a narrowly political realm, on the one hand, from the no longer 
commensurate economic market and household, on the other (Benhabib, 1992: 74). 
With the emancipation of the economic realm from the household, the pursuit of 
economic self-interest developed within the midst of ethical life (Hegel), and the 
political realm of individuals acting as citizens was occluded by the social realm in 
which they merely behaved as consumers. The shift is from the agonistic space of the 
Ancient Greek polis to an associational space of modern society; from competition 
between political elites in order to transcend the futility of everyday life, to the 
association of people merely acting in common; and from a strict separation between 
politics and society, based upon a homogenous but exclusive community, to a porous 
model of public space in which the distinction between politics and society has 
broken down. 
 
The rise of the social has blurred the borderline between the private and the political, 
changed their meanings and their significance for the individual and the citizen 
(Arendt, 2000a: 191). Viewing individualism as nothing more than the equal 
absorption of all social groups into mass society, Arendt argued that its enrichment 
of the private realm had led us to overvalue privacy and to equate it with intimacy, 
rather than valuing it merely as a temporary refuge from the polis or res publica, too 
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long spent in which would be ‘deprivation’ (Arendt, 2000a: 193). Likewise, the 
democratic increase in the size of the body politic made it unwieldy, and increased 
the likelihood that the social rather than the political would constitute its public realm 
(Arendt, 2000a: 194). When the only thing people have in common is their own 
private interests, the non-privative traits of privacy, such as its function as a hiding 
place from publicity, and those of property, such as its significance as a worldly 
place of one’s own, are threatened (Arendt, 2000a: 211-212). Devouring both 
political and private realms, this constantly growing social realm constitutes the 
public organisation of the life process and transforms modern communities into 
societies of labourers (Arendt, 2000a: 196-197) and consumers.  
 
For Arendt, maintaining the distinction between public and private was important for 
nothing less than the constitution of reality. In terms of the visibility dimension of 
Ancient Greek thought on the distinction, reality is constituted by public appearance, 
so that in public life everyone is capable of seeing and hearing, and of being seen and 
heard by, everyone else with the widest possible publicity (Arendt, 2000a: 199). The 
reality of the public realm relies on the condition of plurality; the simultaneous 
presence of innumerable perspectives concerned with the same object, that of 
‘common concern’ or ‘public interest’. In mass society, however, people behave as if 
members of the same family, multiplying and prolonging the perspective of their 
neighbour and becoming entirely private, deprived of visibility and imprisoned in the 
subjectivity of their own privacy (Arendt, 2000a: 204-205). Because it blurs the 
border between public and private realms, mass society is incapable of relating and 
separating people, of discerning the sameness of the object and ultimately of assuring 
reality (Arendt, 2000a: 201-205).  
 
Arendt’s distinction between public and private has since been contended, however, 
notably by feminists who argue that the domains are porous, that domestic issues can 
be politically important, and that the private realm has traditionally been a realm of 
patriarchal power (Baehr, 2000: xxxiv-xxxv). Seyla Benhabib, for instance, has 
criticised Arendt’s idealised account of the agonistic political space of the Greek 
polis, which was only possible because large groups of human beings were excluded 
while their labour made possible the leisure of politics for the few. Arendt's critique 
of the rise of the social is also, for Benhabib, a critique of the emancipation of these 
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groups and their entry into political life, seeing public space as necessarily elitist and 
exclusionary, and therefore opposed to political emancipation and the extension of 
citizenship rights (Benhabib, 1992: 75). The distinction between the social and the 
political, for Benhabib, is no longer possible in modernity because the struggle to 
make something public is a struggle for justice, with every new group bringing with 
it an extension of the scope of what can be called public matters (Benhabib, 1992: 
79). In contrast to Arendt's agonistic view of public space, seeing it procedurally in 
terms of either a certain type of activity (action rather than work or labour) or content 
(public dialogue), she proposes an associational model (adapted from Habermas’s 
discourse model) which can emerge whenever and wherever ‘men act together in 
concert’ (Benhabib, 1992:78). An associational view, she argues, avoids relegating 
all economic and technological issues to the private realm, recognising instead the 
extent to which they can be based on power relations and therefore become matters 
of public dispute (Benhabib, 1992: 80). For Arendt, however, the personal could 
never be political, and the blurring of the two realms is unfortunate. The ‘social’, a 
product of the modern market economy (the rise of mass culture, and the 
transformation of property into wealth), impinged on both the public and the private. 
The social is typified by its instrumentalism and uniformity; instead of the equality of 
the public sphere, there is only the conformism of mass taste (Baehr, 2000: xxxv). 
 
Sometimes Arendt's remarks on the social were more restrained, however – while 
she deprecates it in The Human Condition, she defends it in ‘Reflections on Little 
Rock’. In the latter work, it is a realm that is nevertheless worth protecting; because 
it is a hybrid realm between the political and the private, it is the first realm one 
encounters upon leaving the privacy of one’s home, before entering the political 
realm, and in which in the modern age, men spend most of their lives (Arendt, 
2000b: 237). If the principles governing the political and the private are, respectively, 
equality and exclusivity, then that governing the social is ‘discrimination’: ‘the 
ability to choose not who your fellow citizens are, or with whom you share your 
home, but what occupation you wish to pursue, what people you wish to congregate 
with…’. As equality is a political right, discrimination is a social right (Arendt, 
2000b: 238), indispensable and legitimate within its borders (Baehr, 2000: xxxvi). 
Without discrimination, society would cease to exist, as would free association and 
group formation (Baehr, 2000: xxxv-xxxvi; Arendt, 2000b: 237-238). So Arendt isn't 
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against ‘society’ as such, but ‘mass society’ which blurs lines of discrimination, and 
the encroachment of discrimination (a specific type of choice) into political and 
personal realms. Mass society is a danger to society rather than personal identity, 
which has its source beyond the social realm (Arendt, 2000b: 238). Controversially, 
Arendt argued that government interference in social discrimination (to impose upon 
society a political ideal such as equality) would be an infringement on civil liberties. 
Specifically, she argued against the enforcement of civil rights where no basic 
political right was at stake, and where social and private rights could be affected 
(Arendt, 2000b: 243). Arendt rallied to prevent the political from being threatened by 
the social and the personal, but also vice versa – it was the distinction and border 
between them that was important (Baehr, 2000: xxxvi).  
 
Writing later on the ‘social question’ (distinct from her writings on the ‘social’ and a 
question that preceded the emergence of ‘mass society’), Arendt contrasted the 
American and French revolutions, and the conflation of the political and the social in 
the latter. The French revolution made the political freedom of a leisured few to 
speak and act upon the public stage of the commonwealth equivalent to social 
equality and freedom from poverty (Baehr, 2000: xxxvii). In contrast, the American 
Republic became a public space that both related and separated, encouraging 
political freedom (Baehr, 2000: xxxix) and making social issues irrelevant to politics.  
 
In contrast to modern representative democracy, Arendt praised the republicanism of 
the American founding era and the short-lived, interstitial, local and small-scale 
political bodies that arise at revolutionary junctures, for the emphasis on political 
participation and self-governance, free from statist rules and a concern with the 
social question. The flaw in the American Constitution was its barrier to 
participation, displacing power from local politics to federal government (Baehr, 
2000: xli). Arendt echoed Thomas Jefferson’s critique that a centralised system made 
citizens remote from government, and his fear that the Constitution had given all 
power to citizens as private people, without giving private people the space to act as 
citizens. In the context of increasing economic development (and the rise of the 
social), this meant a decreasing concern for public duty and a turn to private 
interests. (Baehr, 2000: xlii). In this occlusion of the political by the social, the 
intimate spheres of society lose their function, authority and authenticity, dissolving 
109 
 
into a sphere of pseudo-privacy (Wolfe, 1997: 184), while the public space of politics 
is transformed into a pseudo-space of interaction in which individuals no longer ‘act’ 
as citizens but ‘merely behave’ as urban city dwellers, economic producers and 
consumers (Benhabib, 1992: 75),  
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This overview of the literature upon which Habermas drew for his 1962 book, as 
well as of the literature he perhaps should have drawn upon, serves the purpose of 
contextualising his own subsequent account of the public sphere and of introducing 
the following chapter of this thesis. It also highlights problems with assuming too 
clear and simple a distinction between public and private, and suggests as much for 
that between citizenship and consumption.  
 
Although Arendt sought to ‘dismantle traditions’, ‘stretch distinctions’ and 
emphasise the ‘continuity between the past origin and the present condition’, her 
distinction between citizens and consumers, and her critique of the lost values and 
functions within contemporary modernity, certainly suggest a narrative of decline to 
parallel that of Habermas. Arendt’s emphasis on the public-private distinction is 
qualified, however, by her insistence upon their mutual dependence and, in 
particular, upon the private realm’s importance for the public realm. Similarly, 
Lipmann’s and Schumpter’s critiques of the extent to which private citizens can 
become public citizens without the two roles ‘merging insensibly’ into one another, 
and the earlier critique of the extent to which public opinion can be distinguished 
from private interests, cautions us against too simplistic a reading of the public-
private dichotomy. The republican critique also suggests that, in liberal thought, 
citizenship is little more than the counterpart of consumption, both as potentially 
passive (and active) as the other. What Habermas takes from the critiques of 
liberalism (as we shall see in the next chapter) is a republican emphasis on 
citizenship as rational-critical debate rather than as merely a legal-political status or 
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set of rights. As well as scepticism towards the supposed neutrality of the market, he 
also (more controversially) takes on board a wariness regarding the effect of 
democratic inclusion on the ‘publicity’ of public opinion, which has led, in public 
sphere theory, to political-philosophical debates on the distinction between politics 
and the social. For media and communications critiques of broadcasting regulation, 
however, such debates pose fundamental problems for the appropriation of the public 
sphere concept, and for opposing a vague concept of citizenship to an equally vague 
notion of consumption, as a means to defend PSB against a market alternative.  
 
This early literature offers a powerful critique of liberal press freedom, to which the 
public sphere can be counterposed as a theoretical corrective, and substantiates in 
part the more contemporary critique of commercial pressures in the media and the 
associated defence of PSB. But it also offers a critique of accounts that valorise the 
citizen (in contradistinction to the consumer) as someone capable of acting rationally 
and critically, and therefore problematises the extent to which PSB and citizenship 
can be simplistically opposed to consumption and the market. While doubt has been 
cast upon the extent to which market-based press freedom can produce rational-
critical citizenship, the extent to which this can be produced by PSB must also be 
more critically examined, and the following chapters will endeavour to do that. 
 
Having outlined the Arendtian view of an agonistic public space and the critiques of 
the liberal approach to public opinion, the next chapter will deal with the 
Habermasian view of a discursive public space, providing a close reading of his 
seminal book on the history of the bourgeois public sphere, before dealing in-depth 
(in Part Five) with the theoretical debates it subsequently engendered.  
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Part Four: Habermas and the Bourgeois Public Sphere 
 
 
While the model of the public sphere depends upon a clear separation of public and 
private realms, Habermas’s intention with his The Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere (STPS from hereon) was to elaborate and improve upon the Hegelian 
(public-private) distinction between state and civil society, by developing the notion 
of a sphere that was fundamentally private, but which was capable of becoming 
public. Whereas Hegel equated civil society with the economy, and saw the 
legislative system of estates as the force that mediated state and civil 
society/economy (from above), Habermas developed the model of the public sphere 
of civil society as that which mediates state and civil society (from below), 
simultaneously (although not unproblematically) distinguishing between society and 
the economy, and liberating politics from the state.  
 
Part Four of this thesis will engage directly with the literature on the Habermasian 
public sphere. It will offer a close reading of Habermas’s STPS, teasing out the 
intricacies of his argument, as well as the tensions (subsequently criticised by others) 
within his own approach, to suggest that the dominant reading of his theory within 
broadcasting scholarship has been somewhat selective. In particular, Habermas’s 
focus on the welfare state and passive citizenship as the main cause of the decline of 
the public sphere, more so than the commercialisation of the press and the rise of 
consumer society, poses particular problems for the appropriation of his concept by 
defenders of PSB against the threat of commercialisation. Habermas’s more nuanced 
treatment of the relation between citizenship and consumption, as well as the 
problems with his approach to doing so, also pose problems for a strictly 
dichotomous approach to active citizens and passive consumers, as well as a 
simplistic and negative account of the shift from one to the other.  
 
Although originally published in 1962, Habermas’s STPS wasn’t translated into 
English until 1989. Until then, the only available text in English remained the 1974 
translation of his 1964 encyclopaedia article on the public sphere. This chapter 
appropriates the clearer structure of that short article to offer a close, comprehensive 
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and unselective reading of Habermas’s argument, as developed throughout both the 
book and its more accessible encyclopaedic condensation. Beginning with an account 
of Habermas’s concept of the public sphere, it will then summarise his account of its 
history from antiquity to modernity; although his narrative echoes that of Arendt, he 
pays far more attention to the role played by media, and his focus is more explicitly 
related to the political-economic rise of mercantilism and liberalism than an abstract 
account of modernity. His interrogation of both the bourgeois and welfare-state 
models of the public sphere will then be elaborated in detail, and those aspects that 
have been selectively unread by advocates of PSB as a public sphere will be 
highlighted and critically discussed in the conclusion.  
 
 
 
 
4.1 THE CONCEPT 
 
Habermas’s threefold intention is to provide: a historical understanding (from 
classical antiquity, through feudalism, to early mercantilist capitalism and the birth of 
liberalism) of the structures of the public sphere; a sociological clarification of the 
concept (defining it as the sphere occupied by ‘society’ in between the political and 
economic spheres) (Habermas, 1989: 68); and a systematic comprehension of 
contemporary (mass democratic) society through one of its central concepts (1989: 
5).  
 
As the translator notes at the beginning of the English language version of 
Habermas’s book, originally appearing in German under the title Strukturwandel der 
Öffentlichkeit, the term Öffentlichkeit can be translated as either ‘(the) public’, 
‘public sphere’, ‘publicity’ or ‘publicness’. Originally a function of public opinion, 
Habermas argues, the term ‘publicity’ has become, via the mass media, an attribute 
of whatever attracts public opinion (1989: 2). The term Bürger, as in Bürgerliche 
Öffentlichkeit, can also be rendered as either ‘bourgeois’, ‘middle class’, ‘civic’ or 
‘citizen’ (Burger, 1989: xv). Habermas's account of the historically-specific category 
of the bourgeois public sphere limits itself to an investigation into the emergence and 
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transformation of its ‘post-literary’ liberal model, leaving aside its ‘illiterate’ 
plebeian ‘variant’ (Habermas, 1989: xvii-xviii).  
 
Drawing on CW Mills’s distinction between ‘public’ and ‘mass’, Habermas contrasts 
public and mass communication. In an autonomous public, as many people express 
as receive opinions; there is the possibility to answer back; discussion can lead to 
effective action; and authoritative institutions do not penetrate it. By contrast, in a 
mass, fewer people express than receive opinions – the community of publics 
becomes an abstract collection of individuals who receive opinion from the mass 
media; it is difficult or impossible to answer back; the realisation of opinion is 
controlled by authorities; and authorised institutions penetrate the mass and reduce 
its autonomy (1989: 249).  
 
According to Habermas’s interpretation of the model, citizens became a ‘public 
body’ when they were free to assemble and express their opinions about matters of 
general interest (Habermas, 2010a: 114). When discussion turned to the role or 
activities of the state, this literary public sphere became a political public sphere 
(2010a: 115). Both these literary and political public spheres were located within 
civil society, which had in turn been established as a realm of commodity exchange 
governed by its own market laws (1989: 3). Through the subordination of political 
control to the democratic demand that information be ‘made public’, the executor of 
the political public sphere was the state; although it was itself set apart from the 
public sphere (2010a: 115). The metaphor of the sphere serves to illustrate that the 
public sphere mediated between society and the state (2010a: 115).  
 
Today, mass communication links informal and formal opinion only through 
manipulative publicity, integrating non-public and ‘publicly manifested’ opinions 
through the culture industry’s unquestioning promulgation. Public communication in 
the contemporary social-welfare state, in contrast, can only be brought about through 
critical publicity within intra-organisational public spheres (1989: 249), thus linking 
formal quasi-public opinion with informal and hitherto non-public opinions (1989: 
250).  
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As the public sphere is the product of a historically-specific epoch, Habermas 
stresses the difficulty of applying the concept synchronically to either an industrially 
advanced social-welfare state or the Greek polis, despite both the appropriateness of 
such a term and the absence of a more precise alternative (1989: 1). He warns that 
any attempt to restore the liberal public sphere through the reduction of its 
plebiscitarily expanded form would only weaken those functions that remain, albeit 
residually, within it (1989: 208). He proposes instead the extension of publicity (as 
the subjection to the public's supervision) to political parties, special-interest 
associations and the 'politically influential mass media'. All are 'societal power 
centres whose actions are oriented to the state - private organisations of society that 
exercise public functions within the political order' (1989: 209). In accord with the 
principle of publicity, such organisations (including political journalism) should: 
have an inner structure that institutionally permits unhampered communication and 
rational-critical debate within; be open to the public to assure the link between the 
intraorganisational public sphere and that of the entire public; make their activities, 
whether applying pressure on the state or using power against one another, or in 
demonstrating relations of dependence or economic influence, transparent by making 
public their sources and use of financial means (1989: 209). 
 
The process by which societal power is transformed into political power is as much 
in need of criticism and control as the state’s use of political power over society; not 
only the state, but all institutions that are publistically influential in the political 
public sphere are bound to publicity. Although publicity is institutionalised no 
differently in the social welfare state than in the bourgeois constitutional state, it can 
no longer be realised in the same way. Whereas before it was rationalised through 
critical public debate, today it can only be rationalised through the exercise of 
societal and political power through their internal structures, and their interaction 
with one another and with the state (1989: 210).  
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4.2 HISTORY 
 
Antiquity 
 
Although the public sphere had not required a name of its own prior to its emergence 
in the 18th Century, he follows Arendt in tracing its underlying distinction between 
public and private back to its Greek and Roman origins (1989: 3). According to the 
'stylised self-interpretation' (1989: 4) of the Ancient Greek city-state, the polis that 
was common to all citizens was strictly separated from the oikos that was specific to 
each individual, and public life was constituted for the most part in discussion (lexis) 
or common action (praxis) in the marketplace (agora). Participation in public life 
depended on a citizen's private autonomy as the master of a household in a 
patrimonial slave economy that freed him from labour (1989: 3). Within the 
ideological template of this Hellenic public sphere, citizens interacted as equals but 
also did their best to excel, forming public opinion through the open discussion of 
issues that were made topical (1989: 4). Although the social formation of the slave 
economy upon which this model was based was dispensed with, the public-private 
distinction and the public sphere, reconceived as the res publica, was later enshrined 
in Roman law and passed down through the Middle Ages. With the rise of the 
modern nation-state and the separate civil society, these categories have undergone a 
renewed application, serving both the political self-interpretation and the legal 
institutionalisation of the bourgeois public sphere.  
 
 
 
Feudalism 
 
The Roman law distinction between publicus and privatus could only be precariously 
applied to the lower and higher sovereignties of the feudal system of domination, in 
which private law provided no status by which private people could step forward into 
a public sphere (1989: 5). However, it corresponded more to the ancient Germanic 
legal distinction between the ‘common’ and the ‘particular’; whereby common use 
and public wealth were opposed to the special and private interests that formed the 
core of the feudal ‘public’. The feudal absorption of both Germanic and Roman legal 
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traditions led to both the conflation of the common man with the private man (i.e. the 
private rank of the common soldier), and the constitution of publicity as more a 
status attribute than a social realm (1989: 6-7). Because the feudal prince and his 
estates were inseparable from the territory, their publicity was represented before the 
public, rather than on the public’s behalf (1989: 7-8). In contrast, the final form of 
representative publicness, receiving greater emphasis despite being reduced to the 
monarch’s 18th Century court, and serving as a vehicle for the representation of the 
monarch rather than a representation of its own lordliness, had become ‘an enclave 
within a society separating itself from the state’, formally distinguishing for the first 
time between public and private spheres in the modern sense (1989: 10-11). In this 
modern sense, the ‘public’ state authorities served the public welfare, and the 
‘private’ subjects excluded from public office pursued their own private interests 
(1989: 11).  
 
At the end of the 18
th
 Century, the representative publicness of the feudal powers 
disintegrated into public and private elements; religion became a private matter 
(1989: 11) and the public budget was split from the territorial ruler’s private 
holdings, while occupational status groups developed into ‘civil society’ as a domain 
of private autonomy opposed to the state (1989: 12).  
 
 
 
Modernity/Mercantilism 
 
According to Habermas, early capitalism simultaneously stabilised the feudal mode 
of production, based on an enserfed peasantry and urban craftsmen, and unleashed 
new commercial relationships, such as the traffic in commodities and news, which 
would eventually dissolve it (1989: 15). The political order was initially unthreatened 
by the shift from the estate system to the far-reaching network of economic 
dependencies that it could no longer manipulate (1989: 15). But once merchants’ 
market-oriented calculations required more frequent and exact information to deal 
with expanding trade, they set up the first mail routes between the great trade cities. 
The institutionalisation of regular communication through the press and postal 
services, making news accessible to the general public via the published word, 
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threatened what had, until then, been the traditional domain of communication; 
representative publicity (1989: 16). No longer satisfied with limited markets, from 
the 16
th
 Century onwards the merchant companies became stock companies, and 
town-based economies became nationalised in the form of the nation-state (1989: 
17).  
 
 
 
 
4.3 THE LIBERAL MODEL OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE  
 
As ‘public’ no longer referred to the representative court, but to the functioning of a 
depersonalised state apparatus (1989: 18), civil society and the market, rather than 
the household economy, became its ‘private’ corollary (1989: 19). Referring to 
Arendt on the rise of the social, Habermas stresses that the privatisation of economic 
reproduction, oriented towards a market economy that had expanded under public 
supervision, was of general interest beyond the household, taking on a public 
relevance beyond private interests (1989: 19). Concomitant with the emerging 
distinction between a political and social order in the mercantilist phase of 
capitalism, the rise of the commercial press developed both in connection with the 
needs of commerce, and in terms of news as a commodity itself (1989: 20-21). 
Although the state began to use the press as its own administrative instrument, 
addressing its announcements to ‘the public’ and in principle to all subjects, they 
tended to reach only the educated classes rather than the ‘common man’, so that a 
new ‘bourgeois’ and reading public arose within the public as a whole (1989: 21-23). 
Increasingly aware of itself as an opponent to public authority, this reading public 
subsequently developed into a public sphere of civil society (1989: 23).  
 
Habermas compares the paradoxical intent of the state to both control commercial 
activity and encourage initiative through regulation, and the equally paradoxical 
commercial policy of the mercantilists towards both state enterprise and private 
business. The peculiar ambivalence between public regulation and private initiative 
made problematic the state’s interventions, principally through taxes, into the private 
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sphere. Because, on the one hand, civil society now saw a strict distinction between 
public authority and a private domain, and because, on the other, the state 
reconstructed (through the press) life as a subject of public interest beyond the 
confines of the private household, state interventionism ‘provoked the critical 
judgment of a public making use of its reason’ (1989: 24). This led to a change both 
in the constitution of the public, from receivers of regulations from above to the 
adversary of the state (1989: 26), and in the function of the press, from the medium 
by which the state instructed the public, to the critical medium of public opinion 
(1989: 24-25). The public sphere now ‘cast itself loose’ as a forum in which private 
people came together to form a public, for the purpose of ‘compelling public 
authority to legitimate itself before public opinion’ (1989: 25). And from the mid-
17
th
 Century, references to a critical ‘public’ rather than merely the ‘world’ or 
‘mankind’ became common (1989: 26).  
 
The bourgeois public sphere was a sphere of private people come together as a public 
via the medium of the people’s public use of reason (1989: 27), initially in apolitical 
form to debate culture (1989: 29), before evolving into a post-literary form of public 
opinion to put the state in touch with the needs of society. It reclaimed the public 
sphere regulated from above, and turned it against the public authorities themselves, 
engaging them in debate over the rules governing the privatised but publicly relevant 
sphere of commodity exchange and social labour (1989: 27), confronting state power 
with their own principle of control – publicity (1989: 28). 
 
Following the polarisation of state and society, the process was repeated within 
society itself, with the separation of commodity exchange and the family, on the one 
hand, and the new public spheres in the worlds of politics and letters, on the other; 
private men thus comprising the roles of heads of family and property owners, as 
well as political members of a bourgeois public (1989: 28-30).  
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Publicity in the Town, the Family and the Press 
 
The town took over the social functions of the court, strengthened by new 
institutions, such as the coffee houses in Britain (1680-1730) and then the salons in 
18
th
 Century France (between regency and revolution), which became centres of 
literary and then political criticism (1989: 32). Within these institutions, the prestige 
and power of public office or private interest were left at the door, and inequalities of 
status were disregarded, the better argument carrying, in principle, more weight than 
status or rank (1989: 36). The public were free to determine their own common 
concern, debating issues that were unquestioned within the parameters of state or 
church discussion (1989: 36-37). And no matter how exclusive any given public 
might become, however, it could never be equated with the public, or with its 
mouthpiece or educator, and remained always in principle ‘immersed within a more 
inclusive public’ (1989: 37). Concomitant with these new institutions was the rise of 
a reading, theatre- and concert-going public, who paid to attend performances which 
were now more commodities to be consumed, judged and debated than passive 
celebrations of courtly splendour (1989: 39-40).  
 
At the same time, (an individualising process of) privatisation made the home more 
suited to individuals than the family. The representative functions of the family’s 
display before their servants in the parlour gave way to the conjugal family’s living 
room, while family festivities gave way to social evenings at which private people 
gathered to form a public, or salon society (1989: 45). Habermas claims that such a 
scene represented the emancipation of the family and commodity owners from 
governmental directives and controls, but that nevertheless the family was never 
truly independent of society, labour and commodity exchange, and that commodity 
owners were now subject to the economic rationality and laws of the market. The 
rhetorical independence of the individuals in the family corresponded to that of the 
property owners in the market, to the extent that the bourgeois family’s 
consciousness of its private autonomy denied its economic origins (1989: 46).  
 
By the mid-18
th
 Century, the public’s communication with itself through the conjugal 
family had evolved into the rational-critical debate in the world of letters, held 
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together more by the professional press than early institutions such as coffee houses 
and salons (1989: 51).   
 
The public sphere in the world of letters, already equipped with institutions of the 
public and forums for discussion, was then functionally converted into a sphere of 
criticism of public authority, so completing the appropriation of the state-governed 
public sphere by the public of private people making use of their reason (1989: 51), 
and giving rise to a battle between public opinion and public power over the 
regulation of society (1989: 52). In contrast to the ancient Greek public sphere, 
which was constituted by the political tasks of a citizenry acting in common to 
administrate law and defence, the modern public sphere was constituted by the civic 
tasks of a society engaged in critical public debate to protect a commercial economy 
(1989: 52). In contrast to the res publica, its political function was to regulate society 
(1989: 52). It was inherently, therefore, both private and polemical, whereas the 
Greek model was neither. In the former, the citizen’s private status as master, upon 
which his political status as citizen depended, was based merely on domination, and 
was only agonistic rhetorically, such as in the mock war context of sporting events. 
The bourgeois citizen, in contrast, depended on the freedom and intimacy accorded 
him by the private family, and was properly agonistic through his disputes with his 
own government (1989: 52).  
 
 
 
The Bourgeois Model 
 
For Habermas, the family or intimate sphere was the core of the market or private 
sphere (1989: 55). In both the political and literary public sphere, the public of 
private people, whose autonomy rested on private property, represented itself as the 
bourgeois family and humanity (1989: 55). The privatised individual was both 
bourgeois (owner of goods and persons) and homme (human being). Importantly, 
there was a fundamental ambivalence in the private sphere(s): on the one hand, the 
family was bonded by human closeness and represented the individual’s 
emancipation from society; on the other, the family was bonded by patriarchal 
authority that was representative of society. This ambivalence was shared with the 
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public sphere(s), whereby privatised individuals could communicate through 
rational-critical debate, in either the political realm or the world of letters, as both 
bourgeois (serving his own private interests) and homme (1989: 55-56). There was 
also a lack of congruency between the two publics; while women were active 
members of the literary public, they were excluded from the political public sphere 
(1989: 56). But in the self-understanding of bourgeois public opinion, both spheres 
were identical. The conflation of property owner and common man, and thus the 
fiction of one public, was accomplishable because ownership and education often 
went hand in hand. But the convergence of the private interests of property owners 
with the freedom of the common man was acceptable because it served a positive 
function in emancipating civil society from both mercantilist rule and absolutist 
regimentation (1989: 56).   
 
Habermas uses Britain as the model case for the critically debating public’s gradual 
assumption of political control. In the first instance, at the end of the 17
th
 Century, 
the government was constitutionally based on law (via the Habeas Corpus Act and 
Declaration of Rights) (1989: 62). Secondly, by the end of the 18
th
 Century, 
government could be said to be influenced by ‘public opinion’ – understood as the 
considered opinion of an educated and informed public formed by public discussion, 
rather than simply ‘vulgar’ or ‘common opinion’ (1989: 66). And thirdly, by the 
early 19
th
 Century, parliamentary proceedings could legally be reported on. 
 
The liberalised market and the general privatisation of civil society were the social 
preconditions for the public sphere (1989: 74). Civil society under absolutism was 
private only in the privative sense of social relationships stripped of their quasi-
publicness, neither free from state authority and mercantilist regulation, nor having 
political functions of its own. Nevertheless, mercantilism had already paved the way 
for privatisation in accordance with the laws of the market (1989: 74). Civil society’s 
status as private in a positive sense came to be associated with the freedom and 
autonomy of property owners, and social relationships subsequently assumed the 
form of exchange relationships (1989: 74), reduced by private law to contracts on the 
model of the free market, whereby commodity owners were assumed to be 
fundamentally equal and freely competing, and the legal status of the person was no 
longer defined by estate (1989: 75). This emancipation of civil society from public 
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authority and mercantilism, and the subsequent development of the political public 
sphere within the bourgeois constitutional state, were made possible only by the 
principles of laisser faire and a particular form of competitive capitalism that 
‘determined the entire phase we call liberal’ (1989: 78).  
 
The free (self-regulated) market was protected by law from state interventions 
(unless empowered by law), because of their arbitrariness rather than their violation 
of justice (1989: 79-80). In this law-based state, all state activity was bound to a 
system of norms legitimated by public opinion, so that legislation, distinct from 
executive power, would be the result of rational agreement rather than political will. 
Public opinion, as the consensus on what was politically necessary in the interests of 
all, brought about by the public competition of private arguments (1989: 83), was 
intended to be neither a check on power, nor a source of power, nor power itself, but 
the very dissolution of domination (1989: 82).  
 
This constitutional state, founded on legislation, set out in law the functions of the 
public sphere through a series of rights. The first set of rights (freedom of opinion 
and speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly and association) concerned the 
public engaged in rational-critical debate, and the political function of private people 
in this sphere (right of petition, equality of vote). The second set (personal freedom, 
inviolability of the home) concerned the individual’s status as free human being in 
the intimate sphere. The third set (private property rights) concerned the transactions 
between private property owners in civil society. These rights guaranteed: firstly, the 
public and private (with the intimate sphere at its core) spheres; secondly, the 
institutions and instruments of the public sphere (press, political parties) and private 
autonomy (family, property); and thirdly, the political functions of private people as 
citizens and the economic functions of private people as commodity owners and 
human beings (1989: 83). The constitutional state predicated on civil rights claimed 
to be the embodiment of public power, organised to ensure its own subordination to a 
neutralised private sphere. But the presupposed model of civil society, based on 
historical tendencies rather than universal categories, failed to correspond to the 
reality, and the claim that ‘power’ came from the people betrayed the public sphere’s 
character as an order of domination itself. The private people, upon whose property-
guaranteed autonomy and education the constitutional state was built, were in fact a 
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minority of high and petty bourgeoisie, while the landed nobility continued to 
exercise power in accord with the political laws of pre-capitalist society (1989: 84).  
 
Although the public sphere rested on the assumption of universal access, the public 
itself assumed a very particular form, as the dual criteria for admission to the public 
sphere of education and property ownership tended to demarcate the same circle of 
persons. The restriction of the franchise was not however synonymous with the 
restriction of the public sphere, as long as it was understood as merely the legal 
ratification of the status of the educated and property-owning private person, to 
which there was universal accessibility (1989: 85). This universal accessibility was 
decided by the structure of civil society from the outset, not ex post facto by the 
subsequent constitution and bestowal of franchise (1989: 85-86).  
 
Such universalism was rooted in the economic, sociological and theoretical 
presuppositions of classical economics, whose assumption of free competition and 
independently formed prices, dependent upon a society of commodity producers in 
which the ownership of the means of production was evenly distributed, led to the 
conclusion that supply and demand would always be in equilibrium (1989: 86). If 
everyone had the chance to become a citizen, only citizens should be allowed entry 
to the political public sphere. The interests of the bourgeois class could be equated 
with the general interest of the nation as only such people, i.e. property owners, had 
private interests that could converge into a common interest that preserved the 
integrity of civil society as a public sphere. Only such private people could represent 
effectively the general interest, as it was unnecessary for them to distinguish between 
their roles as homme or citoyen, or to leave their private interests at the door, because 
as owners of private property their political task was to protect the property order as 
a private one. Class interest was therefore the basis of public opinion (1989: 87).  
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4.4 THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN THE SOCIAL WELFARE STATE MASS DEMOCRACY 
 
Structural Transformation 
 
When the social conditions that had given rise to the public sphere underwent a 
profound transformation, the contradictions that had been institutionalised in the 
constitutional state came to the fore, and exposed the identification of domination’s 
dissolution with the continued prevalence of domination within a new political order 
(1989: 88). Over time, the original relationship between public and private dissolved, 
and the contours between them eroded. Neither liberal nor socialist models were 
adequate to make the diagnosis that as the public sphere penetrated more spheres of 
society, it lost its political function of subjecting public affairs to critical debate. The 
contradictory tendencies toward too much publicity and disregard for privacy, on the 
one hand, and too little publicity and an increase in secrecy, on the other, meant that 
the more the public sphere expanded, the more both the public and private spheres 
were undermined (1989: 140). 
 
The public sphere emerged in a ‘tension-charged field’ between state and society in 
such a way as to remain part of the private realm (1989: 141). Even neo-mercantilist 
state interventionism at the end of the 19
th
 Century, while restricting the autonomy of 
private people, didn’t affect the private character of their relations with one another. 
Society as a private sphere only became questionable when the ‘powers of society’ 
assumed public authority, leading to the ‘refeudalisation of society’ (1989: 142). This 
state interventionism was due to the irreconcilability of conflicts of interest in the 
private realm, and had its counterpart in the transfer of public functions to private 
corporate bodies, constituting a dialectic between the societisation of the state and 
the stateification of society, and gradually destroying the separation of state and 
society that was the basis of the public sphere. The public-private distinction could 
no longer be usefully applied to the repoliticised social sphere (1989: 142).  
 
By the end of the 19
th
 Century, the restriction of competition and the onset of the 
long depression led to the abandonment of laisser faire principles across the 
capitalistically advanced countries, who now recognised that Say’s Law of the 
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automatic equilibrium between production and consumption was a function of 
historical circumstance rather than a natural state of affairs. In the reality of 
imperfect competition and dependent prices, social power was concentrated in 
private hands, contrary to the theory of perfect competition, independent prices and 
horizontal exchange between equal commodity owners (1989: 144), and the liberal 
state’s role of night-watchman was recast in light of the need for a strong state (1989: 
144). This inequality and power in the private sphere translated into the public 
sphere, so that the common man could justifiably claim to be excluded from both 
spheres. With the extension of the franchise, and the rise of the unions, organised 
interests aimed to influence legislation as well as act as a counterweight to the labour 
market (1989: 145). As public services and social welfare were extended, the ‘public 
costs of private production were complemented by the public costs of private 
consumption’ (1989: 147). As state and societal institutions fused within the 
repoliticised social sphere of the social welfare state, the reciprocal permeation of 
state and society (1989: 151) meant that public and private law had to be superseded 
by ‘social legislation’ (1989: 148).  
 
As the private sphere of work and organisation became increasingly public, the 
family and intimate sphere, becoming ever more private, moved from the core to the 
periphery of this deprivatised private sphere (1989: 152). The objectification of the 
realm of work between public and private realms broke down the distinction between 
public bureaucracy and private enterprise, and the extent to which a large enterprise 
could ever remain under the private control of an owner or shareholder became 
questionable (1989: 152). Large enterprises developed into social institutions, or 
organisations, whether public or private (1989: 154), and private property no longer 
served to distinguish between owner and employee; instead, employees were linked 
to an institution rather than to each other via the status of ‘function performance’ 
(1989: 153). Meanwhile, the family lost its productive functions in favour of 
consumptive ones, and more importantly disengaged from social labour (1989: 154). 
No longer having to bear as private risk the eventualities of illness, age, 
underemployment etc, the family’s individual members became publicly protected 
by the welfare state, which took over responsibility for shaping the conduct of the 
privacy of family life (1989: 155). Instead of control, the private autonomy of the 
family is maintained as consumption of income, leisure time and publicly guaranteed 
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benefits. This pseudo-privacy (1989: 157), or illusion of intensified privacy, 
comprises the family only insofar as it is constituted as a community of consumers, 
whose control is replaced by state guarantees within a framework of rights and 
obligations bestowed by the welfare state (1989: 156). As the public-private 
distinction broke down, private reading and rational-critical debate gave way to a 
fetishism of community participation and watching television together (1989: 158).  
 
 
 
Mass Society and the Media 
 
When the literary public sphere collapsed, it was replaced by the ‘pseudo-public or 
sham-private world of culture consumption’ (1989: 160), which blurred the 
distinction between bourgeois and homme (1989: 160). When the laws of the market 
pervaded the sphere reserved for private people as a public, rational-critical debate 
devolved into consumption, the public as audience became a passive body, and 
public communication unravelled into the individuated reception of the culture 
industry’s products via the mass media (1989: 161). This transmutation of the 
original relation between the intimate domain and the literary public sphere, which 
from the beginning provided the illusion of bourgeois privacy, now uncoupled 
intimacy and the family from property ownership and capital. Although this freed 
private people from the ideological fusion of bourgeois and homme, it brought with it 
new relations of dependence; upon public state guarantees rather than private 
property or participation in the political public sphere (1989: 161).   
 
Literary family periodicals were replaced by popular advertiser- and subscriber-
financed magazines (1989: 162-163), and bourgeois forms of sociability were more 
generally replaced by diverse substitutes that nevertheless shared in common the 
abstinence from literary and political debate. Convivial discussion among individuals 
gave way to noncommittal group activities that lacked the institutional power to form 
a ‘public’ around them. With TV, radio and the cinema, privacy was no longer 
‘oriented towards an audience’. Whereas critical debate was dependent upon the 
reading done in the privacy of the home, the culture-consuming public didn’t require 
any further discussion (1989: 163). Nevertheless, some critical debate persisted, but 
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only in the form of a secondary business, staged as panel discussion in the form of a 
consumer item. Although the commercialisation of cultural goods had once been the 
precondition for rational-critical debate, it had been in principle excluded from the 
exchange relationships of the market, and remained at the centre of the sphere in 
which private people met only as ‘human beings’, paying for what they consumed 
(books etc) but not the conversation about what they had consumed. In contrast, 
Habermas argues that conversation itself is now administered, and critical debate has 
become just another commodity. Consensus on content, now reduced to a matter of 
etiquette, is superfluous to consensus on form, the balancing of positions bound to 
prearranged rules and the demotion of conflicts from public polemic to personal 
incompatibility (1989: 163), and consensus developed in debate is itself yielded to 
compromise imposed nonpublicly (1989: 179). Critical discussion amongst a public 
becomes exchanges about taste between consumers (1989: 171). While performing 
important functions, it lacks a ‘publicist’ function and acts as a substitute for action 
(1989: 164), replacing a reading public with a mass public of culture consumers 
(1989: 168).  
 
The function of the market had been restricted to the distribution of cultural goods 
and their removal from the exclusive use of a wealthy minority; the market didn’t 
affect the quality of the good itself. Mass culture, however, adapts to the needs of the 
relatively uneducated consumer strata, bringing culture down to the masses, rather 
than bringing them toward the appreciation of a culture undamaged in substance 
through the guidance of an enlarged and educated public (1989: 165-166). Habermas 
distinguishes between, on the one hand, the market’s function of economically easing 
access to culture and reducing culture to a commodity in form only, and, on the 
other, psychologically facilitating access to culture and reducing it to a commodity in 
content too (1989: 166). The latter criterion of consumer culture is accompanied by 
the destruction of the public sphere (1989: 167). The commercialisation of 
participation in an expanded public sphere led to depoliticised content and the 
transformation of the ‘psychological facilitation’ provided by the market from a 
means to an end, to an end in itself (1989: 169). The distinction between fact and 
fiction, journalism and literature, information and rational-critical debate, is 
abandoned, and the news becomes more superficially just news stories (1989: 170).  
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The ‘new media’ (by which Habermas meant broadcasting as a ‘culture industry’) 
reduced the distance between the public and culture, affecting both the privacy of its 
appropriation and the publicity of its debate (1989: 170), and reducing both public 
and private sphere to illusions. The public sphere becomes privatised as the sphere 
for the publicising of the private biographies of a consuming public (1989: 171), split 
into specialist minorities who use their reason nonpublicly, and the mass of 
consumers whose public receptiveness to culture remains uncritical (1989: 175). 
 
Contrary to Marx’s view that the entry of the propertyless and uneducated masses 
into the public sphere would bring about a truly public sphere, Habermas argues that 
it resulted in the interlocking of state and society, removing the public sphere from 
its former basis in the liberal public-private distinction without supplying a new one, 
and undermining its function as a go-between linking state and society. Instead, its 
mediating function has passed to special interest associations from the private realm 
and parties from the political realm, which attempt to gain the acquiescence of a 
mediatised public through the now autonomous mass media (1989: 177). The critical 
publicity of public opinion is consequently supplanted by the manipulative publicity 
of non-public opinion (1989: 178).  
 
Habermas focuses on the press as the ‘preeminent institution’ of the public sphere to 
demonstrate the shift in its function as a special realm, arguing that its 
commercialisation led to the blurring of the public-private distinction within the 
private domain, while its dependence upon political guarantees of independence 
meant that it ceased to be exclusively located within the private domain (1989: 181). 
He criticises the rise of the editorial function and shift from publishing as the 
provision of news (that contributed towards public opinion) to the provision of public 
opinion itself (1989: 182). From the 1830s onwards, the press developed from taking 
ideological sides to seeing itself primarily as a business (1989: 184), increasingly 
influenced by private people as private individuals rather than as a public, and 
becoming the ‘gate through which privileged private interests invaded the public 
sphere’ (1989: 185).  
 
But compared to the press, the economic concentration, technological-organisational 
coordination and capital requirements of film, radio and TV were so great that in 
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some countries they (at least broadcasting) had to be brought under government 
direction from the start. These developments turned private institutions of a public of 
private people into public corporations. Taking the telegraph industry as his example, 
he demonstrates the level of indirect dependence upon government, and the 
bestowing of semi-official status upon agencies by exploiting rather than eliminating 
their commercial character (1989: 187). The experience of press concentration gave 
cause (outside of the US) to block ‘natural monopolies’ in broadcasting as private 
business enterprises, organising them instead into public or semi-public corporations 
to prevent their capitalistic function encroaching upon their publicist function. The 
basis of these publicist institutions was thus reversed; no longer protected in the 
hands of private people from public authority, as in the liberal model, because in the 
long-run the economic, technological and organisational concentration had turned 
them into ‘societal powers’. Although the mass media reaches a greater public than 
the liberal press, it has abandoned the public sphere for the once private sphere of 
commodity exchange. The more effective they are at publicity, the more accessible 
to private interests. While the liberal press transmitted and amplified debate, the 
mass media shape it (1989: 188), and private interests are no longer left to the 
market as regulating force, but are allowed instead to shape opinion, while private 
people as property owners are now able to influence private people as the public 
(1989: 189). He argues also that the broadcasting of parliamentary debates is 
inadequate as a means of providing opportunity to public participation, as it distorts 
debate and disrupts parliamentary work, making parliamentary deliberation 
secondary to its documentation (1989: 206). Further, consumer culture's distortion of 
judicial publicity matches the plebiscitary distortion of parliamentary publicity. The 
mass media documentation of criminal trials constitutes more the packaging of court 
proceedings for consumers than it serves the control of the jurisdictional process by 
the assembly of citizens of the state (1989: 207).  
 
The flood of advertising into the public sphere was not entirely due to the 
liberalisation of the market and the commercialisation of the press, however (1989: 
189), nor did this necessarily entail a negative effect on the public realm. A 
separation of the media’s publicist functions into those of the debating public and 
those of the presentation of private interests, along the lines of newspapers’ 
distinctions between classifieds and editorials, could have protected the public realm. 
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But a clear distinction between an economic and political public sphere was never 
achieved; and both the horizontal competition between private interests through 
advertising, and the vertical competition between class interests (through the 
expanded franchise and the appeal to the mass of consumers) invaded the public 
sphere (1989: 192).  
 
Through public relations, economic advertising became aware of its political 
character. Although private adverts are directed to consumers, opinion management 
claims to play a political role in the public sphere. The message sender hides their 
business intentions in the role of someone interested in public welfare, and the 
addressee of public relations is public opinion and the public of private citizens, ‘not 
directly consumers’. This influencing of consumers exploits the idea of the public 
sphere for its own ends, integrating the functions of the public sphere into the 
competition of organised private interests (1989: 193), and the subsequent 
engineering of consent leads to consumers’ false consciousness that they contribute 
responsibly to public opinion (1989: 194).  
 
The original basis (and the double condition) for the convergence of opinions into the 
public interest collapses; the public is no longer restricted to private people as 
members of civil society, and debate is no longer restricted to the foundations of civil 
society as a sphere of private control. The fake version of the public sphere, shaped 
by public relations under the aegis of a sham public interest, produces a mood of 
conformity among its customers, and imitates the feudal features of representative 
publicity. The refeudalisation of the public sphere occurs also in another sense; the 
state itself is subjected to the code of public relations and the more general fusing of 
entertainment and advertising. ‘Because private enterprises evoke in their customers 
the idea that in their consumption decisions they act in their capacity as citizens, the 
state has to “address” its citizens like consumers. As a result, public authority too 
competes for publicity’ (1989: 195).  
 
With the interpenetration of state and society, the bridging functions of the public 
sphere (including parliament as the ‘public sphere established as an organ of the 
state’) were lost. Correlative to the weakening of parliament was the strengthening of 
both bureaucracy, on the one hand, and special-interest associations and political 
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parties, on the other; i.e. the means by which state was infused into society, and 
society was infused into state. The new public sphere integrated state and society in a 
different fashion (1989: 197).  
 
In aiming to transform the private interests of many into a common public interest, 
special-interest associations represent their particular association’s special interest as 
the general interest, manipulating public opinion without being controlled by it 
themselves. Publicity work aims at strengthening prestige without making the matter 
on which compromise is to be achieved a topic of public discussion (1989: 200). 
Critical debate is no longer carried on within the public sphere; rather, the public 
sphere becomes the court before whose public prestige is displayed (1989: 201). 
Although representative publicity itself is not revived, it lends traits to the 
refeudalised public sphere of civil society, so that modern publicity has an affinity 
with feudal publicity (1989: 200).  
 
With the collapse of the institutions of social-convivial interchange (1989: 202), as 
well as the parallel developments of the commercial mass circulation press and the 
reorganisation of parties run by dignitaries on a mass scale, the public sphere was 
transformed. Equal citizenship rights for all altered the structure of parties, now 
mobilised around the mass of citizenry rather than just the bourgeois class. Mass-
based parties, trading on surface integration, replaced class parties and became the 
dominant type (1989: 203); no longer strictly class or special-interest parties, but 
representative of the interlocking of organised interests and the political machinery 
that, Habermas argues, in reference to Schmitt, transforms parliament into a 
committee for airing party lines (1989: 205).  
 
 
 
 
4.5 FROM RATIONAL-CRITICAL DEBATE TO NON-PUBLIC OPINION 
 
Political and Social Rights 
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In the liberal constitutional state, basic rights guaranteed society as a sphere of 
private autonomy in contradistinction to the limited functions of a public authority. 
Linking state and civil society was the realm of private people, who, assembled into 
a public of citizens, could transform political authority into rational authority (1989: 
222). Citizens’ rights guaranteed that, freed from state interference, private people 
would act according to the general rules of the legal system and the inherent justice 
of the market mechanism, which, through the guarantee of liberties over and against 
the state, assured equal opportunity for the generation of both societal wealth and 
public opinion (1989: 222-223). For Habermas, the liberal constitution was meant 
not only to define the state and its relation to society, but ‘the system of coexistence 
in society as a whole’ (1989: 223). The guarantee of the autonomy of private people 
in both public and private spheres assured the proper function of the public sphere 
and the market (1989: 224). 
 
The transformation of the liberal constitutional state into a state committed to social 
rights, however, marked a point of departure and reversal of relations (although it 
was marked more by continuity than a break with liberal traditions). In moving from 
a negative to a positive view of liberty, it altered the function of basic rights and 
shaped social conditions to continue the legal tradition, which also wanted to ensure 
a legal order to encompass both state and society (1989: 224). Although there is a 
historical continuity between liberal basic rights and social rights to welfare, there is 
a fundamental shift from a passive state that limits its own power in order to 
guarantee the liberty of individuals, to an active state that comes to the aid of the 
individual in an otherwise merciless society. Although institutional guarantees 
concerning property and family serve well the public-private demarcation that 
underlies basic liberal rights, once it is recognised that the positive consequences no 
longer come about automatically, these rights need to be supplemented by basic 
social rights, even though this no longer honours the original demarcation (1989: 
226). Rights that were once exclusionary over and against the state are subsequently 
reconceived as participatory rights, extending the idea of equality and participation 
throughout the entire economic and social order (1989: 226-227). Freedom of the 
press, which in its negative interpretation guaranteed public opinion, can no longer 
claim to express the opinions of individuals as private people because of the flooding 
of the public sphere by private interests and because of the mediatisation of 
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individual opinions, to the extent that such rights must now be reinterpreted as 
positive guarantees of participation in order to fulfil their original function. Press 
freedom is then reconceived (cf. Ridder) as a social rather than a political right, 
aimed at providing citizens with the equal opportunity to participate in public 
communication, rather than the individual or collective freedom from government 
interference (1989: 227). Equal access to the public sphere can only be guaranteed 
by active state interference rather than the guarantee of freedom from state 
interference (1989: 227-228). Press freedom as a social right thus undermines press 
freedom as a political right, and therefore the original basis for the public sphere. 
 
Because state and society interpenetrate, the middle sphere becomes one of 
semipublic-semiprivate relations ordered by social legislation, changing the 
significance of the private sphere that precedes the state, and the public sphere that 
connects society with the state. Exemption can no longer guarantee a share in social 
benefits (via the market), nor participation in the public sphere; instead they have to 
be positively guaranteed. But as the political authorities of an interventionist state 
take over the functions of commerce and labour (and as political functions are taken 
over by societal powers), public and private are relinked, and society is refeudalised 
(1989: 231). 
 
Because the social welfare state ‘administers, distributes and provides’, it reduces the 
political interests of citizens to private claims (1989: 211). For Habermas, a problem 
with public service is that it makes citizens relate to the state in a demanding, yet 
unpolitical and indifferent way, encouraging their expectations of being provided for, 
and making for a passive citizenship that is not so dissimilar from consumption.  
 
In critical reference to Berelson’s essay on the voter’s ‘personality structure’, setting 
out the ideal psychological characteristics of the active republican citizen, Habermas 
emphasises the difficulty in assessing the democratic behaviour of citizens, 
advocating instead the relative importance and superiority of the sociological 
constituents of the political public sphere. Further, he stresses that if voters are 
deviating from these norms, it is because of the structural transformations to the 
public sphere (1989: 212). He argues that the social composition of those politically 
active members of the mass enfranchised society echoes that of the bourgeois public, 
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in that they tend to be wealthier and better educated, and that there is even a 
correspondence between those who vote and those who are organised as members of 
private associations. However, the principle of debate is not respected as this stratum 
tends to not subject their opinions to debate, holding on to them and frustrating their 
evolution into public opinion (1989: 212-213). The tendency to target the marginal 
voters, despite them being those who know and care the least, relies heavily on the 
mass media and adaptation to this group’s unpolitical consumer attitude, rather than 
through the enlightenment of citizens (1989: 215). The temporary manufacturing of a 
political public sphere by electoral managers social-psychologically integrates the 
political realm into the realm of consumption, addressing the ‘political consumers’ 
that Riesman referred to as the ‘new indifferents’ (1989: 216); not non-voters, as 
such, but the peer-group exchange of consumption preferences, viewing politics as if 
they were its spectators (1989: 217).  
 
The political public sphere of the social welfare state contradictorily represents, on 
the one hand, the collapse of the public sphere of civil society and its devolution into 
a manipulative publicity displayed by organisations over a mediatised public, and, on 
the other, the preservation of the public sphere of civil society and critical publicity, 
and the conflict between the two. The degree of democratisation is hence determined, 
not simply by the exercise of critical publicity, but by the extent to which critical 
publicity prevails over manipulative publicity (1989: 232). Optimistically, Habermas 
insists that the outcome of the battle between the critical publicity regarding the 
exercise of the power of the social welfare state, and the manipulative publicity of 
private interests, is far from inevitable (1989: 235). 
 
 
 
(Critical and Manipulative) Publicity and (Public and Nonpublic) Opinion 
 
While publicity remains today an organisational principle of the political order, 
‘more than a mere scrap of liberal ideology that a social democracy could discard 
without harm’, and while its scope has continued to expand, Habermas argues that its 
function has become progressively insignificant since the mid-19
th
 Century (1989: 
4).  
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Habermas differentiates between ‘public opinion’ as understood as the subjection of 
political and social power to critical publicity, and ‘public opinion’ as manipulative 
publicity in the service of private persons and consumer goods. Both these forms of 
publicity compete in the public sphere, but both address ‘the’ public opinion. The 
critical and manipulative functions are of different orders; the public of each are 
expected to behave in different ways – one is premised on public opinion, the other 
on non-public opinion – and each are at cross-purposes (1989: 236). Rather than a 
distinction between facts and norms, critical publicity is understood as more than a 
norm (as a constitutionally institutionalised norm), and manipulative publicity is 
more than a fact (it is accompanied by a particular self-interpretation that may stand 
in opposition to critical publicity) (1989: 237). While the publicity of parliamentary 
deliberations and the juridical process was the cornerstone of the liberal public 
sphere, the plebiscitary deviations from this model towards a more representative 
publicity for the benefit of consumers undermines the public sphere (1989: 207).  
 
In the context of a factual decline of the public sphere, and the empirical 
impossibility of identifying it, the necessity of defining it normatively remains, of 
which there are two dominant paths. The first desires to salvage an inner circle of a 
critically debating public amidst the more acclamatory common opinion, sacrificing 
the element of publicity that guarantees universality at the expense of that which 
guarantees rationality. The second, in contrast, abandons considerations of rationality 
and representativeness in favour of institutional criteria (1989: 238), equating public 
opinion and an active citizenry with that of parliament, and, more specifically, with 
the party in majority at any given time. But it is impossible to discern whether this 
account of public opinion is brought about by public communication or opinion 
management (1989: 239). When public opinion becomes neutral to both the public-
private distinction and the difference between reasonable communication and 
irrational conformity, the relationship between group opinions and public authority is 
abandoned to public administration (1989: 242-243). And when it is no longer 
concerned with political problems or bound by rules of public discussion, public 
opinion becomes little more than an object of domination (1989: 243).  
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In distinguishing between the system of informal, personal, non-public opinions and 
the system of formal, institutionally authorised public opinions, Habermas splits non-
public opinions into three levels of obligatoriness. The lowest level tends to be 
commonsensically held, unreflected-upon beliefs, such as views on the death 
penalty; the second level are subreflective ‘refractory results of socialisation shocks’, 
such as attitudes to war and security; finally, the third level are often-discussed 
matters, presented as self-evident, but which remain ‘other-directed opinions’, 
influenced by family, peers and the culture industry (1989: 245). Taken for granted 
assumptions rooted in deep-seated traditions can be seen as ‘sub-literary’, while 
those manufactured by the culture industry are ‘post-literary’. The disconnection 
between public reason and the literary medium means that the ‘integrative culture’ 
delivers only a ‘public service for private consumption’; the public of which is as 
little a ‘public’ as the pre-bourgeois society that produced traditionally rooted, 
unpolemically circulated opinions. Although there remain people who, in having 
reflected-upon opinions formed through literary and rational controversy, are still 
capable of forming a public, they remain outside of the communication network of 
an intact public, and therefore also form part of non-public opinion (1989: 246). 
Against this stands a sphere of quasi-public opinion, officially or semi-officially 
authorised announcements that circulate within a narrow circle that skips the mass of 
the population. Because they are privileged and there is no correspondence with the 
non-organised mass, such opinion fails to fulfil the criteria of rational-critical debate. 
Public opinion is thus decomposed into the informal opinions of private citizens 
without a public on the one hand, and the formal opinions of publistically effective 
institutions on the other (1989: 247). Only when these two domains are mediated by 
a third of critical publicity can public opinion properly be formed (1989: 249). 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter’s close engagement with Habermas’s historical and normative approach 
to the public sphere raises questions about the appropriateness of its application to a 
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defence of PSB. Certainly, there is much here to substantiate the critique of market 
forces in broadcasting, and Habermas’s history of the rise and fall of the liberal 
public sphere (albeit a flawed and partial history, as we shall see in the next chapter) 
provides a powerful narrative with which to make sense of the development of 
broadcasting. His critique of the mass media and public relations, in particular, has 
obvious relevance to a media environment saturated by the private interests of 
powerful multinational corporations and the strategic discourse of political spin. But 
there’s also plenty here to suggest that the application of the public sphere concept to 
PSB is far from straightforward, and that the defence of PSB in the name of the 
public sphere is somewhat problematic. The sticking point usually picked up on is 
the relative absence of broadcasting from the STPS. Habermas only fleetingly refers 
to the rationale for PSB as a defence against the commercialisation that was so 
harmful for the press, in contrast to the amount of space he devotes to dismissing all 
mass media technologies (including broadcasting and in contradistinction to the 
press) as inherently destructive of the public sphere. The naivety of his views on 
media technology and reception have been widely criticised, though, and he has 
since acknowledged the arbitrariness of that original distinction. What is of far 
greater concern for the direct appropriation of the concept, however, is Habermas’s 
treatment of citizenship and the welfare state, and ultimately his distinction between 
citizenship and consumption. 
 
In the shift from seeing press freedom as a political right (the negative liberty from 
government interference to participate) to seeing it as a social right (the positive 
guarantee of equal participation through active government interference), the 
political basis for the public sphere is actually undermined, Habermas argues, the 
more inclusive and egalitarian it becomes (Habermas, 1989: 227-228). The 
development of the welfare-state, the expansion of the franchise to include (in 
principle) all social groups, and the bestowal of social citizenship rights upon a 
passive and dependent citizenry, are analysed in STPS for their negative effect on the 
public-private distinction that underlies the public sphere. This is in direct contrast to 
the account of social citizenship developed by TH Marshall and appropriated by 
Murdock to defend PSB against marketization. Comparatively, the rise of 
commercialised mass media and public relations are of only secondary concern to 
Habermas, and are even treated as merely symptomatic of the more fundamental 
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process of social democratisation. Although Habermas exposes the tendency of 
critical publicity to be undermined by manipulative publicity when the public sphere 
is grounded in the free market, he suggests that it is equally undermined by 
representative publicity when grounded in public service. Because the political 
public sphere of the social welfare state contradictorily represents both the collapse 
and the preservation of critical publicity, therefore, one should perhaps avoid 
distinguishing too neatly between the negative influence of the market and the 
positive influence of public service. 
 
Indeed, the paternalist character of Reithian PSB and Paddy Scannell’s celebratory 
account of modern public life, in particular, resemble more Hegel's reduction of the 
public sphere to the education of a passively consuming citizenry, as well as 
Habermas’s critique of the welfare state’s reproduction of the ‘traditionally rooted, 
unpolemically circulated opinions’ typical of a pre-bourgeois society (Habermas, 
1989: 246),  than it does Habermas’s own elevation of the public sphere to the 
rational-critical debate of an actively participating citizenry. Although Habermas 
accepts that broadcasting media perform the function of widely circulating 
information and opinions, and while, we may add, the quality and inclusivity of 
debate in the public service variety may be noteworthy, the role of broadcasting is 
not the only or most important aspect of public communication (Habermas, 2010b: 
186). While PSB shields citizens from economic power and the declining standards 
associated with the need to cut costs and boost profits, because autonomous 
citizenship cannot be brought about through intervention from above (Habermas, 
2010b 192-193), PSB simultaneously reduces the citizenry to a community of private 
consumers of public service by relating them to the state in a passive, unpolitical way 
(Habermas, 1989: 156; 211; 246-247). Both the consumer culture of the commercial 
market and the welfare-state's bestowal of equal citizenship rights upon the ‘mass of 
citizenry’ (rather than the ‘public of citizenry’), therefore, constitute for Habermas 
the plebiscitary distortion of publicity and the undermining of the public sphere 
(Habermas, 1989: 207). 
 
Although Habermas’s Millsian distinction between public and mass culture, where 
the former brings the public towards culture and the latter brings culture down to the 
masses (Habermas, 1989: 165-166), corresponds to Scannell’s appropriation of 
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public life and the public sphere to PSB, Habermas emphasises that 
commercialisation was neither solely responsible for the decline of the public sphere, 
nor necessarily negative in its effect upon it (Habermas, 1989: 189-192). Contrary to 
support for PSB as a public sphere, and corresponding more to Keane’s approach to 
broadcasting, Habermas suggests that a separation between the public sphere’s 
economic and political functions, and between public and private interests (along the 
lines of the distinction between classifieds and editorials), could have protected the 
public realm. Instead, it was invaded by both horizontal competition (private 
interests) and vertical competition (class interests) (Habermas, 1989: 192). Although 
the broadcasting literature focuses on the horizontal competition of producers (and 
private interests) and the vertical competition of consumers (and the appeal to the 
masses), seeing them as antithetical to PSB, vertical competition also includes the 
expanded franchise of citizens to which PSB and the welfare state relate, 
problematising the extent to which PSB/citizens and market/consumers can be 
constructed as respectively good and bad for the public sphere. Although it may be 
essential to distinguish between the public sphere’s economic and political functions, 
such a distinction, to the extent that it is realisable, cannot be limited to that between 
public service and the market, or between citizens and consumers. 
 
Before going on to address the respective literatures on citizenship and consumption 
(in Part Six), however, the next chapter will offer a review of the most dominant 
critiques of Habermas’s model. As well as the more widely understood criticism of 
the historical selectivity of his model, and the associated temptation to produce 
‘golden age’ narratives, Part Five will also outline the more complex critique of 
Habermas’s distinction between politics and society (that which underlies the 
distinction between citizenship and consumption), as well as the ways in which 
others have subsequently developed the relation between these spheres. 
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Part Five:  A ‘Dialectical Alliance’: Critiques, 
Developments and Divergences 
 
 
Critical engagements with Habermas’s model and more general approach to 
deliberative democracy have led Habermas himself to amend many elements of his 
original intervention, and this chapter deals in turn with the most significant themes 
of subsequent debate. While the veracity of his historical account has been 
questioned, and the exclusion of women and other social groups from the bourgeois 
model has been highlighted, Habermas’s own normative assumptions have proven 
more problematic to resolve, and the extent to which his approach can be adapted to 
accommodate its critiques has its limits. Although some have developed his model of 
the public sphere to provide a more effective procedure for holding power to account 
in a world of transnational states, corporations and publics, most critiques have been 
more concerned with addressing a legitimacy deficit in his wider theoretical 
approach. The significance of inclusion to a truly ‘public’ sphere has not been as 
unproblematic as common sense would suggest, and the relation between inclusion, 
participation and rationality, and the significance of each to the public sphere, raises 
questions concerning not only the make-up of the public and the role of citizens’ 
rights, but also the form and content of public communication among citizens.  
 
In light of the many critiques that his STPS has stimulated, Habermas has revised his 
outline of both the ideal type and the history of the public sphere, but the significance 
of this early book to his intellectual approach perhaps requires qualification. Among 
those who have engaged with the general Habermasian approach to deliberative 
democracy, there appears to be a consensus that the real Habermas emerges only 
around 1970, whereupon he distances himself from both his theoretical roots in the 
Frankfurt School and the historical methodology of STPS (Hohendahl, 1992: 100-
101). Although the public sphere certainly remains an ideal in his later writings, it 
becomes contingent upon, rather than the basis of, his subsequently developed theory 
of communicative action (Calhoun, 1992: 32), and the book can retrospectively be 
read as a first step towards the elaboration of his discourse theory model.  
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The normative aspect of Habermasian theory, certainly present in STPS but which 
gains prominence over the historical approach in his later writings, becomes the 
priority for Habermasians such as Benhabib and McCarthy, who ground the public 
sphere in abstract principles rather than historical analysis, which they use only to 
illustrate the limitations of less complete theories and realisations of the public 
sphere (Hohendahl, 1992: 100-101). Attempts to revise and develop the Habermasian 
model along more inclusive or effectual lines, however, have raised significant 
questions about the extent to which such a task is possible. Consequently, the critical 
engagement with Habermas’s model can perhaps best be presented as a ‘dialectical 
alliance’, simultaneously critiquing and embracing its paradoxically exclusive 
egalitarianism (Benhabib, 1992: 94-95), and continuing its project of merging and 
transcending liberal and republican traditions. 
 
This chapter will begin by critically examining Habermas’s discursive project in light 
of the liberal and republican traditions he hoped to transcend.  It will then summarise 
the critiques of his historical narrative of the rise and fall of the public sphere and his 
normative emphasis on reason, before outlining the theoretical developments of his 
model that seek to improve upon its inclusiveness and effectiveness. It will conclude 
by summarising the key issues of debate within public sphere theory, and 
highlighting those areas of particular consequence for the problematic application of 
the public sphere concept to the role and regulation of broadcasting.  
 
 
 
 
5.1 HABERMAS’S DISCOURSE MODEL – BEYOND DICHOTOMOUS THINKING? 
 
Habermas’s approach to the relation between state and society draws on both the 
legalistic model of liberalism and the agonistic model of civic-republicanism to 
propose a discourse model of public space (Benhabib, 1992: 73). Starting with his 
theory of the public sphere as distinct from both state and society, he attempts to 
overcome the dichotomous thinking that limits both liberalism’s and republicanism’s 
142 
 
distinction between public and private, but it is the distinctions and conflations 
within his own model that have caused controversy.  
 
Within liberal (and communitarian) and republican approaches, political discussion 
tends to start with the state rather than society. In liberalism, the state is neither 
synonymous with country nor population, but rather a ‘specialised apparatus of rule’; 
it is the administrative guardian of a market-structured society, and public opinion, as 
the competitive aggregation of private interests, mediates between these two sources 
of social integration. In the republican tradition, the state is the very 
‘institutionalisation of an ethical community’, while public opinion and the common 
good are themselves a third source of social integration (Benhabib, 1996: 6; 
Habermas, 1996: 21). Rather than neutrally mediating between state and society, as 
part of the vita activa the independence of politics and public communication are 
preserved from both administration and the unpolitical social realm (Calhoun, 1997: 
75-76; Habermas, 1996: 21). While the liberal perspective hinges on the legal 
institutionalisation of an economic society, which guarantees a non-political common 
good by aggregating private interests, the republican perspective is grounded in the 
self-constitution of a political society by its citizens’ deliberation on matters of 
public interest.  
 
Even within the republican tradition, however, the content of citizens’ deliberation 
and what constitutes the public interest is determined by a distinction between justice 
(a political matter) and the good life (a social matter). Arendt, for example, 
concluded that public intervention into matters of private interest was one of the 
causes of the unfortunate breakdown in the republican distinction between politics 
and society. But Benhabib argues that because supposedly private domains, such as 
the economy and the household, are premised upon power relations, they have the 
potential to become publicly (both socially and politically) relevant (Benhabib, 1992: 
80). Distancing herself from Arendtian distinctions, she stresses that the struggle to 
make something public is a question of justice (Benhabib, 1992: 78-79), which 
transcends public-private distinctions and which cannot be reduced to a social/private 
matter of the good life.   
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In contrast to the republican model, liberalism makes such questions of power and 
legitimacy explicit in its model of public space, but it depoliticises politics by 
reducing it to law, and lacks the emancipatory dimension of the agonistic model 
(Benhabib, 1992: 81). Further, the liberal emphasis on providing a private space in 
which individuals are free from the state to develop the good life, rather than on 
ethically moulding them as republican citizens, leads to a similar distinction between 
public norms of justice and private values of the good life; a distinction which is 
itself exclusionary. Politics for Benhabib, however, is about renegotiating public-
private distinctions between justice and the good life (Benhabib, 1992: 82-83). Public 
life in terms of liberal dialogic neutrality is, consequently, no more inclusive than the 
agonistic model, as it excludes questions of the good life from public dialogue 
concerning universal or general questions of justice (Benhabib, 1992: 84). 
 
In contrast to the views in both traditions of the relation between state and society, 
Habermas’s discourse theory model (normatively weaker than republicanism but 
stronger than liberalism) depends on the state only as the institutionalisation of the 
procedures and conditions necessary for public communication. This proceduralist 
compromise moves away from a view of society as a state-centred and goal-oriented 
whole, towards recognising a decentred society (Habermas, 1996: 27) that, in the 
first instance, produces influence (through public opinion), then communicative 
power (via elections) and ultimately administrative power (in the form of 
legislation); the extent to which one level can be guaranteed to lead to another, 
however, raises questions of efficacy (discussed below). More than legitimating 
political power (as in the liberal model), though not quite constituting it (as in 
republicanism), public opinion in the discourse model rationalises political power 
(Habermas, 1996: 28). Habermas’s model, if not Habermas’s own articulation of it, 
also holds out the prospect of transcending the distinction between justice and the 
good life (Benhabib, 1992: 85). Although Habermas shares the republican emphasis 
on reason and political participation, he is relatively less hostile to the market as he 
engages with the complex reality of modern societies, seeing the possibility of 
contemporary participation not only within the narrowly defined realm of politics, 
but in the social and cultural spheres too (Benhabib, 1992: 86). 
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Contrary to the argument that the public sphere represents a third sphere between 
state and society, however, Habermas’s reliance upon the public-private distinction 
undermines his explicit task of transcending the dichotomous thinking that limited 
both liberal and republican traditions (Calhoun, 1992: 37).  
 
For Habermas, the rationalisation that he sees as having emerged in the bourgeois 
public sphere was undermined by the blurring of the public-private distinction, which 
meant that the private realm could no longer create the autonomous and equal 
individuals who could address the general interest through public discourse. The 
distinction was undermined when inequalities in society were no longer ‘bracketed’ 
but became the basis of public (i.e. no longer political but social) discussion, thus 
disrupting the distinctions upon which Habermas’s liberal-republican compromise 
depended. Although many have chosen to focus on the rise of social inequalities and 
the emergence of giant corporations as the reason behind this, for Habermas it was 
also due to the democratic inclusion of more people into the public sphere (Calhoun, 
1992: 21). As interest groups in civil society used the public sphere to demand social 
rights and move towards the formation of the welfare-state, consensus on the general 
interest was replaced by a compromise among interests, and rational-critical debate 
shifted towards (relatively irrational) negotiation (Calhoun, 1992: 22). Excessive 
state intervention into the economy prevents a Marxist focus on the contradictions of 
capital, of course, but it has additional consequences for the public sphere. It also 
‘orients politics away from fundamental transformation [and] toward the state itself’ 
(Calhoun, 1992: 29-30), depoliticising citizenship and reducing politics to a matter of 
state administration.  
 
Additionally, although Habermas clearly states that critical public discourse has been 
replaced by a passive culture of consumption, he also emphasises the shift towards 
an ‘apolitical sociability’ (Calhoun, 1992: 23). Certainly, the dependence upon the 
early Habermas’s orthodox critique of ‘mass culture’ can be criticised by reference to 
the large body of literature on audience research and ‘new reception studies’ (Hall, 
Fiske, Kellner, Livingstone & Lunt), as can Habermas’s arbitrary and unconvincing 
distinction between print and audio-visual media (Calhoun, 1992: 45), but another 
important point here is that Habermas doesn’t uniquely see this in terms of 
consumption, but also as part of a concomitant depoliticisation of citizenship; caused 
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in part by the extension of the franchise. His assertion that consumption levels 
increase with wealth and status reminds us that the public sphere is undermined by a 
dual process; not simply by the inclusion of new substandard participants who are 
more consumers than citizens, so diluting the public sphere around the edges, but by 
both the inclusion of new entrants with their demands for social rights, and the rise 
of consumption among the bourgeois core; that is, a mixture of new citizens 
passively dependent upon the welfare-state, as well as the shift from active 
citizenship to passive consumption among the former bourgeois elites (Calhoun, 
1992: 25). 
 
A central paradox in the liberal theory that Habermas reformulates is in the rooting 
of the public sphere in civil society, and its dependence upon an organisation of 
private life that enables citizens to transcend their private interests (Calhoun, 1997: 
83), which means that it must ‘bracket’ rather than recognise difference. Breaking 
with the liberal presumption that politics revolves around a unitary (nation) state, and 
that membership (such as legal citizenship) of a common society is a precondition for 
deliberation (Calhoun, 1997: 84), efforts to resolve this issue have concentrated upon 
reformulating identity-formation as part of the process of public life rather than a 
separate and private concern, and upon the shift from a single to multiple public 
spheres as the ideal type of deliberative democratic public space. This recognition of 
difference also has consequences for the content and form of discourse that is 
permissible in the public sphere(s), abandoning the emphasis on rational-critical 
debate on matters concerning the distinction between state and economy, to 
potentially ‘irrational’ confrontations regarding all matter of concern to sections of 
the body politic (Calhoun, 1997: 85; Fraser, 1992: 116-118).   
 
Unable to ground in contemporary social institutions the valuable critical ideal he 
uncovered in this early work, Habermas has shifted his focus away from the 
historically specific grounding of institutions to a transhistorical reliance upon 
universal validity claims (Calhoun, 1992: 31). In doing so, he has moved away from 
an explicit and simplistic focus on the public-private distinction, to a recast and more 
nuanced distinction between the lifeworld (personal relationships and potentially 
communicative action) and the system (money and power). Although he maintains 
his insistence upon the need to preserve this distinction, and to defend the lifeworld 
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against the encroachment of systemic media (Calhoun, 1992: 30-31; 35), he sees the 
colonisation of the lifeworld as occurring in both private (whereby individuals are 
socialised as consumers by the economic system) and public realms (where they are 
socialised as citizens by the state-administrative system) (Owen, 1999: 27). 
 
 
 
 
5.2 EXCLUSIONS AND OMISSIONS – A HISTORICAL REVISION 
 
The development in Habermas’s approach away from historical research and an 
explicit distinction between public and private, suggests Calhoun (1992), may be, in 
part, because of fundamental weaknesses in his first book. His history of the idea of 
the liberal public sphere certainly seems overly simplistic, and somewhat idealistic, 
when read in light of ‘Foucault-inspired’ (Habermas, 1992a) revisionist 
historiographies. Habermas fails, for instance, to treat the bourgeois and post-
transformation public spheres symmetrically, judging the 18
th
 Century in terms of 
Locke and Kant, the 19
th
 Century by Marx and Mill, and the 20
th
 Century by the 
‘typical suburban television viewer’. He completely ignores both the ‘fairly large 
outpouring of literature on democracy and public life’ by 20th Century thinkers (such 
as those discussed in 3.1), as well as the ‘less than rational-critical’ examples of the 
press and public speakers of the earlier periods (Calhoun, 1992: 33; 43). Questioning 
through his own historical research the extent to which such debate characterised 
colonial era America, for example, Michael Schudson finds that the riot was a more 
typical manifestation of public opinion than learned discussion; and that even in the 
relatively more inclusive 19
th
 Century, the increase in political participation had not 
gone hand in hand with a rise in rationality (Schudson, 1992: 160).  
 
Problematically, while the first half of Habermas’s book ignores power relations and 
influence completely, the second half is devoted to how such power and influence 
bring about the decline of the public sphere (Calhoun, 1992: 38). As such, neither his 
idealisation of early print media and salon culture, nor his dismissal of audio-visual 
media and consumer society, is ultimately convincing. Habermas’s account of the 
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shift to a mass-mediated public sphere is limited to one of refeudalisation (Calhoun, 
1997: 87) precisely because of his distinction between an argument-constituted 
public sphere and an identity-constituted community, which fails to recognise the 
lifeworld’s constitution through asymmetrical power relations (Calhoun, 1997: 86). 
 
Also absent from Habermas’s account are an appreciation of the importance of 
nationalism (Calhoun, 1997; Eley, 1992), science and religion (Habermas, 2006; 
Zaret, 1992), and the role of political struggles in redefining identities and interests 
(Warner, 1992) that Habermas sees as settled in the private realm and brought fully 
formed into the public sphere (Calhoun, 1992: 34-35). The absence of such political 
struggles and wider social movements, as well as a general inattention to agency, 
reflects Habermas’s failure to account for the ways in which the public sphere and its 
participants are ‘actively made and remade’, proposing instead a view of their 
transformation as reflective of underlying developments in state and civil society 
(Calhoun, 1992: 37). Instead, feminist critics, in particular, have emphasised the 
ways in which public deliberation isn’t just about the common good, but an occasion 
for the constitution of interests and identities, including the distinction between or 
conflation of bourgeois and homme, upon which Habermas places such importance. 
His subsequent acknowledgment of the gendered nature of this distinction has not 
been enough to assuage his critics, who argue that, as well as advocating gender 
neutrality, it is essential to thematise gender itself as an issue of public debate, and to 
address the problematic way in which the public-private distinction neutralises 
difference by establishing publicness as ‘abstraction from private identity’ (Calhoun, 
1992: 34-35).  
 
His account is shown to ignore the histories of other competing public spheres and 
fail to appreciate the complexity of the relation between publicity and status, as well 
as the ways in which the emphasis upon rational publicity may be deployed as a 
strategy of distinction (Fraser, 1992: 115). Joan Landes (1996), for instance, has 
highlighted the exclusion of women from the French republican public sphere, which 
was actually constructed, she argues, in deliberate opposition to a more woman-
friendly salon culture that it dismissed as ‘effeminate’ and ‘irrational’ (Fraser, 1992: 
113-114).  
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Even among feminists, however, initial readings of Habermas’s argument had been 
positive. Early readings of Habermas's Encyclopaedia Article had offered feminists 
in the 1960s a key resource for conceptualising women in public (whereas even 
Arendt's elaboration of the concept reified the traditional patriarchal alignment of the 
household with the private realm), as his outline of the bourgeois public sphere and 
inclusive citizenship seemed to free politics from the state, which through its 
historical denial of franchise to women had effectively defined the public in 
masculine terms (Ryan, 1992: 261). By the time of the eventual publication of the 
fuller monographical outline, however, feminist readings (among others) had become 
more critical, and contradictory accounts of the development of the public sphere, 
such as Mary Ryan's history of the ascension of women into American politics, offer 
a striking counternarrative to Habermas's depiction of ‘chronological decline’ (Ryan, 
1992: 262). She documents the ways in which women from various classes and 
ethnicities, excluded from the liberal (19
th
 Century North American) public sphere, 
forged a counter civil society of voluntary associations and support for male-
dominated working-class protests. Despite the absence of suffrage and formal 
citizenship, such women found alternative routes to access political life (Fraser, 
1992: 115-116). Instead of decline, the history of women in public emphasises the 
importance of open access and insurgent social movements that expand the rights of 
all citizens, and suggests that identity and interests need not be seen as antithetical to 
the public good, but rather as an advance toward inclusion and empowerment (Ryan, 
1992: 285). That said, the extent to which women can be integrated on equal terms 
into a public sphere, whose structures remain founded upon the patriarchal separation 
of public and private realms, remains a source of debate (Habermas, 1992a: 428-429; 
Pateman, 1983). 
 
Such gender exclusion has been linked (in England and Germany, as well as in 
France and the US) to processes of class formation, and, in particular, the distinction 
of bourgeois men as a universal class from both the old aristocratic elites, whom they 
wished to displace, and the popular-plebeian strata that they wished to rule (Fraser, 
1992: 114). Eley’s account (1992) demonstrates, contra Habermas, that the 
boundaries between public and private domains are always permeable, and suggests 
that it is difficult to fit Habermas's dichotomous treatment into the older tradition of 
theorising around ‘civil society’, in which political theorists of the 18th and 19th 
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Centuries applied the state/civil society couplet in a variety of undichotomous ways 
(Eley, 1992: 317). Eley also suggests that the bourgeois claim to rational discourse 
was ‘simultaneously a claim to power in Foucault’s sense’ (Eley, 1992: 331; Tully, 
1999: 138), arguing that the bourgeois public was therefore defined by both the 
struggle against absolutism and towards a form of popular containment (Fraser, 
1992: 116), and that the emergence of this bourgeois public sphere represented little 
more than the shift from a repressive mode of domination through acquiescence, to a 
hegemonic mode of domination through consent (Fraser, 1992: 117).  
 
Nancy Fraser praises Habermas’s concept of the public sphere for circumventing 
both the Marxist failure to distinguish between the state and the public of citizens, 
and the feminist conflation of the state, the economy and public discourse (Fraser, 
1992: 109-110). Habermas’s public sphere is distinct from – and potentially critical 
of – the state as well as the economy and market relations, and is therefore, she 
argues, indispensable for critical theory’s understanding of late-capitalist democracy. 
However, Fraser finds Habermas’s idealising history of the rise and fall of the liberal 
model inappropriate for theorising the limits of actually existing, welfare-state mass 
democracy (Fraser, 1992: 111).  
 
Seeing the public sphere as an indispensable model for the good society, Schudson 
nevertheless warns against the ‘retrospective wishful thinking’ that imagines a 
previous golden age. Acknowledging that the contemporary public sphere is different 
to the bourgeois model, he suggests that it is not necessarily inferior, arguing that 
thinking through the conditions and possibilities for rational-critical debate and 
political participation today will not profit from maintaining illusions about the 
public sphere of the past (Schudson, 1992: 160-161). 
 
Accepting the weaknesses exposed by Foucauldian inspired revisions of his 
historical account, and praising the value of a Foucauldian approach for revealing 
hidden asymmetries and power structures in liberal and alternative models of the 
public sphere, Habermas nevertheless argues for the continuing merit of the public 
sphere concept, which remains at least an attempt to eradicate such asymmetries 
(Habermas, 1992b), and maintains that the rights to inclusion and equality built into 
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the public sphere prevent Foucauldian exclusion and provide the potential for self-
transformation (Habermas, 2010b: 194). 
 
As a result of such weaknesses, however, which Habermas apportions to not only the 
neglect of certain aspects but also to the ideology-critical approach he undertook, he 
now accepts that the contrast between a glorified past and a distorted present requires 
revision (Habermas, 1992a: 430). Indeed, he acknowledges that his diagnosis of a 
unilinear development from a politically active and culture-debating public to a 
culture-consuming public withdrawn into a ‘bad privacy’ was too simplistic 
(Habermas, 1992a: 438). (Similarly, he accepts that his simplistic treatment of media 
ignored both institutional and cultural contexts (Habermas, 1992a: 439).) However, 
he maintains that the social welfare-state negates the separation of bourgeois and 
citoyen, which had made economic independence and equal opportunity the 
preconditions for autonomous citizenship, as it makes democratic will formation 
instrumental to social equality. In the contemporary welfare-state, the ‘public role of 
the citizen and the private role of the client’ become interlinked as the paradoxical 
‘societalised private person’ (Habermas, 1992a: 445). It remains important for 
Habermas to critically bridge this gap between the enlightened self-interest of the 
client and the orientation to the common good of the citizen (Habermas, 1992a: 449).  
 
 
 
 
5.3 LEGITIMACY AND EFFICACY – FROM BOURGEOIS PUBLIC SPHERE TO 
TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERES 
 
In light of Habermas’s omissions and the exclusiveness of the model of the public 
sphere he outlined, it has been necessary to theoretically reformulate and amend that 
model. While the exclusion of social groups and problems from a unitary model of 
the public sphere raises questions of legitimacy, global changes to the status of 
nation-states and their citizens highlight issues of efficacy. Efforts to theorise both 
legitimacy and efficacy problematise the presumed link between states and societies 
that underlies the original Habermasian model of national citizenship and a single, 
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universal public sphere, and lead to a more nuanced approach that elaborates a model 
of multiple public spheres and plural publics.   
 
Perhaps the earliest theoretical critique of Habermas’s account of the bourgeois 
public sphere comes from Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge’s dialectic of bourgeois 
and proletarian counterpublic spheres. Criticising Habermas’s ‘history of ideas’ 
approach for the illusion it provides of the continuous historical progression of a 
unified sphere, they propose an alternative approach that examines the substance of 
aggregated and conflictual spheres that exploit the idea of the unified public sphere 
(and the related concepts of public opinion and press freedom) for their own interests 
(Negt & Kluge, 2010: 124).  
 
Rejecting Habermas’s reduction of the ‘plebeian public sphere’ to merely a variant 
of the bourgeois public sphere, Negt and Kluge argue that the ‘proletarian public 
sphere’ is rather an ‘entirely separate conceptualisation of the overall social context’; 
an alternative or counter public sphere. Particular examples of out-of-routine 
expressions of public opinion (such as the protests, strikes and the riots that 
Schudson demonstrated, rather than periodic voting), therefore, are reconceived as 
the essential core of an alternative conception of the public sphere (Negt & Kluge, 
2010: 125). 
 
Although Eley (1992: 305) further distinguishes between a plebeian public that was 
easily suppressed and a radical one that was both combative and literate, in Negt and 
Kluge’s Marxist critique of bourgeois society, they are keen to develop a left-wing 
space for workers to form a public ‘rooted in production’ (Negt & Kluge, 2010: 125), 
potentially in opposition to both the manipulative publicity of capitalist production 
and the critical but exclusive publicity of the classical public sphere. They criticise 
the bourgeois public sphere for contradictorily claiming, on the one hand, to 
represent society as a whole while, on the other, excluding the particular life contexts 
and interests of the majority of society (Negt & Kluge, 2010: 123).  
 
Because the bourgeois public sphere insists on splitting public and private, and 
distinguishing between public and mass culture, they argue, it excludes the 
experiences and interests of the proletariat, thus preventing expressions of social 
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criticism and of a counterpublic sphere, and frustrating the attempts of the majority 
of society to organise themselves and secure their emancipation from political and 
economic authority (Negt & Kluge, 2010: 124).  
 
Although Habermas is well aware, according to Calhoun, that the bourgeois public 
sphere was constituted as both a defence of civil society against the state, and as a 
means of domination within civil society, he ignores the ways in which it was always 
permeated by demands from below, with bourgeois ideals such as press freedom 
being carried out mostly by activists within what Habermas dismissed as the plebeian 
public sphere. Contrary to Habermas’s dismissal of the plebeian variant to the 
bourgeois model, therefore, bourgeois publicity itself was constituted only in relation 
to ‘insurgent discourses’ (Calhoun, 1992: 39). 
 
Fraser develops this argument further in her own rethinking of the public sphere in a 
post-bourgeois society. In stratified societies in which subordinated social groups 
have been formally or informally excluded from or disadvantaged by the dominant 
public sphere, subaltern counterpublics, although they may be antidemocratic, 
antiegalitarian or exclusive themselves, may enhance the participation of subordinate 
strata and provide the form of public life that comes closest to realising the ideal of 
the public sphere within actually existing democracies (Fraser, 1992: 122-123). Such 
counterpublics perform a dual function as both spaces of withdrawal from, and bases 
for agitation directed towards, wider publics (Fraser, 1992: 124). In more egalitarian, 
multicultural societies, multiple public spheres are preferable as they combine 
participatory democracy with both social equality and cultural diversity (Fraser, 
1992: 128). In both types of society, they allow the possibility of membership of 
multiple overlapping publics, ‘including at least one public in which participants can 
deliberate as peers across lines of difference about policy that concerns them all’ 
(Fraser, 1992: 127).  
 
In critiquing the necessity of the distinction between state and civil society, she 
dismisses first of all the classical liberal claim that limited government and laisser-
faire capitalism are necessary preconditions for a public sphere, not only because 
they fail to foster social equality, but also because the privatisation of economic 
issues as off-limits for state activity impedes free discussion. Secondly, she takes 
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issue with Habermas’s insistence that the public be made up of private individuals 
without official capacities, eventuating in public opinion that can serve as 
counterweight to the state. For Fraser, the limitation of public discourse to public 
opinion rather than binding, sovereign decisions, results in weak publics. Contrary to 
Habermas’s critique of political parties as contributing to the decline of the public 
sphere, she argues that parliamentary politics constitutes strong publics that combine 
public opinion with decision-making (Fraser, 1992: 133-134). Critical inquiry should 
then turn to questions of accountability, contextual preferences for representative or 
direct democracy, and the relation between strong and weak publics, as well as 
hybrid forms of ‘quasi-strong’ decision-making publics within civil society (Fraser, 
1992: 135; Fraser, 2007: 12).  
 
For Calhoun, however, the shift towards an appreciation of multiple public spheres 
risks leaving unaddressed the communicative relationships among them, and he 
proposes instead a view of the public sphere as a field of discursive connections, in 
which there will be small and large clusters of communication (Calhoun, 1992: 37).  
 
The all too often conflation of the public-private distinction with that of state and 
society implies that to each state corresponds a public, but the suggestion that there 
has ever been a united ‘national’ public sphere has been widely criticised. A politics 
of ‘identity/difference’, emerging from new social movements in liberal capitalist 
democracies (and distinct from that which has emerged out of ethnonationalisms in 
Eastern Europe, North Africa and the Middle East, and which aims at constructing 
cultural homogeneity through the sovereign-state form), has prioritised the 
contestation and representation of difference beyond the state (Benhabib, 1996: 4). 
 
Critics of the national public sphere model point out processes of both internal 
segmentation and external fluidity, and recast questions concerning the public sphere 
in terms of inevitable differentiation in modern societies, and the extent to which that 
differentiation leads to fragmentation and threatens integration (Peters, 2010: 237). 
Although the classical concept of the public sphere denotes a field in which no-one is 
excluded and all participate and belong equally, we find in practice that public 
spheres are differentiated in terms of the degree of participation, visibility and 
influence among members. As well as this unequal distribution among the public, we 
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find a second level of structural differentiation in which the public splits into 
multiple publics, within each of which internal communication is denser than that 
between publics. There is also structural differentiation in terms of the competence 
and prestige of publics and different types of media (Peters, 2010: 238). That this 
differentiation has always existed raises doubts about the extent to which we are 
seeing an increasing fragmentation of public communication. Indeed, contrary to 
Scannell, some have argued that it is ‘hardly plausible’ to claim that the public is 
fragmenting because people no longer sit down to watch the news at a given time, 
and that despite playing an important part in unifying public communication at a 
particular period of its development, the obsolescence of PSB ‘implies little’ about 
fragmentation (Peters, 2010: 240).  
 
The failure so far to develop in the EU more than a meagre transnational public 
realm suggests only the relative unity of national publics (Peters, 2010: 243). The 
cultural differences that hinder the European public sphere are as prevalent within its 
member states, but here they are linked to social practices and institutional structures 
rather than consisting entirely of media markets and organisations (Peters, 2010: 
244). Consequently, challenges to the centrality of the nation-state have led to an 
unhooking of the public sphere from its liberal-modern realisation through the 
institutions of the state (Bohman, 2010: 249). The rhetorical grounding of the public 
sphere in a nation-state depends on individualism as much as communality, as the 
nation is established as both a category of similar individuals and as a 
superindividual entity that denies difference (Calhoun, 1997: 93). Consequently, 
Fraser has called for national citizenship to be bypassed so that ‘publicity’ can be 
retheorised directly, while Randeria has called for transnationalism to be outlined in 
a way that highlights the mutual imbrication of national publics and overlapping 
sovereignties (Randeria, 2007:40). 
 
Fraser recasts the theory of the public sphere in light of global changes that have 
reorganised relations between nation-states and their peoples to such an extent that 
the simple Westphalian model of the public sphere is inadequate. Since Habermas’s 
1962 text and until just recently (due to globalisation and post-Cold War 
instabilities), public sphere theory (including many of its critiques) has been 
informed by a Westphalian political imaginary, assuming a bounded political 
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community with a territorial state. If a post-Westphalian version of the concept is to 
be designed, she contends, it will not be enough to conceptualise transnational 
spheres as actually existing (Fraser, 2007: 8), but one must rather reformulate the 
critical theory of the public sphere to illuminate the emancipatory possibilities of the 
present, and so repoliticise the theory, which she claims is in danger of being 
depoliticised. Hence, the idea of a transnational public sphere needs to reconstruct 
the conceptions of the normative legitimacy and political efficacy of communicative 
power, where the former have traditionally referred to the equal rights and shared 
community of participants, and the latter to the relation between those participants 
and a sovereign state. A Westphalian framing of political space is assumed tacitly on 
both empirical-historical and ideological-critical-normative levels of Habermas’s 
model. Empirically, he highlighted the historical processes of the democratisation of 
the Westphalian state; normatively, he articulated a model of deliberative democracy 
for a territorially bounded polity. But Fraser argues that because of these 
presuppositions, Habermas conceptualises the public sphere in terms of a historically 
specific political project: the democratisation of the modern territorial nation-state 
(Fraser, 2007: 10), and situates a deliberative model of democracy within it. In this 
model, democracy requires national public opinion, a national language and national 
media. Fraser argues that rather than trying to recast a theory of the public sphere 
beyond a Westphalian frame, critiques of the legitimacy and efficacy of public 
opinion have also been guilty of Westphalian presuppositions, seeking only to 
enhance the legitimacy or efficacy of public opinion within it (Fraser, 2007: 11). 
Likewise, she accepts that her previous work, while critiquing the theory from both 
streams, was also guilty of this. Nevertheless, all these critiques failed to transcend 
the social-theoretical (Westphalian) underpinnings of Habermas’s theory.  
 
She criticises much of the literature for focusing on cultural aspects such as 
hybridisation and glocalisation, neglecting as it does the critical function of 
democratising governance, the legitimacy of public opinion (without a demos or 
political citizenry) and the efficacy of public opinion (without a sovereign state to 
hold accountable). As such, she proclaims the absence of a critical theory of the 
(transnational) public sphere (Fraser, 2007: 15). In general, the previously theorised 
national citizenry is now made up of dispersed interlocutors who do not form a 
demos; national interest and economy is replaced by transnational risk; national 
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territory is now deterritorialised cyberspace; print media is being superseded by 
translinguistic visual cultures; and the territorial state to be held accountable is now a 
mix of public and private transnational powers (Fraser, 2007: 19). 
 
Fraser’s solution to the problem of rethinking the public sphere for a transnational 
context is to rethink the concepts of normative legitimacy and political efficacy that 
she regards as intrinsic to any conception of publicity, regardless of context. She 
breaks legitimacy down into two parts – inclusiveness and participatory parity – 
where the inclusiveness condition concerns who participates (all with a stake in the 
outcome), and the parity condition concerns how they participate (with equal 
chances). Within the Westphalian frame, these two conditions could be fused under 
the ideal of shared citizenship, so that citizenship was the model for the legitimacy of 
public opinion. Fraser argues that the Westphalian frame encouraged debate about 
the parity condition at the expense of the inclusiveness condition (Fraser, 2007: 20). 
Today, political citizenship no longer suffices as a demarcation of the public, and 
Fraser proposes that Habermas’s ‘all-affected principle’ be applied directly to the 
framing of publicity without having to go through citizenship (Fraser, 2007: 21), so 
that the relevant public should match the reach of the structures and institutions that 
affect its members. Likewise, she splits efficacy into two elements – the translation 
condition and the capacity condition. The former refers to the translation of the 
communicative power of civil society into binding laws and administrative power. 
The latter refers to the capacity of public power to implement this discursively 
formed will, whether negatively or positively (Fraser, 2007: 22). Within the 
Westphalian frame, these two elements were linked within the idea of the territorial 
state; although the focus was on the translation condition and the strength of public 
power to constrain state administration, rather than the capacity condition and the 
state’s capacity to regulate private powers. Fraser thus concludes that a critical 
conception can no longer restrict its attention to communicative flows, and that new 
transnational public powers need to be constructed, and made accountable to new 
transnational public spheres (Fraser, 2007: 23).  
 
Retrospectively, Habermas accepts the need for both ‘greater internal differentiation’ 
in the composition of the bourgeois public as well as recognition of the coexistence 
of competing public spheres and processes of communication, conceding that 
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although the recognition of difference could be accommodated easily enough within 
his earlier account, the latter critique is more problematic (Habermas, 1992a: 425). 
More attuned to the exclusion of women and no longer seeing the ‘plebeian’ public 
sphere as just a variant of the bourgeois model, he nevertheless emphasises the 
particular dialectic of inwardness and publicness that typified the ‘audience-oriented 
privateness’ of the bourgeois public, in contradistinction to Richard Sennett’s more 
simplistic narrative of the decline of public life, whereby representative publicity 
merely gives way to intimacy (Habermas, 1992a: 426-427). The dialectic of 
rhetorically equal and active participation for all, on the one hand, and the actual 
denial of that for women and other groups, on the other, contradicted the bourgeois 
public sphere’s self-understanding from its very inception. Habermas explored this 
dialectic through a Marxist critique of domination and ideology, demonstrating the 
effect upon the relationship between public and private by both the expansion of the 
right to participate and by the welfare state’s compensation for disadvantages, but 
acknowledges now that neither aspect of the structural transformation affected the 
patriarchal character of society (suggesting that his critique of mass media and 
consumer society is treated as a consequence or variant of, or at least of secondary 
importance to, these more fundamental aspects), and that, therefore, the exclusion of 
women was indeed more significant than that of ‘the people’ as it has a structuring 
and constitutive effect on the constituents of the ‘public’ and on the gender-specific 
relation between public and private realms (Habermas, 1992a: 428).  
 
 
 
 
5.4 ‘ON THE SOCIAL QUESTION’ – INCLUSION, PARTICIPATION AND 
RATIONALITY 
 
Although some critics have addressed the exclusivity of the public sphere in the 
procedural terms of legitimacy and efficacy, the exclusion of certain social groups 
and issues from the bourgeois public did little to delegitimise the ‘publicity’ of the 
public sphere in Habermas’s original view. Indeed, he saw their subsequent inclusion 
as partly, perhaps mostly, to blame for the gradual demise of rational publicity. 
Taking issue with this particular aspect of his model, and prioritising the inclusion of 
158 
 
people and topics previously relegated to the private realm, critics have since debated 
the link between inclusion and participation, and the importance of rational-critical 
debate to a genuinely inclusive public sphere. 
 
If the more that people engage in debate as citizens, the closer one gets to the public 
sphere, then one could argue, contrary to Habermas, that the history of increasing 
enfranchisement, and the formal recognition of legal citizenship to social groups that 
had previously not been recognised as citizens, actually demonstrates ‘the rise’ of the 
public sphere. But increasing recognition does not necessarily lead to increasing 
participation, as Lipmann and Schumpeter argued, nor does increasing participation 
necessarily entail rational-critical debate (Schudson, 1992: 148). While historical 
revisionists have highlighted the non-rational aspects of the bourgeois public sphere, 
and by extension suggested the rational dimensions of the mass mediated public 
sphere, others have dismissed the extent to which public opinion can ever be equated 
with rationality. For Niklas Luhmann, in particular, the history of the rise of public 
opinion and the bourgeois public sphere has little to do with an emerging reason, nor 
does the history of its decline has much to do with its subsequent manipulation 
(Luhmann, 2010: 181). Renouncing Kantian expectations of rationality and hopes of 
a civic republican revival of active citizenship (Luhmann, 2010: 180), Luhmann sees 
public opinion as neither a liberal aggregation of individual self-interests, nor a 
republican consensus on the common good, but merely a self-regulating 
communicative system (in which communication merely reproduces more 
communication). Within this ‘social system of society’, ‘public opinion’ can never be 
‘what actual persons actually think’ (Luhmann, 2010: 174), whether as bourgeois or 
homme, while the ‘public’ itself can only ever be an imaginary body (Warner, 1992: 
379).  
 
For Habermas, however, plebiscitary democracy and (liberal) political involvement 
is not enough; increasing participation must go hand in hand with the (republican) 
quality (of rational-critical debate) that the public sphere concept evokes. Because of 
this, the polity must be defined by factors beyond those that formally enable 
participation (i.e. legal citizenship) (Schudson, 1992: 146-147).   
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Addressing this ‘social question’ (Fraser, 1992: 113), Fraser criticises the bourgeois 
public sphere’s assumption that participants could act ‘as if’ they were social and 
economic peers by merely ‘bracketing’ rather than eliminating inequalities (Fraser, 
1992: 118-119). Contrary to the liberal preoccupation with insulating equality-
oriented political institutions, on the one hand, from inequality-premised social, 
cultural and economic institutions, on the other, Fraser argues that a more or less 
equal society and the acknowledgment and elimination of systemic social inequality 
would remove the necessity of erecting barriers between politics and society (Fraser, 
1992: 121). Recognising the impossibility of achieving this is stratified societies, 
however, and emphasising the significance of informal as well as formal 
‘impediments to participatory parity’ (Fraser, 1992: 119), she proposes instead that 
inequalities be ‘unbracketed’ and explicitly thematised (Fraser, 1992: 120), arguing 
that making visible the ways in which social inequality infects supposedly inclusive 
public spheres should be a primary task of critical theory (Fraser, 1992: 121).  
 
In terms of content and Habermas’s exclusion of ‘social issues’ from the public 
sphere, Fraser stresses that there are ‘no naturally given, a priori boundaries’ between 
public and private realms, and that what is of common concern can only be decided 
by discursive contestation (Fraser, 1992: 129). Although she praises the civic-
republican preference for the common good over individual interests, she criticises 
its presumption of the common good in advance of deliberation, and its reduction of 
private interests to pre-political concerns, emphasising instead that the 
acknowledgment of private interests can help the less powerful recognise whether or 
not they are included in the public, and so better contest the common interest (Fraser, 
1992: 129-130). For Benhabib, these boundaries should be fluid, so that questions 
concerning the good life are included as well as problems of justice.  
 
But Arendt's idealistic view of the agonistic polis, for example, ignores its 
exclusiveness, while her negative narrative (to the extent that it is a narrative) of the 
rise of the social, in ignoring the concomitant rise of inclusiveness, suggests that hers 
is also a critique political universalism. This poses a fundamental problem with 
reconciling public space with the extension of citizenship rights (Benhabib, 1992: 
75). However, as Benhabib points out, Arendt was not concerned with narrating a 
history of decline, but with analysing the extent of continuity between past origins 
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and present conditions, and with revealing what has been lost; in this case, the 
original meaning of politics and of the public-private distinction (Benhabib, 1992: 
76-77).  
 
Habermas’s novel view of public space, which is more democratic than agonistic, 
seeing the public sphere as coming into being only when all those affected by a 
public issue engage in practical discourse to evaluate its validity, suggests there may 
potentially be as many publics as there are issues (Benhabib, 1992: 87).  
 
But Benhabib accuses Habermas of having inherited from the liberal social-contract 
tradition some dubious distinctions between public and private on the one (moral-
theoretical) hand, and justice and the good life on the other (sociological-theoretical) 
hand. Despite its proceduralist claim to egalitarian recipricocity, the discursive model 
of public dialogue in ideal speech situations predefines the nature of the issues 
appropriate to the public sphere, excluding issues that affect only some members of 
society. But distinctions between universal norms of justice and the more subjective 
values concerning the good life are not external to discursive will formation, and the 
way they have traditionally been differentiated has been of particular detriment to 
women, whose values are excluded from public debate (Benhabib, 1992: 89-90). 
Habermas is therefore continuing a tradition of political thinking that is blind to 
difference and to the power relations that sets beyond the scope of justice issues such 
as the unremunerated work of women in the home (Benhabib, 1992: 92).  
 
As well as raising doubts about political and institutional limits of deliberative 
democracy, Benhabib (2010) also questions the extent to which there is a cognitive 
and affective bias inherent to the model. Despite echoing Habermas’s defence of the 
model’s ability to correct its own prior exclusions and biases, she argues that the 
centrality of rationality and reason-giving to the republican tradition is unavoidably 
exclusive.  
 
The problems with the universal and rationalist framework of Habermas’s liberal-
republican compromise have led Chantal Mouffe to formulate a radical-democratic 
alternative that substitutes agonistic pluralism for deliberative democracy. Drawing 
on Schmitt’s critique of liberal democracy, she critiques the centrality of rational 
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communication and consensus to the institutionalisation of ‘politics’ in the 
deliberative democratic model, and argues instead for the adversarial and therefore 
‘political’ expression of collective passions in the agonistically pluralist public 
sphere. Although the deliberative model, by emphasising political participation in 
terms of rational argumentation, improves on the market-inspired view of democracy 
as the aggregation of interests, Mouffe argues that Habermas’s move from an 
economic to a moralistic model fails to account for the ‘political’ dimension 
(Mouffe, 2010: 271), and ignores the crucial role of conflict in the formation of 
collective identities.  
 
Mouffe therefore reverses Habermas’s republican distinction between politics and 
society, so that it is the very passions that he sought to relegate to the private realm 
that become the basis for politics, and the rationality he emphasised as the core of the 
public sphere that becomes just another means of social discrimination.  
 
The radical democratic alternative has consequences for the conception of power and 
the role of rights, in that power is no longer a relation between identities, but 
constitutive of those identities, and political practice is no longer concerned with 
protecting the rights of preconstituted identities, but in constituting them. This 
approach recognises the link between power and legitimacy, recasting the role of 
politics so that it accepts power as legitimately constitutive, and seeking to produce 
democratic forms of power rather than grounding legitimacy in rationality and the 
elimination of power (Mouffe, 2010: 275).  
 
For Mouffe, rational consensus is inevitably exclusive, even when it attempts to 
transcend an us/them distinction. The radical democratic task is therefore to establish 
a form of discrimination that is compatible with pluralist democracy (Mouffe, 2010: 
276). This entails the democratic mobilisation of passions rather than their relegation 
to the private realm, the recognition of necessarily ‘conflictual consensus’ (Mouffe, 
2010: 277), and the rejection of the idea of a nonexclusive public sphere of rational 
debate (Mouffe, 1996: 255).  
 
Hohendahl has argued, however, that questions concerning the good life are not 
necessarily excluded from Habermas’s model, as culture (and such questions) plays a 
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pivotal role in the literary public sphere, upon which the political public sphere (and 
debate concerning problems of justice) depend (Hohendahl, 1992: 108). Although 
exclusion mechanisms remain necessary for the constitution of publics, whether 
episodic (coffee houses and streets), occasional (party assemblies and rock concerts) 
or abstract (readers and media audience), there is no exclusion rule without a proviso 
for its abolishment (Habermas, 2010b: 194). Because they are cultural values and 
cannot be generalised, however, they cannot be settled in the same way as universal 
questions of justice (Hohendahl, 1992: 101).  
 
Likewise, Habermas now acknowledges that class- and gender-specific social issues, 
as well as values concerning the good life, can legitimately become issues of public 
debate after all, because of the links between citizens’ positions within the political 
public sphere and civil society. Public and private are not sealed off from one 
another; instead, the threshold separating the private from the public sphere is 
marked by different conditions of communication rather than by a fixed set of issues 
or relationships (Habermas, 2010b: 189). This suggests that Habermas has turned to 
a view of the public sphere as made up of social as well as private persons come 
together as a public, although the discourse remains public in character.  
 
Ultimately, there is a ‘conceptual unclarity’ as well as ‘political contestation’ in 
contemporary debates (Benhabib, 1992: 93). Any theory of the public, public sphere 
or publicity presupposes a public-private distinction that is exclusive, and that tends 
to disadvantage women (Benhabib, 1992: 93). But Benhabib encourages feminists to 
engage in a dialectical alliance with Habermas’s critical model of public space and 
discourse, critiquing its assumptions and distinctions while simultaneously 
embracing the emancipatory and egalitarian aspirations it has in contrast to the 
liberal and republican models (Benhabib, 1992: 94-95). 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The close engagement with Habermas’s historical and normative approach to the 
public sphere (in Part Four), assessed in light of both earlier theorisations of public 
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opinion (Part Three) and subsequent critiques of the Habermasian model (this 
chapter), highlights the theoretically rich and diverse climate of debate that exists 
around the public-private dichotomy. It reminds us of the need to avoid making 
simplistic assumptions about where to draw the line between what is public and what 
is private, or arbitrary distinctions between politics and society, or, by extension, 
between citizenship and consumption. And it cautions us against the temptation to 
narrate a tale of decline from a past golden age to a more sceptically assessed 
present. Thinking through the conditions and possibilities for public communication 
and political participation in the present will, to paraphrase Schudson (1992: 160-
161), benefit neither from maintaining illusions about the broadcasting public sphere 
of the past, nor from misleadingly conflating the public sphere with PSB today.   
 
The extent to which Habermas regards both citizens (of the welfare-state) and 
consumers (of the commercial market) as potentially threatening to the public sphere 
becomes even clearer in his later writings, when he explicates the colonisation of the 
lifeworld by both the market and state-administration. More complex than a shift 
from public to private, individuals are socialised as both consumers in the economic 
system, and as citizens in the political system (Owen, 1999: 27). In terms of 
Habermas’s emphasis upon active participation and rational-critical debate, what 
liberal citizens and consumers have in common is their socialised, apolitical 
irrationality. The loss of the original republican meaning of citizenship that Arendt 
diagnoses in modernity is what Habermas identifies as having fleetingly been 
institutionalised in the bourgeois public sphere, when a particular mixture of liberal 
citizenship rights and consumption activities, in the transitional context of relative 
freedom from both political and economic power, enabled individuals to put their 
reason to use and become a public. This mediating sphere between state and society 
was constituted from below by citizen-consumers, who transcended their roles as 
both citizens and consumers. Although the critique of the distinction between politics 
and the social in Habermas’s approach, particularly Mouffe’s recasting of reason as 
social rather than political, confounds the identification of contemporary occurrences 
of this lost transcendence, it would certainly be misleading to reduce it to the kind of 
passive citizenship that is merely the liberal counterpart of passive consumption. 
Consequently, a closer engagement with the critical literature on both citizenship and 
consumption (see the next chapter) is required to elaborate a more nuanced 
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appreciation of their relative typographies and the not necessarily antagonistic 
relation between them.  
 
In the meantime, it is difficult to reconcile the delicate balance struck between liberal 
and republican traditions in Habermas’s original model with contemporary proposals 
for its revision. More specific to the purpose of this thesis, it is likewise a challenge 
to accept the wholehearted appropriation of the public sphere concept to the PSB 
model, when certain aspects of the concept, particularly Habermas’s republican 
commitment to active citizenship and rational-critical debate, seem at odds with the 
liberal passivity implicit in Scannell’s praise of national culture and Murdock’s 
embrace of citizenship rights. In the same way that Habermas’s idealisation of the 
liberal model neglected an acknowledgement of the ways in which its elitism 
repressed broader participation, as well as an appreciation of alternative sources of 
participation in popular radical traditions (Eley, 1992: 306), the dominant 
broadcasting literature risks idealising PSB and citizen interests to the point of 
neglecting the ways in which they may also depoliticise and pacify participation in 
the public sphere, while alternative contexts of commercial media and consumer 
interests may occasionally offer the potential for political participation and resistance 
to economic and political power. In light of the less selective reading in this chapter 
of Habermas’s account of the public sphere, the wholesale equation of PSB with the 
political public sphere, critical publicity and active citizenship seems somewhat 
unconvincing. Instead, the task Habermas appears to suggest becomes one of 
analysing the extent to which broadcasting also functions within the economic public 
sphere, performs manipulative publicity and produces a passive citizenship that is 
actually equivalent to private consumption. Such an approach would reveal the 
extent to which one type of publicity prevails over another within PSB and the wider 
broadcasting regulatory environment, and demonstrate the ways in which both PSB 
and the market, through a mixture of citizenship and consumption, simultaneously 
enable and undermine the public sphere.  
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Part Six: Citizenship and Consumption 
 
 
The dominant perspective on citizenship and consumption assumes an opposition 
between the public duties and ethics of citizenship on the one hand, and the private 
pleasures and aesthetics of consumption on the other, as well as a trajectory from the 
former to the latter, whereby contemporary society is characterised by the 
undermining of citizenship by consumption (c.f. Bauman, 1998: 31; 2000; Bourdieu, 
1984). This perspective is drawn upon in the critical scholarship on broadcasting 
policy and regulation (outlined in Part Two) to critique policy initiatives that seem to 
favour deregulation and individual choice over public service regulation and 
community, as well as an alternative scholarly perspective that suggests instead that 
consumption should be embraced as a new form of post-national citizenship. 
However, while constituting an important way of theorising the relationship between 
citizenship and consumption, and while performing an important role in warning 
citizens of the threat of commodification and corporate power, this dichotomy has, 
like the public-private dichotomy, also been guilty of constructing citizenship as 
masculine and consumption as feminine, effectively relegating women from the 
realm of politics. Further, these terms of debate have become narrow and self-
limiting, ignoring the growing body of literature on citizenship, consumption and, 
more recently, the long-term and complex relationship between the two (Soper & 
Trentmann, 2008: 4; Stevenson, 2003: 127; 132). This literature suggests that the 
presumed distinction between these isolated ideal types has in practice not held true, 
re-presenting them instead as ever-shifting categories that complement and overlap 
as much as they exist in tension, highlighting the permeability of the politics-
economy divide, and shifting attention to the ways in which both citizenship and 
consumption together redraw the boundaries of public life (L Cohen in Daunton & 
Hilton, 2001: 203).  
 
This chapter will therefore address the literatures on citizenship and consumption in 
turn. Beginning with arguments drawn from citizenship studies, section 6.1 will 
summarise TH Marshall’s seminal account of citizenship rights and the main points 
of contention, before dealing with more recent elaborations of citizenship as practice 
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and its relation to culture as well as to formal politics. Section 6.2 will then turn to 
empirical accounts of consumption that emphasise consumer agency and ethics as 
much as objectification and passivity, and collective and critical consumption as 
much as individual and self-interested materialism. Finally, section 6.3 will address 
citizenship and consumption as overlapping processes, which both mutually 
reinforce as well as undermine one another, before explicating the philosophical 
theories of individualisation, subpolitics and reflexive modernity that inform 
problematisations of the citizenship/consumption and politics/culture dichotomies. 
 
 
 
 
6.1 CITIZENSHIP 
 
This section will begin with a brief outline of Marshall’s arguments and the now 
well-established critique of his account of citizenship and its relation to social 
welfare and egalitarianism on the one hand, and to liberalism and capitalism on the 
other. It will then address the consequences of both this critique, and of 
contradictions in Marshall’s own approach, for debate on the policy changes to social 
welfare in Thatcher’s Britain that motivated the political-economic critique of the 
privatisation of the UK’s public services in the 1980s. Theoretical developments in 
the literature on citizenship, motivated in part by empirical studies of citizenship 
practice, will then be summarised, and an account of citizenship as process 
developed, before the specific engagement with cultural and cosmopolitan 
citizenship is drawn upon to demonstrate the shift from formal citizenship and 
explicitly political participation to the practices and experiences of everyday life.  
 
 
 
6.2.1 CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL RIGHTS – TH MARSHALL AND HIS CRITICS 
 
While references to ‘citizen’ in the literature on broadcasting draw on the important 
work of TH Marshall, they ignore developments in citizenship studies that have 
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engaged more critically with both Marshall and with citizenship more generally, to 
elaborate a more nuanced and complex account of ‘citizens’.  
 
Writing in the context of the burgeoning welfare state, Marshall (1950) traced the 
historical development of citizenship in Britain from the end of the 17
th
 to the end of 
the 19
th
 Century, dividing it into three elements: civil and legal rights (such as the 
right to property), political rights (such as the right to vote in a newly emerging 
parliamentary democracy), and socio-economic rights (to economic welfare and the 
right to assert one’s rights on equal terms). As we have already seen, in elaborating 
his case for PSB, Murdock supplemented Marshall’s triptych with his own idea 
(anticipated by Parsons’ work on cultural rights and the university) of information-
cultural rights, which he argued were necessary to ensure that relevant information 
and arguments, as well as opportunities for representation and recognition, would be 
available to all citizens. The narrative Marshall provided demonstrated that although 
civil rights had developed throughout the 18
th
 Century (becoming formally 
established around the time of the first Reform Act in 1832), and the extension of 
political rights had characterised the 19
th
 Century (with ‘the principle’ of universal 
political citizenship eventually gaining recognition between the two world wars of 
the 20
th
 century), social rights were actually diminished in the 18
th
 and early 19
th
 
Centuries, achieving parity with political and civil rights only with the development 
of the welfare state at the mid-point of the 20
th
 Century. Marshall maintained that 
although civil and political institutions and rights had been fused at the national level 
in feudal societies, social status distinctions between nobles and commoners, 
affecting the extent to which justice was available to the latter, meant that there had 
been no equality of citizenship among all men (and certainly not among all people). 
Although local forms of equal citizenship could be discerned in medieval towns, 
there existed no principle of citizenship equality at the national level to use as a 
benchmark against class inequality. The welfare state, he argued, finally offered just 
such a principle of universally applicable rights and duties by which to measure and 
judge the inequality produced by capitalism (Marshall, 1950: 149). For Marshall, 
citizenship was fundamentally a principle of equality that had developed alongside, 
though not always in conflict with, the rise of capitalism, which was in contrast a 
system of inequality (Marshall, 1950: 150). His analysis traced the relation between 
these two opposing principles, demonstrating that early forms of citizenship, 
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characterised more by civil rights and legal contract than the other elements, offered 
an individualism that was indispensable to the competitive market economy, in that it 
simultaneously granted autonomy and denied social protection to the public, 
conferring the right to acquire property without guaranteeing the right to possess it 
(Marshall, 1950: 150-151). However, such civil rights were instrumental, he argued, 
in laying the foundations of equal citizenship. The emerging sense of national 
community membership and the awakening public opinion, which Habermas also 
traced throughout the 19
th
 Century, did little to alleviate social inequality only 
because of the lack of political and social rights (Marshall, 1950: 151). Once these 
were granted, citizenship was able to ‘impose modifications’ on capitalism, and 
subordinate market price to social justice and the declaration of rights (Marshall, 
1950: 154).  
 
In defining modern citizenship as the recognition of social as well as political and 
civil rights, and therefore dependent upon the welfare state as much as liberal 
democracy and the rule of law, Marshall’s legacy has been to cement a view of 
citizenship as a status with corresponding rights to social welfare support, and as a 
principle mostly in conflict with the market. Consequently, it is his particular account 
of citizenship that is drawn upon to support the view that erosion of the welfare state 
is synonymous with erosion of citizenship rights (Saunders, 1993: 61). But, as 
influential as Marshall’s social history has been, it makes some problematic 
assumptions that the uncritical appropriation of his account into broadcasting 
scholarship has perpetuated. Liberal accounts of citizenship, such as Marshall’s 
evolutionary and ethnocentric view of the attainment of homogenous rights, tend to 
emphasise the institutional development of rights passed down to a passive citizenry 
by a sovereign state (Weintraub, 1997; Stevenson, 2003: 7), glossing over issues of 
social struggle and difference beyond class (ignoring issues of gender and race, for 
example), and neglecting a republican focus on the opportunities for citizens to 
actively participate in public life. Although Marshall’s account captures sufficiently 
the legal dimension of citizenship, it fails to distinguish between active and passive 
types of citizenship and so falls short of capturing the ethical dimension of civic 
virtue (Dagger, 2002:153).  
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Further, the ambiguity in Marshall’s account of the relationship between citizenship 
and capitalism (Turner, 1993: 8), and between liberalism and socialism, necessitates 
a greater degree of critical engagement than that which is conventionally offered. In 
retrospect, his account of the ‘compromised formation’ (Hall, 2011) that was the 
British welfare state can be seen as a liberal defence of the ‘hyphenated society’, 
which attempted to reconcile the egalitarianism of parliamentary democracy with the 
class inequalities of the capitalist market (Turner, 1993: 15). As such, the 
development of the welfare state in Britain can be seen as the exemplar of a liberal 
strategy to incorporate the working class into the private market (Mann, 1987; 
Turner, 1990: 196). Indeed, Marshall’s objective to elaborate a compromise between 
citizenship and the market entailed recognising that citizenship and the economic 
system applied different standards to the levels of inequality that could be 
legitimated, suggesting that there were therefore limits to the extent to which 
citizenship could be equated with egalitarianism (Hindess, 1993: 21).  
 
While Marxist critics have focused on Marshall’s legitimation of class inequality, 
supporting the welfare state as a supplement to the market rather than as a 
substitution, it is his emphasis on the link between welfare and citizenship that is 
more problematic for those concerned with the public sphere, because it relegates 
citizens to a passivity that precludes their participation in public life. For Habermas, 
of course, it was the construction of the passive citizen of the welfare state as much 
as the passive consumer of the free market that undermined the bourgeois public 
sphere. In Marshall’s later work (1981), he defends his model of the hyphenated 
society against the idea of society organised around a single principle such as 
citizenship, emphasising instead the importance of a mixed economy and economic 
freedom as well as welfare (Hindess, 1993: 21). Murdock’s appropriation of 
Marshall, however, appears to neglect this particular aspect, which would suggest a 
less antagonistic relation between citizenship and consumption than that commonly 
presumed by broadcasting scholars.  
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6.2.2 CITIZENSHIP, THE MARKET AND THE WELFARE STATE 
 
Within the wider political debate about welfare, critics from both the right and the 
left have lambasted the state provision of welfare services for being unnecessarily 
bureaucratic, and rethinking citizenship’s relation to the market in an ‘individualist 
age’ has been a particular concern of some scholars (Hoover & Plant, 1989; 
Saunders, 1990). Those on the right have built on this to argue for the dismantling of 
public welfare and its replacement by market or quasi-market modes of provision 
(Warde, 1991). Peter Saunders, in particular, has been critical of the equation of 
citizenship with egalitarianism and collectivism, questioning the view that sees 
compulsory collectivism as morally superior to voluntarist market relationships 
(Saunders, 1993: 76). Echoing the earlier critiques of Schumpeter, for example, he 
maintains that competition between individuals in a market does not necessarily lead 
to social atomisation (Saunders, 1993: 83), and claims that voting behaviour and 
support for welfare may be as motivated by self-interest as they are by altruism 
(Saunders, 1993: 75). He argues instead that the pursuit of such seemingly noble 
goals actually undermines citizenship, while market capitalism and privatised 
consumption are in practice better equipped to ensure its attainment (Saunders, 1993: 
57; 62).  
 
Focusing his attention on changes to UK state welfare in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
he argues that the shift from socialised to privatised service provision was not simply 
the result of Thatcherism, but the response to the public’s preference for the role of 
customer to that of ‘client of the patronage state’, as well as the expression of more 
fundamental and widespread trends (Saunders, 1993: 59). More a structural feature 
of mature capitalism than a short-term product of right-wing governments (Saunders, 
1993: 60), he argues, the shift in service provision was due to the growth in the real 
purchasing power of households and the rising cost for the state of service provision, 
while the shift from socialised to privatised consumption was the product of 
enhanced individual choice and the public’s experience (or perception) of 
deteriorating public services (Saunders, 1993: 59). In those areas where privatised 
consumption is advanced (such as in housing), he acknowledges that the task must be 
to extend it to the poorer sections of the population in danger of being marginalised; 
but in those areas in which it remains relatively small (such as in health and 
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education, at least in the early 1990s), he insists that the problem is how to overcome 
the entrenched interests of state sector producers (Saunders, 1993: 88). 
 
This assumes, however, that the manner of delivery of state provided service is 
necessarily bureaucratic whereas market delivery is not; it also assumes, by 
extension, that clients of state services are unsatisfied whereas customers of 
commercial services are not. But this is to confuse the ‘manner of delivery’ 
(un/satisfactory) with the ‘mode of provision’ (state/market), when there is no 
necessary connection between them at all (Warde, 1991). Arguments for the 
privatisation of public services also presuppose that consumer satisfaction, choice 
and service quality are paramount, when alternative values, such as universal access 
or improved working conditions for producers, may be preferred by users. Such a 
perspective also ignores dissenting arguments that suggest that impersonal 
bureaucratic service delivery may have advantages over more direct and interactive 
relations between producer and consumer, which may inadvertently widen the scope 
for class inequalities and prejudice (Warde, 1991). On the other hand, Warde’s 
intervention also suggests that similar arguments in favour of state over market 
provision may also suffer from blindness with regards to the more nuanced 
differences in manner of delivery. Similarly, it requires us to qualify the argument 
that the shift in the mode of provision of broadcasting, from PSB to the market, 
necessarily entails all the negative features attributed to it, and encourages us to look 
more closely instead at the manner of delivery of broadcasting services, as well as 
the experiences of the public, however they are constructed.  
 
In focusing on the inadequate delivery of state welfare provision and the poor 
experiences of clients, Saunders ignores issues of production and access, while his 
critics’ focus on the exploitation of capitalist production and the inequalities of 
market relations disregards the issues of delivery and enjoyment (Warde, 1991). As 
Warde has pointed out, both sides of the debate tend to be ‘highly selective in 
identifying the essential features of different modes of provision’. Indeed, shifting 
the focus from the ‘mode of provision’ to the ‘manner of delivery’, and recognising 
that the relation between production and consumption varies within both state and 
market modes of provision, weakens the effectiveness of the ‘state versus market’ 
dichotomy (Warde, 1991) as a framework for debating the relative strengths and 
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weaknesses of both state and market service provision. Of course, this also has 
theoretical and methodological implications for the effectiveness of the ‘PSB versus 
market’ dichotomy. 
 
Saunders’s arguments are important, however, for questioning assumptions about the 
character of neoliberalism and presumptions about the effects of privatisation. 
Distinguishing between the market mode of consumption typical of mid-19
th
 Century 
classical liberalism, the socialised consumption of the mid-20
th
 Century welfare-
state, and the late-20
th
 Century emergence of privatised consumption typical of 
neoliberalism (Saunders, 1993: 60), he argues that whereas the market (liberal) mode 
entailed the withdrawal of the state, the privatised (neoliberal) mode entails only a 
change in form (‘and perhaps scale’) of state intervention, away from direct 
provision and more towards indirect support and subsidy (Saunders, 1993: 65). 
Similarly, he argues that it would be a mistake to assume that privatised (neoliberal) 
consumption will necessarily lead to mass poverty, as if it was no different to the 
earlier market (liberal) mode, because the social contexts are so different, not least in 
the fact that real income and purchasing power are so much higher than 150 years 
ago (Saunders, 1993: 64). (This distinction between liberalism and neoliberalism will 
be addressed in more detail in Part Six.) 
 
As such, Saunders argues against the necessity of egalitarian social rights for the 
attainment of citizenship, emphasising instead their negative effect upon equality 
enshrined in the more fundamental political and legal rights of liberal citizenship. 
Rather than signalling the breakdown of collective social life (Saunders, 1993: 83), 
he suggests, privatised consumption may actually hold out the prospect of ‘new and 
active forms of citizenship’ grounded in both individual competence and a genuinely 
collective sociability from below (Saunders, 1993: 88).  
 
 
6.2.3 FROM CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS TO CITIZENSHIP AS PRACTICE AND PROCESS 
 
Beyond the debate about the relative significance of different citizenship rights, 
however, scholarly interest in citizenship has turned towards other aspects that are 
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often neglected in the traditional liberal approach. Consequently, a turn towards 
participation and an account of citizenship as a set of practices has been developed as 
an alternative to Marshall’s account of citizenship as a set of rights.  
 
Arguing that different historical circumstances produce different forms of citizenship 
participation (Turner, 1990; 1993; also Mann, 1987), Turner has suggested two axes 
of four ideal types (below/above, public/private) of citizenship. On one axis, 
citizenship from above is contrasted with citizenship from below; while the other 
axis gauges the extent to which it is developed in public or private space. The ways 
in which public and private space are structurally related, and whether citizenship is 
handed down from above or struggled for from below, will affect the extent to which 
citizenship is active or passive (Turner, 1993: 9). In his Foucauldian critique of 
citizenship and individualism, Jean Leca has argued from a republican perspective 
that citizenship can be neither too public and produced by the state, nor too private 
and the result of conflicts between particular interests, but only really exist between 
public and private realms (Leca, 1992; Stevenson, 2003: 19). 
 
Once this is taken into account, however, liberal citizenship is inherently passive – 
requiring nothing more than membership of a given community – as well as 
privatistic and materialistic, as individuals are defined primarily through private 
property, contract and the market (Schuck, 2002: 131-133). Republican citizenship, 
by contrast, requires more than membership of a given community (Weintraub, 1997: 
13), and less privileging of the private individual. Rather, commitment to the 
common good over individual self-interests, and active participation in public life, 
are required. Such civic virtue and ‘publicity’, as well as an emphasis on self-
government rather than individual freedom (Dagger, 2002: 146-149), are the 
cornerstones of republicanism, and constitute the kind of active citizenship that 
Habermas argued was necessary for a public sphere. Consequently, the liberal 
approach to citizenship, which emphasises the institutional development of rights, 
has since tended to be supplemented in citizenship studies by a republican emphasis 
on participation (Lister, 1997).  
 
Since the emergence of citizenship studies in the 1990s, citizenship has been 
redefined and reconfigured in three more fundamental ways: in terms of extent 
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(inclusion/exclusion), content (rights/obligations) and depth (thickness/thinness). Its 
modern liberal conception as a state-bestowed legal status has been challenged and 
broadened to more adequately include struggles for recognition and redistribution 
(Fraser & Honneth, 2003), and the flexible, differentiated nature of citizenship 
beyond the nation-state (Ong, 1999), while emphasis has increasingly been placed on 
citizenship as a non-linear and non-universal process of losing as well as claiming 
and expanding rights (Isin & Turner, 2002: 2-9). Psychoanalytical elaborations of 
citizenship have also emphasised the importance of feeling, affect and even 
irrationality to citizenship (Elliott, 2001; Frosch, 2001), weakening the extent to 
which citizenship can be presented as the rational counterpart to the irrational 
consumer.  
 
Globalisation has perhaps had the most significant effect on the traditional approach 
to citizenship as an inherently national concept. Although citizenship as the legal 
relationship between an individual and the polity was originally located within the 
city, it assumed its most developed form in the nation-state. The extent to which 
citizenship can still be equated with nationality or the sovereign nation-state, 
however, has been challenged by transnational developments in politics (such as the 
EU and devolution in the UK) and the economy (the rise of multinational 
corporations), and by the emergence of multiple actors and cross-border networks, 
partly facilitated more recently by the internet, which strengthen alternative forms of 
post-national community (Sassen, 2002: 278). One consequence of the expansion of 
citizenship rights has been to actually weaken the national framework of citizenship, 
which is currently being reconfigured as a multiple and dispersed rather than a 
unitary and fixed concept, only some dimensions of which are necessarily linked to 
the nation-state (Sassen, 2002: 277; 287). Increasingly, it is recognised that the 
nation-state is no longer (if it ever was) the exclusive site for the enactment and 
understanding of collective identities, citizenship practice, the protection of (human) 
rights, or even the formal recognition of legal status (Sassen, 2002: 278; Turner, 
1993). Further, and concomitant to the process of ‘post-nationalisation’ across 
nation-states, a distinct process of the ‘de-nationalisation’ of citizenship has been 
diagnosed within the formal institutions of nation-states, notably in the changing 
relation of citizens to the state in the context of privatisation and the withdrawal of 
the state from citizenship entitlements. And because the global is partially embedded 
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within the national by both the international human rights regime and the nation-
state’s granting of rights to foreign businesses and markets, particularly in the 
provision of what were formerly public services, the attention of some scholars has 
turned to the capacity (or incapacity) of citizens to hold global corporations to 
account through national and supranational institutions, and to the tenability of a 
simple distinction between the national and the global (Sassen, 2002: 287). 
 
While many of these issues are taken into account by broadcasting scholars, the 
extent to which they complicate the distinction between citizenship and consumption 
is often dismissed as capitalist, consumerist or neoliberal ideology, when such 
complexity requires closer critical examination. Rather than diverse entitlements and 
capabilities being incorporated within a territorialised bundle of universal rights, 
elements of citizenship are in fact being disarticulated from one another and 
rearticulated in global assemblages that replace the nation-state as the exclusive site 
of political mobilisation. As diverse groups claim diverse rights, the multifarious 
dimensions of citizenship are rearticulated in the shifting political landscape. 
Although this often entails the recasting of citizenship in terms of neoliberal values 
of flexibility, mobility and entrepreneurialism, resisting this shift in the ethics of 
citizenship (in the context of broadcasting and beyond) by maintaining a distinction 
between a juridically and legally recognised political body and those excluded from 
it, fails to capture the varied assemblages that are the sites of contemporary – post-
national, flexible, technological, cyber-based, biological – political claims for 
resources, entitlements and protection (Ong, 2006). In short, it risks looking for 
politics in the wrong place.  
 
 
 
6.2.4 CITIZENSHIP AND CULTURE 
 
While the associated turn to an emphasis on cultural citizenship often remains within 
a national context and statist frame, it problematizes the extent to which citizens can 
be universalised as a unitary body politic, and moves away from the reduction of 
citizenship to a legal recognition of rights. Although Marshall’s advocacy of rights-
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based liberal citizenship at least acknowledged the relation between rights and other 
duties and loyalties, he nevertheless ignored the substantive dimension of citizenship 
better addressed by the republican approach. On the other hand, despite the 
republican emphasis on agency and participation, scholars in that tradition have also 
tended to avoid paying particular attention to culture (Delanty, 2002: 60). Raymond 
Williams’s emphases on communication and culture, by contrast, helped shift 
attention away from the liberal focus on rights within a nation-state and the 
republican disparagement of the unpolitical, towards a closer engagement with the 
relation between citizenship and culture (Stevenson, 2003: 9). Over the last two 
decades, accounts of citizenship have consequently moved away from both the 
Marshallian focus on production, class and rights, as well as the republican emphasis 
on explicitly political participation, to more of an interest in cultural diversity and 
subcultural leisure and consumption (Delanty, 2002: 60).  
 
While political theorists such as Will Kymlicka (Kymlica & Norman, 2000) seek to 
bridge the gap between universal citizenship and cultural diversity, cultural 
sociologists such as Nick Stevenson (2001; 2003) emphasise the necessity of an 
engagement with culture to a full understanding of citizenship (Delanty, 2002: 61). 
For Gerard Delanty, while Kymlicka’s normative approach seeks to expand an 
already existing framework of state-bestowed citizenship to include the excluded, 
Stevenson’s approach, which is more concerned with issues of identity and 
belonging, and theoretical debates around group representation, the accommodation 
of difference and the limits of tolerance, seeks to address inclusion by going beyond 
the state (Delanty, 2002: 61).  
 
In highlighting the accommodation of cultural diversity and citizenship in 
communitarian traditions such as those of Canada (and by extension the problems 
with its accommodation in republics such as France and the US, which see them as 
antithetical), Kymlicka outlines the possibility of equating citizenship with groups 
rather than with individuals, so as to allow individuals to maintain a strong affiliation 
to their ethnic subgroup and only a relatively minimal commitment to a national 
identity (Delanty, 2002: 61). Kymlicka’s elaboration of group-differentiated rights 
involves devolved assemblies and minority community rights to self-government, 
polyethnic rights and cultural tolerance, as well as special forms of representation to 
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counter the invisibility of minority groups. It has met with criticism, however, from 
both liberals who fear the effects on individual rights, as well as cosmopolitan critics 
(Waldron, 1999) who emphasise the cultural heterogeneity within communities that 
Kymlicka appears to treat as homogenous (Stevenson, 2003: 50-51).  
 
While both approaches ostensibly deal with cultural rights and cultural citizenship, a 
distinction can perhaps be drawn between Kymlicka’s liberal communitarian focus 
on minority rights and cultural citizenship, which sees identities as fixed entities, and 
Stevenson’s greater concern with cultural rights and cosmopolitan citizenship 
(Delanty, 2002). In basing citizenship on ‘common experiences, learning processes 
and discourses of empowerment’, the latter approach offers a more fluid account of 
citizenship that engages directly with the more recent theoretical problematisations 
of citizenship outlined above (Delanty, 2002: 64). For Delanty, however, there 
remains an uncertainty in both approaches about the relation between the necessarily 
narrow focus on cultural rights and the relatively wider aspects of cultural identity 
and belonging (Delanty, 2002: 66), which may be articulated in domains of culture 
beyond (and even considered antithetical to) citizenship.   
 
While some have suggested that there need be no antinomy between liberal rights-
based and republican participation-based approaches, as rights are essential for 
participation and not necessarily productive of passivity (Cohen & Arato, 1992), 
others have grappled directly with the exclusionary aspects of both liberal and 
republican approaches to citizenship, and with the extent to which culture and 
citizenship can be reconciled with liberalism and republicanism. Judith Vega (2010), 
for instance, has attempted to resolve this tension by developing a neo-republican 
account of cultural citizenship and cultural politics, which draws on the politics of 
difference literature (Mouffe, outlined at the end of Part Four) rather than that of 
identity politics or cultural studies. Such an agonistic approach sees ‘culture as a 
realm of contestation’ (Vega, 2010: 270), and distinguishes more subtly than 
classical republicanism between different kinds of participation; that is, addressing 
cultural and economic, as well as political participation. For Vega, a cultural citizen 
is one who, in recognising that culture is also political, is sensitive to issues of social 
exclusion and to possibilities for participation within culture (Vega, 2010: 271). Such 
an approach blurs the boundary between citizenship and consumption, but in 
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maintaining an emphasis on the political it transcends the confining rigidity of such a 
distinction, and allows for a more nuanced theoretical approach to the practice and 
process of politics beyond both formal and explicit citizenship, such as that 
advocated by those who seek to prescribe a public service environment for media 
regulation. 
 
In seeking politics beyond the strictly political realm, however, and in developing 
notions of citizenship that evolve within the cultural realm and from below rather 
than from the state, it becomes necessary to address practices and processes which 
neither the participants themselves nor those researching them would immediately 
recognise as citizenship. Although a rather limited and idealised conception of the 
citizen has tended to be contrasted with an equally limited but degraded conception 
of the consumer, elaborations of citizenship disturb the extent to which this contrast 
holds true. The next section, therefore, will address the ways in which consumption 
practices, as distinct from explicit (liberal and republican) citizenship, can influence 
politics and effectively contribute to citizenship in a wider sense. 
 
  
 
6.2 CONSUMPTION 
 
Until recently, however, the literature on citizenship has shown little interest in 
consumption, maintaining the distinction between the individualised consumer in a 
‘neoliberal world of markets’ and the citizen of the state, while the literature on 
consumption has likewise tended to leave implicit any connections to citizenship. 
But this divide between public-citizen and private-consumer ignores the complexity 
of consumer cultures and the role of consumption as an important source of political 
engagement, as well as local and global spheres of politics above and below the level 
of the nation-state (Soper & Trentmann, 2008: 1-2). Over the last couple of decades, 
academic literature has gone beyond the reduction of the consumer to either a 
quantitative economic indicator or a pejorative object of manipulation, understanding 
consumption instead as a communicative act and as a moment of both social and 
political exchange (Wyrwa, 1998), and clearing the way for a more balanced 
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assessment of consumerism (Schudson, 1998) and the relation between citizenship 
and consumption (Soper & Trentmann, 2008). 
 
This section begins with a brief summary of the traditional critique of what is 
variedly described as consumption, consumerism, consumer culture or consumer 
society. It then draws on the critique of this critique, and the empirical research that 
has revealed a very different account of consumption practices and of the 
significance of consumption to both personal and communal ethics. The ways in 
which this notion of an active consumer problematises the relation between 
production and consumption on the one hand, and between citizenship and 
consumption on the other, will then be elaborated to develop an alternative account 
of the active, productive, ethical and political consumer. Finally, by drawing upon a 
recent debate on the difference between critique and moralism in consumption 
studies, the extent to which such accounts of consumption are guilty of falling back 
on relativism and ignoring power relations will be addressed. 
 
 
 
6.3.1 THE CRITIQUE OF CONSUMERISM 
 
Since Thorsten Veblen highlighted the significance of luxury and ‘conspicuous 
consumption’ to social stratification in North America, and John Kenneth Galbraith 
examined the constant promotion of demand and consumption in American industrial 
society, terms like consumerism and consumer society have been recurrent 
characterisations of 20
th
 Century (Americanised) society (for an overview, see 
Featherstone, 2007; Wyrwa, 1998). American consumer culture has subsequently 
been critiqued as a system that simultaneously compensates for and justifies what is 
otherwise a repressive society (Gorz, 2011). It imprisons the ‘eternal consumer’ 
(which is in reality little more than a product of the ‘culture industry’) in a circle of 
manipulation (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2002), deceiving them to accept false needs 
and to subordinate themselves to an obsessive compulsion to consume useless things 
(Lefebvre; Marcuse). Consumption is thus characterised as a capitalist-produced 
180 
 
passivity that atomises and isolates individuals (Debord, 1994), cutting off their inner 
selves from the social world, and leaving them perpetually unsatisfied (Lasch, 1991).  
 
Michael Schudson has distinguished between five traditions of consumer critique, 
ranging from elitist and potentially anti-democratic assumptions about the inferior 
qualities of mass-produced commodities (the Aristocratic critique), a concern for the 
disregard of labour and the exploitation of the worker (the Marxist critique), and 
anxiety about unnecessary waste – which, in its more recent guise, is more 
specifically and understandably concerned with environmental consequences (the 
Quaker critique) – to those more preoccupied with the detrimental effect of 
possessiveness on character (the Puritan critique), or with withdrawal from the public 
and political realm (the Republican critique) (Schudson, 1998; Warde, 2010: xxii-
xxiii).  
 
While the Quaker critique allows for ethical consumption that is practical and useful, 
and which is distinct from excessive consumption that is wasteful and ostentatious, 
the Puritan critique maintains that goods only ever have an instrumental rather than 
an innate value, and that the aesthetic dimension of human experience is unrelated to 
either ethics or the truly good life; dismissing as a contradiction in terms, therefore, 
the possibility of such a thing as ethical consumption. Following on from the latter, 
the Republican critique is more concerned with the privatising influence upon public 
life of this good’s orientation in private life, arguing that it produces social and 
political passivity among the public, and reduces political participation to a matter of 
choice between predetermined alternatives.  
 
The republican perspective and the Frankfurt School’s critique of the culture industry 
have proven to be the most influential traditions of critique, while in recent decades it 
is Zygmunt Bauman (2000) who has made the most significant contribution to the 
critique of consumption, within his theoretical frame of individualisation and liquid 
modernity. In his narrative of the shift from the producer society of solid modernity 
to the consumer society of liquid modernity, morality becomes more a contingent 
process than a stable and inherited condition (Bauman, 1992), and flexibility replaces 
solidity as the ideal condition to be pursued in the negotiation between negative and 
positive freedoms (Bauman in Dawes, 2011b: 132-136). Whereas consumption (as 
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merely an animal necessity) and production were balanced in the producer society, 
they are divorced from one another in the consumer society, in which ‘consumerism’ 
becomes the ‘operating force of society’, and consumers are transformed into 
commodities (Bauman, 2007). The accompanying process of (enforced) 
individualisation divorces individual from collective freedoms, devolving to 
individuals powers (and responsibilities) previously assumed by the state (Bauman 
2000; Gane 2012: 621). In Bauman’s Arendtian reading, the erosion of public 
institutions and civic virtue by private processes and the market (Warde, 2010: 
xxviii) constitutes the privatisation and depoliticisation of the public sphere; a 
process he insists must be reversed by a counter-process of decolonisation (Bauman, 
1995). This critique of consumerism has proven especially influential in the field of 
broadcasting regulation, where it is drawn upon to substantiate the critique of the 
shift from public service to a market regulated environment, and to tie the debates 
about citizenship and consumption to those concerning the public sphere and 
neoliberalism. 
 
But Daniel Miller (2001), among others, has critiqued the assumptions behind such 
accounts, exposing the anti-materialist ideology behind them, problematizing the 
links between consumption and capitalism, and proposing even that the 
Americanisation thesis is itself simply another form of Americanisation. He 
emphasises instead that the fear of materialism is shared by consumers even in the 
process of acquisition, evidenced by measures taken by consumers to curb the anti-
social potential of material culture. Although he prefers the moralist critics to the 
amoral stance of those they critique (Miller, 2001: 226), he rejects deterministic 
views of consumption that assume an essentialist, natural citizen, masked by an 
artificial commodity culture of consumers (Miller, 1987: 192-193).   
 
Rather, consumption for Miller is about studying wealth and poverty as a means of 
exposing historical contradictions, such as the incompatibility between individual 
liberty and social reciprocity, and the tensions between the interests of ‘real’ and 
‘virtual’ (mediated by auditors) consumers (Miller, 2001: 240). Social scientists, he 
insists, would do better to ‘acknowledge consumption’ as more of a context of social 
change than a cause of social ills (Miller, 2012: 184), and take contradictions in 
consumption (as well as those in citizenship, one might add) as the starting point for 
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historical analysis. Such an approach, when applied to an analysis of the historical 
contradictions in broadcasting regulation, for example, could be more fruitful than 
the comparatively simple ideological reading of a binary relation between citizenship 
and consumption.  
 
 
 
 
6.3.2 CONSUMPTION AS PRACTICE AND PROCESS 
 
Such ideological readings, typical of normative critiques of consumer culture, 
assume the possibility of neatly distinguishing between necessary and artificial needs 
and wants, ignoring their cultural and social constitution in even the poorest of 
societies (Schudson, 1998). More recently, however, these assumptions have been 
challenged by the shift from economic and psychological accounts of consumption to 
more socio-cultural accounts of actual practices that recognise the importance of 
consumer goods for establishing and circulating meaning in modern societies 
(Douglas & Isherwood, 1979). This critical sociology of consumption is more 
informed by empirical and historical research, and less adherent to mass culture 
theory’s negative evaluation of the consumer (Featherstone, 2007: 13), contesting the 
extent to which consumption can be dismissed as either privatising or passive by 
revealing the active involvement of television audiences, the appropriation of 
consumer goods and the social and collective dimension of consumption.  
 
Such scholars argue that the individualist approach to the consumer, as someone who 
has ‘no choice but to choose’ between one symbol or another (typical of theorists 
such as Bauman), offers only a partial understanding of consumption. Accordingly, 
this theoretical turn in the literature offers a distinctive perspective: attending more to 
the processual and ‘collective development of modes of conduct in everyday life’ 
than individual choices; shifting the focus from the ‘insatiable wants of the human 
animal’ to the ‘instituted conventions of collective culture’; and from a critique of 
constrained choice to an analysis of disciplined participation. Careful to avoid the 
reduction of the consumer to either a sovereign or a dupe, such research focuses on 
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the particular moments of consumption as well as the more general organisation of 
consumption practice (Warde, 2005: 146).  
 
As with the recent research into citizenship, scholarly attention has turned to 
examining consumption as practice and process, emphasising what people do and 
feel rather than what they mean (Warde, 2005: 132). Maintaining that most practices 
entail consumption (Warde, 2005: 137) that is generally routine, ordinary, collective 
and conventional, a distinction is drawn between consumption as a dispersed practice 
and shopping as an integrated practice. That is, there are those that like shopping and 
those that do not, but whereas shopping can be avoided, consumption is inescapable, 
and generally understood as simply ‘doing something’ rather than as ‘consumption’ 
per se (Warde, 2005: 150). While research discussed in Part Two suggests that the 
public of public services do not see themselves explicitly as consumers (Clarke et al, 
2007), they don’t see themselves especially as citizens either. Understanding both 
citizenship and consumption as dispersed rather than integrated practices may be one 
way of better acknowledging the ways in which the public relate to public and 
private services, such as broadcasting.  
 
In advocating a broader definition of consumption beyond status emulation or the 
materialist acquisition of goods by individuals, such as the suggestion that it 
comprises the ‘selection, purchase, use, maintenance, repair or disposal of any 
product or service’, (Campbell in Warde, 2010: xxiv-xxv, xxxii), or the elaboration 
of consumption as a collective rather than individual process much larger than the 
market and essential for the forging of social relationships (Miller, 2012; Warde, 
2010), there has also been a greater sensitivity to the inconspicuous consumption of 
social services and publicly provided goods as well as market products, and even to 
the empowering potential of shopping.  
 
Consequently, we now have a more sophisticated understanding and nuanced sense 
of the origins and development of consumer cultures around the world (Sassatelli, 
2007; Trentmann, 2004; Warde, 2010), that resists simplistic periodization, and goes 
against the view of consumption as a 20
th
 century phenomenon that simply 
homogenises and erodes civic engagement. Historical research has revealed that the 
consumer has an even longer history than advanced liberalism, with debate on the 
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origins and development of consumption suggesting that it may go as far back as the 
16
th
 Century. The fusion of multiple consumer identities into the universal subject of 
the sovereign consumer, it is argued, has been as long a process of social and 
political contestation as the history of citizenship, with which it shares its roots in 
rights and equity rather than individual choice, and the privatisation of the consumer 
reveals only its recent history (Trentmann, 2007: 151). Consequently, John Brewer 
and others (McKendrick, Brewer & Plumb, 1982; Brewer and Porter, 1993) have 
suggested a focus on the historical development of consumption as an alternative 
perspective from which to reveal unexplored aspects of modern life (Wyrwa, 1998).  
 
 
 
6.3.3 PROBLEMATISING PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND POLITICS 
 
Since the turn of the 21
st
 Century, there has been a boom in scholarly interest in more 
active dimensions of consumption,  and the extent to which the distinction between 
production and consumption, and that between politics and consumption, continues 
to hold true. Indeed, Warde has argued that work and production are involved in 
every aspect of consumption (Warde, 1991).  Problematising the salience of passive 
consumption, particularly in terms of its assumed distinction from production (Firat 
& Venkatesh, 1995), scholarly attention has turned more to the ‘prosumer’ (Toffler, 
1980), the ‘produser’ (Bruns, 2008), the more active and productive aspects of 
consumption (Arnould & Thompson, 2005: 871), and the new relations of production 
and consumption that are emerging especially online with the rise of Web 2.0 (Beer 
& Burrows, 2007), where content is mostly not generated by the producer, but by 
users (Ritzer, Dean & Jurgenson, 2012: 385). Rather than claiming, however, that 
prosumption is the product of Web 2.0 or that this new media environment heralds a 
new third age of capitalism (production, consumption, and then prosumption), 
George Ritzer and others have argued that the alleged shift from a producer- to a 
consumer-society (insisted upon by Bauman and others) is itself misleading, and that 
economies have instead always been dominated by prosumption (Ritzer & 
Jurgenson, 2010).  
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Alvin Toffler (1980) was the first to coin the term ‘prosumer’. He argued that 
prosumption had actually been predominant in a first (pre-industrial) wave of 
marketisation, and that it was only in the second wave of marketisation (which 
accompanied the emergence of industrial society and modernity) that the functions of 
producer and consumer were separated. This second wave introduced a distinction 
between production and consumption that initially privileged the former over the 
latter, presuming a passive consumer and the market logic of consumption (Firat & 
Venkatesh, 1995: 239), giving birth to the producer society but also eventually to the 
consumer society (Firat & Venkatesh, 1995: 248). Contemporary (postmodern) 
society was, according to Toffler, being swept by a third wave towards the 
reintegration of production and consumption in the form of the prosumer (Toffler, 
1980: 265-266). According to this argument, the producer-consumer dichotomy is at 
best only a historical anomaly (Ritzer, Dean & Jurgenson, 2012: 380), as there is no 
natural distinction between them (Firat & Venkatesh, 1995: 254). Further, Ritzer has 
claimed that even at the peak of the Industrial Revolution, production and 
consumption were never fully distinct, and that theorists such as Marx and 
Baudrillard were guilty of too strongly distinguishing between the two spheres and 
misguided in emphasising one over the other (Ritzer & Jurgenson, 2010: 17). 
Debunking the view of the consumer as merely the end of the production process, 
consumption is thus instead viewed as an ongoing process of construction in which 
things are constantly ‘consumed, produced, signified, represented, allocated, 
distributed and circulated’ (Firat & Venkatesh, 1995: 259). 
 
‘Traditional prosumption’, such as self-servicing at petrol stations or supermarkets, 
has of course been exposed as capitalist exploitation, critiqued as merely the creation 
of ‘temporary employees’ (Humphreys and Grayson, 2008; Fuchs, 2010) or free 
labour in the ‘social factory’ (Terranova, 2000). Arguing that production has 
abandoned the factory and is now dispersed throughout society, for instance, the 
Italian autonomists have highlighted the shift from material to immaterial labour 
(Negri, 1989; Lazzarato, 1996; Hardt & Negri, 2000) so prevalent in all aspects of 
production, but particularly in new media. However, while traditional forms of 
prosumption enable corporations to exploit consumers (who produce nothing but 
surplus value) rather than workers (who produce only a great deal of surplus value) 
without having to pay them a wage (Ritzer & Jurgenson, 2010: 26), Ritzer argues 
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that newer forms of prosumption, especially those associated with Web 2.0, are more 
complex than that (Ritzer & Jurgenson, 2010: 21). In newer forms, the ‘ideological 
recruitment of consumers into productive co-creation relationships hinges on 
accommodating consumers’ needs for recognition, freedom and agency’ (Zwick et 
al, 2008: 185). This of course could itself be dismissed as false consciousness (Ritzer 
& Jurgenson, 2010: 25), and no matter how much productive power consumers are 
given over their Facebook pages or Wikipedia edits, the profits or profit-potential of 
such products are not distributed among the users but retained by their owners 
(Ritzer & Jurgenson, 2010: 27). Nevertheless, prosumers appear to be harder to 
control, and more likely to resist such control, than consumers (Ritzer & Jurgenson, 
2010: 31). Although it would be naïve to assume that prosumers are free from 
external control, alienation and exploitation, a better understanding is needed of the 
extent to which producers, consumers and prosumers are subject to such processes 
(Ritzer, Dean & Jurgenson, 2012: 387).  
 
Beyond the problematisation of the production-consumption dichotomy, the active 
dimensions of consumption have also been addressed by those questioning that 
between consumption and politics. Although both liberal and neoliberal discourse 
aligns consumption with the market as opposed to both the state and citizenship, 
alternative modes of consumer action suggest a bottom-up cultural revolution in both 
everyday life and political participation (Sassatelli, 2006). Through consumption, 
people formulate a sense of the good life and of what is good for their family and 
community, others and the planet, as much as for themselves. As well as a site of 
materialist individualism, therefore, it needs to also be approached as a space of 
moral reasoning, ethical engagement and political critique (Slater in Schor et al, 
2010: 282). There has therefore been a growing interest in ethical and critical 
consumption, whereby economic rationality is subordinated to ethical considerations 
(Nava in Stevenson, 2003: 134; Sassatelli, 2007), and in understanding the consumer 
as an actively ethical, moral and political subject (Sassatelli, 2007).  
 
Contrasting ‘critical consumerism’ with other aspects of consumer culture, Roberta 
Sassatelli, for example, emphasises consumption as a politically contested field in 
which, under certain circumstances, individuals can make public use of their reason. 
Kate Soper (2007) has also emphasised the ways in which changing consumer 
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practice has incorporated civic mindedness, making redundant the dichotomy 
constructed between the self-interested consumer and the civic-minded citizen. 
Michael Schudson’s work, already discussed in the context of revisionist accounts of 
the public sphere, has also been significant for emphasising the political 
opportunities offered by consumption and the private realm for those (such as 
women or those without property) denied formal citizenship and access to politics. 
Although Lizabeth Cohen (2003) provides an account of how the conflation of 
citizenship and consumption in 20
th
 Century America brought about in the long-term 
a misguided belief that value for money could determine political freedom, she 
nevertheless emphasises the importance of the politically motivated consumer 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s for aspiring to hold both governments and 
corporations to account (L Cohen 2004: 239), arguing that the ‘sovereign citizen-
consumer’ has become the most effective counterweight to the political 
unaccountability of multinational corporations (Sassatelli, 2006). And in Michele 
Micheletti’s work on contemporary political participation, she identifies ‘political 
consumerism’ as one of a number of emerging forms, as citizens seek to formulate 
more individualised philosophies of the good life outside of traditional politics and 
civil society (Micheletti, 2003). 
 
It would be a mistake to assume, however, that while the citizen is nation-bound, the 
consumer is free to perform a kind of transnational citizenship, as (questions of 
efficacy and legitimacy aside) political consumption is often itself entangled in 
national public debates (Micheletti, 2003). Further, when consumerism is used to 
refer to the consumers’ rights movement (Hilton, 2003), it is simultaneously both a 
movement on behalf of consumers, as well as a movement against consumerism as 
an ideology (Binkley & Littler, 2008: 526). But recognising the productive and 
political agency of consumers, as well as the opportunities offered by critical 
consumerism for the holding to account of private corporations, suggests that the 
typical reaction of broadcasting scholars to the process of consumerism has been all 
too dismissive. 
 
Certainly, the political activists’ discourse of critical consumerism borrows themes 
normally associated with the public sphere or rationalised production to reconstitute 
the consumer as not only active but productive and political, questioning and 
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renegotiating the distinctions between consumption, production and politics 
(Sassatelli, 2006). Making such discourse an object of critical analysis, however, 
Sassatelli not only highlights the emancipatory potential of consumption, but 
simultaneously critiques the extent to which consumption can be political, thus 
problematizing the consumer beyond both the traditional critique and the more recent 
tendency in consumer studies to develop an ontology of the consumer that risks 
ignoring its full cultural and historical meaning (Sassatelli, 2006). Although some 
consumers, particularly consumer activists, seek to defy consumerist norms and 
challenge corporations, the extent to which they are motivated by citizenship and see 
other consumers as part of the problem suggests the need for further distinction 
between types of consumer and types of citizen, as well as reminding us of the fuzzy 
distinction between the two (Arnould & Thompson, 2005: 875).  
 
 
 
6.3.4 CONSUMPTION, CRITIQUE AND MORALISM 
 
As important as it is to recognise consumption as more complex than the traditional 
critiques suggest, analysts have been warned to be wary of relativizing consumption 
and abandoning a critical stance towards it (Wyrwa, 1998). The elaboration of an 
ethics or moral value of consumption can perhaps be developed (Schudson, 1998), 
but only from a critical appreciation of both the actual practices of consumption and 
the normative critiques of consumerism. As such, it may be necessary to return to the 
earlier critical theorists as a first step towards developing a new critical approach to 
consumption, which combines the normative theories that had been limited to the 
macro-level, with the empirical results that tend to be limited to the micro-level. 
Such a critique would engage at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels (Arnould & 
Thompson, 2005: 871) with the ways in which social relations, as well as 
contemporary notions of individuality and community, have been transformed by 
consumption (Schor, 2007: 29).  
 
Debate on the question of moral stance in consumption research is a recurrent source 
of tension between those who are critical and those who are more agnostic in their 
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approach. Until the 1990s, however, the critical study of consumption existed only in 
the form of a ‘patrician dismissal of everyday life’ (Slater in Schor et al, 2010: 280). 
What such critics are actually critical of is more specifically consumer culture and 
society, with the associated judgments on overconsumption, the undue influence of 
consumption on everyday lives, and the enjoyment of some individuals to the 
detriment of others. But the consumer critics’ equation of consumption with 
consumer culture and society reduces it to the ‘moral panics, guilt complexes, class 
tastes and intellectual traditions’ of northern, western or occidental researchers, and 
actually obscures the vast majority of consumption, which is more complex and not 
necessarily cultural (Slater in Schor et al, 2010: 281).  
 
While the critics are accused of elitism in the imposition upon their research object 
of the personal tastes or particular politics of their own specific social position, the 
agnostics are accused of ignoring or even supporting the power relations underlying 
consumption practices (Schor in Schor et al, 2010: 274). Schor argues, for instance, 
that the wholesale rejection of the consumer critique tradition by the agnostics has 
led to a theoretical cul-de-sac in which it is difficult to engage in critical analysis 
(Schor in Schor et al, 2010: 275). Although it is correct that the critical accounts 
tended to deny consumer agency and be overly totalised, elitist and anti-working 
class, reflecting the largely unconscious class bias of those particular scholars, it is 
important to differentiate between them rather than simplistically dismiss them, and 
to critically engage with their arguments when re-applying them to contemporary 
society (Schor in Schor et al, 2010: 275). It is an irony, she notes, that the shift in 
academic attention away from the alienated and exploited consumer in favour of the 
active and sovereign consumer corresponded with the rise of multinational 
corporations and their encroaching influence over politics and society. However, the 
recent emergence of new forms of anti-consumption and ethical consumption remind 
us of the need not to avoid an engagement with ethics and values in consumption 
‘just as they come to the fore in consumers’ own understandings of how they shop, 
spend, and live their daily lives’ (Schor in Schor et al, 2010: 279).  
 
To critique the critics, however, is neither to naively embrace consumption nor to fall 
for the myth of value-free social science; rather it is to recognise that by constituting 
consumption as a social problem, it is reduced to a narrow and singular analytical 
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framework, in which the social and political location of the researchers becomes 
unreflexive, unchallenged and moralistic. As such, the political impulse to critique 
power actually becomes the opposite of politics, so that the only questions worth 
asking are those that would occur to a certain type of researcher, whether they are 
right to ask them or not. Rather than being uncritical, therefore, the recent generation 
of consumer researchers are engaged in deepening critique and refusing moralism 
(Slater in Schor et al, 2010: 281-282). Such an approach does not necessarily oppose 
the modernist reading of the consumer that is constructed as willing to be objectified 
and commodified, but it does remove the stigma that modern thought attaches to 
such objectification, since postmodern thought deconstructs binary oppositions such 
as subject/object and citizen/consumer, and transcends imposed narratives and myths 
(Firat & Venkatesh, 1995: 254), such as the depoliticisation of citizenship by 
consumption. Rejecting older critical epistemologies that are structured by a dialectic 
of the universal and the particular, in which the aim is to connect the empirical 
surface with the normative depth, to formulate a macro-theory to subsume micro-
situations, and to diagnose the most effective remedy for social change, recent 
consumer research is more concerned to follow connections, assemblages, 
disassemblages and reconfigurations upon a flattened landscape that no longer 
assumes a distinction between epiphenomena and deeper structures (Slater in Schor 
et al, 2010: 283-284). 
 
Such an approach allows for a properly critical examination of the ways in which 
degrees of agency/passivity have evolved over time within the overlapping processes 
of both citizenship and consumption.  
 
 
 
 
6.3 INDIVIDUALISATION – BEYOND THE CITIZEN-CONSUMER DICHOTOMY? 
 
In light of such research that exposes the ‘contradictory and multi-faceted workings 
of consumption’, and theoretical developments in the debate around cultures and 
politics of consumption, ideas such as consumerism and consumer culture and 
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society become of ‘diminishing analytical and conceptual usefulness’ (Trentmann, 
2004: 376-380). A more mobile or tautological approach is required that 
acknowledges the full spectrum of forms of consumption, that doesn’t reduce 
consumer politics to resistance to consumerism (Clarke et al, 2007: 139; Trentmann, 
2004: 377), and that reformulates the economic dimension of consumption to 
account for its collective and active dimensions. Rather than assuming a competitive 
relation between citizenship and consumption, where the expansion of one 
necessitates the decline of the other (Trentmann, 2004: 379), the complex and 
contradictory ways in which they interact needs to be more taken into account 
(Warde, 2010:  xlii). Such an approach recognises that consumption expresses, 
functions and shapes citizenship (Jubas, 2007: 232; Trentmann, 2007: 154), and 
demonstrates that consumption is embedded within a larger universe of civic values 
that blends ideas of individualism with collective identities and social solidarities, 
making the distinction between citizen and consumer subsequently less evident 
(Trentmann, 2004: 379-382). This emerging notion of the ‘consumer-citizen’ 
redefines the citizen’s rights to be a consumer, and the consumer’s responsibilities to 
question the consequences, risks and costs of consumption (Featherstone, 2007: 
xvii), while its redrawn history reveals a variance in emphasis on individualism or 
collectivism, as well as in the role of the state and the market (Jubas, 2007).  
 
Rather than a simple distinction between active citizenship and passive consumption, 
therefore, the emerging literatures in citizenship and consumption studies suggest 
that there may instead be degrees of activity/passivity in consumption (Schudson, 
1998) as there may be degrees of dis/engagement in citizenship. Additionally, in 
contrast to the assumption of an inversely proportionate relation between the two, the 
significance of consumption to participatory and active democratic societies 
highlights the necessity of consumption for citizenship. Indeed, while traditional 
political action has often been historically available to only propertied white males, 
the possibility of channelling protest through consumption or consumer-boycotts has, 
for women, residents of non-citizenship status and, even, the poor, demonstrated that 
basing political participation upon consumer identities has for a long time offered a 
radically egalitarian alternative. As Schudson comments, while consumption may 
sometimes take people out of the public square, it has also on occasions provided the 
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avenue and engine for entrance into public life that citizenship has itself denied 
(Schudson, 1998).  
 
Some of the recent literature on the cultural dimension of both citizenship and 
consumption has also emphasised the ways in which individuals may forge feelings 
of social solidarity and create, in their pursuit of common consumption interests, 
‘distinctive, fragmentary, self-selected, and sometimes transient cultural worlds’ 
(Arnould & Thompson, 2005: 873). This aspect of the literature, engaging directly 
with the contradictions of consumption and the limits to the individual-collective 
dichotomy, draws on literature that seeks to break away from a ‘modern’ analytical 
framework to engage more appropriately with the context of ‘second’ or ‘reflexive’ 
modernity (Beck, Giddens & Lash, 1994; Beck, 1992; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 
2002; Maffesoli, 1996; as well as Bauman, 2000). Michel Maffesoli’s work on 
postmodernity, for instance, has been of particular importance to those consumption 
scholars who have distanced themselves from the Frankfurt School critique of 
consumerism. In particular, they evoke his account of neotribalism, in which he 
argues that individuals are forging more ephemeral collective identifications and 
pursuing common lifestyle interests in response to the threat of isolation and 
alienation, caused in turn by the erosion of traditional sociality by globalisation and 
socioeconomic change, on the one hand, and by the resultant ethos of radical 
individualism on the other (Arnould & Thompson, 2005: 873).   
 
Such accounts are supported by Beck and Beck-Gernscheim’s elaborations of the 
dual processes of ‘individualisation’ (a more complex process than that outlined by 
Bauman) and ‘sub-politicisation’, whereby the former refers to the increasingly 
reflexive values of social actors and the ongoing (never complete) process of 
‘becoming individual’, and the latter to the search for political participation beyond 
traditional politics. The Becks’ concept of ‘individualisation’ (2002) is distinct from 
the self-effacement of communitarianism, but also from the self-gratifying 
individualism commonly associated with consumerism (as well as the empowering 
individuation typified by republicanism). Society is individualised when a mobile 
and fluid commonality is provisionally formed by the ‘paradoxical collectivity of 
reciprocal individualisation’ (Beck, 1992: xxi). Far from the rigidity of traditional 
communities of class, gender and ethnic belonging, and contradicting the 
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'fragmentation of society' thesis, this idea accounts for the ways in which individuals 
converge to form communities of interest; consuming together for mutual benefit. 
This postmodern and ‘reflexive’ individualisation involves the recognition of the 
incompleteness of the self, combining and tempering personal freedom with an 
engagement with others, and reflexively problematising the distinction between the 
individual and the collective. As a consequence, it raises doubts about the continued 
relevance of the citizen-consumer dichotomy as an effective framework for making 
sense of either general social changes, or, more specifically, the transformation of 
media regulation.  
 
While globalisation theories problematise the continued relevance of the nation-state, 
individualisation problematises that of the collective. Distinguishing between 
neoliberal individualisation (the free-market individual) and their own concept of 
‘institutionalised individualisation’, the Becks share the dominant critique of the 
former that sees it as fostering an ideology of the autonomous and freely choosing 
individual that directly threatens the welfare state. However, they argue that 
‘institutionalised individualisation’ concerns the very process of questioning this 
false image and engaging instead with the incompleteness of the self. Rather than 
free choice, they argue, it is this reflexive questioning of the incompleteness of the 
self that constitutes the ‘core of individual and political freedom in second 
modernity’ (Beck, 1992: xxi). Although in the first modernity, individuals were 
constituted in terms of their roles and relations with specific institutions, such 
institutions are now in crisis, and functions which once took place at the interface 
between the individual and the institution now occur much closer to the former. In 
this second modernity, individuals define themselves so little in terms of their roles 
and links to specific institutions that it makes little sense to talk about subject-
positions (such as ‘citizen’ and ‘consumer’) at all (Lash, 2010: ix-xi).  
 
Beck suggests that diagnosing a shift from citizen to consumer in contemporary 
society is therefore to miss the point, and to fail to diagnose the more fundamental 
and significant process of individualisation that traditional forms of analysis, such as 
Marxism, are incapable of recognising (Beck, 1992: 206). The communitarian 
reaction to individualisation as something that must be overcome, he argues, 
misunderstands the political forces of a newly emerging form of society, in which 
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individualisation is actually a new form of cultural democratisation and social self-
consciousness that relates politics to everyday life (Beck, 1992: 208). Reactivating 
old values in reaction to globalisation and individualisation fails to understand the 
process of ‘reflexive modernisation’ we are living through (Beck, 1992: 209), and in 
employing ‘zombie categories’, such as ‘citizen’ and ‘consumer’, to make sense of 
such processes, social scientists blind themselves to the ‘realities and contradictions 
of globalising and individualising modernities’ (Beck, 1992: xxv). 
 
Contrary to Bauman, who sees this process as responsible for the disintegration of 
citizenship, and who sees little prospect of re-embedding individuals in a republican 
body of citizenship (Bauman, 1999; xviii), Beck develops his own theory of 
cosmopolitan republicanism. Drawing on Kant’s critique of representative 
democracy as despotic, because the privileging of the rule of collective/general will 
over and against that of the individual is a contradiction in terms, Beck proposes that 
the agency of civil society resides as much in the emotional and everyday life of the 
transnational citizen as it does in national parliamentary politics (Beck, 1992: 209). 
In developing his theory, he distinguishes between the early phase of individualism 
that was associated with modernity and the emergence of capitalism, and in which 
the values and ethics that were developed reflected a preoccupation with the self, and 
the individualised subcultures of reflexive modernity which are in the process of 
developing their own altruistic ethics. While the old value system subordinated the 
individual to the collective, he explains, the new ethics being developed will be 
highly individualised yet simultaneously ‘socially sensible’ (Beck, 1992: 211). This 
altruistic individualism is the opposite of a culture in which everyone is for himself, 
which only illustrates part of the picture (Beck, 1992: xxii), for it involves a search to 
combine personal freedom with an engagement with others on a transnational scale; 
an ongoing moral process without fixed values that have been prescribed from above 
(Beck, 1992: 212).  
 
Here, following Norbert Elias (2001), the ‘modern’ formulation of the relationship 
between society ‘and’ or ‘versus’ the individual becomes the acknowledgment of the 
society ‘of’ individuals (Bauman, 1999). In this reformulation, the individual 
becomes the basic unit of social reproduction, disembedded from traditional 
communities and the inherited ethics of fixed groups, and enabled to develop their 
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own altruistic ethics. For Elias, it was incorrect to conceive of the individual as a 
‘we-less I’, or of society as an ‘I-less we’; rather, the ‘we-I balance’ was contingent 
upon the temporal-spatial context, the specifics of the here and the now. In Beck’s 
elaboration of this concept, he suggests that this ‘we-I balance’ is not only mobile, 
but protean, recognising both individuality and sociality as active and unfinished 
processes rather than as inherited states or statuses. It may be more correct, therefore, 
to talk of the socialising individual and the individualising society, to see these as 
being simultaneously enacted through acts of both citizenship and consumption, and 
mutually constitutive of the ‘we-I balance’. Going back further, when Emile 
Durkheim (1933) addressed the problem of resolving social cohesion with 
individualism, he warned against political prescriptions of collective cohesion from 
above, and for the grounding of cooperation in voluntarism from below; setting out 
the state’s duty to enable individuals to celebrate diversity rather than to override 
differentiation (Saunders, 1993: 71). For Durkheim, a society which encouraged self-
interest was just as pathological as one which encouraged self-denial (Saunders, 
1993: 72). So as well as qualifying the assumption that markets and consumerism are 
necessarily negative for the public sphere, one should also consider the ways in 
which the discourse of citizenship and public service may be little more than the 
other side of the same pathological coin, and not automatically conducive to a 
healthy public sphere.   
 
With the decline of national industrialism and the rise of a global cosmopolitan ethic, 
Beck argues, problems of common citizenship can no longer be debated uniquely in 
the ‘modern’ terms of national citizenship prescribed from above. Because the 
‘political constellation of industrial society is becoming unpolitical’, and because 
‘what was unpolitical is becoming political’ (Beck, 1997: 99), critics may have to 
acknowledge that they have been looking for politics in the wrong place (Stevenson, 
2003: 31). Instead, and between individualistic narcissism and communal self-
repression, both of which can be seen from a Foucauldian (or Deleuzian) perspective 
as not so different forms of discipline (or control), researchers should engage not 
only with the disembedding of traditional communal ties and forms of citizenship, 
but also with the re-embedding of new reflexive ones in consumption practices as 
well as more explicit and formal citizenship roles. Controversially, this may mean 
more than just balancing a more critical account of citizenship with a less moralistic 
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engagement with consumption, and suggest even an abandonment of the concepts 
altogether.  
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The mounting evidence of consumption as a political site for collective mobilisation, 
and the recognition of citizenship and consumption as omnipresent and overlapping 
categories, rather than successive ideal-types, are at odds with the conventional 
distinction between individual choice and political organisation, as well as the 
nostalgic narrative of the shift from traditional community and public space to 
neoliberalism and consumerised politics (Trentmann, 2004: 392-399). Closer 
engagement with theories of citizenship and consumption suggests, therefore, that a 
historical analysis of the ways in which citizens and consumers are configured over 
time would produce a theoretically more revealing account of broadcasting 
regulation (and its consequences for the public sphere), than an approach which 
simplistically equates the public sphere with vague notions of citizenship and PSB, 
and distinguishes it from equally vague notions of consumption, the market and 
neoliberalism.  
 
The conceptual distinction between the market and individual self-interest, on the 
one hand, and the welfare state and collective altruism, on the other hand, may not be 
as clear-cut as it commonsensically appears. On a theoretical level, this distinction 
may actually undermine self-proclaimed attempts at critique and misunderstand the 
very processes being targeted. More worryingly, on a practical level, it may well be 
that this dualism could even encourage attacks on the very ‘conditions which enable 
social bonds to form while extending the conditions which encourage greater 
fragmentation’ (Saunders, 1993: 85). For the purposes of both social cohesion and 
the public sphere, therefore, it may not necessarily be to the obviously public rather 
than the suspiciously private realm that we should turn for answers.   
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Considering the significance of citizenship and consumption to arguments about the 
history of broadcasting policy, it seems surprising that so little attention has been 
paid to their respective literatures. While these suggest that more detail is needed to 
elaborate the kinds of citizenship that have been represented in policy documents, 
and to distinguish between these and the more active ideal of citizenship 
participation that is evoked by the public sphere concept, they also suggest that more 
detail is needed to elaborate the varying kinds of consumption that have also been 
represented. However, the tendency in the broadcasting literature to expose as 
ideological manipulation any attempt in such documents to renegotiate these subject-
positions, while probably not incorrect, seems to cut short such elaboration. While 
care must be taken to avoid descending into moral relativism, the tendency to dress 
moralism in the clothing of critique must also be circumvented, so that the positive 
and negative aspects of both citizenship and consumption may be acknowledged and 
properly critiqued.  
 
More fundamentally, an engagement with the concept of individualisation suggests 
that neither the citizen nor the consumer subject positions, however qualified (even 
as cultural citizenship and critical consumption), are particularly helpful to develop 
or even recognise newly emerging forms of politics. While it may be problematic to 
label these as citizenship, and while labelling them as a form of consumption risks 
depoliticising them, the problem with diagnosing them rests more with the ‘hang up’ 
of certain scholars who feel the need to differentiate between good citizenship and 
bad consumption. It is not so much the terms themselves that are unhelpful, but 
rather the binary opposition that has been constructed between them. An account of 
citizenship and consumption in broadcasting regulation that acknowledges their 
respective problems and political potentialities, by contrast, would shift debate away 
from a moralistic versus economistic/relativist debate. Far from sacrificing critique, 
furthermore, this could actually deepen critique.  
 
While the Foucauldian perspective that informs much of the respective literatures on 
citizenship and consumption allows us to move away from moral presumptions and 
simplistic binaries, efforts to recognise politics beyond such terms, whether by 
problematizing citizenship or consumption, or by dispensing with both terms 
completely, offer a way to reconceptualise the public sphere. While the Habermasian 
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literature continues to contend with balancing classical liberal and republican thought 
and force their application upon an ever-changing and increasingly ill-fitting 
transnational and social context, cosmopolitan literature engages in dialogue between 
neoliberal and neorepublican debates in an effort to more fully recognise such 
changes for what they actually are.  
 
As we shall see in the next chapter, neoliberalism itself is a more complex concept 
than moralistic ‘critiques’ suggest, and a burgeoning critical sociology of 
neoliberalism, which engages directly with the literature of the neoliberal economists 
themselves as well as with the contradictory aspects of so-called neoliberalisation, 
provides a clearer account of how better to recognise, understand and critique 
neoliberalism. It turns attention, for example, to the ways in which citizenship and 
consumption have been reconfigured throughout the history of liberalism, and to the 
contradictory ways in which they are currently configured in neoliberal thought and 
practice. Such a move has consequences for how we understand contemporary social 
change, and for how we conceptualise the relationships between public and private 
realms and between citizenship and consumption. It also has consequences for the 
elaboration of a contemporary public sphere, as well as for the approach to 
broadcasting regulation that addresses change in terms of ideology rather than 
governmentality.  
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Part Seven: Neoliberalism – Ideological and 
Governmental Approaches 
 
 
The past 20 years have witnessed an explosion of intellectual interest in 
neoliberalism. Whereas there had been fewer than 5 scholarly references to 
‘neoliberalism’ per year throughout the 1980s, there were over a 100 per year by the 
end of the 1990s, and over 600 per year by the end of the last decade (Web of 
Science, in Peck, 2013b). Such interest seems unlikely to subside in the foreseeable 
future. Prompted by the dramatic onset of the global financial crisis (2008-ongoing), 
which was purportedly the result of neoliberal logic, and the subsequent 
intensification of the familiar policies of ‘regulatory restraint, privatisation, rolling 
tax cuts, and public-sector austerity’ through an even more relentless focus on 
‘growth restoration, deficit reduction and budgetary restraint’ (Peck, 2013a: 3-5), 
there has also recently been an abundance of public debate on the efficacy, validity 
and legitimacy of neoliberal policies. Despite (or perhaps because of) such 
promiscuity, however, the term itself has been prone to inflation (Peck, 2013a: 17), 
and for some it has become an ‘overblown’ concept (Collier, 2012) that tends to be 
applied (in an invariably disapproving way) to pretty much anything today (Allison 
& Piot, 2011: 5).  
 
While its meaning, its history and even its existence continues to be debated in 
disciplines such as geography, urban studies and sociology, the richness of the 
theoretical and methodological debate surrounding neoliberalism is conspicuously 
absent from the literature on broadcasting regulation, in which little critical 
engagement is made with the term. Rather, in presenting it simply as the antonym of 
PSB and as the cause of perceived shifts from citizen to consumer in regulatory 
discourse, it is persistently evoked, implicitly or explicitly, as a monolithic and 
external force whose features are either taken for granted or predictably described 
(Collier, 2012).  
 
In contrast, recent contributions towards a critical sociology of neoliberalism (Gane, 
forthcoming) deal not only with the contradictory ways in which these elements 
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combine with other policies, and the contextual differences in their application from 
one country to another, but with the history of liberal and neoliberal thought, and an 
engagement with the political-economic debates within liberalism and neoliberalism. 
This literature suggests a longer and more detailed history than tends to be assumed, 
and provides a corrective to accounts of neoliberalism framed in terms of laisser-
faire or individualisation. It also turns our attention to a more nuanced appreciation 
of the changing role of both the state and the market. 
 
This chapter begins with a critical account of the ideological approach to 
neoliberalism that informs scholarship on broadcasting regulation, before contrasting 
it with the governmental approach that has been relatively ignored. It then offers an 
up-to-date account of theoretical and methodological debates between proponents of 
each perspective, and of recent historical accounts of neoliberalism that offer timely 
correctives to contemporary misconceptions in both camps. Finally, the possibility of 
establishing dialogue between these approaches through the development of a 
processual account of neoliberalism will be critically explored, and its application to 
critical scholarship on broadcasting regulation will be proposed.  
 
 
 
 
7.1 IDEOLOGY, HEGEMONY AND THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC CRITIQUE OF 
NEOLIBERALISM 
 
[N]eoliberal doctrine is best understood as an ideology—a 
doctrine which provides only a partial representation of the 
world and whose misrepresentations mask material processes 
which benefit dominant class interests. When read as an 
ideology, a clearer picture can be formed of the relationships 
between neoliberal doctrine and the practices which have 
generally been labelled ‘neoliberal’.  
(Cahill, 2012: 177) 
 
 
[I]s neo-liberalism hegemonic? Hegemony is a tricky concept 
and provokes muddled thinking. No project achieves a 
position of permanent ‘hegemony’. It is a process, not a state 
of being. No victories are final. Hegemony has constantly to 
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be ‘worked on’, maintained, renewed and revised…[I]n 
ambition, depth, degree of break with the past, variety of sites 
being colonised, impact on common sense and everyday 
behaviour, restructuring of the social architecture, neo-
liberalism does constitute a hegemonic project.  
(Hall, 2011: 727–728) 
 
 
Although occurrences of ‘neoliberalism’ abound in broadcasting scholarship (and 
further afield), they rarely explain what is meant by the term, assuming instead a 
commonsensically shared understanding of the public policies it evokes. When 
greater specification is provided, neoliberalism’s essential features are ‘variously 
described, but always include’ (Ferguson, 2009: 170): consumer choice (Harvey, 
2007 :42); private ownership and property rights, free trade, free markets, 
privatisation, and state withdrawal from social provision (Harvey, 2007: 2); 
deregulation, the restriction of state intervention, opposition to collectivism, 
emphasis on individual responsibility and a belief that economic growth leads to 
development (Hilgers, 2011: 352); valorisation of private enterprise over the state, 
tariff elimination, currency deregulation and enterprise models that run the state like 
a business (Peck, 2008); a logic of ‘DIP (deregulation, individualisation, 
privatisation)’ (Bauman & Rovirosa-Madrazo, 2010: 52); as well as an emphasis on 
the entrepreneurial self; and the social scientist’s particular bugbear regarding 
Thatcher’s claim that there is ‘no such thing as society’ (Mirowski, 2013). Emphasis 
is also placed on the encroachment of market relations into domains previously 
considered exempt, and on the opportunities such encroachment provides for figures, 
such as Rupert Murdoch, to not only extend and diversify their commercial media 
empires, but even to ultimately influence the political process (Harvey, 2007: 34). 
More broadly, neoliberalism is seen as the reinvention of the classical liberal 
tradition, expanded to encompass the whole of human existence, whereby the market 
stands as the ultimate arbiter of truth, and where freedom is recoded to mean 
anything the market allows (Mirowski, 2013). Other uses of ‘neoliberalism’ see it as 
shorthand for a new era of capitalism in more speculative times, or as an abstract and 
external causal force, often little more than a ‘sloppy synonym’ for capitalism or the 
world economy and its inequalities (Ferguson, 2009: 171).  
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Announcements of neoliberal trends in broadcasting regulation tend to refer 
understandably to David Harvey’s seminal contribution (2007), and to Stuart Hall’s 
successive analyses of UK neoliberalisation from Thatcher, through Blair, to 
Cameron (1988, 2003, 2011). Unfortunately, such announcements demonstrate little 
critical engagement with Harvey’s and Hall’s approach, and limited awareness of the 
wider array of perspectives on neoliberalism.  
 
Both Hall and Harvey portray neoliberalism as an ideological and hegemonic project 
(Hall, 2011: 728; Harvey, 2007: 3) to disembed capital from the constraints of 
Keynesian interventionism (Harvey, 2007: 11), and to oversee ‘the shift of power 
and wealth back to the already rich and powerful’ (Hall, 2011: 721; Harvey, 2007: 
42). Hall’s neo-Gramscian account highlights Thatcherism’s contradictory strategy 
of balancing ideological anti-statism with state-centrist interventions, thus providing 
an admirably nuanced account of hegemony that refuses to reduce Thatcherism to a 
simple phenomenon of ideological class interests. However, it makes the ideological 
impulse of Thatcherism of ‘considerable importance’ (Barry et al, 1996: 11), while 
refusing to acknowledge neoliberalism itself as anything other than an ideological 
project. As for Harvey, although he distinguishes between neoliberalism as a utopian 
project to re-organise capitalism, and neoliberalism as a political project to restore 
power to capitalist elites in the West (or to create it in Russia and China), he argues 
that fundamental contradictions between the two projects result, in practice, in the 
discarding of principles in favour of the restoration or creation of power (Harvey, 
2007: 19-21), and in the strategic use of utopian theories as little more than 
theoretical justification for political goals (Harvey, 2007: 19). In this sense, 
neoliberalism refers to a ‘set of highly interested public policies’ that, in order to 
enrich holders of capital, have dismantled public services and deteriorated the quality 
of life for the poor and working classes, thereby increasing inequality and insecurity 
(Ferguson, 2009: 170). There are, however, other reasons for divergences between 
policies and doctrine that should also be noted, such as the inherent and inevitable 
‘contingencies of democratic politics’ (Ferguson, 2009: 170-171), which such an 
ideological approach neglects to consider; and Ferguson’s work on the ambivalent 
impacts of neoliberalism in Africa will be discussed later in this chapter.  
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Although some have recently acknowledged critiques of the term ‘neoliberalism’ – 
for instance, its ‘totalizing reach, eliding of other histories, and application to almost 
everything today’ (Allison & Piot, 2011: 5) – there remains an attachment to it as an 
umbrella term for otherwise complex processes. Despite acknowledging the term’s 
ubiquity, reductiveness and lack of geo-historical specificity, for instance, Hall 
nevertheless insists upon the political necessity of ‘naming neoliberalism’ to give 
focus to its resistance, arguing that it has enough common features to warrant at least 
a provisional conceptual identity (Hall, 2011: 706).  
 
Terms such as ‘Thatcherism’ and ‘neoliberalism’ are effective as mobilising slogans 
and at identifying, personalising and politicising particular root causes of social 
problems (and suggesting, by extension, specific remedies for them). Using such 
words to bring together multiple meanings also offers occasions for reflection upon 
the ways in which they may be related. Confusion can arise, however, from there 
being ‘so many distinct referents for the same widely used term’, leading to shallow 
analyses (that don’t really say much) as well as ineffectual politics (that is reduced to 
merely denouncing neoliberalism) (Ferguson, 2009: 171). ‘Naming’ either 
Thatcherism or neoliberalism, however nuanced the account of their hegemonic 
spread, risks ignoring the ways in which the process of neoliberalisation ‘never 
secures a monopoly’, existing instead always ‘amongst its others, usually 
antagonistically’ (Peck, 2013a: 8). (In Thatcher’s case, neoliberalism was mixed with 
both traditional British Toryism and ‘little-Englander anti-Europeanism’; the New 
Labour governments of Blair and Brown combined neoliberalism and a move away 
from the labour movement with elements from both social democracy and Christian 
socialism; in the contemporary era of the financial crisis, Cameron’s coalition 
government appears to fuse Blairism and Thatcherism in yet more novel ways.) Such 
naming of cause and remedy also ignores anomalies that contradict claims of 
hegemonic spread, such as the expansion of state intervention in certain areas that 
has accompanied its reduction in others; the stability of the aggregate size of the state 
since the 1970s despite ‘neoliberal’ attempts to reduce it; and continuities in welfare 
state provision, albeit in an eroded and restructured guise; as well as the ways in 
which neoliberalism itself shape-shifts over time (Cahill, 2012; Peck, 2013a: 8). 
Although ‘analytically inconvenient’ (Peck, 2013a: 8), the recognition of 
neoliberalisation as an incomplete process and of neoliberalism’s contradictory 
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cohabitation with other projects demands more nuance and precision in critical 
accounts of policy and social change (Peck, 2013a: 9). Hall’s own successive 
analyses of cumulative neoliberalisation in the UK suggest that even when 
neoliberalism is the dominant feature of public policy it remains prone to mutation 
(Peck, 2013a: 20). As such, it may be more perspicacious to see actually existing 
‘neoliberalisms’ as lived and reflexive realities in which contradictions and 
counterarguments abound (Goldstein, 2012: 305; Peck, 2013a: 20), rather than as 
local manifestations of global ideas or norms.  
 
Commandeering this umbrella term for the purposes of political critique has, 
however, meant that heretofore it has been little more than a convenient bogeyman 
for commentators on the disempowerment of politics by economics, particularly in 
the context of market attacks on the welfare state (Gane, 2012: 613), and for critics 
of the colonisation of the public sphere by private processes, particularly in the 
context of the privatisation of public services, and the deregulation of PSB. In its 
disdain for such processes, the critical deployment of the term ‘neoliberal’ follows 
the tradition set by earlier critics of privatisation and deregulation in Thatcher’s 
Britain, such as Garnham and Murdock, who used the term ‘market’ in much the 
same way to critique changes to broadcasting policy. But when so much of the 
literature reaches inevitably the same conclusion, some readers may be left 
wondering, whether or not they agree with the conclusion, what the point is of 
reading yet another analysis diagnosing yet another case of viral neoliberalism 
(Ferguson, 2009: 166). 
 
As politically important as such a strategy may be, it is perhaps a theoretical and 
methodological ‘mistake to see neoliberalism as simply a negative political response 
to the welfarism or corporatism of previous decades’, and too ‘reductive, reactive 
and univocal’ to interpret the variety of phenomena embraced by Thatcherism as a 
fiscal retreat by the state (Barry et al, 1996: 11). While the aims and consequences of 
neoliberalism that Hall and Harvey diagnose are certainly discernible, it seems 
misleading to associate them with neoliberalism while selectively ignoring other 
contemporary trends and other facets of neoliberal thought (Gane, 2012: 613). It also 
avoids engagement with theoretical debates on the role of the state and of the market 
within liberalism and neoliberalism, as well as contextual differences between 
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examples of neoliberalisation in action, and consequently the relation between the 
theory and practice of neoliberalism. In privileging certain aspects of these complex 
processes, such as privatisation and the shift from citizen to consumer, such 
approaches also continue to ignore ‘novel subjectivities and sovereignties that are 
emerging under its sign’, as the derisive treatment of Ofcom’s citizen-consumer 
demonstrates, as well as its ‘less-dominant features and less-known origins’ (Allison 
& Piot, 2011: 5), such as the ordoliberal aim to bridge the gap between unfettered 
capitalism and state control (Foucault, 2010; Peck, 2010: 60), the Washington 
Consensus’s lack of consensus on the issue of state provision of education and 
healthcare (Collier, 2012: 192), and the neoliberal critique of the influence of private 
interests in determining the rationale behind state monopoly in broadcasting (Coase, 
1947). 
 
While more extreme terms, such as ‘market fundamentalism’ and ‘libertarianism’, 
severely misrepresent the movement (Mirowski, 2013), it is often difficult to see how 
neoliberalism is meant to differ from liberalism. Arguments for privatising PSB may 
represent a neoliberal extension of the market into a domain that had previously been 
exempt, but they also echo (albeit often strategically) liberal arguments for a free 
press. To the extent that it is possible to discern in the critical literature a clear 
difference between earlier and contemporary incarnations of liberalism, it is that 
neoliberalism represents an extreme and limitless version of liberalism. As previous 
chapters on the public sphere and the public-private dichotomy have shown, 
however, critics of liberalism have for 150 years been criticising many of the 
‘essential features’ often attributed to neoliberalism. Consequently, while critics of 
liberalism have often balanced denouncement with praise, picking the good elements 
of liberal thought and practice from the bad to develop, for example, their concept of 
the public sphere (Habermas, 1989), critics of neoliberalism tend to see little merit in 
what is invariably nothing more than an ideology whose hegemony is to be thwarted 
at all costs. 
 
Further, while much of the critical literature on neoliberalism predictably concludes 
that it is bad for citizenship, a distinction should be made between the critique of 
neoliberalism's effect on social citizenship and the poor, on the one hand, and its 
negative effect on political citizenship and the public sphere, on the other. As earlier 
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references to Habermas and Mouffe have demonstrated, whether one argues that 
social rights and political participation are complementary or contradictory, it is at 
least problematic to conceptually conflate these two types of citizenship. 
Consequently, the diagnosis of neoliberalism’s negative effect on the poor does not 
automatically mean that it is detrimental to the public sphere, or vice versa. 
 
This ‘critical’ tendency to use ‘neoliberalism’ a little too loosely and freely, seeing it 
as a Leviathan (Collier, 2012) that immerses itself everywhere, and denouncing it 
wholesale without really engaging it as an object of study in its own right, has been 
located within a broader weakness of the Left to reduce politics to negation and 
resistance, to the extent that it is often ‘anti-everything’ but rarely ‘pro-something’ 
(Ferguson, 2009: 167). There are theoretical and methodological weaknesses to a 
structural and moralistic approach that ignores debates and developments beyond 
broadcasting studies; a self-defeating consequence of which may be, this thesis 
contends, to also undermine the political efficacy of such critique.  
 
In contrast, others have warned against fetishising neoliberalism as an ideology, 
representing it as a caricature of liberalism (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009: 433), or 
reducing it to (neoclassical) economics (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009: 421), when it 
should instead be seen as a multidisciplinary concern with theories and practices of 
the state (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009: 427) and market.  
 
 
 
 
7.2 GOVERNMENTALITY AND THE GENEALOGY OF NEOLIBERALISM 
 
The Anglo School of Governmentality 
 
Motivated by dissatisfaction with the broadly Marxist reduction of capitalism to 
economic relations, of ideology to false ideas that serve ruling class interests, and of 
power to a falsifier and suppressor of ‘true’ human essence (Miller & Rose, 2008: 2-
4), a contrasting sociology of neoliberalism developed throughout the 1990s and 
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2000s under the banner of ‘governmentality studies’. The work of the ‘Anglo-
Foucauldians’ (Barry et al, 1996; Rose, 1999; Miller & Rose, 2008) on the 
Thatcherite and Reaganite neoliberal assaults on the welfare state focused instead on 
the governmental rationalities that emerged during the period. 
 
Predominantly an ‘Anglo School of Governmentality’ building on the work of 
Nikolas Rose and colleagues, it was based in large part on what were at the time only 
the scattered availability (occasional interviews and partial notes from his then 
unpublished lectures of the late-1970s) of Foucault’s elaborations on the subject of 
governmentality (Barry et al, 1996: 7). Of particular importance was Foucault’s 
lecture on ‘governmentality’ (1st February 1978), subsequently published in English 
in The Foucault Effect (Burchell, Gordon & Miller, 1991) and eventually in its 
proper context as the fourth lecture in Security, Territory, Population (2009). In this 
lecture, Foucault traced back to the 16
th
 Century the emergence of the idea of 
‘government as a general problem’, the associated problematisations of concepts 
such as state, economy and society, and an increasing concern with statistics and 
calculation as a means of governing the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault, 1991; Rose, 
2000: 315). Arguing that the ‘state’ is a relatively abstract and unimportant concept, 
he shifted attention instead to the ways in which ‘government’, as both internal and 
external to the ‘state’, makes possible the redefinition of what is within and outside 
of the competence of the state; in other words, what is public and what is private 
(Foucault, 1991: 103). Seeking to understand, without recourse to ideology (Miller & 
Rose, 2008: 4), intervention into the lives of individuals in ‘liberal’ societies, which 
otherwise proclaimed the limits of the state and the privacy of the individual (Miller 
& Rose, 2008: 1), the Anglo School found in Foucault’s approach a more adequate 
way of capturing the productive, individualising aspects of power that actually make 
possible a series of positive and tactical interventions, as well as those negative 
aspects captured by the ideological approach.  
 
Arguing that Hall’s ideological critique of Thatcherism, in particular, missed the 
ethical and technical character of neoliberalism, and the ways in which neoliberalism 
constructively aligns diverse interests (Barry et al, 1996: 11), the governmentalists 
shifted theoretical attention away from political philosophy, and towards 
governmental rationality and the close analysis of mundane techniques and 
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technologies. Although the ethos of public service and the public provision of social 
welfare no longer play a pivotal role in the neoliberal way of governing social life 
(Miller & Rose, 2008: 82), governmental analyses suggested that neoliberalism does 
not necessarily preclude their continued existence in some form. Rather than a 
rejection of actual failures of central planning, therefore, the neoliberal critique of the 
welfare state is better appreciated as a critique of the ideals of knowledge and power 
that such rationalities embody (Miller & Rose, 2008: 81). Such an argument returns 
us to the debate (discussed in 6.1) over the manner of delivery and mode of provision 
of services such as broadcasting, and suggests that the distinction between public 
service and market approaches to broadcasting should be debated less in terms of 
actualities, and still less in terms of the public's perception of institutional 
effectiveness, and more in terms of these ideals of knowledge and power embodied 
by the two approaches. 
 
Like Hall, Garnham and Murdock, Rose and others were also writing at a time when 
the state was seeking to withdraw from many spheres of life, and when notions of 
choice, the customer and the entrepreneurial self were in ascendance (Miller & Rose, 
2008: 1). In contrast to the appropriation of Gramsci, however, their embrace of 
Foucault’s work into British debates demonstrated how, through scholarly tracing of 
dispersed events, ‘novel ways of thinking, doing and relating to oneself’ could be 
shown to emerge at particular historical moments, and to be linked in variously 
constitutive ways with new forms of politics and production, without need of 
reference to ideology (Miller & Rose, 2008: 4). In dispensing with pre-given notions 
of class interests, they moved away from questions of ‘why’ to questions of ‘how’, 
multiplying the ‘weight of causality’ to identify the multiple processes by which 
practices and roles are constituted (Miller & Rose, 2008: 6). Rather than presuming a 
universal form of the human subject and tracing the historical effects of practices on 
certain subjectivities, they took such presuppositions themselves as their object of 
study, investigating how subjectivities, such as the citizen or the consumer, had been 
problematised over time (Miller & Rose, 2008: 7). Rather than taking the citizen as 
an ahistorical basis from which to critique neoliberal and consumerist practices, 
therefore, the governmental approach (as developed by the Anglo School) sees both 
the citizen and consumer conceptions of human subjects as equally the results of 
practices of subjectification (Miller & Rose, 2008: 8). And rather than taking 
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discursive tensions as signs of ideological conflict and critiquing sham forms of 
freedom, such an approach, in tracing the ‘surfaces of emergence’ of problems of 
difference, also points to ways in which power in liberal societies is built on 
regulated premises of freedom (Miller and Rose, 2008: 9). Such forms of power are 
subsequently recognised as operating ‘beyond the state’ and upon both individuals 
and collectivities (Miller & Rose, 2008: 10), affecting the extent to which people can 
see themselves as either citizens or consumers. 
 
Rather than developing a general theory of governmentality, however, Miller and 
Rose took a looser approach to reflecting upon what it means to govern the ‘conduct 
of conduct’. They argued that attempts to govern were responses to a process of 
problematisation, in which ‘problems’ were constructed and made visible. In this 
process of problematisation, contrasting perspectives are addressed and brought into 
alignment by the identification of problems in multiple locales; common features 
among these problems are then invoked and proposed as the basis for a particular 
way of explaining them (Miller & Rose, 2008: 14). In direct contrast with the 
ideological approach, their emphasis was on diverse rationalities rather than a unique 
and homogenous rationality, and upon multiple histories and contingency rather than 
a continuous and linear narrative (Miller & Rose, 2008: 16). They also teased aPart 
Three specific aspects of governmentality, distinguishing between these multiple 
rationalities on the one hand, and equally diverse technologies on the other, while 
discerning ‘family resemblances’ between them, so as to emphasise the link between 
ways of understanding and of acting upon perceived problems (Miller & Rose, 2008: 
15-17).  
 
In Foucault’s work, the present is more of ‘an array of questions’ than an epoch, the 
ostensible coherence of which is something to be acted upon by historical 
investigation, to be cut up and resewn out of its heterogeneous elements, each of 
which will have their own conditions of possibility. To fragment the present is to be 
perspectivist rather than relativist, to destabilise traditional (ideological) approaches 
rather than critique or dismiss them, highlighting the ‘historically sedimented 
underpinnings of particular problematisations’ rather than assuming a grand 
historical process or singular underlying cause (Barry et al, 1996: 5). Following 
Foucault’s lead, therefore, they treated liberalism less (or not only) as an epoch or a 
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political philosophy of rights and liberties, and more (or also) as an ethos or a 
rationality of how to govern, distinguishing between classical, social and advanced 
variants of this ethos, which all nevertheless undermine the pertinence of simplistic 
public-private and citizen-consumer distinctions.  
 
Classical liberalism’s supposed separation of state and civil society, and the state’s 
self-limitation in terms of what it cannot explicitly touch – private life, the market, 
civil society etc. – is subsequently interpreted as more specifically the recognition 
that society cannot be penetrated through traditional forms of sovereignty or 
discipline, but rather through new forms of implicit manipulation that recognise its 
own laws and independent reality. At the same time as acknowledging the need to 
preserve the autonomy of society from state intervention, for example, liberal 
governmentality also aims to ensure the existence of political spaces and the 
possibility of a public sphere for critical reflection upon the state (Barry et al, 1996: 
10). The emergence of the public-private distinction and the domain of ‘society’, 
therefore, is understood as a consequence of a ‘particular problematisation of 
government’, rather than as a ‘withdrawal of government’ (Barry et al, 1996: 9).  
 
In the 19
th
 and 20
th
 Centuries, the rise of ‘social government’ and a state that more 
explicitly intervened in society developed in response to both unbridled market 
individualism and the rise of communism, transforming private citizens into social 
citizens with social rights, and producing the social welfare state. Here, the state’s 
new role as guarantor of individual welfare entailed a breach of the public-private 
barrier, and required strategies of intervention that wouldn’t violate the individual’s 
private freedom; though, as Habermas pointed out, they nevertheless undermined the 
extent to which the public sphere could effectively hold government to account.  
 
In a third ‘advanced’ phase of liberal government, which, Miller and Rose argue, 
took shape in the last three decades of the 20
th
 Century (having been ‘pre-figured’ by 
the post-war ‘neoliberal’ thinkers), rationalities and technologies of the market have 
been extended through new forms of regulation to previously exempt zones. This has 
entailed, as yet another response to perceived problems of government, the 
reconstruction of subjects as autonomous and responsible individuals, but not 
necessarily or simply a shift from citizen to consumer (Barry et al, 1996: 8; Miller & 
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Rose, 2008: 17-18). Foucauldian scholarship distinguishes advanced from classical 
liberalism, therefore, by the relatively more active role it envisages for government 
in setting the conditions for markets and market-like environments (Collier, 2012: 
190; Hilgers, 2012), by governments’ attempts to govern through the calculative 
choice of autonomous individuals, and by the particularly important relationship of 
economistic expertise to government (Collier, 2012: 190; Rose et al, 2006).  
 
Highlighting the deployment of market mechanisms and enterprise models in 
government, the restructuring of the state, and novel modes of government and 
subjectification, Rose and others clearly distinguish neoliberalism from liberalism. 
For Rose, liberalism involved the search for a balance between two distinct but 
related spheres (state and market, or public and private). In contrast, neoliberalism 
involves the application of governmental mechanisms developed in the private 
sphere to the work of the state, either outsourcing state functions to private providers 
or running the state like a business. Rather than shifting the line between public and 
private, the line is blurred by neoliberalism. Concomitantly, ‘active’ and 
‘responsible’ citizens and communities, which rationally make choices and assess 
risks, are constructed as miniature firms or micro-enterprises that do not depend on 
state intervention (Ferguson, 2009: 172).  
 
From this perspective, it is important to stress not only that such subjects could be 
conceived of as both citizens and consumers, but also that the previous incarnation of 
social citizens was as much a form of governmental subjection as the advanced 
liberal guise, both of which contain elements that may enable, as much as undermine, 
the public sphere. Rather than governing private individuals (as in classical 
liberalism) or members of society (as in social liberalism), advanced liberalism 
governs through the regulated (and accountable) freedom (and choices) of 
autonomous (and plural) individuals, conceived as members of ‘communities’ of 
allegiance, whether as citizens or consumers (Miller and Rose, 2008: 25). The 
neoliberal political subject is no longer a social citizen whose powers and obligations 
derive from membership of a collective body, and whose citizenship is manifested in 
‘receipts of public largesse’. Rather, the subject is reconceived as ‘an individual 
whose citizenship is active’, in the sense that their energetic pursuit and calculation 
of personal happiness enables their citizenship (Miller & Rose, 2008: 82).  
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As Miller and Rose propose, if we are to understand the varied and changing ways in 
which subjects are governed, it is essential to move beyond an unquestioning 
acceptance of the public-private and citizen-consumer divide, and to qualify claims 
about the colonisation of the public or private sphere, or the extent to which the 
boundary between them has been inappropriately transgressed. Rather, the ways in 
which the very ideas of public and private, and citizen and consumer, have been 
constructed concomitantly needs to be vigorously examined (Miller & Rose, 2008: 
19). This is achieved genealogically by an emphasis on historical and discursive 
research into the ways in which these dichotomies have been negotiated and 
‘rendered amenable to calculation’ over time (Miller & Rose, 2008: 21; Rose, 1987), 
as well as by supplementing the meta-level research, implicit in the ideological focus 
of political-economic approaches, with a lower-level focus on family resemblances 
between disparate problematisations (Miller & Rose, 2008: 20); methodological 
questions to which this thesis will turn in Part Eight.   
 
Much of the early governmental approach and the literature subsequently inspired by 
it have, however, been accused of relativism, or at least of lacking any specificity in 
their understanding of neoliberalism (Wacquant, 2012), while Rose has more 
particularly been criticised for his preference for the relatively nebulous ‘advanced 
liberalism’, over-privileging its incoherence as a diverse and contingent assemblage 
of techniques and rationalities, and confining ‘neoliberalism’ itself to a contingent 
feature of particular political formations, such as Reaganism and Thatcherism (Dean, 
2012). However, the recent publication in French and then in English of Foucault’s 
lectures on liberal and neoliberal governmentality (Foucault, 2009; 2010) has offered 
new occasions for an engagement with Foucault’s concepts, and re-invigorated the 
debate between ideological and governmental approaches to neoliberalism.  
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Foucault’s Genealogy of Neoliberalism 
 
Neo-liberalism is not Adam Smith; neo-liberalism is not 
market society; neo-liberalism is not the Gulag on the 
insidious scale of capitalism. 
(Foucault, 2010: 131) 
 
Because the governmentality lecture on which much of the early literature was based 
was more an ‘overture of where [Foucault’s] researches were going…than a 
culmination of analyses already undertaken’ (Elden, 2007: 29), however, both 
sympathetic and critical accounts have much to learn from the fuller ‘history of 
[liberal and neoliberal] governmentality’ offered by the publication of the two lecture 
series as a whole (Elden, 2007: 30). While governmental accounts of neoliberalism 
throughout the 1990s and much of the 2000s were reliant on the Anglo School’s 
interpretations of Foucault’s reflections on governmentality and neo/liberalism, the 
subsequent publication in full and translation into English of Foucault’s lectures of 
1978-1980 on the history of liberalism (2009) and neoliberalism (2010) have 
provided scholars with the opportunity to engage more directly with Foucault’s 
genealogy in full.  
 
Shifting his concern from discipline to security, or the government of a population, 
Foucault elaborates how security seeks to regulate as little as possible, ‘incorporating 
and distributing’ in order to enable, whereas discipline attempts to regulate 
everything, ‘isolating and segmenting’ in order to disable (Elden, 2007: 30). 
Conceiving of a governmental triangle of sovereignty-discipline-government, where 
each is a facet of the whole, rather than a linear narrative, he proposes that different 
places and times may be closer to one node or another (Elden, 2007: 30). His object 
of analysis is the series of mechanisms of security-population-government, the 
‘opening of the field that is called politics’, and the ‘emergence of population as a 
correlative of power and as an object of knowledge’, in which the ‘figure of 
population’ is man in a non-gendered, plural sense; whether as ‘living being, 
working individual or speaking subject’ (Elden, 2007: 31), or, one might add, citizen 
or consumer.  
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What Foucault calls biopolitics is the means by which measuring and statistical 
techniques are applied to the group of living beings understood as a population in 
order to govern them; he then ties these apparatuses to the political rationality of 
liberalism (Elden, 2007: 32). Liberal governmentality thus shifts attention away from 
territory and on to population, developing governmental practices that aim to make 
population as amenable as possible to calculative strategies (Elden, 2007: 32). In 
neoliberalism, however, biopolitics is no longer seen as a government logic at all, but 
as a problem space in which recombinatorial processes redeploy techniques and 
technologies (Collier, 2009: 93). Indeed, governmentality was only one of many 
concepts deployed by Foucault in his lectures on political government, and ‘in many 
ways peripheral’ to his account of neoliberalism (Collier, 2009; Collier, 2012: 193). 
In Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault’s focus was not so much on a stable ‘rationality’ or 
particular set of techniques, as an open-ended exploratory investigation into the ways 
in which certain thinkers modified liberal principles in response to various 
circumstances (Collier, 2012: 193).  
 
Given on the cusp of the Reagan-Thatcher era, the lectures are not only remarkably 
prescient; they offer a view of neoliberalism that is untainted by associations with the 
divisive policies carried out throughout the 1980s. They also offer a view of 
neoliberalism that is jarringly at odds with ideological accounts, from a perspective 
that is explicitly critical of the failure of the Left to develop its own autonomous 
governmentality to critique that of neo/liberalism (and which recalls the debate over 
critique and moralism outlined at the end of Part Six of this thesis). Most 
importantly, the lectures emphasise not only the differences between neoliberalism 
and classical liberalism, but between different periods and schools of neoliberal 
thought itself.  
 
By approaching neoliberalism as a form of governmental rationality, Foucault 
reveals aspects of emerging neoliberalism that political-economic accounts of 
neoliberal ideology fail to appreciate. His historical approach to neoliberalism sees it 
as linked ‘less to economic dogmas and class projects than to specific mechanisms of 
governments, and recognisable modes of creating subjects’ (Ferguson, 2009: 171). 
Having already demonstrated the emergence of the state in Society Must Be 
Defended (Foucault, 2003), Foucault moves away from state-based theories 
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altogether and treats the idea of state itself as an object of study, turning his attention 
to the Freiberg School’s ordoliberal construction of the state as defined by the market 
in post-war Germany (Jessop, 2007: 36), before moving on to analyse the more 
familiar neoliberalism of the Chicago School. In preferring general problematisation 
to detailed critique, his distancing from Marxist theory is wide-ranging and 
sweeping, (Fontana & Bernati in Jessop, 2007), but ranges from vulgar to academic 
Marxism, obsessions with class and labour rather than detailed studies of subjects 
and modalities of class struggle, and fetishisations of ideology and dialectics. He 
nevertheless maintains an ‘uninterrupted dialogue’ with Marx (Fontana & Bernati in 
Jessop, 2007) that suggests more of a ‘tactical alliance’ with Marxism, whereby his 
opposition to Marxist theory corresponds with his appropriation of Marx’s historical 
analyses and political-economic concepts (Balibar in Jessop, 2007: 35). 
 
However, he dismisses, in particular, the political-economic critique of neoliberalism 
that normatively equates it with an extreme form of classical liberalism, arguing that 
critical accounts of consumption, consumer society and mass society ‘have no value’ 
in understanding consumption in neoliberal thought (Foucault, 2010: 226). For, 
although neoliberalism relies on the figure of homo oeconomicus, it is transformed 
from liberalism’s equal partner (whether as consumer or producer) of natural 
exchange, into economic man as an active agent, who is at once consumer, 
entrepreneur, capital and producer of himself (Foucault, 2010: 225-226). It is not, 
however, a supermarket society, but an enterprise society, in which homo 
oeconomicus is more an active entrepreneur and producer than merely a consumer 
(Foucault, 2010: 147). Neoliberalism aims to multiply the enterprise form to the 
extent that the market, competition and enterprise become the formative power of 
society (Foucault, 2010: 148), foregrounding competition over exchange and laisser-
faire as the organising principle of government, with the recognition that competition 
actually requires state intervention (Venn, 2010; and Venn, forthcoming: 19). To 
critique neoliberalism as synonymous with spectacle, consumption or consumer 
society, therefore, is to criticise something that it is not. On the contrary, Foucault 
claims that the objective of neoliberal government policy is the multiplication and 
differentiation of enterprise, rather than the uniformity of commodity (Foucault, 
2010: 149).  
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There is, therefore, a shift in the legitimating principle of the market, from exchange 
between equal partners to competition between inevitably unequal actors; as liberal 
exchange presumes equality, neoliberal competition presumes inequality (Lazzarato, 
2009: 116). Although 18
th
 and 19
th
 Century liberalism understood exchange and 
competition in terms of laisser-faire (Foucault, 2010: 118), the 20
th
 Century German 
ordoliberal variant of neoliberalism, for example, argued that competition was 
neither natural nor guided by the invisible hand. Instead of a natural game between 
equalities, they saw competition as a formal (and co-ordinated) game between 
inequalities (Foucault, 2010: 120). They were actually, therefore, critical of laisser-
faire policies, and aimed to promote competition through bridging the gap between 
unfettered capitalism and state control (Peck, 2010: 60). 
 
For Foucault, whereas liberalism insisted on a distinction between state and politics 
on the one hand, and market and economy on the other, defining a free space as 
private within an already given political society, and defining government 
subsequently in terms of its own self-limitation (Foucault, 2010: 20), neoliberalism 
considers how the exercise of political power can be modelled on the principles of 
the already given market economy, abandoning the necessity of distinguishing 
between politics and economy, or between citizens and consumers. While liberalism 
was concerned with the public-private distinctions between what and when 
government could and couldn’t touch, neoliberalism transcends the distinction 
between public and private, and concerns itself with how government is to touch the 
previously untouchable (Foucault, 2010: 133). Foucault also demonstrates how 
liberalism opened up a domain of the social, of collective and political units 
constituted by social relations between individuals that were ‘beyond the economy 
without being juridical’; therefore in between citizen bearers of rights and consumer 
participants in the market. But although this opened up the possibility of a public 
sphere, as Habermas has also demonstrated, it also understood the social as little 
more than an aggregation. For neoliberals, however, individual calculation also 
counts, albeit as socially embedded and normatively governed (Davies, 2013). The 
state-market distinction is broken down in neoliberal thought: the market is no longer 
a system of exchange between equals, whereby the absence of state intervention 
ensures that prices are generated by naturally occurring competition, but a 
mechanism whereby the spread of competition throughout an already unequal society 
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is dependent upon active state guidance. Homo economicus, no longer seen as a man 
of exchange and consumption, but of competition and enterprise (Foucault, 2010: 
147), is governable simultaneously as both a subject of rights and as an economic 
actor (Foucault, 2010: 270; 290); regulated, that is, as both citizen and consumer. In 
contrast to Harvey’s claim that neoliberalism presents contractual relations and 
market exchange as values in themselves (Harvey, 2007: 3), therefore, Foucault 
demonstrates the neoliberals’ move away from an emphasis on market exchange 
towards a focus on competition. Neoliberalism is thus a market economy without 
laisser-faire, and an active state policy without state control, and should therefore be 
identified with active and permanent intervention (Foucault, 2010: 131-132) rather 
than with laisser-faire, the free market or the withdrawal of the state.  
 
Adam Smith’s argument that the market is naturally self-regulating (‘the invisible 
hand’) implies that, for liberal political economy, the collective benefit must never be 
an objective for either the individual or for the state; a laisser-faire naturalism 
rejected by ordoliberals (Venn, 2010b; and Venn, forthcoming: 20). For these early 
neoliberals, the role of the state was recognised, but it was to be limited to 
establishing a market framework. The state must intervene at the level of civil 
society, therefore, not as counterweight to inequality, but in order to socialise 
consumption (Venn, forthcoming: 21). Recognition of this unfamiliar aspect of 
neoliberal rationality has led some, following Rose (1990), to question the extent to 
which neoliberalism and the welfare state can be treated as antonymous (Gardiner, 
2013), reminding us of the critique (discussed in Part 6.1) of the equation of the 
welfare state with social citizenship (Saunders, 1993).  
 
In contrast to the traditional view of neoliberalism as the protection of class interests, 
or the decline of state powers and the passing down of responsibilities from the state 
to the individual or the market, therefore, such an account helps us to understand it 
more accurately as a reconfiguration of the relation between state and market, 
running now from the market to the state, whereby the market structures, intervenes 
in and marketises the state (Gane, 2012: 611-614). Neoliberalism is the general 
regulation of society by the market within which the state plays a new proactive role 
(Foucault, 2010: 145), not only occasionally through direct intervention for the 
benefit of society – as with PSB and the welfare state – but permanently through 
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indirect regulation to ensure competition as the key regulatory mechanism of society 
(Gane, forthcoming).  
 
In contrast to laisser-faire liberalism, neoliberalism takes the market as the formative 
truth and power of society, conducting a social programme of reform of the functions 
of law and juridical institutions, rather than insisting on the non-intervention of the 
state. There is therefore a shift in the liberal consciousness of government, from 
‘governing because of the market’ to ‘governing for the market’, privileging 
competition over exchange, and modelling government on the market; more a 
different type of government than a doctrine of less government. No longer the 
liberal principle of government’s self-limitation (with the associated principles of 
individual liberty and press freedom), the neoliberal market is a permanent economic 
tribunal confronting government, measuring and assessing each of its activities 
according to the law of the market (Foucault, 2010: 247-248), undermining but also 
enabling the public sphere in novel ways.  
 
 
 
 
7.3 TOWARDS A PROCESSUAL APPROACH TO NEOLIBERALISM? 
 
Contemporary Theoretical Debates and Critical Histories 
 
The promiscuity of the concept makes it prone to inflation (Peck, 2013a: 17), but 
interconnected issues such as the financialisation of capitalism, the economic rise of 
China, the explosion of the world population and the associated pressures of 
urbanisation and migration, as well as climate change, cannot all be neatly subsumed 
and explained by reference to neoliberalism alone (Kalb, 2012: 319), even if they 
have been partly enabled by earlier neoliberalisations of so called ‘barriers’ to trade, 
capital and labour, and even if they do establish conditions for future 
neoliberalisation by inducing entrepreneurial and competitive responses to social 
change (Peck, 2013a: 19).  
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For some time, the political-economic conceptions of neoliberalism as an ideological 
or hegemonic project and as a ‘robust regime’ of state-facilitated market rule have 
been questioned by governmental critics, while the associated methodological tools 
have been abandoned as too blunt for much ethnographic work. Critical engagement 
with the history of neoliberal thought has demonstrated how flawed dominant 
assumptions are (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009: 434), allowing us instead to see it as a 
vision of the ‘good society’, within which laisser-faire, deregulation and the 
shrinking state are far from necessities; rather, the fundamental concern is to 
reregulate society, marketise government and redefine the state’s role as active 
producer and guarantor of a stable market society (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009: 434-
436). Similarly, critical engagement with empirical studies of actually existing 
neoliberalisms around the world suggests that neoliberal techniques do not 
necessarily go hand in hand with the preservation of ruling class interests, nor are 
they automatically detrimental to the poor or to the public sphere (Collier, 2011; 
Ferguson, 2009).  
 
The advantage of the governmental over the ideological approach is that it treats the 
public-private (state-society) dichotomy as an instrument and effect, rather than the 
basis and limit, of governmental practice, becoming itself an object of study (Lemke, 
2001: 201). It also highlights a congruence, rather than a distinction, between 
individuals and collectivities as moral-responsible and rational-economic actors 
(Lemke, 2001: 201). Rather than diagnosing a shift from state to society, the state is 
shown to retain its sovereign form and take on new functions. The reduction in 
welfare state intervention, therefore, is less a matter of the state losing its powers of 
regulation, than the reorganisation and restructuring of governmental techniques, and 
the shifting of competence onto responsible and rational individuals (Lemke, 2001: 
201-202). It is both a response to individual demands for more autonomy, and an 
outsourcing of responsibility (Lemke, 2001: 202). Contrary to the Left’s 
misunderstanding of neoliberalism as laisser-faire, it reveals instead a shift away 
from the manipulation of individual behaviour by classical liberal and social 
welfarist governmentalities, towards a focus on establishing a ‘sovereign framework 
in which a process can spontaneously occur’ within civil society (Davies & Gane, 
forthcoming). 
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In Maurizio Lazzarato’s elaborations on the ‘social’ as a mode of government, he has 
drawn on Foucault’s account of the shift from sovereign power exercised on territory 
and the subject of rights (homo juridicus) to the government of population as both 
subjects of rights and economic subjects of interests (homo oeconimicus), and 
developed his argument that this gives rise to two contrasting heterogeneous 
processes of constitution. Through dialectics of reconciliation, subjects of rights 
become part of the ensemble of other subjects of rights via a process of subtraction; 
which presupposes that the subject transposes his rights onto another. Economic 
man, however, is integrated with the economic ensemble by the multiplication of 
interests; presupposing the preservation of one’s self-interests as a condition for the 
multiplication and satisfaction of the needs of the collective. Foucault suggests that 
neither the law nor the market can reconcile this heterogeneity, and that a new 
domain or field is required. Civil society, as the correlate of techniques of 
government, becomes the assemblage that can link and envelop these two subjects. It 
is upon this recognition that biopolitics is born (Lazzarato, 2009: 115-116).  
 
The government of conduct as enterprise is subsequently institutionalised throughout 
the social body through an ‘audit culture’ (Lazzarato, 2009; Venn, 2010; Venn, 
forthcoming: 22), in which social welfare and policy are financialised and marketised 
(Lazzarato, 2009). Economic interest and choice are absolutised, and the individual 
is reconstituted more as the subject of choices and interests than the subject of rights 
(McNay, 2009: 61). Citizen and consumer become variables to be manipulated 
(Lazzarato, 2009: 119), whereby citizens on benefits are represented as ‘passive 
consumers’ (Lazzarato, 2009: 121). Individuals are governed as legal rights-bearing 
subjects as well as living beings (who have characteristics such as age or particular 
skills) (Lazzarato, 2009: 112), although because civil society is grounded in an 
economic ontology, the subject of rights is rendered secondary to the subject of 
choices (McNay, 2009: 68-69). Juridical power retains only a residual role, where 
rights and duties can contain the fragmenting effects of unregulated economic 
activity (McNay, 2009: 70). ‘Ideology’ is helpful but insufficient for expressing the 
complex relations of power between them (Lazzarato, 2009: 113), as there is no 
relation of causality, symbolism or representation, but only ‘mutual presuppostion’.  
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Because the early governmentality literature was based upon only the scattered 
availability of what became Security, Territory, Population, with its focus on 
governmentality, classical liberalism and the displacement of sovereignty by 
techniques of statistical measurement, it has, however, been criticised for implicitly 
reducing the state to a technical apparatus of power without any sovereign 
component (Davies & Gane, forthcoming). In Foucault’s subsequent lectures on 
neoliberalism, his focus is much more about the links between state sovereignty and 
the market, and more specifically the economic re-imagination of sovereignty and 
the state (Davies & Gane, forthcoming). This aspect of neoliberalism has since been 
played out in the way that think-tanks, such as the World Economic Forum, have 
influenced the re-imagination of state, nation and governmental leadership in 
entrepreneurial, business-like ways, so that running a nation becomes equivalent to 
running a firm in a competitive global environment (Davies & Gane, forthcoming).  
 
Foucault himself has been accused, however, of failing to distinguish between 
neoliberalism as a hegemonic theory and neoliberalism as a never complete form of 
government (McNay, 2009). Others have criticised the over-emphasis on 
governmentality itself. Stephen Collier, for example, has drawn in particular on 
Rose’s work on generalised neoliberal governmentality, or what Rose terms 
‘advanced liberal government’, and his criticism of the tendency in much 
Foucauldian work (echoing the tendency of ideological scholarship) to interpret 
certain techniques as parts (and therefore proof) of a neoliberal whole. Collier 
criticises Foucault’s concept of governmentality itself for encouraging such 
misidentification in the work of others, as well as the inflationary use of the concept 
by Foucauldians, who make it refer to something so global that it is beyond empirical 
investigation. On the other hand, he is cautious of Rose’s alternatively flexible use of 
governmentality – ‘to cover projects that are under constant modification in the face 
of new problems, while retaining certain styles of thought and technological 
preferences’ – because it risks losing the ability to distinguish between very different 
phenomena. While he accepts that work on ‘advanced liberal government’ is 
essential for the identification of neoliberal influence, he argues for a more 
‘topological’ analysis to demonstrate how aspects of this recombine with other forms 
and establish new government ensembles (Collier, 2009: 97-98).  
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Collier suggests that it would be more promising to rethink governmentality in 
Foucault’s own later writings, and to draw upon the vocabulary he begins to use in 
his later lectures, such as ‘redeployment’, ‘recombination’, ‘reconfiguration’, 
‘problematisation’, and ‘patterns of correlation’ (Collier, 2009: 99). Here the focus is 
less on conditions of possibility than on such processes of recombination by actors. 
Neoliberalism from this perspective then becomes less a governmentality, or a form 
of knowledge-power that establishes conditions of possibility (such as an ensemble 
of practices that we assume have an internal logic), and more a form of thinking that 
aims to recombine existing mentalities and practices of government that have 
become problematic (Collier, 2009: 100). Comparatively, governmentality is a less 
useful tool for analysing such heterogeneous elements, as it tries to make them 
intelligible through reference to common conditions of possibility (Collier, 2009: 
98). 
 
Failing to address the empirical or explanatory limits of neoliberalism, and ignoring 
the ways in which neoliberal policies fuse or co-exist with other things (Collier, 
2012: 187), the tendency of the ideological approach and much governmental 
literature to ‘accelerate’ from local examples to a neoliberal meta-narrative, also 
poses problems for how to make sense of instances (in African states, for instance) in 
which economic liberalisation has not been accompanied by social welfare 
retrenchment (Hilgers, 2012). By associating neoliberal ideas ‘inevitably and 
intrinsically’ with unsavoury regimes or policies, such theoretical apparatuses fail to 
account, Collier argues, for formations or contexts that are different to those under 
analysis (Collier, 2012: 188). Instead of dismissing neoliberal initiatives as simply 
the tools of the global rich, he suggests, it may be more productive to consider the 
progressive possibilities as well as the reactionary dangers of a fundamentally 
reconfigured political-spatial world order, and to imagine new ‘arts of government’ 
that may take advantage of recent transformations (Ferguson, 2009: 169).  
 
James Ferguson’s work is a case in point. His focus is on the anthropological study 
of changes to social welfare in Africa, and more specifically the rise of transnational 
forms of government by private and third sector enterprises, in the context of the 
growing recognition that the majority of poor people will never have access to formal 
employment. Such changes break the link between social policy and both the nation-
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state and the universal figure of the ‘worker’, which defined the Keynesian pact 
between capital and labour (Ferguson, 2009: 168). In no longer taking such 
categories for granted, Ferguson argues that it is not true that neoliberal government 
ignores poverty or leaves it to the market. Through empirical research into actual 
political processes (Ferguson, 2009: 170), he demonstrates instead that ‘social’ 
payments and ‘welfare-like’ interventions not only coexist with neoliberal economic 
models, but they are also sometimes ‘necessary complements’ (Ferguson, 2009: 
169).  
 
Rather than dismissing the term or suggesting a more appropriate alternative, 
however, Ferguson emphasises that reference to neoliberalism needs to be more 
precise and specific (Ferguson, 2009: 172). While the constitution of subjects as 
consumers may be a particularly obvious aspect of neoliberalism, for example, 
neoliberal policies also constitute subjects as responsible citizens, complicating the 
extent to which one can flippantly diagnose a neoliberal shift in policy from 
constituting the public as citizens to constituting them as consumers.  
 
In addressing the so called neoliberalisation of Africa, in which international banks 
and lending agencies forced privatisation and deregulation upon certain states in the 
1980s (the same period as the neoliberalisation of the US-UK welfare state), 
Ferguson emphasises that these processes and the ideological celebration of markets 
that went with them resembled more laisser-faire liberalism and imperial capitalism 
than neoliberal governmentality as such (Ferguson, 2009: 173). In contrast to these 
self-interested liberal policies that benefited a few global institutions while being 
disastrous for the poor population of Africa, Ferguson has suggested that neoliberal 
modes and mechanisms of government, as developed within the First World, may 
actually offer new political possibilities for the Third World (Ferguson, 2009: 173). 
More recent anti-poverty programs in Africa and many other postcolonial states have 
favoured direct income support in cash rather than indirect welfare support, 
empowering people to rely on their own abilities rather than imposing the 
paternalism of the welfare state. In recognising both that markets are failing because 
people are too poor to participate, and that government programs are failing because 
states are inefficient, such an approach balances recognisably neoliberal elements 
(market efficiency, individual choice and autonomy, entrepreneurship, scepticism 
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about state service provision) with a ‘pro-poor’ politics. This simultaneously 
involves the appropriation of neoliberal reasoning as well as opposition to the 
ideological project of neoliberalism. Similar to the way in which the statistical 
techniques for calculating the probability of workplace injuries, originally developed 
in the 19
th
 Century by employers for the purpose of controlling costs, were 
subsequently used as the technical basis for social insurance and the welfare state, 
Ferguson suggests that market techniques can also be re-appropriated for quite 
different purposes (Ferguson, 2009: 174). 
 
He emphasises that arguments for seemingly neoliberal policies are actually many-
sided and irreducible to a single logic, and that such policy documents regularly 
contain social democratic elements and deploy traditional welfare-state arguments 
alongside more obviously neoliberal preoccupations (Ferguson, 2009: 176). In fact, 
arguments for a basic income grant in South Africa appropriated neoliberal critiques 
of welfare paternalism to argue in favour of welfare, and actually reversed traditional 
right-wing arguments against social payments by justifying them as a way of 
combating entrepreneurship-inhibiting dependency and passivity. While recipients 
are constructed as rational actors rather than the potentially stigmatised dependents 
on the nanny state, the state itself is represented as simultaneously omnipresent and 
minimal; both universally engaged (in direct provision to all citizens) and maximally 
disengaged (standing back from the surveillance and normalisation of recipients) 
(Ferguson, 2009: 177). Although recognisably neoliberal motifs can be identified 
here, Ferguson argues that such policies represent novel configurations of markets, 
enterprise, welfare and social payments, rather than a neoliberal ideological project 
(Ferguson, 2009: 178). Further, he argues that they demonstrate a genuinely 
progressive way of redirecting markets to the poor, by boosting purchasing power 
rather than by restricting the market (Ferguson, 2009: 180-181).  
 
Although such redistribution requires non-market interventions by states or state-like 
entities, its use of market mechanisms for redistributive purposes suggests, therefore, 
that prejudices about the market may require revision (Ferguson, 2009: 181), and that 
assumptions about an automatic fit between neoliberal techniques and a hegemonic 
project may need to be questioned. Close attention to particular techniques in 
particular contexts actually demonstrates that neoliberal techniques are deployed in 
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relation to ‘diverse political projects’, and that the link between the technical and the 
political-economic is more polymorphous and unstable than critical scholarship 
assumes (Collier in Ferguson, 2009: 182). Further, seeing neoliberalism as a field of 
governmental techniques, of which some can be appropriated and repurposed for 
other purposes, rather than as an evil and unified essence that can only be denounced, 
enables the possibility of taking up Foucault’s provocation to develop a socialist 
governmentality and to reinvigorate critique (Ferguson, 2009: 183). 
 
The governmental approach, on the other hand, and that of Aihwa Ong in particular 
(Collier & Ong, 2005; Ong, 2006), has been criticised for denying the existence of a 
‘big-N neoliberalism’ in favour of emphasising the hybridisation of neoliberal ideas 
with local forms to produce multiple ‘small-n neoliberalisms’ (Brenner et al, 2010; 
Wacquant, 2012). In such accounts, governmental scholarship is accused of 
portraying neoliberalism as something that is infinitely mutable (Brenner et al, 2010: 
201) and severed from its ‘conditions of production’ (Brenner et al, 2010: 202). But 
as Collier has emphasised, the governmental approach in his and Ong’s work, as well 
as in that of Rose and others, does not argue for particularism but rather against 
overly-rigid structural analyses. Instead, they emphasise the ‘mobility of neoliberal 
techniques, diverse formations and uncertain political valence’ (Collier, 2012: 191). 
Rather than arguing that neoliberalism can be anything by ‘multiplying cases and 
abandoning a core understanding’ of it, they insist it is not everything by building on 
the contradictions they identify to make general claims about ‘neoliberal 
implementation’ in certain sites (Collier, 2012: 191).  
 
The choice is not between one approach that emphasises diversity and variation, and 
another that emphasises connections and repetition. It is rather a question of how 
neoliberalism is specified in various contexts. Both approaches seek to understand 
how liberal measures for some (expansions of citizenship and consumer rights, or 
opportunities for citizen or consumer empowerment, for instance) are coupled with 
illiberal measures (such as limitations on citizenship and consumer rights, or the 
undermining of citizen and consumer voice) for others. Although conceptual 
recourse to neoliberalism is essential to understanding contemporary political 
formations, such necessity does not mean, Collier argues, that such formations are 
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neoliberal, or that invoking neoliberalism as a meta-context is helpful (Collier, 2012: 
191). 
 
For Collier, there is a need for recourse to ‘something called neoliberalism’, but to a 
‘neoliberalism’ that is not a macro-structure meta-context (Collier, 2012: 191). Such 
inflationism has been associated with a sampling preference found in anthropological 
studies to investigate neoliberalism in ‘sites located at some distance from centres of 
hegemonic power’ (Brenner et al, 2010: 201), and to contrast such sites with the 
essential features of a ‘pure variant’ in either neoliberal theory (specifically, the 
Washington Consensus) or a neoliberal core (invariably, the US). Rather than 
making this pure variant an object of analysis, however, such studies tend to presume 
its essential features, suggesting that it is only once neoliberal theory and practice is 
implemented that it becomes a proper subject of inquiry (Hilgers, 2011: 351). The 
distinction between implementation and theorisation may not be so easy to maintain, 
however (Collier, 2012: 192), and the circumscription of scholarly inquiry to an 
assessment of how pure neoliberalism is implemented risks obfuscating the actual 
process (Brenner et al, 2010; Collier, 2012).  
 
The assumption that neoliberalism exists in a pure form in somewhere like the US 
and in a filtered or refracted variant in China or elsewhere, acknowledges the 
complexity of neoliberalism’s implementation in the latter case at the expense of an 
acknowledgment of its complexity in the former (Peck, 2013). In contrast, Peck 
reminds us that as well as ‘roll-back’ processes (Peck, 2010) such as deregulation, 
privatisation and the withdrawal of the state (D Harvey, 2007: 3), neoliberalism, even 
in the US and the UK, also involves new forms of ‘roll-out’ regulation and 
intervention, such as the selective empowerment of non-state service providers, and 
management by audit and devolved governance (Peck, 2010: 23; Gane, 2012: 629). It 
also ignores the complexity of neoliberal theory itself. The reduction of neoliberal 
theory to the Washington Consensus ignores differences among neoliberal thinkers, 
conflating German ordoliberals with the Chicago School, or Hayek and von Mises 
with Friedman (Foucault, 2010; Gane, forthcoming). Similarly, it ignores 
inconveniently nuanced aspects of the Washington Consensus itself, such as John 
Williamson’s insistence that health care and education are most appropriately 
provided by the state, and his questioning of the presumed superiority of the private 
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over the public management of enterprises (Collier, 2012: 192), as well as the 
ambiguity of the wider neo/liberal tradition’s critique of the state for representing 
only the private interests of a particular elite and, therefore, not being ‘public’ 
enough (Gaus, 1983). The oversimplification of the neoliberal perspective in the 
context of broadcasting regulation, in both the US and the UK, also ignores the 
interventions of neoliberal thinkers such Ronald Coase, who criticised the private 
interests behind the rationale for a public monopoly in the UK (Coase, 1947). 
 
Collier (Collier, 2012: 194) emphasises that it is not enough to accept that ‘actually 
existing’ neoliberalism is contextually complex and often in contradiction to what are 
assumed to be the fixed and coherent principles of neoliberal theory; rather, a critical 
history of the contradictory ‘origins, tenets and imperatives’ of neoliberalism is also 
required (cf. Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009; Peck, 2008; Peck, 2010; Stedman Jones, 
2012). As Collier explains, the point is not that a closer reading of particular 
neoliberal thinkers will reveal the true content of neoliberalism and prove the critical 
tradition wrong, but that the mechanical reproduction of over-simplifications and 
unquestioning presumptions ‘should at least give some pause’ (Collier, 2012: 192). 
As the burgeoning literature on the history of neoliberal thought is beginning to 
demonstrate, neoliberal theory is heterogeneous, often contradictory, and sometimes 
contrary to the picture painted by many critics (Collier, 2012: 192). Foucault, for 
instance, drew attention to the differences between the German ordoliberals and the 
Chicago School neoliberals, tracing the movement back to the Walter Lipmann 
Colloquium 1938 at which laisser-faire liberalism was renounced as much as 
socialism. For Stedman Jones (2012) this period is best understood as 
neoliberalism’s prehistory (1920s–1950), in which various responses to the Great 
Depression and the subsequent collapse of liberalism were articulated. It was only 
through the debates of the Mont Pelerin Society, in neoliberalism’s ‘intellectual 
consolidation’ phase (1950–1980), however, that it was actually stabilised. Stedman 
Jones distinguishes between both these stages as well as a third phase of elaborate 
and globally distributed think tanks, in which neoliberalism acceded to political 
power (1980–present). Through close reading of archival material, others have also 
pointed out the differences between individual neoliberal thinkers and highlighted 
nuances in their arguments, as well as critiquing Foucault’s account for neglecting an 
analysis of the Mont Pelerin Society (Gane, forthcoming), and for relying too heavily 
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on secondary French sources for an understanding of German and American 
arguments (Tribe, 2009: 694). 
 
Critical engagement with neoliberalism’s history reveals ‘concerted real-time 
revisions of doctrine’ and structure, and the absence of a contemporary centre of 
neoliberal thought equivalent to Mont Pelerin. Rather, contemporary neoliberalism is 
a multi-centred and networked movement with few, if any, fixed points, frustrating 
attempts to draw a straight line ‘from some fixed ideology to political programs’ 
(Mirowski, 2013). Critics have also been warned to avoid being confounded by 
neoliberal rhetoric (‘shrink the state, grow the economy, free the people!’) and 
accepting it at face value (Peck, 2013a: 14). Proponents of neoliberalism have been 
accused of providing a ‘fake genealogy’ of their own movement, portraying different 
essences of neoliberalism for different audiences; sometimes even dropping the neo-
prefix and claiming a continuous, long, and hallowed heritage extending back to 
classical liberals (as did the Mont Pelerin members in the 1950s), even while they 
proposed doctrines that diverged radically from the history of liberal thought. Such 
rhetoric is replete with double truths and oxymorons; disclaiming contempt for 
government in public, while plotting in private to take over existing governments, 
and to make them larger, more intrusive and more powerful in their reborn role as 
implementers of explicitly neoliberal policies (Mirowski, 2013).  
 
Close analysis of neoliberal texts also enables a greater understanding of the 
development of the neoliberal perspective, and the history of particular doctrines. 
Ronald Coase, for instance, was influential in transforming the neoliberal approach 
to competition, regulation and the relationship between private economic actors and 
the state. Until the early 1960s, neoliberals tended to acknowledge that the state’s 
role in ensuring a competitive market environment necessitated occasional 
intervention to reduce excessive market dominance. Coase’s argument (1960), 
however, was that it was not enough to account for the costs incurred by 
marginalised parties, but that the effect of regulation on the costs and interests of the 
monopolists, as well as the costs to the regulator of making mistakes, and the costs of 
the overall legal and regulatory process, also had to be taken into account. As a 
consequence of extending the cost-benefit analysis to all players and the whole 
regulatory framework, neoliberals began to argue for a more radical, corporate 
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monopolist form of laisser-faire, in which monopoly and marginalisation could be 
rationalised as an efficient state of affairs. Coase was also responsible for influencing 
the Chicago School’s extension of cost-benefit analysis beyond market-behaviour 
and the calculation of institutions, and to the everyday life of individuals (Davies & 
Gane, forthcoming). 
 
There are, therefore, two strands to the Foucauldian literature on neoliberalism. On 
one level, historical research that reveals ambiguity, contradiction and internal debate 
within neoliberal thought merely advocates a more nuanced and qualified 
deployment of the term. On another level, a genealogical approach to emerging 
subjectivities, such as citizen and consumer, requires a more fundamental debate on 
the critical theorisation of neoliberalisation. While the former strand can be accepted 
and incorporated relatively easily by political economists, the latter poses significant 
problems for any attempt at rapprochement, and significant tensions remain between 
the contrasting theoretical and methodological approaches to neoliberalism (Peck, 
2013). 
 
 
 
Neoliberalism as Process: Between Ideological and Governmental Approaches? 
 
According to ‘inflationist’ political-economic accounts (such as those provided by 
Hall and Harvey), neoliberalism is an expansive and adaptable ideological project 
linked to financialised capitalism. The Foucauldian ‘sceptics’ (such as Collier and 
Ferguson), on the other hand, emphasise it instead as one of many strands of a 
complex of individualised governmentalities, and never more than a flexible 
assemblage of technologies, routines and conducts (Peck, 2013a: 3). While the 
recurring commonalities of neoliberalism in the ‘cumulative ideological/institutional 
realignments’ of successive governments, as well as in the ‘relational 
interpenetration of governing logics and routines’ across spatial contexts, have been 
recognised by both camps, the way in which such features are analysed vary greatly 
between political-economic and governmental approaches (Peck, 2013a: 10). The 
former emphasises neoliberalism as a coherent and unitary external force, focusing 
upon its ‘unifying strands across disparate contexts’, even while acknowledging the 
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diversity of ‘actually existing’ neoliberalisms. In contrast, the latter favours a focus 
on difference, foregrounding the contingence, contradiction and instability of 
incomplete processes (Peck, 2013a: 10).  
 
Despite some efforts to bridge the gap between these two approaches (Larner, 2003; 
Peck, 2004) or to rethink the terms of debate (Brenner et al, 2010; Dean, 2012), 
constructive dialogue between them has been rare. For some (Collier, 2012: 189), 
such attempts risk obscuring rather than illuminating neoliberalism, as there are 
‘unbridgeable methodological differences’ between political-economic and 
governmental approaches. Although Collier acknowledges that the tensions between 
similarly non-structural approaches can be reconciled, and neoliberalism as an 
original movement of thought linked to policy programmes that produce hybrid 
government formations, he maintains that such approaches cannot be reconciled with 
even the nuanced structural approach of Peck and colleagues (Collier, 2012: 193-
194). There remain, he argues, two distinct ways of approaching analysis. Either 
neoliberalism is specifically linked to particular elements that are then teased out 
from a jumble of diverse elements, or it is expanded so that the entire ensemble is 
associated with neoliberalism, in which case it is presumed to have greater 
significance than and influence upon any other element (Collier, 2012: 189). 
Methodologically, Collier sees a clear distinction between the approach that insists 
that heterogeneity and variegation can still be called neoliberal, and that which 
dispenses with structural explanations that only obfuscate actual processes.  
 
In terms of critical inquiry, Collier sees another irreconcilable difference. While the 
critical instinct of the structuralists is to reveal the political agency and common 
project behind ‘economic conditions, state formations and ideologies’, and to 
establish a critical counterpoint to such a project, non-structural approaches propose 
a ‘different kind of critical reflection on neoliberalism’ that critically probes 
neoliberal ideas rather than uncritically denouncing them (Collier, 2012: 194). While 
the political alternative to neoliberalism suggested in Collier’s (2011) work on post-
Soviet societies, and in Ferguson’s (2009) on South African social support, may be 
less ‘solidarising’ than invocations of community and citizenship, or of public 
service and social welfare, they are also potentially less paternalistic and less 
disempowering (Collier, 2012: 194). Conditional cash grant programmes, for 
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instance, are not neoliberal in the sense that they are mechanical oppositions to 
solidarising measures; nor are they neoliberal in the sense of a formulaic insistence 
on government through the calculative choice of individuals. Rather, they are derived 
from neoliberal propositions that social welfare is better directed to individuals than 
a phantom collectivity, and better delivered in cash than in kind so that the values of 
government correspond to those of the governed (Collier, 2012: 195). By extension, 
although auditing and accountability have particular utility for neoliberal rationality, 
there is no reason to assume that there is ‘an intrinsic relation between the techniques 
and the politics, such that they must be discarded by those who seek an alternative art 
of government’ (Barry et al, 1996: 15).  
 
For others (Peck, 2013), however, although there are significant tensions between the 
contrasting ontological and epistemological understandings of neoliberalism, there 
remains scope for dialogue between them (Peck, 2013a: 18). Jamie Peck, Nik 
Theodore and Neil Brenner have made the most serious attempt to find a 
compromise between approaches (Collier, 2012: 188), accommodating a fluid and 
variegated appreciation of contextual difference while maintaining a structural 
approach that recognises the ways in which local differences and contextually 
embedded forms are shaped by the ‘context of context’ (Brenner et al, 2010). Both 
approaches have, they argue, questioned ‘template’ models of neoliberalism that tend 
to reduce it to a list of explanatory attributes, such as ‘privatisation, deregulation and 
the limited state’, though neither alarmist presumptions of a singular and global 
monolith, nor ambivalent or agnostic accounts of diverse techniques that share no 
more than a ‘family resemblance’, offer a satisfactory account of neoliberalism 
(Peck, 2013a: 15). Rather, ‘theoretically informed, and informing, empirical work’ is 
required for the refinement of understandings of neoliberalisation (Peck, 2013a: 19). 
More recently, Jamie Peck has argued that the failure of the global economic crisis of 
2008 to bring an end to neoliberalism has prompted reconsideration of its 
explanatory status, and opened up the possibility of dialogue between these two 
approaches (Peck, 2013a: 1). While neoliberalism has always been a form of attack 
on its alternatives (liberalism, socialism etc.), its resilience in the face of a crisis of 
its own making suggests that as well as being more robust than the poststructural 
critics have allowed, it is also no longer the same; the failure of postneoliberal 
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alternatives means that neoliberalism now exists in an ideological vacuum of its own 
making (Peck, 2013a: 2) with nothing left to define itself against. 
 
A methodological compromise must be struck between sweeping accounts of 
hegemony that gloss over contradictory hybridity, and fine-grained accounts of 
hybridity that betray an ambivalence about hegemonic undercurrents across contexts 
(Peck, 2013a: 20). Warning against blindness towards either similarity or difference 
among static neoliberalism/s (Peck, 2013a: 15), Peck and his colleagues have 
advanced their own processual approach to dynamic or ‘variegated neoliberalisation’ 
(Brenner et al, 2010), and the associated ‘patterning of contingencies’ that 
problematise uneven development and irregularity as defining characteristics of 
neoliberalisation (Peck, 2013a: 12). They propose the extended selection of cases in 
relational or conjunctural terms, rather than in terms of terrain or typicality (Peck, 
2013a: 21), and ‘in an orthogonal or awkward relation to emergent explanatory 
conceptions’, which are subsequently interrogated and reconstructed (Peck, 2013a: 
20), and argue that instead of unquestioningly presuming neoliberalism as an ‘article 
of critical faith’, analysis should render it anew as an ‘object of sustained, reflexive 
and dialectical interrogation’ (Peck, 2013a: 21).  
 
Such an approach emphasises that there is no intrinsic essence to the doctrine, no 
home or origin, nor is there an ideal type of perfect or complete neoliberalism, 
against which to measure other ‘alien’ and partial instances. Rather, the critical task 
is to analyse the relations among hybrid occurrences (Peck, 2013a: 12), and to define 
neoliberalism and neoliberalisation in terms of their ‘recurring contradictions and 
uneven realisation’. The discrepancy – acknowledged by Harvey – between the 
utopian vision of freedom through the market and the more complex and 
contradictory reality of actual policies, is actually here reconceived as the 
‘contradictory heart’ of an ‘ongoing process of regulatory transformation’. The 
absence of a theoretical break on the rolling programs of marketisation, privatisation, 
deregulation and commodification etc., means that such a process, while often 
consequential, is never complete, prompting instead counteractions that may impede 
or enable in various ways further neoliberalisation. In practice, neoliberalisation 
never entails a ‘tidy arc from regulated to deregulated’ or from ‘big government to 
small state’, but results rather in a ‘plethora of gyrations across the terrains of social 
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regulation’ (Peck, 2013a: 13). Acknowledging that neoliberalism is always 
‘antagonistically embedded’ does not, however, necessitate a rejection of the critique 
of neoliberalism.  
 
On the contrary, Peck accepts Hall’s insistence on the political importance of 
‘naming’ neoliberalism, even as only a ‘provisional concept’, and even Collier 
acknowledges the (theoretical and) methodological importance of addressing 
‘something called neoliberalism’. It serves as a reminder to critically assess how 
neoliberalism has been systematically reproduced among its others and through 
‘discrepant formations’, and to critically address the contradictions between 
neoliberal theory and practice, rather than to uncritically accept at face value the 
utopian dogmas of neoliberal advocates themselves (Peck, 2013a: 14). Such an 
approach necessitates a combination of abstract-ideational and concrete-institutional 
approaches, and an appreciation of contextual differences and inherent 
contradictions, as well as of the ideological and hegemonic form of neoliberalism 
(Peck, 2013a: 14).  
 
Identifying pathways of neoliberalisation tends to demonstrate a ‘directional’, 
deliberate and explicit course away from preceding social formations such as the 
welfare state, rather than a ‘destinational’ course towards a neoliberal nirvana of 
market freedom (Peck, 2013a: 16). It is important to make explicit, therefore, that 
neoliberalism is not about a fixed policy repertoire, but rather improvisation, 
experimentation, opportunism and trial and error, albeit within a regulatory 
framework that favours ‘market-based and market-like strategies’ (Peck, 2013a: 16). 
This explains the diachronic blurring of privatisation into public-private partnerships, 
of monetarism into fiscal vigilance, of ‘bootstrapping exhortations to the 
unemployed’ into community empowerment, and of ‘no such thing as society’ into 
the ‘Big Society’, not only as the softening or mainstreaming of 1980s neoliberal 
ideology, but also as evidence of the continuing and reflexive evolution of 
neoliberalism (Peck, 2013a: 16-17).  
 
It is a ‘category error’ to measure incomplete or partial neoliberalisation against a 
benchmark of ‘complete neoliberalism’ or absolute market rule, and to classify areas 
or domains in terms of degrees of neoliberalisation. This is not to deny its presence, 
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omnipresence or even its hegemony, but to emphasise its necessary hybridity (Peck, 
2013a: 9). Nor is to argue for the abandonment of the term; rather, it is to critically 
acknowledge its pertinence and to insist on its rigorous refinement (Peck, 2013a: 21). 
In doing so, it moves beyond analytical shortcuts that connect particular changes to a 
singular global entity called neoliberalism, turning political, theoretical and empirical 
attention instead to connections with the always ‘contradictory reproduction’ of 
‘neoliberalisation as a transformative process’ (Peck, 2013a: 9-10).  
 
The processual approach to teasing out neoliberal tendencies (Peck, 2013a: 19) shifts 
the methodological focus towards ‘relational neoliberalisation’ and away from 
‘gradational neoliberalism’, demonstrating a concern with the multiple forms of 
market rule and the mutual constitution of local neoliberalisms, rather than providing 
an account of the degree to which a particular case is neoliberal (Peck, 2013a: 18). It 
also suggests a theoretical and methodological approach that is potentially capable of 
combining ideological and governmental perspectives.  
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Peck’s conciliatory approach demonstrates that recognising limits to the critique of 
neoliberal trends in broadcasting necessitates neither the abandonment of the term 
nor the dismissal of the ideological approach. Rather, critical engagement with 
ideological and governmental theoretical-methodological approaches to 
neoliberalism highlights the need for broadcasting scholars to participate in debates 
and developments that they have hitherto largely ignored, and for analysis to be more 
specific and even more critical.  
 
Reframing the political-economic, and often partisan, approach to neoliberalism as 
an ideology or economic doctrine within a wider theoretical framework that views 
neoliberalism instead as a form of governmentality, enables an understanding of this 
‘reasoned way of governing best’ (Foucault, 2010: 2). Consequently, critical analysis 
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of processual neoliberalism can concern itself more with the modelling of political 
power on market principles (Foucault, 2010: 131), and with the ways in which 
objects such as the state, market, citizen and consumer are formed and rationalised, 
rather than limiting itself to teasing out their ideological manipulation (Foucault, 
2010: 3). Such a genealogical approach to the history of liberalism and to the 
‘reconfiguration’ (Collier, 2009) of citizens and consumers, also enables a more 
nuanced understanding of the distinctions between classical liberalism and 
neoliberalism, which in turn is invaluable for a rereading of debates on public sphere 
theory and their application in media studies literature to broadcasting regulation. As 
well as having implications for the way in which broadcasting regulation should be 
debated, there are also methodological implications for reframing the traditionally 
ideological approach to discursive analysis within a genealogical frame (as 
demonstrated in the next chapter). While engaging in such theoretical and 
methodological debates risks acknowledging inconvenient premises regarding PSB, 
endeavouring to engage contrasting approaches in dialogue involves a more critical 
and less moralistic approach, which could also contribute to a more convincing 
political critique of corporate power, private interests and market influence, as well 
as to an elaboration of a public sphere more efficacious for its critical engagement 
with the complexity of neoliberal thought.  
 
 
  
236 
 
Part Eight: Towards a Genealogy of PSB 
 
 
 
Problematising Broadcasting Regulation 
 
This final chapter provides a summary of the results of discursive analyses carried 
out upon regulatory documents from the 1920s to the present as part of the research 
for this thesis. The analyses have been split into three separate but overlapping 
problematisations. In the first, the governmental rationalising of how most 
legitimately to balance the principle of public control with private enterprise is 
demonstrated via the perpetual reconfiguration of ‘monopoly’ and ‘competition’ as 
problems to be addressed and resolved. In the second, the expansion of a 
broadcasting market and the emergence of ‘choice’ as a value to be instilled are 
linked to a reconfiguration of the relations between ‘public service’, ‘public interest’ 
and, more recently, ‘public value’ concepts. Finally, distinctions between ‘citizens’ 
and ‘consumers’ are shown to reveal not only a concern to address the public both 
individually and collectively, but to regulate broadcasting both directly and 
indirectly, and to accommodate both media law and media organisation perspectives. 
(N.B. References throughout are to documents rather than their authors, so that 
‘Peacock’, for instance, refers to the Peacock Report rather than to the Peacock 
Committee, or Peacock himself.) 
 
 
Problematising Monopoly and Competition: Balancing Public Control and Private 
Enterprise 
 
Far from being principally preoccupied with ensuring the public interest or an ethos 
of public service, the regulatory focus at the inception of broadcasting was on ‘the 
principle of public control’ (Sykes, 1923: 13), whereby ‘public’ and ‘national’ 
control were conflated with ‘government’ and ‘state’ control. A concern for ‘public 
interest’ and associated concepts, such as ‘public service’, were of only secondary 
importance to early broadcasting governmentality, and were framed in terms of the 
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relation between ‘public control’ and ‘private enterprise’. From the very beginning, 
finding an appropriate balance between public control and private enterprise was 
explicitly addressed as a problem to be resolved, and the associated problematisation 
of ‘monopoly’ and ‘competition’ has subsequently been a recurring discursive 
feature of broadcasting regulation. While the arguments for and against monopoly 
have considered both public and private monopolies (and duopolies), the concept of 
competition has also been addressed as both an aspect of the commercial market, 
synonymous with private enterprise, and (more subtly) as a value divorced from 
private interests and essential to legitimate public control.  
 
The ‘emergence’ of the superimposition of these conflicting concepts (in the context 
of broadcasting regulation) can be traced back to just before the advent of 
broadcasting. Although the committee discussing wireless telecommunication did 
‘not wish to trench upon the question of private monopoly versus State ownership’ 
(Imperial Wireless, 1920: 17), it nevertheless saw fit to clearly distinguish between 
public and private monopoly. Whereas a state monopoly, it reasoned, ‘would not 
preclude private enterprise in other spheres of wireless activity,’ a private monopoly 
would ‘exclude the State altogether’ (Imperial Wireless, 1920: 17). The contrast is 
effectively made between state intervention and government control, on the one 
hand, and commercial laissez-faire, on the other, and the principle of public control 
here precludes the possibility of a free wireless press. However, this is only because 
the principle allows a compromise between private enterprise and state control, 
whereas a private monopoly is criticised for allowing no such compromise or role for 
the State. It is therefore not a matter of choosing either public control (with no 
private enterprise) or private enterprise (with no public control), but a matter of 
choosing between either private enterprise (with no public control) or a balance 
between public control and private enterprise. Rejecting laissez-faire, private 
monopoly and state operated systems, therefore, British PSB was from its inception 
regulated in terms of a compromise between public control and private enterprise.    
 
Although the Crawford Report (1926) concluded that ‘the United States system of 
free and uncontrolled transmission and reception’ was unsuited to the UK (Crawford, 
1926: 5), and that broadcasting should accordingly not only remain a monopoly, but 
be re-established as a public corporation rather than a private company, Beveridge 
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(1951) accused this earlier report of having been too harsh in its dismissal of the US 
system, and ‘incorrect to see monopoly as the only alternative’ (Beveridge, 1951: 
40). Although Crawford dismissed private enterprise, private interests and 
competition in its critique of both the private monopoly of the British Broadcasting 
Company and the laissez-faire ‘chaos’ of the US system, neither public monopoly 
nor the concept of monopoly itself were subject to the same amount of scrutiny. 
Indeed, although the earlier Sykes Report (1923) had actually been ‘against 
monopoly in principle’ (Beveridge 1951: 39), by the time of the Ullswater Report 
(1936), the issue of monopoly was no longer even addressed (Beveridge, 1951: 40).  
 
Because the Beveridge Committee had received more evidence against monopoly 
than any previous committee, however, it considered it important to ‘probe more 
deeply’ into the question of monopoly (Beveridge, 1951: 40). It split the arguments 
against monopoly into four different standpoints (the critique of its excessive power, 
its bureaucratic unwieldiness, its London-centricity, and the effect on employees of 
being dependent upon one employer and therefore vulnerable to abuse) (Beveridge, 
1951: 45-6), and weighed them up against the established critiques of competition or 
parliamentary control, supporting the critiques of monopoly (Beveridge, 1951: 46) 
but finding that the alternative systems would produce ‘equal or greater dangers’  
(Beveridge, 1951: 51). The importance of ‘competition’, however, emerges as a 
value that should nonetheless be encouraged. 
 
Although a truly free market is dismissed as unattainable, and ‘competition for 
listeners’ is criticised for making broadcasters the ‘servants of consumers’, forced to 
make programmes ‘contrary to the pursuit of the highest social purposes’, ‘more and 
freer competition’ is nevertheless welcomed. However, a clear distinction is made 
between ‘competition in service’ and ‘competition for listeners’: ‘We want more and 
freer competition than exists at present, but it must be competition in service, not 
competition for listeners’ (Beveridge, 1951: 164). As such, Beveridge’s 
problematisation of how and to what extent monopolies should be under public 
control leads to the need to differentiate between public monopolies and government 
departments; consequently, as well as emphasising the independence from 
parliament of those operating the monopolies, the need for them to have ‘more of a 
business character’ is also suggested (Beveridge, 1951: 164). The internalisation of 
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market-like mechanisms and characteristics, such as ‘competition’ and ‘business-
like’ behaviour, is not therefore a strictly neoliberal logic that was introduced in the 
1980s; rather, it can be traced back to the need to legitimate the independence from 
the state of public monopoly, over and against private monopoly or laissez-faire.  
 
Subsequently, the government considered ‘permit[ting] some element of 
competition’ in the interests of ‘viewers, writers, artistes and technicians’ (White 
Paper, 1953). Addressing the fears arising from ‘misconceptions’ about competitive 
broadcasting, the White Paper (1953) sought to balance the enabling of ‘private 
enterprise’ with the maintenance of commercial broadcasting as another public 
corporation (White Paper, 1953), while the Pilkington Report (1962) hoped its 
proposals would lead to ‘competition between the two broadcasting services2, 
competition in good broadcasting. Any other competition is at least irrelevant and 
probably damaging’ (Pilkington, 1962: 286). The principles of public control and the 
structure of public corporation(s) are maintained, but the value of competition, made 
distinct from ‘market competition’ for listeners or advertising funding, becomes the 
most important value in broadcasting regulation, around which other concepts, such 
as public service and public interest, are reconfigured. 
 
Indeed, a minority report to the Sykes Report reveals that questions of competition 
and enterprise were on the minds of those debating broadcasting regulation from the 
start. Reacting to the lack of ‘precedent for the collection of a revenue by the 
State…for a private company’ (Sykes, 1923: 39), Charles Trevelyan MP argued 
against his colleagues that state operation (by the Post Office) would actually be 
‘more sensitive to [public] pressure than a private company’ (Sykes, 1923: 40), and 
that ‘to debar altogether the idea of transmission by the State is to restrict enterprise 
and experiment’ (Sykes, 1923: 41). Arguing that there was no ‘valid reason, except 
theoretical objection’ to the state operation of broadcasting, his argument for state 
operation incorporated the logic of enterprise and competition into the principle of 
public control. The ensuing evolution of the BBC, from a private company into a 
                                                          
2
 The two broadcasting services were the BBC, on the one hand, and independent television, on the 
other, where the latter was composed of both the Independent Television Authority and the 
programme companies (Pilkington, 1962: 51).  
240 
 
public corporation, can thus be seen as a resolution to this dilemma of how to 
legitimate the prescribed balance between public control and private enterprise.  
 
Similarly, the long-term rejection of advertising has not always been bound with the 
hostility to laissez-faire. Rather, it has often been framed in terms of the 
problematisation of competition. Early reports, having heard evidence from the press, 
argued that broadcasting should ‘not be allowed to compete with newspapers as an 
advertising medium’, as it ‘would seriously affect the interests of newspapers’, 
although there was ‘no objection’ to event sponsorship (Sykes, 1923: 19). Later 
reports were equally concerned to prevent the BBC from carrying adverts to avoid 
competition for advertising with commercial broadcasters (again, at the behest of the 
latter), and also because, unlike subscription, it was as poor as the licence fee at 
promoting ‘consumer sovereignty’ (Peacock, 1986). Even Pilkington’s consideration 
of the potential damage posed by competition (for anything other than good 
programming) is not explicitly related to a concern to protect citizenship over a 
concern to protect the private interests of commercial enterprises. So the question of 
advertising on the BBC has been justified over time not only in terms of public 
service values, citizenship and quality programming, but also consumer sovereignty 
and competition with the wider market, as well as in defence of the private interests 
of the press and commercial broadcasters.  
 
From the perspective of consumer sovereignty, the Peacock Report (1986) criticised 
both advertising (as synonymous with the commercial laissez-faire model), on the 
one hand, and the licence fee model on the other, as distortions of a true consumer 
market. Rather, a mixture of institutions and finance sources was proposed, and 
public regulation was incorporated into a ‘new market framework’, within which the 
Report assessed PSB history in terms of its replication of a true consumer market, 
rather than as an alternative to it (Peacock, 1986: 126). While the relation between 
public ownership, control, funding and operation, as well as their relation to 
consumer sovereignty, private enterprise and arguments for press freedom, are 
problematised in Peacock, arguments for the latter are unproblematically conflated. It 
is misleading, however, to overstate Peacock’s market approach, when the conflation 
of press freedom with private enterprise has been a long-term feature of the 
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problematisation of public control in broadcasting (and the even longer history of 
press freedom debates discussed in Part Three).  
 
As previously discussed (Part Two), the press has traditionally been regulated from a 
media law perspective, whereas broadcasting has been regulated from one of media 
organisation. However, while the Hunt Report (1982) had argued that commercial 
cable TV should be subject to ‘reactive oversight’ rather than ‘regulation’ as such 
(Hunt, 1982: 4; 38), Peacock acknowledged that it was not sufficient to confine 
government activity in broadcasting to the press framework of media law and 
monopoly prevention (Peacock, 1986: 126), justifying regulation not only as a way 
to introduce commercially non-viable programmes, but as a way of ‘stimulating the 
effects of a genuine consumer market… against the distortions inherent in a duopoly 
financed by advertising and the licence fee’ (Peacock, 1986: 149). Nevertheless, its 
recasting of the ‘new market framework’ signalled a shift away from public 
regulation ‘by the back door’ and towards an increasingly legal approach. The 
Communications Act (2003) and the White Paper (2006) subsequently cemented this 
by doubling the ways in which the BBC is subject to competition law, establishing 
Ofcom as a competition regulator, in the first instance, and introducing ex ante 
regulation for the BBC, in the second instance, via the newly established BBC Trust 
and the newly proposed broadcasting codes (WP, 2006: 36).  
 
While the new market framework and an increasing market logic has been 
introduced for the regulation of the commercial PSBs, state intervention was 
increased for the BBC in the White Paper (2006), which re-established the BBC as a 
distinct entity from the wider market, nevertheless linked by ‘competition for good 
broadcasting’. The assumption that ‘plurality creates competition for quality in the 
provision of public service broadcasting’ (Ofcom, 2006: 3) and the importance of 
ensuring quality programming via competition are emphasised by the regulator for 
the benefits they will deliver to ‘viewers, particularly in their capacity as UK 
citizens’ (Ofcom, 2006: 7). Competition (for quality PSB programming) between the 
BBC, commercial PSBs and commercial broadcasters remains, therefore, linked with 
‘public service’ and citizenship, distinct from competition (for audience ratings), 
which is restricted to commercial TV and the market. In the contemporary Coalition 
government’s recently published policy paper (DCMS, 2013), competition, as far as 
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the BBC is concerned, is made synonymous with market impact and something 
which should be limited. Meanwhile, the traditional critique of the bureaucratic 
unwieldiness of public monopoly broadcasters is transferred to that of the 
independent regulator, as the focus becomes one of reining in the competition 
regulator’s powers over the increasingly self-regulated commercial sector, while 
simultaneously expanding its scope to cover the publicly accountable BBC in terms 
of its effect on the wider market and competition.  
 
 
 
Problematising Choice: Balancing Public Service and Public Interest 
 
By the late 1970s, the public’s questions regarding PSB had become ‘more critical, 
hostile and political’ (Annan, 1977: 8), and the Annan Committee was obliged to 
address the legitimacy of a public duopoly. Although it had ‘hitherto been assumed 
that Britain had solved the problem of the political relations of broadcasting to 
government, parliament and the public’ (Annan, 1977: 15), the public’s hostility to 
monopoly/duopoly, and the recognition of a differentiated and critical public, 
justified the emergence of ‘choice’ as a new regulatory concern, problematising the 
values of ‘public service’ and ‘public interest’, and necessitating a reconfiguration of 
‘competition’, ‘private enterprise’ and ‘public control’.  
 
Although the long-held distinction between public and private interests became much 
more explicitly problematised from Annan onwards, the distinction had never 
actually been that clear-cut or unproblematic. Originally, ‘particular interests’ were 
associated with both the private monopoly of the British Broadcasting Company and 
the laissez-faire system of the US, and it was deemed that they ‘should be subject to 
the safeguards necessary to protect the public interest’ (Sykes, 1923: 6), where 
‘public interest’ was synonymous with ‘national interest’ and coterminous with 
‘public corporation’ and ‘public service’ (Crawford, 1926). At this time, there was no 
conflict between ‘what the public want’ and the ‘public interest’, with programmes 
of ‘greater cost’ and ‘higher quality’ (Sykes, 1923: 30-31) presumed to satisfy both. 
However, the distinction between ‘what the public wants and what someone thinks is 
good for the public’ (Pilkington, 1962: 18) that typified the commercial and public 
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service approaches, respectively, emerged in the Pilkington Report (1962) as a 
governmental problem to be addressed and resolved.  
 
Consulting with both the BBC and the ITA on their views, the Report concurred that, 
although they were the ‘usual expressions of opposing philosophies’, they were 
‘deceptive slogans’, and the antithesis between them was a ‘gross over-simplification 
of a complex and continuing problem’ (Pilkington, 1962: 18). Pilkington critiqued 
both the ‘give the public what it wants’ approach and the ‘give the public what [the 
broadcaster] thinks is good for it’ alternative as ‘deceptive’ and ‘patronising’, 
arguing that the former ‘claims to know what the public is, but defines it as no more 
than the mass audience’, limiting the public’s choice to ‘the average of experience’, 
while the latter claims to know what would be in the public’s best interests 
(Pilkington, 1962: 17). Both approaches are thus accused of reducing the public to a 
passive and undifferentiated mass. In critiquing both these contrasting philosophies 
and the effort to choose between them, the Report argued that there was, however, 
‘an area of possibility between the two’, and that the duty of broadcasters should 
rather be to acknowledge that ‘what the public wants and what it has the right to get 
is the freedom to choose from the widest possible range of programme matter. 
Anything less than that is deprivation’ (Pilkington, 1962: 17-18). Between ‘what the 
public wants’ and the ‘what [the broadcaster] thinks is good for it’, therefore, is a 
reconfiguration of the ‘public interest’ as the ‘right and freedom to choose’, and of 
‘public service’ as the duty to provide choice to the public.  
 
The Report further maintained that broadcasters should be given the ‘greatest 
possible freedom’ to provide such a public service (Pilkington, 1962: 1058), and 
proposed that ‘competition in good broadcasting’ (Pilkington, 1962: 286) between 
the two broadcasters of the time, although not competition of any other kind (as 
discussed above), would best support this redefinition of PSB’s duty to its public. 
‘Public service’ becomes, therefore, less an obligation or constraint than something 
that broadcasters would naturally provide given the right conditions and absence of 
constraints, while its provision becomes dependent upon competition (in good 
broadcasting, rather than for audiences or advertising revenue).  
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The shift away from the ‘patronising’ approaches of both the BBC and the 
commercial PSBs towards a focus on choice in the public interest was furthered by 
both the Annan Report (1977), with its recommendation to establish a fourth public-
private channel to cater for the marginal interests of a diverse public (and 
emphasising Pilkington’s emphasis on accommodating choice within PSB), and the 
Hunt Report (1982) on cable TV. Problematising the early antithesis between PSB 
and commercial TV in the context of cable, the latter Report argued that both 
approaches were essential to the ‘wider public interest’, which could best be met by 
encouraging the development of cable TV as a supplement to a safeguarded PSB 
(Hunt, 1982: 1). In considering the arrangements under which PSB and cable can co-
exist without damaging the former or inhibiting the latter (Hunt, 1982: 34), PSB is 
shown to provide a ‘balanced service for the country as a whole’, while cable is ‘all 
about widening the viewer’s choice’ (Hunt, 1982: 3). The effect, however, is to 
decouple ‘public service’ (balanced content) from the ‘public interest’ (balanced 
content supplemented by choice), to undermine the contrast between the ‘public 
interest’ and the self-regulated market, and to see the ‘wider public interest’ in terms 
of accommodating both PSB and the market. As PSB is also linked with the ‘country 
as a whole’, and the cable market with the individual ‘viewer’s choice’, the link 
between the ‘public interest’ and the nation/public (rather than the individual) is also 
weakened, and the contrast between the ‘public interest’ and individual’s private 
interests softened. Rather, the ‘public interest’ is ‘widened’ to accommodate both 
individual choice and a balanced service to the aggregate public, while PSB becomes 
a ‘counter-balance to fears about concentration of ownership and the absence of 
diversity of views’ (DTI/DCMS, 2000). 
 
Although the Peacock Report (1986) certainly represented a clear break from earlier 
reports in approaching broadcasting from an economic perspective, critically 
acknowledging the long-term evolution of the relation between ‘public service’ and 
‘public interest’ throughout the history of broadcasting regulation allows us to put its 
significance into perspective. When Peacock approached broadcasting in terms of 
‘consumer sovereignty’, it made ‘public interest’ explicitly synonymous with the 
‘interests of viewers and listeners’ (Peacock, 1986: n552), understood principally as 
‘consumers’. Although it argued that the ‘public interest’, thus understood, was 
therefore best served through both public service and the market, it evaluated PSB’s 
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successes and failures in terms of the extent to which it replicated a ‘true consumer 
market’. ‘Public service’ was thus reconfigured as a temporary solution to the 
conundrum of how to ensure the ‘public interest’ (i.e. ‘consumer sovereignty’ and a 
‘true consumer market’) in the context of spectrum scarcity, and no longer as 
antonymous to consumption.  
 
Although the Report concurred with Pilkington that the essence of PSB institutions is 
to serve the interests of the public or society as a whole, as judged by the institutions 
themselves, Peacock argued that PSB ‘can best be understood in relation 
to…consumer sovereignty and commercial laissez-faire’ (Peacock, 1986: 130), thus 
replacing the dichotomy of PSB-commercialism with a trichotomy of PSB-consumer 
sovereignty-commercialism. The Report also stated that ‘…the fundamental aim of 
broadcasting policy should in our view be to enlarge both the freedom of choice of 
the consumer and the opportunities available to programme makers to offer 
alternative wares to the public’ (Peacock, 1986: 125). Peacock therefore also returns 
to Pilkington’s definition of ‘public service’ (Peacock, 1986: 130-131) as an 
opportunity for, rather than a restriction on, broadcasters, and no longer a case of 
providing set content for a passive public, but of providing choice, albeit for a public 
understood as consumers. Further, although the Report understands PSB as ‘any 
major modification of purely commercial provision resulting from public policy’ 
(Peacock, 1986: 130), and thus presumes that broadcasting’s natural state is one of 
‘purely commercial provision’, it finds both the free market advertising model and 
the PSB licence-fee model wanting in terms of guaranteeing ‘consumer sovereignty’, 
and accuses them jointly of serving more the interests of producers than of 
consumers (Peacock, 1986: 37).  
 
Having defined ‘public service’ in this way, its scope can be made to ‘vary with the 
state of broadcasting’ (Peacock, 1986: 130), justifying the ongoing reconfiguration of 
PSB and tying it to a pre-existing market. The Report maintains that, historically, 
PSB institutions have been ‘necessary to provide the viewer and listener with what 
[they want] as a consumer’, while the ‘public service’ ethos is described as a 
‘commitment to produce a wide range of high quality programmes to maximize 
consumer appreciation’ (Peacock, 1986: 148), and concludes that PSB has even done 
‘far better, in mimicking the effects of a true consumer market, than any purely 
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laissez-faire system, financed by advertising could have done under conditions of 
spectrum shortage’ (Peacock, 1986: 131). At the same time, PSB’s weakness (other 
than its vulnerability to political pressure because of its ‘dependence on public 
finance and regulation’) is exposed as an ‘absence of true consumer 
sovereignty…which only direct payment by viewers and listeners could establish’ 
(Peacock, 1986: 132). However, should a true consumer market be achieved, in 
which viewers and listeners express their preferences (and the intensity of their 
preferences) directly through subscription, then ‘the main role of public service 
could…be the collective provision…of programmes which viewers and listeners are 
willing to support in their capacity of taxpayers and voters, but not directly as 
consumers’ (Peacock, 1986: 130). This is the market failure definition of PSB: that 
while a true market may ultimately serve the consumer interest, PSB will still be 
required to serve the citizen interest. Public intervention and regulation are justified, 
however, not only in terms of ‘our [i.e. the Committee’s] sense of public service’ 
(that is, the market failure approach to supplementing the market with service 
provision for ‘citizens’) (Peacock, 1986: 130-133), but also to ensure an effective 
‘consumer market’ (Peacock, 1986: 126). PSB is therefore justified for ensuring that 
both citizen and consumer interests are met. But PSB is here tied to programming 
rather than institutions (with consequences for the funding of the BBC), and 
citizenship is reductively associated with voting and taxpaying, rather than any active 
republican or communitarian aspects.  
 
Although advertising is criticised for failing to achieve ‘standards of public 
accountability for the private use of public assets’ (Peacock, 1986: 133), both the 
advertising and licence fee models are rejected in favour of ‘direct consumer choice’ 
(Peacock, 1986: 151) because they fail to achieve the ‘welfare benefits theoretically 
associated with a fully functioning market’ (Peacock, 1986: 133). The Report 
therefore recommends that broadcasting ‘move towards a sophisticated market 
system based on consumer sovereignty’, and to supplement this direct consumer 
market with the public financing of public service programmes for ‘citizens and 
voters’ (Peacock, 1986: 133) – though the distinction between citizens and voters in 
this sense is unclear. Although its emphasis is on economic theory, consumer 
sovereignty and market failure, it retains an important role for citizens and PSB, and 
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envisages a mixture of direct payments and public service grants, as well as of 
private enterprises and public corporations (Peacock, 1986: 133).    
 
Although Peacock is often credited with having ushered in an economic, consumer-
oriented, commercialisation of broadcasting, it is important to note the Report’s 
critique of laissez-faire commercialism, and its distinctions between its own nuanced 
approach to consumer sovereignty and the private interests of advertising-financed 
commercial broadcasting. However, when Ofcom later distinguished between ‘social 
values-led’ and ‘economics-driven’ approaches to broadcasting regulation, the latter 
was made to conflate the consumer and commercial approaches that Peacock had 
distinguished between, while the former was made to include them alongside public 
service. In this case, the social values-led approach is made to consider PSB as only a 
‘sub-set’ of the public interest, ‘alongside, for example, healthy competition, (and) a 
thriving commercial broadcasting sector…’, and the commercial sector is 
constructed as a prerequisite for, rather than an alternative to, PSB (Ofcom, 2004: 
‘Understanding the Market’). Rhetorically, the two approaches are given equal 
weight and are evenly balanced in the regulator’s unsurprising conclusion that the 
two approaches are ‘not so different’ after all (Ofcom, 2004: ‘Supporting 
Documents: A Conceptual Review’), and that ‘both approaches can, in fact, be 
captured in a wider economic framework which considers the maximisation of social 
welfare’ (Ofcom, 2004: ‘Supporting Documents: A Conceptual Review’).  
 
Following Peacock’s interpretation of the history of broadcasting regulation in terms 
of consumer interests, and its realignment of ‘public service’ with programming 
rather than with institutions, Ofcom saw broadcasting history as a matter of the 
expanding ‘plurality of public service broadcasting provision’ (Ofcom, 2006: 3), 
asserting that such ‘plurality provision is in the public interest’ (Ofcom, 2006: 26). 
The aim to expand commercial TV while safeguarding PSB is therefore achieved by 
expanding the notion of PSB institutions. The ‘major sources’ of PSB programming 
are made to include not only the publicly-funded BBC, Channel 4 and commercial 
PSBs (ITV and Five), but also those ‘commercial broadcasters that also provide 
content that meets PSB purposes’ (Ofcom, 2006: 6), so reducing the difference 
between PSB and commercial institutions, and incorporating competition, PSB and 
the ‘wider market’ within the ‘public interest’.  
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However, the BBC’s problematic position as a ‘deliberate public policy intervention 
in the market’ (DCMS, 2006: 34) is subsequently differentiated from that of the 
commercial PSBs, who are associated instead with the ‘commercial services and 
wider industry’. While these broadcasters (who may or may not be competing to 
produce quality PSB programming) serve the interests of the ‘public and the rest of 
the broadcasting world’ (DCMS, 2006: 2), the BBC’s purposes are rewritten to 
include an explicit objective to sustain ‘citizenship and civil society’ (DCMS, 2006: 
3). PSB’s democratic function is thus re-inscribed in the institution of the BBC, now 
explicitly linked to citizenship and public service programming, while both the 
commercial PSBs and commercial broadcasters are associated with the provision of 
public service programming for the ‘public’ as well as commercial content for the 
‘rest’.  
 
However, ‘competition regulation’ arrangements are made to regulate the BBC 
‘within a new market framework’ (DCMS, 2006: 34), whereby it is assessed by the 
newly established BBC Trust in terms of ‘public value’, where that is understood as a 
balance between the ‘public interest’ and ‘market impact’, as well as by Ofcom’s 
own market assessment ‘to help balance the benefits of PSB with the health of the 
wider media market’ (DCMS, 2006: 3). Although PSB is recognised as being in the 
public’s ‘affection’ and in the ‘public interest’, it must nevertheless be ‘balanced 
with consideration for competition’ (DCMS, 2006: 34). So, while the commercial 
PSBs are conflated with purely commercial TV, and the BBC explicitly linked with 
citizenship, the BBC-citizenship nexus remains framed within the same logic of 
market competition. While it is independently regulated in terms of the public 
interest, which is already a compromise of commercial, consumer sovereignty and 
public service perspectives, and a balance between this multiple perspective and its 
impact on the market, it is also prone to tertiary regulation by the competition 
regulator, which seeks to balance PSB with a competitive market. Competition and 
the market are therefore protected via three levels of BBC regulation: within the 
government’s policy approach to the ‘public interest’ (a balance between PSB and 
the wider market), the BBC Trust’s approach to ‘public value’ (a balance between 
the ‘public interest’ and ‘market impact’) and Ofcom’s ‘market impact’ assessments. 
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Problematising the Public: Balancing the Interests of Citizens and Consumers 
 
The recently published media and telecommunications policy paper (DCMS, 2013) 
contains just one reference to ‘citizenship’ (not counting one reference to ‘citizen 
journalists’ and another to the ‘Citizens Advice Bureau’), but 117 to ‘consumer/s’ 
(that is, 53 to ‘consumer’ and 64 to ‘consumers’). Although references to 
‘consumers’ have been explicit since the Peacock Report (1986), and the distinction 
between ‘citizens’ and ‘consumers’ awkwardly negotiated from the Communications 
White Paper (DTI/DCMS, 2000) onwards, their problematisation can be traced 
further back to the emergence of distinctions between ‘what the public wants’, ‘what 
the broadcaster thinks is good for the public’, the ‘public interest’ and the ‘interests 
of viewers and listeners’. It is also necessary to look more closely at Peacock’s 
nuanced and economically-informed account of ‘consumer sovereignty’, Annan’s 
recognition of a differentiated and plural ‘public’, and Pilkington’s emphasis on 
‘choice’ over prescribed content, for a fuller appreciation of the long-term 
problematisation of ‘the public’.  
 
Although Beveridge had feared that competition for listeners would make 
broadcasters the ‘servants of consumers’ (Beveridge, 1951: 164), subsequent reports 
argued that the introduction of competition and private enterprise would be in the 
‘interests of viewers’ (White Paper, 1953), that ‘the public’s right to choose’ was a 
superior alternative to providing either ‘what the public wants’ or ‘what the 
broadcaster thinks the public wants’ (Pilkington, 1962: 17-18), and that an 
increasingly pluralist society expected the full range of their different views to be 
expressed (Annan, 1977: 30). Up to this point, however, a stark contrast had always 
been made between the ‘public’ and ‘consumers’. The Annan Report’s elaboration of 
a differentiated public, for instance, maintained a distinction between consumer 
interests and the public interest by limiting all references to consumers to a section 
on ‘Consumer Programming’ (Annan, 1977: 357); this section took up just one page 
of the 522 page report, and addressed consumer interests as well as complaints from 
the Consumer Association about broadcasting’s negative representation of 
consumerism (Dawes, 2007). The Peacock Report (1986), however, shifted its focus 
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away from ‘public interest’ and towards the ‘interests of viewers and listeners’, 
understood principally as ‘consumers’. Approaching broadcasting regulation in terms 
of ‘consumer sovereignty’, Peacock assessed the extent to which consumer interests 
could be met through both PSB and the market. The Report’s understanding of 
‘consumer’, however, is not easily compatible with the ‘consumers’ of earlier 
reports, as Peacock distinguishes a ‘true consumer market’ from the inferior laissez-
faire market of commercial (advertising financed) broadcasting. Nor is it clearly 
distinct from the ‘citizens’ or ‘public’ of earlier reports, as Peacock develops a fuller, 
more elaborate view of the ‘consumer’ that builds upon an increasing interest in 
choice and recognition of difference in the public’s views and tastes, as well as the 
developing critique of the effects upon the public of an absence of competition.  
 
Following Pilkington in rejecting the dichotomy between providing ‘what the public 
wants’ and ‘what they ought to have’ as false, Peacock proposes a ‘more thoughtful 
exponent of consumer sovereignty’, which recognises that consumers have more than 
‘known and static wants’, and argues that a competitive (subscription) market 
functions as a ‘discovery mechanism’ for consumers to ‘expand their range of tastes 
and preferences’ (Peacock, 1986: 126). In addition to their conscious wants, 
therefore, consumers sometimes enjoy what they don’t already know, accept 
guidance in areas where their knowledge is limited, and want high quality 
programming to be available, even if not enough to pay for it themselves directly 
(Peacock, 1986: 128). Peacock approaches programmes that consumers might not 
directly consume, therefore, in terms of ‘consumer welfare’ rather than ‘citizen or 
public interest’, begging the question ‘to what extent, if at all, public intervention is 
required’ (Peacock, 1986: 126). Should consumer preferences be expressed directly, 
the Report proposes, PSB would provide the programmes that consumers do not 
support as consumers, but as ‘taxpayers’ (Peacock, 1986: 130), ‘citizens’ and 
‘voters’ (Peacock, 1986: 133). ‘Public support’ for the provision of public service 
programmes is consequently acknowledged as ‘consumer support’ (Peacock, 1986: 
128), and PSB defended in terms of consumption rather than citizenship; indeed, 
PSB is judged to have been ‘better for consumers’ than the (advertising financed) 
commercial market (Peacock, 1986: 131), thus bringing consumers closer to PSB 
than pre-subscription commercial TV. 
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In the Communications White Paper (DTI/DCMS, 2000), there is both a clear 
distinction between the interests of citizens and those of consumers, and 
simultaneously an area of ambiguity in which certain interests are not explicitly 
related to either citizens or consumers. Confusingly, there is also an inconsistent use 
of the term ‘consumer’, whereby it appears to perform a contradictorily double 
function (for a fuller account, see Dawes, 2007). Although a preoccupation with 
meeting the needs of ‘both citizens and consumers’ or ‘citizens as well as consumers’ 
is prevalent throughout the document, whereby they appear as equivalent, with each 
other as well as with ‘parents’, ‘workers’, ‘students’ and ‘every section of our 
society’, the document is oriented much more to ‘consumers’ than ‘citizens’. In the 
Executive Summary, for instance, ‘citizen’ occurs three times while ‘consumer’ 
occurs ten times, while even in a section that deals specifically with ‘quality’ and 
‘public service broadcasting’ (DTI/DCMS, 2000: Section 5), ‘citizen’ occurs only 
once compared with five times for ‘consumer’, and a ‘Consumer Panel’ is proposed 
to represent the views of the public.  
 
This does not, however, suggest that the new regulatory framework is necessarily 
oriented more to those issues it explicitly defines as consumer-interests, but that the 
new regulator will be principally a competition regulator. In a key passage from the 
document in which the objectives of the newly proposed regulator are set out, the 
simultaneity of the distinction between and conflation of citizens and consumers is 
most explicit: 
 
We propose that OFCOM's central regulatory objectives 
should be: 
 
- protecting the interests of consumers in terms of choice, 
price, quality of service and value for money, in particular 
through promoting open and competitive markets; 
 
- maintaining high quality of content, a wide range of 
programming, and plurality of public expression; 
 
- protecting the interests of citizens by maintaining accepted 
community standards in content, balancing freedom of 
speech against the need to protect against potentially 
offensive or harmful material, and ensuring appropriate 
protection of fairness and privacy. 
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(DTI/DCMS, 2000: Section 8.5, emphases added) 
 
‘Choice’, ‘price’, ‘service quality’ and ‘value for money’ are all defined as 
consumer-interests, and consumers are defined in terms of their financial relationship 
with service providers; further, it is proposed that their interests will be protected 
indirectly through the regulator’s promotion of ‘open and competitive markets’. As 
far as the interests of consumers are concerned, therefore, Ofcom’s role will be to act 
as a competition regulator. 
 
‘Content standards’, protection from ‘offensive or harmful material’ and of ‘fairness 
and privacy’, on the other hand, are clearly defined as citizen-interests (although it is 
unclear if a balance is required between ‘freedom of speech’ and ‘privacy’ as distinct 
citizen-interests, or if ‘freedom of speech’ is made synonymous with the press 
freedom/free market approach of consumer-interests, which the regulator will be 
required to balance with citizen-interests such as ‘privacy’). Although the regulator 
will have a more directly interventionist role in protecting citizen-interests, by its 
ability to impose fines on specific service providers, these are all issues that have 
traditionally related to the media law perspective more associated with the self-
regulation of the press (in which, as Part Three has demonstrated, the distinction 
between citizens and consumers has always been unclear) than the public regulation 
of broadcasting.  
 
It is also interesting to see how public control and private enterprise are balanced in 
relation to citizen and consumer interests. There are clear parallels, for instance, 
between Ofcom’s and New Labour’s distinction between direct and indirect 
regulation, on the one hand, and Peacock’s distinction between direct and indirect 
relations between the consumer and service provider. For Peacock, the more direct 
the relation, the better for consumer sovereignty and the lesser the need for direct 
regulation. The latter is reserved in recent documents for citizen interests and the 
regulation of the BBC in particular. However, for Peacock, it was not only the 
licence fee that negatively affected consumer sovereignty, but commercial laissez-
faire broadcasting when financed by advertising rather than by subscription. 
Peacock’s insistence on the necessity of public intervention for consumers as well as 
citizens in the absence of direct relations, is therefore split by Ofcom into a 
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distinction between direct and indirect types of intervention, thus framing the long-
term balance between public control and private enterprise within the 
problematisation of citizen and consumer interests. Effectively, two contrasting 
balances are provided: while citizen interests are protected by a particular balance 
between public control and private enterprise (namely direct regulation), consumer 
interests are protected by a different balance between public control and private 
enterprise (that is, indirect regulation). The former involves censorship and fines on 
particular institutions, the latter involves more general competition regulation of the 
sector as a whole. However, Ofcom was originally dedicated to regulate the 
commercial market, not the BBC, and to do so indirectly, as a rule; direct regulation 
for citizen interests was a backstop. More recently, this direct intervention seems to 
have been further recalibrated to allow Ofcom to regulate the BBC purely in terms of 
market impact assessments.  
 
However, as they are attributed explicitly to neither the interests of citizens nor 
consumers, the issues listed in the second bullet-point are more ambiguous; although 
there is an implicit suggestion that they follow on from the preceding list of 
consumer-interests prior to the introduction of distinct citizen-interests. ‘Content 
quality’ is thus made distinct from both ‘content standards’ (which are dealt with 
directly by the regulator as citizen-interests), and from ‘service quality’ (which is 
dealt with indirectly through the market as a consumer-interest). The ‘range of 
programming’ (distinct from consumer-related ‘quality of programming’ or citizen-
related ‘content standards’) and the ‘plurality of public expression’ also fall into this 
grey area that the document is unable to subsume under the banner of either citizen- 
or consumer- interests, constituting points of tension that pervade throughout the 
text. Consequently, concepts such as ‘quality’ and even ‘plurality’ become free-
floating signifiers. In a section devoted to ‘quality’ (DTI/DCMS, 2000: Section 5), 
the ‘quality of broadcasting’ unless otherwise stated, could refer to the quality of 
either content or service provision, whereas, in a section devoted to ‘diversity and 
plurality’ (DTI/DCMS, 2000: Section 4), the concern is with the ‘diversity and 
plurality of communications services’ rather than the ‘plurality of public expression’, 
suggesting it is more related to service provision and consumer interests. Because 
‘consumers’ are also associated with these vague concepts of ‘quality’ and 
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‘plurality’, the term ‘consumer’ appears to perform a second function, referring not 
necessarily to financial relations but to the public more generally. 
 
Indeed, a distinction is made, for instance, between ‘consumers’ who ‘watch 
television’ (DTI/DCMS, 2000: Section 6.4.11) and ‘buy information goods’ 
(DTI/DCMS, 2000: Section 6.3.6), and ‘citizens’ who principally watch ‘news and 
current affairs’ (DTI/DCMS, 2000: Section 6.4.10); in more recent documents, 
however, even news is discussed mainly in terms of ‘news consumption’, although 
its important role for ‘citizens’ access to information’ is recognised (DCMS, 2006: 
30). Similarly, ‘customers’, who are particular individuals in a direct relation with a 
specific service provider, are distinguished from ‘consumers’, understood as the 
general public’s relations with all service providers or the market as a whole, 
suggesting that ‘consumers’ only become ‘citizens’ when they watch the news, or 
‘customers’ when they deal with their specific service provider.  
 
The grey area between citizen and consumer interests, which the White Paper 
attempted to resolve through a secondary use of the term ‘consumer’, was originally 
resolved by Ofcom itself in terms of the ‘citizen-consumer’. By ‘serving the interests 
of citizen-consumers,’ the regulator attempts to treat the individual as both a citizen 
and a consumer; but despite its original dominance on the homepage of Ofcom’s 
website (until January 2005), not only is this transcendence unequally balanced 
throughout its publications, it is in sharp contrast to its complete absence throughout 
the regulator’s PSB Review. Rather, the ‘citizen-consumer’ seems equivalent to the 
consumer, and antithetically related to the citizen, and the regulator has since 
substituted the term ‘consumer’ for ‘citizen-consumer’.  
 
The text refers to the Peacock Report’s suggestion that ‘consumers may have a 
considered view about the provision of aspects of broadcasting which they 
themselves might not directly consume’ (Ofcom, 2004: ‘A Research-Based View’), 
and to the ITC’s research into the extent to which the ‘public’ could ‘separate their 
own personal programming likes and dislikes from their support for ‘citizenship’ or 
‘social/cultural’ programming’ (Ofcom, 2004: ‘ITV1 Pilot Study’). Significantly, the 
text distinguishes between the approach to regulation that has delivered to citizens 
what they ‘want to be widely available for as many people as possible to watch’ and 
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the approach that has delivered ‘what consumers want to watch or want to have the 
option to watch’ (Ofcom, 2004: 8 ‘Definition and Purpose of PSB’). Further, the 
individual is constructed as both a citizen and a consumer (Ofcom, 2004: ‘Supporting 
Documents: A Conceptual Review’), and the impact of a consumer’s private 
preferences on other consumers is emphasised. This process serves the purpose of 
reducing the differences between consumers and citizens, so that, on the one hand, 
the consumer can act collectively, and, on the other, the citizen can act individually. 
The distinction between ‘wanting to have the option to watch’ and ‘wanting to be 
widely available for others’ is weakened, justifying the regulator’s ‘great emphasis 
on the perspective of the viewer’, and the inclusion of citizens’ interests within the 
remit of the Consumer Panel (Ofcom, 2004: ‘Ofcom’s Research to Date’). 
 
This produces contradictions, however, in the ways in which individuals and the 
public are constructed, particularly in reference to the ‘the UK as a whole.’ On most 
occasions, ‘individuals and citizens’ (Ofcom, 2004: ‘Suggested Overall Framework’) 
are constructed antithetically, and ‘the UK as a whole’ is synonymous with citizens 
or public (Ofcom, 2004: 9 ‘Executive Summary’). Occasionally, however, ‘citizens 
and the UK as a whole’ (Ofcom, 2004: ‘Aims of the PSB Review’) are made distinct 
from one another, so that the latter signifies consumers. By contrast, a clear 
distinction had been made in the Hunt Report between the ‘country as a whole’ and 
individual ‘viewer’s choice’ (Hunt, 1982: 3), whereby the former was explicitly 
linked to PSB and citizenship, and the latter with commercial (cable) television and 
consumer choice. Praising PSB from the perspective of consumer sovereignty, the 
Peacock Report (1986) had regarded it as serving the ‘public’s interests’ for the good 
of ‘society as a whole’ (Peacock, 1986: 130), downplaying the distinction between 
citizens and consumers, and linking PSB to consumers as well as the public and 
society as a whole. More recently, the ‘interests of the public and the rest of the 
broadcasting world’ have been linked to commercial PSBs (ITV, Channel Four and 
Five), commercial services (such as Sky) and the ‘wider industry’ (DCMS, 2006: 2), 
while ‘sustaining citizenship and civil society’ has become a core purpose of the 
BBC (DCMS, 2006: 3). A distinction is now made between citizenship and the 
public, whereby ‘public service’ is no longer for the ‘public’ at all, but for ‘citizens’, 
while the free market serves the interests not only of ‘consumers’ or ‘viewers’, but of 
the ‘public as a whole’. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Broadcasting regulation concerns the political relations of broadcasting to 
government, parliament and the public (Annan, 1977: 15). There have been several 
overlapping principles of broadcasting regulation: public control; public service; 
public interest; competition (and plurality); consumer sovereignty (and choice); and 
public value. From the beginning of broadcasting regulation there was a concern with 
the distinction between the ‘public interest’ and particular (or private) interests, and a 
concern with the balance between safeguarding broadcasting’s independence from 
government (in terms of the appointment of governors as well as editorial content) 
and maintaining government control. Initially, the principles of ‘public service’ and 
‘public interest’ were secondary to that of ‘public control’, but once the emphasis 
had shifted, ‘public service’ and ‘public interest’ were treated synonymously and in 
contradistinction to the commercial market and private interests. Over time, the 
integrity of, and link between, the ‘public service’ and ‘public interest’ concepts has 
been reconfigured. Although the two were unproblematically conflated in early 
documents, a distinction has since been made between the ‘public interest’ and what 
the ‘public want’, and between ‘public service’ and the ‘public interest’. While the 
‘public interest’ has been widened to also incorporate choice, competition, consumer 
sovereignty and the market, ‘public service’ has been reconfigured to vary in scope 
and to cover programming and consumers as well as institutions and citizens. 
Ultimately, the ‘public interest’ has shifted from being synonymous with ‘public 
service’ and antonymous to the market, to being distanced from the former and made 
closer to the latter. Since the 1980s, it has been used to account for the relationship 
between a trichotomy of ‘public service-consumer sovereignty-commercial market’, 
in which ‘consumer sovereignty’ is distinguished from the ‘commercial market’ and 
made to overlap with ‘public service’. Although the legacy of Peacock’s economic 
perspective remains manifest in more recent documents, the concepts have continued 
to undergo reconfiguration. ‘Public service’ is currently tied closely with the BBC, 
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while commercial PSBs are considered alongside commercial broadcasters rather 
than the BBC or in terms of ‘public service’. Meanwhile, the ‘public interest’ is 
made to be a mix of ‘public service’ and competition perspectives, while this ‘public 
service-competition’ compromise must always be balanced with an additional 
assessment, in the name of ‘public value’, of the market impact of public 
intervention.  
 
Supplementing the critical methodological approach with a long-term genealogical 
frame allows this chequered history to be revealed, and suggests that it is 
misleadingly reductive (albeit not incorrect) to interpret contemporary regulation in 
terms of neoliberal ideology, a shift from citizenship to consumption, or a case of 
protecting particular private interests. Likewise, it is disingenuous (although not 
entirely false) to suggest that early broadcasting regulation was simply a matter of 
public over private interests, or of citizenship over consumption. Rather, the critique 
of contemporary neoliberalisation needs to more clearly distinguish between recent 
recalibrations of the ‘public interest’, on the one hand, and earlier (proto-neoliberal) 
manifestations of private interests and a disinclination to curb private enterprise, on 
the other. The archaeological work summarised in this chapter begs for a more 
nuanced reading of the citizen-consumer and public-private dichotomies in 
broadcasting regulation history, and for a reassessment of the relation between PSB, 
the public sphere and neoliberalism; and, in the concluding chapter of this thesis, the 
theoretical and methodological debates (surveyed in Parts One and Three-Seven) will 
be brought to bear upon the analyses (in Part Eight) and the dominant literature on 
broadcasting regulation (reviewed in Part Two).   
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Conclusion 
 
 
The assumption of a link between PSB, citizenship and the public sphere, and 
between consumerism, neoliberalism and the private interests of powerful 
corporations, certainly seem commonsensical enough. However, a closer engagement 
with the nuances in regulatory discourse, as well as the complexity of theoretical 
debate around such concepts, suggests that it is not as straightforward as 
broadcasting scholarship tends to assume. While this hardly suggests that we should 
abandon PSB, dispense with citizenship and the public sphere as explanatory tools, 
or embrace the relative autonomy promised by consumerism or neoliberalism, it does 
necessitate a theoretical engagement with consumption as well as with citizenship 
studies, and with neoliberal as well as with public sphere theory. Likewise, while a 
critical theoretical-methodological approach remains necessary for an understanding 
of contemporary regulation, critique must be ‘deepened’ along more reflexive lines, 
and be framed within a longer-term genealogical account of governmental 
problematisations, if the critical assessment of regulatory change is to be effective.  
 
 
 
The Problematisations 
 
The distinction between the ‘public interest’ and ‘what the public want’, identified in 
early broadcasting documents, echoes on one level the distinction between ‘what is 
in the interests of the public’ and ‘what is of interest to the public’, more commonly 
associated with debates from the history of press regulation in the UK. But 
recognising that such a distinction has been a ‘gross over-simplification of a complex 
and continuing problem’ (Pilkington, 1962: 18) suggests that contemporary 
reconfigurations of the ‘public interest’, which associate it more with market 
competition than with ‘public service’, cannot be entirely understood in terms of 
ideological manipulation or private interests. For sure, it is difficult to ignore the 
realities of private lobbying and clandestine relations between politicians and media 
proprietors, and this thesis certainly does not argue that regulatory change is neutral, 
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disinterested or apolitical. However, on a theoretical level, there seems to be 
something more complex going on, and while flippant dismissals of loosely defined 
neoliberalisation are theoretically unhelpful, more considered critiques of neoliberal 
hegemony and the protection of private interests tell only part (albeit an important 
part) of the story. 
 
The identification of discursive trichotomies, such as the ‘public service-consumer 
sovereignty-commercial market’ nexus introduced by Peacock, suggest that critically 
approaching regulation in terms of simple dualities (of ‘public service-commercial 
market’, for instance) can be misleading; the conflation of consumer sovereignty 
with corporate interests ignores the ways in which the interests of consumers are 
often contrary to those of media proprietors. Likewise, the rejection of Ofcom's 
‘citizen-consumer’ as merely a cover for ‘consumer’, while convincing for the most 
part, also risks ignoring a genuine attempt to negotiate a difficult terrain, and falls 
into the trap of presuming that a clear dichotomy of citizens and consumers is 
possible and desirable to maintain. Similarly, contradictory uses of terms such as 
‘consumer’, as in the discourse of Ofcom and the New Labour governments, suggest 
that closer attention needs to be paid to the ways in which such uses are 
contradictory, and to the contrasting concerns, discourses and problematisations they 
represent, rather than simply identifying the existence of a contradiction and 
critiquing it in terms of ideological tension.  
 
While it is hard to refute the general accusation that the ubiquity of terms such as 
‘consumer’ and ‘competition’ demonstrates the hegemony of market logic, and that 
their contradictory usage reveals evidence of ideological tension, it ignores the 
functional differences between usages of particular terms (overlooking, for instance, 
the distinction between consumers in a direct financial relation with service 
providers, whereby the regulator is obliged to act in a certain way, on the one hand, 
and consumers as active members of ‘society as a whole’, where the regulator is 
required to act in another way). Whereas the former suggests the encroachment of a 
strictly market logic, in which broadcasting consumers are treated no differently 
from the consumers of toasters (for example), the latter shares its heritage with a very 
different tradition that has problematised the character of the public, and the 
difference between individuals and the public, throughout the history of media 
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regulation and liberal democracy. In this tradition, the extent to which the public can 
be seen as a mass, an aggregation, a differentiated entity or a ‘phantom’ sphere that is 
more than the sum of its parts, has been critically debated since at least the 18th 
Century, and although the particular usage of the ‘consumer’ as a label for this 
‘problem’ demonstrates more of a market emphasis than the earlier usage of ‘citizen’ 
in broadcasting regulation, to reduce it to evidence of corporate influence over the 
regulatory process denies the complexity of liberal and republican debate on the 
identity of the public.  
 
Further, a closer investigation of the relation between ‘public service’, ‘public 
interest’ and ‘public value’ regulation highlights an intricacy to the reregulation of 
broadcasting, which simultaneously supports the critique of sweeping marketisation 
while qualifying it to reveal differences in the levels of marketisation. It is not 
incorrect, therefore to dismiss ‘public interest’ and ‘public value’ as Trojan horses 
for marketisation, or to denounce the marketisation inherent in the reconstruction of 
‘public service’, but it is frustratingly heavy-handed. Detailed analysis of the 
differences between the regulatory significance of each of these terms contributes, in 
contrast, to a greater degree of understanding about the true extent of marketisation, 
critically revealing the ways in which explicit ‘market impact’ assessments are 
prefigured by the relatively more insidious introduction of elements of market logic 
via ‘public interest’ and then ‘public value’ assessments, as well as by the 
internalisation of a market outlook within the very concept of ‘public service’.  
Nothing in this acknowledgment of, and engagement with, nuance and complexity 
necessitates, however, a rejection of the more familiar narrative of the critical 
approach; rather, in requiring its qualification, it demands even ‘deeper critique’.  
 
 
 
Critique and Governmentality 
 
The critical approach is essential for explaining why such configurations have come 
about, but a more nuanced frame is required to avoid falling back on the misleading 
assumptions and selective readings that undermine the efficacy of such critical 
accounts to convince the unconverted. While the critical approach’s lot is to be either 
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embraced by partisans or dismissed as partisan, a theoretical-methodological bridge 
between critical and governmental approaches engages directly with the complexity 
of such arguments and the difficulty of distinguishing between ideologies or 
perspectives. Although this may perturb those wary of diluting critique, it also offers 
the prospect of converting hostile dismissal into more serious (and critical) 
engagement.  
 
While CDA is certainly useful for an analysis of contemporary texts, and as a 
compliment to the critique of marketisation and the influence of private interests in 
media regulation, the theoretical assumptions, normative thrust and methodological 
dependence upon binary relations of most of its practitioners undermine the extent to 
which it can support a longer-term analysis. As politically important as such a 
strategy may be, it is perhaps too blunt a tool or perspective to avoid theoretical and 
methodological reductionism. Indeed, if it is true that language use is increasingly 
strategic, and that CDA is therefore all the more necessary today (as its proponents 
argue), one could suggest that it is of relatively less value for an analysis of earlier 
documents, written at a time when language use was more communicative. A 
genealogical approach to governmental rationality and the close analysis of mundane 
techniques and technologies, on the other hand, takes account of the ethical and 
technical character, as well as the ideology, of neoliberalism. It appreciates the extent 
to which the neoliberal critique of PSB, for instance, is more a critique of the ideals 
of knowledge and power that such rationalities embody than a rejection of the actual 
or perceived failures or weaknesses of PSB. As such, it is not enough for critics to 
acknowledge the failures or the realities of PSB while maintaining an uncritical 
defence of the rationale for PSB itself; rather, it is necessary to engage with critiques 
of that rationale.  
 
By genealogically tracing the dispersal of events, on the other hand, how 
governmental problems emerge, and how practices and roles are contradictorily 
constituted by multiple processes, can be explained without recourse to ideology or 
the need to explain why (Miller and Rose, 2008). Although this thesis began as a 
critical account of the shift from citizenship/public service to consumerism/market 
competition, it has finished as a genealogical account of the ways in which 
‘problems’ have been identified and approached over time in terms of distinctions 
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between public and private interests, and between the interests of citizens and 
consumers, taking the presuppositions of critical scholars as the primary object of 
study, rather than broadcasting regulation as such. The analyses conducted as part of 
the research for this thesis have illustrated the ‘historically sedimented underpinnings 
of particular problematisations’, rather than assuming a grand historical process or 
singular underlying cause (Barry et al, 1996: 5). Consequently, claims of state 
withdrawal or encroaching private interests are emphasised less than a focus on the 
ongoing reconfiguration of the public-private distinction as ‘particular 
problematisations of government’. Only once the (long-term) liberal-democratic 
problematisation of how to balance private freedom with public intervention is 
acknowledged, and the ways in which its resolution has been attempted (since 
broadcasting’s inception), in terms of reconfigurations of the public-private and 
citizen-consumer dichotomies, have been traced, can their contemporary 
configurations be critiqued without being simplistically reduced to binary opposites.  
 
Efforts to bridge the gap between ideological critique and more nuanced 
governmental accounts of hybridity, in contrast, offer a way to acknowledge truths 
that would otherwise be inconvenient for a critical approach, without jettisoning 
critique in the process. Although this author remains unconvinced that such a mixed 
approach is practical or even possible in many situations, this thesis contends that the 
attempt to bridge these two approaches must nevertheless be made, and the extent to 
which their reconciliation is possible be evaluated. In the context of broadcasting 
regulation, this thesis has demonstrated that the critique of contemporary discourse 
needs to be made within a longer-term governmental framework; only once the 
ongoing problematisations have been identified can the strategic manipulation of 
those dichotomous debates be critically analysed by reference to ideology. If private 
influence or corruption are identified, they should of course be denounced; but not all 
efforts to reconstruct the public as ‘consumers’ can necessarily be denounced as 
evidence of such influence or corruption. Although the preference for the term 
‘consumer’ in contemporary documents, and the tensions between ‘citizen’ and 
‘consumer’ interests in those of the previous decade, can therefore be said to reveal 
an ideological commitment to neoliberal ideas, and, furthermore, understood in the 
context of excessive corporate lobbying and clandestine relations between politicians 
and media proprietors, the wider context of the ongoing problematisation of the 
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public-private dichotomy must not be overlooked. It is misleading to suggest that the 
distinction between them was once stable and appropriate in contrast to its 
contemporary strategic manipulation; rather, the distinction has always been 
unstable, fluid, mobile, protean and the result of a mixture of what can be considered 
private interests as well as something approaching the general public interest. 
Understanding such dichotomies as processes ultimately allows for a decoupling of 
the public sphere from preconceived notions of PSB, and for a more unencumbered 
reconstruction of a public sphere model.  
 
 
 
The Dichotomies 
 
Close engagement with Habermas’s historical and normative approach to the public 
sphere, meanwhile, raises questions about the appropriateness of the concept’s 
application to a defence of PSB. While revisionists have demonstrated the historical 
inaccuracy of much of his account and provided many contrary examples to 
undermine his argument or ‘rise and fall’ narrative, those critically engaging (in 
‘dialectical alliance’) with his normative approach have demonstrated the 
controversial difficulty of distinguishing between society and politics, thus 
substantiating the claim that the appropriation of his concept by broadcasting 
scholars is based on only a selective and uncritical reading of Habermas and 
subsequent debates.  
 
Particularly problematic is Habermas’s treatment of the distinction between 
citizenship and the welfare state, on the one hand, and consumption and the market, 
on the other. His critiques of the bestowal of social citizenship rights upon a passive 
and dependent citizenry, and of the shift from seeing press freedom as a political 
right to seeing it as a social right, emphasise their negative effect on the public-
private distinction that underlies the public sphere. 
 
His critique, on the other hand, of the rise of public relations management and 
commercialised mass media, so often appropriated in broadcasting scholarship to 
substantiate the critique of neoliberalisation, is relatively less important to his 
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argument, and even treated as an effect of the social democratic processes that 
broadcasting scholars problematically propose as a corrective to the decline of the 
public sphere. Rather, according to Habermas, the critical publicity of the public 
sphere is simultaneously both preserved by the free market and the social welfare 
state, as well as undermined by the manipulative publicity of the market and the 
representative publicity of public service. For Habermas, while the public are 
socialised and depoliticised economically as consumers, they are also socialised and 
depoliticised politically as citizens. While it is undeniable that PSB successfully 
shields citizens from corporate power, therefore, it is important to also acknowledge 
the ways in which it reduces citizens to a depoliticised community of private 
consumers, thus simultaneously enabling and undermining the public sphere.  
 
Arendt’s emphasis on the mutual dependence of the public and private realms, and 
Lipmann’s and Schumpter’s critiques of the ‘insensible merging’ of public and 
private citizenship, as well as of public and private interests, cautions us against too 
simplistic a reading of the public-private dichotomy. Indeed, the republican critique 
of liberal press freedom, on which Habermas drew for his development of the public 
sphere concept, demonstrates the extent to which it is difficult to distinguish between 
apolitical consumption and the depoliticised citizenship of the liberal-legal tradition. 
While Habermas proposes that recourse to the rational-critical debate and active 
participation of the republican tradition, as well as liberal rights, overcomes this 
handicap, subsequent theories have demonstrated that it is not so easy to distinguish 
between rational and irrational debate either.  Consequently, while the extent to 
which PSB can produce rational-critical citizenship must be critically assessed 
alongside a critique of market-based press freedom, an engagement with the extent to 
which rational-critical citizenship can be distinguished from irrational-uncritical 
consumption must also be addressed. Thinking through the conditions and 
possibilities for public communication and political participation in the present 
(Schudson, 1992), that is, will benefit neither from maintaining illusions about the 
broadcasting public sphere of the past, nor from misleadingly conflating the public 
sphere with PSB today. None of this rejects, however, the validity of Garnham’s and 
Murdock’s emphasis on citizenship, or of Garnham’s and Scannell’s appropriation of 
Habermas’s public sphere, as a defence of PSB; but it does necessitate their 
qualification, and an acknowledgment of the shaky ground on which such premises 
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are built. It turns attention to an appreciation of the ways in which, for example, PSB 
and citizen interests may also depoliticise and pacify participation in the public 
sphere, while commercial media and consumer interests may occasionally offer the 
potential for political participation and resistance to economic and political power, 
which PSB and citizenship are relatively ill-equipped to guarantee.  
 
It is not so much the terms ‘citizenship’ and ‘consumption’ themselves that are 
unhelpful, however, but rather the binary opposition that has been constructed 
between them. By contrast, an alternative account of citizenship and consumption, 
which acknowledges their imbrication and mutual dependence throughout the history 
of broadcasting regulation, facilitates a more critical theoretical engagement with the 
extent to which the conditions and possibilities for a public sphere are actually being 
fostered. While media studies literature seems to sometimes recognise the 
complexity of distinctions between citizenship and consumption, its efforts to 
address this complexity are limited to (otherwise important) ethnographic research 
into the public’s views on, and understandings of, such distinctions. As useful as this 
research is, however, it unfortunately avoids engagement with the relevant 
theoretical debates, failing to develop a more protean account of the concepts and 
dichotomies, to explicitly recognise them as ongoing processes and everyday 
practices rather than integral and coherent statuses, or to critically acknowledge the 
ways in which they overlap and mutually reinforce one another. 
 
 
 
Naming Neoliberalism 
 
This thesis has not demonstrated (nor has it set out to demonstrate), therefore, that 
regulatory changes in broadcasting cannot or should not be considered neoliberal, 
nor that an understanding of such changes in terms of neoliberalism is unhelpful or 
erroneous. Rather, it has demonstrated the need to look more closely at the historical 
(governmental) roots of neoliberalisation, such as the early regulatory interests in 
choice, competition and private enterprise, and to consider less dismissively the 
neoliberal critiques of the private interests inherent in PSB, and more critically the 
problems posed by early PSB, as well as the ideal of PSB itself, for the public sphere. 
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It has also shown the necessity of acknowledging both exceptions to neoliberal logic 
(such as social democratic concerns for informed citizenship and the continuing 
support for PSB), as well as the potential benefits of explicitly or ostensibly 
neoliberal measures (such as accountability, the recognition of an increasingly active 
and differentiated public, and even market competition) for both citizenship and the 
public sphere. Doing so demands a qualification of the claim that changes are simply 
neoliberal, necessitating instead terminological specification – whether changes are 
evidence of either neoliberal ideology or neoliberal governmentality, for instance – 
as well as an assessment of the extent to which they are a mixture of neoliberalism 
and other ideologies/governmentalities, or whether an unstable mixture of 
contradictory discourses/perspectives, rather than simply an obsession with free 
markets, is what actually defines neoliberalism.  
 
This thesis accepts, therefore, the political necessity of ‘naming’ neoliberalism, and 
of critiquing the influence of private interests on media regulation and the public 
sphere. However, it maintains that such political necessity not only needs to balanced 
with an acknowledgment of theoretical complexity, but that it is also best served by 
such an acknowledgment. Reducing neoliberalisation to always and simply being a 
question of protecting private interests leads to the instinctive rejection of all things 
potentially neoliberal, falsely identifying PSB wholeheartedly with (often a vaguely 
defined notion of) citizenship and the public sphere, and denying the importance of 
consumption and the market for democracy, as well as both a socially inclusive and 
politically critical public sphere. Further, while mostly effective in recognising 
threats from corporate power and in warning citizens of the risks of consumerism, 
such critique sometimes fails to recognise the existence of threats posed to active 
citizenship by the professed protection of citizen interests and by PSB itself, as well 
as the potential of the ostensible protection of consumer interests to hold corporate 
power to account.  
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Concluding Remarks 
 
The research undertaken here into the theoretical and methodological engagement 
with broadcasting regulation in the UK has wider consequences for the critique of 
global media regulation. Although the critical approach remains pertinent (perhaps 
more so than ever), engaging with the wider literatures on the public-private 
dichotomy, and reframing the critical approach within a view of neoliberalism as a 
political-economic governmentality, allows a theoretically more nuanced critique of 
historical changes to media regulation, a more sophisticated reading of governments’ 
and regulators’ negotiation of the discursive terrain, and a reappraisal of the 
contradictorily positive and negative contributions of multiple practices and 
overlapping processes to the public sphere. And as well as addressing the concerns of 
those tired with the usual terms of debate without having to jettison them, such a 
project also contributes to a more convincing political critique of corporate power, 
private interests and market influence, and to an elaboration of a public sphere more 
efficacious for its critical acknowledgment of both the contradictions of liberal and 
republican traditions, as well as the complexity of neoliberal thought.  
 
Although this thesis focused on terminological debates, discursive change and textual 
analyses in a specific national context, more contextual research, comparative 
analyses and engagement with other aspects of media regulation and the public-
private dichotomy could have been included, had space and time allowed. Although 
research into the history of press regulation, as well as the legal and theoretical 
literature on privacy, was undertaken at the same time as this thesis (Dawes, 2013b; 
2014), those sections had to be cut for reasons of space, and so as to maintain a 
coherent focus on broadcasting regulation and on those aspects of the public-private 
dichotomy most pertinent to it. For similar reasons, engagement with current debates 
on internet regulation (Curran et al, 2012; Dawes, 2013c), had to be resisted, despite 
the context of economic-technological convergence and overlapping theoretical and 
critical debates. Finally, although chapters on civil society or the commons would 
have made for a more complete account of the public-private dichotomy, time as 
well as space made it unfeasible to give the necessary amount of attention to them. 
Building on the research undertaken and the arguments made in this thesis, however, 
this author will continue to explore these aspects in the months and years to come. 
268 
 
 
Similarly, extending the research into broadcasting regulation beyond the UK would 
provide a more global perspective and help avoid Anglocentrism. If ‘gradational 
neoliberalism’ – the critical account of the degree to which a particular case is 
neoliberal – is an unhelpful and misguided endeavour, however, and ‘relational 
neoliberalisation’ – a no less critical account of the multiple forms of market rule and 
the mutual constitution of local neoliberalisms – is potentially capable of combining 
ideological and governmental perspectives (Peck, 2013a: 18), then further research 
into comparative examples of national broadcasting genealogies (and overlapping 
international genealogies, such as that of the EU) would be important additions to 
this thesis; not to demonstrate the extents of neoliberalisation, but the emergence of 
yet more problematisations, and yet more ways in which those already identified 
have been rhetorically resolved or discursively addressed. Far from adding 
unnecessarily to the layers of complexity, the identification of such detail could 
contribute to the critique of national regulatory regimes by identifying precedents for 
which scholars are otherwise unprepared. Again, such comparative research is also 
something that this author intends to pursue in the near future.  
 
In terms of subsequent theoretical engagement, this thesis has also highlighted a turn 
towards practice and process, as well as protean distinctions, shared by the literatures 
on citizenship, consumption, the public sphere and neoliberalism, and these 
particular aspects require further elaboration. Additionally, a shared concern to 
balance empirically-informed, nuanced accounts with the earlier normative traditions 
they often dismiss has also been diagnosed in all these respective literatures, 
substantiating the aim of this thesis to supplement the traditional critical approach 
without supplanting it. While such a task may prove difficult, and even impossible in 
many contexts, the attempt to do so is something that should nevertheless be 
encouraged. This thesis is only a first step in such a direction, however, and its 
primary concern has been more to ‘flush out the assumptions’ (Kendall and 
Wickham, 1999: 30), and to ‘fragment, disturb and disrupt’ the conceptual tools 
(Rose, 1987: 66), of the dominant approach to broadcasting regulation. In doing so, it 
has at times been explicitly critical of the existing literature, but ultimately it favours 
a rapprochement between critical and governmental approaches, and between earlier 
and later approaches to the concepts reviewed; much as Habermas favoured a 
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rapprochement between liberal and republican traditions for his account of the public 
sphere. The acknowledgment of the continuing importance of the public-private 
dichotomy, and of the distinctions between public and private, as well as between 
citizens and consumers, is therefore something that remains not only politically, but 
also theoretically, necessary.      
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